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Defining The Punjabi Taliban Network

COMMENT: Punjab and the Taliban —Chaudhry Fawad Hussain

The Taliban philosophy is based on the strict Deobandi school of Islam, which has no room for saints and shrines. The majority of Punjabi Muslims are followers of the Barelvi school; which revolves around the saint and his shrine

The New York Times reports that Taliban insurgents are teaming up with local militant groups to make inroads in Punjab, and that in at least five towns in southern and western Punjab, including Multan, barber shops, music centres and internet cafes offensive to the militants’ strict interpretation of Islam have received threats.

The report has instigated a blistering debate here in Punjab on whether, in the days to come, the Taliban can really take over Pakistan’s largest province. Some recent incidents, including attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore and the Manawan Police Training School, raised fears to new heights and many believe that the Taliban, known to have their roots in the tribal culture of frontier region and Afghanistan, have the capacity to expand their control to other parts of Pakistan, most importantly to Punjab.

The Taliban school of thought simply cannot win support in Punjab. I rest my opinion on three fundamentals because of which the Taliban cannot win in Punjab.

First, the Taliban philosophy is based on the strict Deobandi school of Islam, which has no room for saints and shrines. The majority of Punjabi Muslims are followers of the Barelvi school; which revolves around the saint and his shrine. Punjabi Muslims have always been emotionality attached with shrines and sufis. When the Taliban locked the mausoleum of Pir Baba in Buner, Punjabi Muslims felt offended, despite the fact that Pir Baba is not a well-known saintly figure in Punjab.

No one can dare think of closing down the shrines of Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat Mian Mir or Bahauddin Zakaria. Almost every village in Punjab has a shrine, and for Barelvis, shrines are nearly as sacred as mosques. This is not in conformity with the orthodox Ahle Hadith or Deobandi traditions, which do not recognise the shrine or mazar as a religious symbol. In fact, they consider reverence of shrines as apostasy (shirk).

Second, there is no doubt that Punjabi rural society is caste-based and people care for castes in inter se relationships. However, by no means does this make it a tribal society. The customs even in remote Punjabi villages are far more liberal than tribal customs. The position of women in this society is more elevated than in tribal society; they enjoy more liberties, and in many cases are the sole decision makers.

In an agricultural economy like Punjab, women are as important as men. In rural Punjab, women working in the fields is a common sight; subjecting them to strict veil and domestic confinement as is the case in the tribal areas of Afghanistan is unimaginable in Punjab.

In urban centres like Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi and Faisalabad, women are enjoying an even higher status than in the rural areas. Therefore, it will not be possible for anyone to subject women in Punjab to the kind of restrictions that the Taliban have imposed in the areas under their control. The same applies for harsh punishments: the death penalty was abolished in the area between Delhi and Lahore much before its abolition in the United Kingdom. The reaction to public hanging during the Zia era was so severe that the government was forced to review its policy after only one execution.

The third reason is the strong emphasis in the Punjabi lower and middle class on education. Even families with income levels as low as Rs 4000 to Rs 6000 per month take pains to send their children, including females, to school. Hence, this very strong societal force will deeply resist any ideology that restricts people from educating their children. Further, proliferation of the free media and a strong cultural base are two other factors that will make it extremely difficult for the Taliban to establish themselves in Punjab.

One of the arguments made by several commentators in Pakistan and abroad is that the Taliban are a modern Robin Hood-type organisation that appeals to the masses. Some have used class analysis to support this view, arguing that the Taliban are essentially sparking a ‘revolution’. However, history tells us that it is not enough to just be poor for someone to join a revolution; many more factors are at play. Often, political and religious philosophies take precedence over class identity; which is the case in Punjab. The Taliban movement does not appeal to the people of Punjab because of the reasons outlined above and will therefore find it extremely difficult to achieve any success in the province.

The author is a Lahore-based lawyer and columnist and can be reached at fawadch@hotmail.com
 
All this by likes of FAWAD CH etc are only having a wishful thinking.
Roughly translating an URDU slang, 'TO CLOSE EYES LIKE A PIGEON BEFORE FALCON GRABS & KILLS' in other words ignore the ground reality and wish it cant happen. Or as the MOHAMMED SHAH RANGEELA said....
'DELHI HENUZ DUR RUST'
 
If I have it right the article posted by fatman17:
COMMENT: Punjab and the Taliban —Chaudhry Fawad Hussain
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
refers to the following article published in The New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html?_r=1&scp=7&sq=Punjab&st=cse

April 14, 2009
United Militants Threaten Pakistan’s Populous Heart

By SABRINA TAVERNISE, RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. and ERIC SCHMITT


This article was reported by Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Eric Schmitt and written by Ms. Tavernise.

