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Pakistan Successfully Tested Babur 3 Cruise Missile launch from Submarine : ISPR

That's easy.
Integrating Western weapons in Russian & Chinese platforms are nothing unique as Russia-China readily share the needed source codes.
But the opposite is not true as Western Nations like France and USA do not share the source codes needed.

For example Your F-16s still cannot data link with ZDKs.
To put your mind to rest.....Babur missile is not some Chinese system, if anything it's based on Tom hawk.
You don't make a bullet if you don't have a gun to fire it. :rolleyes:
 
your Missiles depends on American navigation systems ..that means You can not use them without permission of USA .


You can use Chinese navigation systems in the future but then You will be depended on China's permission .


This is why Pakistaan did not use nukes even after loosing 3 months long Kargil war .


on the other hand India has it's own navigation system .
Someone plz ban this baboon, surely there is a certain standard for people allowed on this forum, this species that proves darwin true shouldnf be welcome here, navigation system???, permission??, seriously WTF???
 

http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/images/ORD_UGM-109_Launch_Periscope_Silhouette_Raytheon_lg.jpg

A very informative documentary related to cruise missiles, especially tomahawk one.

Watch the first 5.30 minutes and the same method and tech is used in launching Babur CM yesterday. If you watch the Babur missile launch, in initial first few secs you will see the same debris (covers between the booster & missile holding the tail fins folded) falling as seen here in Tomahawk. The rocket booster fires underwater and propels the missile to a certain height from where the internal turbo jet / fan engine takes over.

Looks like S20 demonstrating the LACM capability. Chinese submarine doing a demo for the customer. Things to cover-up before S20 is delivered.

Bye another troll.

Same treatment for the ones who keep doing that.
 
This is simply wrong. If you look at the development of South Korea's Hyunmoo series of cruise