DERA GHAZI KHAN, Pakistan — Taliban insurgents are teaming up with local militant groups to make inroads in Punjab, the province that is home to more than half of Pakistanis, reinvigorating an alliance that Pakistani and American authorities say poses a serious risk to the stability of the country.

The deadly assault in March in Lahore, Punjab’s capital, against the Sri Lankan cricket team, and the bombing last fall of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the national capital, were only the most spectacular examples of the joint campaign, they said.

Now police officials, local residents and analysts warn that if the government does not take decisive action, these dusty, impoverished fringes of Punjab could be the next areas facing the insurgency. American intelligence and counterterrorism officials also said they viewed the developments with alarm.

“I don’t think a lot of people understand the gravity of the issue,” said a senior police official in Punjab, who declined to be idenfitied because he was discussing threats to the state. “If you want to destabilize Pakistan, you have to destabilize Punjab.”

As American drone attacks disrupt strongholds of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the tribal areas, the insurgents are striking deeper into Pakistan — both in retaliation and in search of new havens.

Telltale signs of creeping militancy abound in a belt of towns and villages near here that a reporter visited last week. Militants have gained strength considerably in the district of Dera Ghazi Khan, which is a gateway both to Taliban-controlled areas and the heart of Punjab, the police and local residents say. Many were terrified.

Some villages, just north of here, are so deeply infiltrated by militants that they are already considered no-go zones by their neighbors.

In at least five towns in southern and western Punjab, including the midsize hub of Multan, barber shops, music stores and Internet cafes offensive to the militants’ strict interpretation of Islam have received threats. Traditional ceremonies that include drumming and dancing have been halted in some areas. Hard-line ideologues have addressed large crowds to push their idea of Islamic revolution. Sectarian attacks, dormant here since the 1990s, have erupted once again.

“It’s going from bad to worse,” said a senior police official in Dera Ghazi Khan. “They are now more active. These are the facts.”

American officials agreed. Bruce Riedel, who led the Obama administration’s recently completed strategy review of Pakistan and Afghanistan, said the Taliban now had “extensive links into the Punjab.”

“You are seeing more of a coalescence of these militant groups,” said Mr. Riedel, a former C.I.A. official. “Connections that have always existed are becoming tighter and more public than they have in the past.”

The Punjabi militant groups have had links with the Taliban, who are mostly Pashtun tribesmen, since the 1980s. Some of the Punjabi groups are veterans of Pakistan’s state-sponsored insurgency against Indian forces in Kashmir. Others made targets of Shiites.

Under pressure from the United States, former President Pervez Musharraf cut back state support for the Punjabi groups. They either went underground or migrated to the tribal areas, where they deepened their ties with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

At least 20 militants killed in American strikes in the tribal areas since last summer were Punjabi, according to people from the tribal areas and Pakistani officials. One Pakistani security official estimated that 5 percent to 10 percent of militants in the tribal regions could be Punjabi.

The alliance is based on more than shared ideology. “These are tactical alliances,” said a senior American counterterrorism official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss intelligence matters. The Pashtun Taliban and Arab militants, who are part of Al Qaeda, have money, sanctuary, training sites and suicide bombers. The Punjabi militants can provide logistical help in Punjabi cities, like Lahore, including handling bombers and target reconnaissance.

The cooperation between the groups intensified greatly after the government’s siege of Islamic hard-liners at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, in mid-2007, Pakistani and American security officials say. The siege has since become a rallying cry.

One such joint operation, an American security official said, was the Marriott bombing in Islamabad in September, which killed more than 50 people.

As this cooperation intensifies, places like Dera Ghazi Khan are particularly vulnerable. This frontier town is home to a combustible mix of worries: poverty, a growing phalanx of hard-line religious schools and a uranium processing plant that is a part of Pakistan’s nuclear program.

It is also strategically situated at the intersection of two main roads. One is a main artery into Pakistan’s heartland, in southern Punjab. The other connects Baluchistan Province in the west to the North-West Frontier Province, both Taliban strongholds.

“We are being cornered in a blind alley,” said Mohammed Ali, a local landlord. “We can’t breathe easily.”

Attacks intended to intimidate and sow sectarian strife are more common. The police point to a suicide bombing in Dera Ghazi Khan on Feb. 5. Two local Punjabis, with the help of Taliban backers, orchestrated the attack, which killed 29 people at a Shiite ceremony, the local police said.

The authorities arrested two men as masterminds on April 6: Qari Muhammad Ismail Gul, the leader of a local madrasa; and Ghulam Mustafa Kaisrani, a jihadi who posed as a salesman for a medical company.

They belonged to a banned Punjabi group called Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, but were tied through phone calls to two deputies of the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, the police said.

“The phone numbers they call are in Waziristan,” said a police official, referring to the Taliban base in the tribal areas. “They are working together hand in glove.” One of the men had gone for training in Waziristan last summer, the police said. The operations are well-supported. Mr. Kaisrani had several bank transfers worth about $11 million from his Pakistani account, the authorities said.

Local crimes, including at least two recent bank robberies in Dera Ghazi Khan, were also traced to networks of Islamic militants, officials said.

“The money that’s coming in is huge,” said Zulfiqar Hameed, head of investigations for the Lahore Police Department. “When you go back through the chain of the transaction, you invariably find it’s been done for money.”

After the suicide attack here, the police confiscated a 20-minute inspirational video, titled “Revenge,” for the Red Mosque, which gave testimonials from suicide bombers in different cities and post-attack images.

Umme Hassan, the wife of a fiery preacher who was killed during the Red Mosque siege, now frequently travels to south Punjab, to rally the faithful. She has made 12 visits in the past several months before cheering crowds and showing emotional clips of the attack, said a Punjabi official who has been monitoring her visits.

“She claimed that they would bring Islamic revolution in three months,” said Umar Draz, who attended a rally in Muzzafargarh.

The situation in south and west Punjab is still far from that in the Swat Valley, a part of North-West Frontier Province that is now fully under Taliban control after the military agreed to a truce in February. But there are strong parallels.

The Taliban here exploit many of the same weaknesses that have allowed them to expand in other areas: an absent or intimidated police force; a lack of attention from national and provincial leaders; a population steadily cowed by threats, or won over by hard-line mullahs who usurp authority by playing on government neglect and poverty.

In Shadan Lund, a village just north of here, militants are openly demanding Islamic law, or Shariah, said Jan Sher, whose brother is a teacher there. “The situation is sharply going toward Swat,” Mr. Sher said. He and others said the single biggest obstacle to stopping the advance of militancy was the attitudes of Pakistanis themselves, whose fury at the United States has led to blind support for everyone who goes against it.

Shabaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, said he was painfully aware of the problems of insurgent infiltration and was taking steps to restore people’s faith in government, including plans for new schools and hospitals. “Hearts and minds must be won,” he said in an interview Monday. “If this struggle fails, this country has no future.”

But people complain that landowners and local politicians have done nothing to stop the advance and, in some cases, even assist the militants by giving money to some of the religious schools.

“The government is useless,” said Mr. Ali, the local landlord. “They live happy, secure lives in Lahore. Their children study abroad. They only come here to contest elections.”

The police are left alone to stop the advance. But in Punjab, as in much of the rest of Pakistan, they are spread unevenly, with little presence in rural areas. Out of 160,000 police officers in Punjab, fewer than 60,000 are posted in rural areas, leaving frontier stations in districts virtually unprotected, police officials said.

Locals feel helpless. When a 15-year-old boy vanished from a madrasa in a village near here recently — his classmates said to go on jihad — his uncle could not afford to go look for him, let alone confront the powerful men who run the madrasa.

“We are simple people,” the man said. “What can we do?”

Sabrina Tavernise reported from Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan; Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Peshawar, Pakistan; and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Mark Mazzetti contributed reporting from Washington, Waqar Gillani from Dera Ghazi Khan, and Pir Zubair Shah from Peshawar.
 
Also though only related in a round about way is the following:

Pakistan’s neo-Taliban
By I.A. Rehman
Thursday, 30 Apr, 2009
DAWN.COM | Columnists | Pakistan?s neo-Taliban

The neo-Taliban have lost all claim to leniency. They must be made to face the full might of the state, except for those who can be trusted with mending their ways.— AFP/File Photo
THE militants’ tactical retreat from Buner, an armed operation against them in Dir and some formal assurances by the army top brass have given most Pakistanis a sense of respite. It should now be possible to comprehend the neo-Taliban phenomenon without which they cannot be overcome.

The armed bands engaged in terrorist activities in the northern parts of Pakistan are called neo-Taliban because it is necessary to distinguish them from the Taliban that overran Afghanistan in the 1990s and about whom conservative Pakistanis entertain some wholesome notions. They condone the Afghan Taliban’s excesses against women and their animalistic hostility to arts and culture, because they want to see the same done in Pakistan. At the same time these elements still praise the Afghan Taliban for unifying their country, for checking violent disorder and for disarming non-state militias. And, latterly, they are hailed for resisting foreign intrusion.

While the neo-Taliban operating against Pakistan can outdo the Afghan Taliban in their animus towards women and democratic institutions, they display none of the characteristics attributed to the latter by their Pakistani supporters. Unlike the Afghan Taliban they are dividing Pakistan and not consolidating its unity; they are increasing violent disorder and not suppressing it; and they are raising non-state militias, not disarming the existing ones.

Finally, the Afghan Taliban could claim to be fighting for their motherland and resisting ‘imperialism’; the neo-Taliban have invaded their patrons’ motherland and are fighting for a brand of imperialism Allama Iqbal had denounced in his 1930 address. Thus, the neo-Taliban cannot be favourably compared with their Afghan predecessors.

A large number of Pakistanis have been confused by the neo-Taliban’s rhetoric that they want to enforce the Islamic Sharia. Nothing can be further from the truth. The neo-Taliban’s precursors in Afghanistan too were not driven by their love of the Sharia. For all one knows, Hikmatyar, Rabbani and Masud, targets of the Taliban offensive, also swore by the Sharia. The Afghan Taliban had a definite political objective — to capture Afghanistan for themselves. The neo-Taliban too have a purely political objective — to establish their rule in a part of Pakistan and if possible over the whole of it.

True, there are many people in Fata and Malakand Division, as there are in Islamabad and Lahore and Karachi, who sincerely believe an Islamic polity is feasible. The neo-Taliban are exploiting the religious sentiment of these people just as it was exploited by quite a few of Pakistan’s rulers, Gen Ziaul Haq in particular. Gen Zia told the people, 'If you believe in Islam, this means you accept me as your sovereign.' The neo-Taliban’s logic is indistinguishable from Gen Zia’s. The qualifications and the credibility of neither are open to scrutiny.

Indeed, the neo-Taliban’s religious mask is more transparent than even Zia’s. The latter had some use for Pakistan’s constitution, its elected representatives and its judiciary; the neo-Taliban want to scrap all of them. Zia accepted the Shias’ right to exist; in their campaign to exterminate the Shias (for instance in Kurram Agency and D.I. Khan) the neo-Taliban have added a hideous concept to the vocabulary of criminology — sectarian cleansing.

Further, the neo-Taliban can easily be indicted for degrading the Sharia on three main counts. First, they cannot convince even their apologists in Pakistan that suicide bombings, the killing of innocent people, beheading their victims without due sanction, extortion and looting of the homes of the internally displaced, seizure of orchards and burning down of schools are in accordance with any version of the Sharia. Secondly, by denying the evolutionary process in the Sharia and closing the door to ijtihad in what is essentially a man-made code, the neo-Taliban are trying to bind the Muslim people within the clerical thought frozen six centuries ago, a view that has prevented Muslims the world over from keeping abreast of the times and humankind’s social growth.

Thirdly, more often than not, the standard of the Sharia is raised by tribal elites that are afraid of losing their privileges if their communities progress towards a higher social formation. Nobody should thus be led by the neo-Taliban’s invoking the Sharia for their hearts and minds are as unclean as their hands.

Another myth about the militants operating in Fata and Malakand Division is that they are the latest avatars of the Pakhtun identity. They are not. Of course, some Pakistani Pakhtuns (as well as some non-Pakhtuns from Punjab and Karachi) have joined the neo-Taliban but there is no evidence that the Pakhtuns are prepared to abandon their Pakhtunwali. Besides, the neo-Taliban’s aversion to the Pakhtuns’ language, poetry, music, arts, cultural diversions and even their dress code is known. If the neo-Taliban had their way the Pakhtuns’ ethno-cultural identity could be as much under threat of extinction as the other ethno-cultural identities within the Pakistan family (Punjabi, Baloch, Sindhi, et al)

If despite all that can be argued against the neo-Taliban they are able to challenge the state of Pakistan the reason lies not in their strength but in the faults and failings of the latter. Pakistan has become vulnerable because its democratic institutions are not worthy of being so described, because its rapacious elite offers no quarter to the poor, because its justice system does not enjoy the people’s confidence, because it does not offer a fair return to the peasant and the worker, because it guarantees neither dignity to women nor gainful education and employment to the youth. It is these weaknesses of the state that has made the neo-Taliban look more menacing than they are.

To say at this point that the government should concentrate only on administrative and judicial reform is like telling West Pakistanis in the summer of 1971 that they could keep Pakistan intact by learning Bengali. The quest for democracy, justice and social rights must of course continue but this will be a long-drawn-out struggle while the threat to the state’s integrity demands an immediate response. A proper understanding of the neo-Taliban threat should lead to two steps.

First, the government should reduce its trust deficit with the people. Its claims of fulfilling its obligations to the nation must be backed by something more than the hollow perorations and meaningless gyrations of ministers.

Secondly, the people must receive evidence that those maintained for and charged with defending the lives, properties and entitlements of the people, which is what national integrity really means, are able and willing to earn their keep. The neo-Taliban have lost all claim to leniency; they must be made to face the full might of the state, except for those who can be trusted with mending their ways.
 
On the issues of madrasas

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html?_r=1&scp=7&sq=Punjab&st=cse

May 4, 2009
Pakistan’s Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy
By SABRINA TAVERNISE


MOHRI PUR, Pakistan — The elementary school in this poor village is easy to mistake for a barn. It has a dirt floor and no lights, and crows swoop through its glassless windows. Class size recently hit 140, spilling students into the courtyard.

But if the state has forgotten the children here, the mullahs have not. With public education in a shambles, Pakistan’s poorest families have turned to madrasas, or Islamic schools, that feed and house the children while pushing a more militant brand of Islam than was traditional here.

The concentration of madrasas here in southern Punjab has become an urgent concern in the face of Pakistan’s expanding insurgency. The schools offer almost no instruction beyond the memorizing of the Koran, creating a widening pool of young minds that are sympathetic to militancy.

In an analysis of the profiles of suicide bombers who have struck in Punjab, the Punjab police said more than two-thirds had attended madrasas.

“We are at the beginning of a great storm that is about to sweep the country,” said Ibn Abduh Rehman, who directs the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, an independent organization. “It’s red alert for Pakistan.”

President Obama said in a news conference last week that he was “gravely concerned” about the situation in Pakistan, not least because the government did not “seem to have the capacity to deliver basic services: schools, health care, rule of law, a judicial system that works for the majority of the people.”

He has asked Congress to more than triple assistance to Pakistan for nonmilitary purposes, including education. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States has given Pakistan a total of $680 million in nonmilitary aid, according to the State Department, far lower than the $1 billion a year for the military.

But education has never been a priority here, and even Pakistan’s current plan to double education spending next year might collapse as have past efforts, which were thwarted by sluggish bureaucracies, unstable governments and a lack of commitment by Pakistan’s governing elite to the poor.

“This is a state that never took education seriously,” said Stephen P. Cohen, a Pakistan expert at the Brookings Institution. “I’m very pessimistic about whether the educational system can or will be reformed.”

Pakistani families have long turned to madrasas, and the religious schools make up a relatively small minority. But even for the majority who attend public school, learning has an Islamic bent. The national curriculum was Islamized during the 1980s under Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, a military ruler who promoted Pakistan’s Islamic identity as a way to bind its patchwork of tribes, ethnicities and languages.

Literacy in Pakistan has grown from barely 20 percent at independence 61 years ago, and the government recently improved the curriculum and reduced its emphasis on Islam.

Failures in Education

But even today, only about half of Pakistanis can read and write, far below the proportion in countries with similar per-capita income, like Vietnam. One in three school-age Pakistani children does not attend school, and of those who do, a third drop out by fifth grade, according to Unesco. Girls’ enrollment is among the lowest in the world, lagging behind Ethiopia and Yemen.

“Education in Pakistan was left to the dogs,” said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a physics professor at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad who is an outspoken critic of the government’s failure to stand up to spreading Islamic militancy.

This impoverished expanse of rural southern Punjab, where the Taliban have begun making inroads with the help of local militant groups, has one of the highest concentrations of madrasas in the country.

Of the more than 12,000 madrasas registered in Pakistan, about half are in Punjab. Experts estimate the numbers are higher: when the state tried to count them in 2005, a fifth of the areas in this province refused to register.

Though madrasas make up only about 7 percent of primary schools in Pakistan, their influence is amplified by the inadequacy of public education and the innate religiosity of the countryside, where two-thirds of people live.

The public elementary school for boys in this village is the very picture of the generations of neglect that have left many poor Pakistanis feeling abandoned by their government.

Shaukat Ali, 40, a tall man with an earnest manner who teaches fifth grade, said he had asked everyone for help with financing, including government officials and army officers. A television channel even did a report. “The result,” he said, “was zero.”

A government official responsible for monitoring schools in the area, Muhamed Aijaz Anjum, said he was familiar with the school’s plight. But he has no car or office, and his annual travel allowance is less than $200; he said he was helpless to do anything about it.

With few avenues for advancement in what remains a feudal society, many poor Pakistanis do not believe education will improve their lives. The dropout rate reflects that.

One of Mr. Ali’s best students, Muhamed Arshad Ali, was offered a state scholarship to continue after the fifth grade. His parents would not let him accept. He quit and took up work ironing pants for about 200 rupees a day, or $2.50.

“Many poor people think salaried jobs are only for rich people,” Mr. Ali said. “They don’t believe in the end result of education.”

Safety Net From Despair

In Punjab, the country’s most populous province, the despair and neglect have opened a space that religious schools have filled.

“Madrasas have been mushrooming,” said Zobaida Jalal, a member of Parliament and former education minister.

The phenomenon began in the 1980s, when General Zia gave madrasas money and land in an American-supported policy to help Islamic fighters against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The Islamic schools are also seen as employment opportunities. “When someone doesn’t see a way ahead for himself, he builds a mosque and sits in it,” said Jan Sher, whose village in southwestern Punjab, Shadan Lund, has become a militant stronghold, with madrasas now outnumbering public schools. Poverty has also helped expand enrollment in madrasas, which serve as a safety net by housing and feeding poor children.

“How can someone who earns 200 rupees a day afford expenses for five children?” asked Hafeezur Rehman, a caretaker in the Jamia Sadiqqia Taleemul Koran madrasa in Multan, the main city in south Punjab. The school houses and feeds 73 boys from poor villages.

Former President Pervez Musharraf tried to regulate the madrasas, offering financial incentives if they would add general subjects. But after taking the money, many refused to allow monitoring. “The madrasa reform project failed,” said Javed Ashraf Qazi, a retired general who served as education minister at the time.

Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, says he is acutely aware of the problem and is trying a different approach, recently setting aside $75 million to build free model schools in 80 locations close to large madrasas, a tactic General Qazi had also proposed.

In the district that includes Mohri Pur, a mud-walled village of about 6,000 where farmers drive on dirt roads in tractors and donkey carts piled high with sticks and grasses, there are an estimated 200 madrasas, one-third the number of public schools, said Mr. Anjum, the education official.

Nonreligious private schools have also sprouted since the 1990s. They have better student-teacher ratios, but only the most exclusive — out of reach of most middle-class Pakistanis — offer a rigorous, modern education. Mr. Ali, the fifth-grade teacher, says the madrasas have changed Mohri Pur. They are Deobandi, adherents of an ultra-Orthodox Sunni school of thought that opposes music and festivals, which are central aspects of Sufism, a tolerant form of Islam that is traditional here.

There were no madrasas in Mohri Pur in the late 1980s, when Mr. Ali began teaching. Now there are at least five. Most are affiliated with a branch in the neighboring town of Kabirwala of Darul Uloom, a powerful Deobandi seminary founded in 1952, and whose leaders in other parts of Pakistan have links to the Taliban.

Fear and Respect

Several local residents said they believed the Kabirwala seminary was dangerous. Some of its members were involved in sectarian violence against Shiites in the 1990s, they said.

Even if the madrasas do not make militants, they create a worldview that makes militancy possible. “The mindset wants to stop music, girls’ schools and festivals,” said Salman Abid, a social researcher in southern Punjab. “Their message is that this is not real life. Real life comes later” — after death.

On a recent Thursday, the Kabirwala seminary was buzzing with activity. Officials showed rooms of boys crouched over Korans, reading and rocking. A full kitchen had an industrial-size bread oven. Flowers adorned walkways. The foundation for a new dormitory had been broken.

There was also a girls’ section, with its own entrance, where hundreds of young women chanted in unison after directions from a male voice that came from behind a curtain. “We have a passion for this work,” said Seraj ul-Haq, a computer teacher who is part of the family that founded the seminary. Teachers preach restrictions. February’s newsletter set out a list of taboos: Valentine’s Day. Music. Urban women “wearing imported perfume.” Talking about women’s rights.

Suicide bombings were neither encouraged nor condemned.

The ideology may be rigid, but it offers the promise of respect, a powerful draw for lower-class young men.

Abed Omar, 24, had little religious education before he was inspired by a sermon at the seminary last year. Better educated than most, he began to work in his family’s sweets shop.

Restless and unfulfilled, he joined a conservative Islamic group, paying about $625 to travel with them around the country for four months on a preaching tour. The group, Tablighi Jamaat, taught him that Islam forbids music and speaking with women. (He would speak to this reporter only through a male colleague.) American officials suspect that the group is a steppingstone to the Taliban. Pakistani officials say it is peaceful.

Now, when Mr. Omar visits his friends, “they turn off their tape players and give me their seat,” he said, a smile lifting his face, which, in the practice of some conservative Islamists, has a bushy beard but no mustache.

He is frustrated by a lack of opportunity and at how much of Pakistan’s bureaucracy requires political connections, which he does not have. “There is no merit,” he said. His faith gives him hope. “I want to make everyone a preacher of Islam,” Mr. Omar said brightly, eating honey-soaked fritters in his family’s shop.

He knows about 100 people in his town who have done a four-month tour like his. As for those who sign up for less, he said “they are countless.”

Waqar Gillani contributed reporting from Mohri Pur and Lahore, Pakistan.
 
RR - i am sorry but that is such a waste of bull$hit!
 
RR - i am sorry but that is such a waste of bull$hit!

:rofl::rofl: Its only a waste of bull$hit because it can not be ploughed into the ground..


Well most came from The New York Times so I am not surprised at all.
I was going to add a rider that this was NYT views but I thought you might miss the subtle point there.:D

But the important aspect that should not be missed, is it is their public perspective.

Much of the war of words has been based totally on this perspective that the Pk media and GoP has done little to discredit.
Hence it will always leave a gap to be filled by the above style reports.
 

The interior minister, Rehman Malik, has told the Financial Times that “we suspect something similar to Swat may arise in South Punjab”. He says he has been sharing “information” with the Punjab government because jihadi militias like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) hail from South Punjab and “perhaps all those terrorists who fled from Waziristan or Swat might have taken refuge in South Punjab”.

Let us place these remarks in another context. The ex-information minister under the previous PMLQ government, Muhammad Ali Durrani, has proposed in parliament that South Punjab or the “Seraiki” region of Punjab should be made into a separate province in order to save it from decades of neglect — the kind of neglect that often breeds desperate movements of terrorism. In fact, more and more writers with expertise in the growth of terrorism in Pakistan are clubbing South Punjab together with FATA and Swat as the region most vulnerable to the Taliban-Al Qaeda network.

South Punjab comprises 13 districts with a total population of around 27 million. These districts are Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Bhakkar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Khanewal, Layyah, Lodhran, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Rahimyar Khan, Rajanpur and Vehari. There is a long-fuse movement for a Seraiki province in the south which has had its ups and downs, but is often demoralised because of lack of support from the more powerful North and Central Punjab whose influential personalities have given themselves agricultural land in the south.

How bad is the situation in South Punjab? There is not much news, but those who live there and are free to speak give frightening information. The interior minister has mentioned two terrorist organisations but has omitted reference to Lal Masjid whose family of clerics had General Pervez Musharraf on the run in Islamabad but who had hailed from one of the most madrassa-congested cities in the southern region: Dera Ghazi Khan.

South Punjab is vulnerable to terrorism radiating from the FATA stronghold of Baitullah Mehsud because Dera Ghazi Khan abuts on the NWFP city of Dera Ismail Khan, which has a border with South Waziristan. Multan remains the stronghold of the Deobandi school of thought by reason of having its wifaq (federation) of madrassas headquartered there. South Punjab also joins Sindh and Balochistan, and if these two provinces go on the boil, South Punjab will feel the heat most.

FATA and Swat-Malakand were “ungoverned spaces” under law and fell to the power of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) simply because normal local administration was either not there or had disappeared. South Punjab is supposed to be under normal administration but in reality the writ of the state is weak there. Because of distance from the Punjab Assembly in Lahore, local power-brokers have taken over. The madrassa and its jihadi offshoots are strong, so are the feudal landlords with large holdings. The police work in tandem with them instead of subjecting them to equality under law.

Whether the north Punjabi politicians like it or not, there is a “power vacuum of the state” in the south which is filled by the above-mentioned elements. This means that there is no proper surveillance over the clerics who “empower” themselves by going jihadi and linking themselves with TTP and Al Qaeda. A south Punjabi “mastermind” was recently arrested while making his way back from South Waziristan after delivering an instalment of “cannon-fodder” boys to Baitullah Mehsud. When the TTP boss was looking for a safe place where to prepare the plot to destroy Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel, he found it in South Punjab.

How can better administrative control be taken to South Punjab? It is accepted on all hands that Lahore is too far and Lahori politicians don’t even try to break the stranglehold of feudal politicians over the vote-bank — in many cases captive — in the “Seraiki belt”. One solution of course would be Seraikistan on the model of Balochistan which will take the development budget closer to the people of the south, enabling them to establish a better policing system. But creating a new province will require a constitutional amendment.

Also the creation of more provinces in Punjab will get tied up with more provinces in the rest of Pakistan. And on that there is no consensus. In fact there is violent resistance to the idea. In default, therefore, it is up to Chief Minister Punjab Mr Shehbaz Sharif to have his second secretariat in Multan to ensure even governance and prevent the region from becoming like Swat.
 
Learn from our mistakes from the past and develop Southern Punjab, it still not too late. :coffee:
 
An article from Dawn wondering if the violence will spread to Karachi. All other cities have been hit (including recently Kashmir), but Karachi spared. The article wonders if Karachi is being used as a fund-raising base.
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DAWN.COM | Provinces | Kashmir to Karachi

Violence in Kashmir has become depressingly familiar over the last two decades. But the violence has been along the Line of Control or Indian-administered Kashmir. Azad Kashmir has been relatively calm, and attacks on troops unheard of. Until now. On Friday, a suicide bomber struck an army barracks in Muzaffarabad, killing two and injuring three. Responsibility was swiftly claimed by a spokesman for Baitullah Mehsud who boasted that the strike was meant to demonstrate that the aerial pounding of Mehsud’s strongholds in South Waziristan had not damaged the group’s will or capability to launch attacks inside Pakistan.



The country has witnessed scores of suicide attacks in recent years, but there is a par-ticularly grim irony in the latest strike. Militancy and Kashmir have long been synonymous, Pakistan having pledged 'moral, political and diplomatic' support to 'freedom fighters' in Indian-administered Kashmir.


In recent times the country has woken up to the dangers posed by certain militants, but even now the discourse on the subject is largely personality specific. Indivi- dual militant leaders like Maulana Fazlullah in Swat and Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan are ‘enemies’ of the state and are being attacked, but there is little by way of strategic debate about whether or not there is any role for any non-state actor under any circumstances. Now the state and its security arm have come under attack in an area where they had long found common cause with militants of different stripes.


But let there be no illusion that Baitullah Mehsud’s reach is confined to only parts of Pakistan. On Friday, a police operation in Karachi ended up in the death of five suspected militants and the seizure of a large cache of arms and ammunition belonging to a group allegedly associated with Mehsud. Often unnoticed at the national level, in recent weeks and months the law-enforcement agencies in Karachi have broken up various groups of militants believed to be associated directly with Mehsud or having some


other connection to South Waziristan. It’s not clear yet why Karachi has been spared violence so far — theories abound that the militants may be using the city to raise funds for their war machine in Fata or that they are using the city as a recruitment and resting place and therefore are not keen to bring too much publicity to their presence in the city — but there is little doubt that the militants do have the capacity to strike in Karachi.


The incidents in Kashmir and Karachi, then, are just another reminder of why it is so important to go after Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan itself and dismantle his network. As long as he is alive and free, he has the will and capability to cause mayhem all over the country. The state simply cannot fail to eliminate Baitullah Mehsud and his network.
 
Baitullah this and Baitullah that, he is just the bogie man that is used to scare the masses and put a name to the troubles to try and give it some form of identification.

No one seems to want to tackle the root causes, its all very superficial.You can kill a thousand Baitullah's and you'll still be in the same if not worse situation.
 
Baitullah this and Baitullah that, he is just the bogie man that is used to scare the masses and put a name to the troubles to try and give it some form of identification.

No one seems to want to tackle the root causes, its all very superficial.You can kill a thousand Baitullah's and you'll still be in the same if not worse situation.

What if you take away all the guns ?

(Rhetorical question -not advocacy)
 
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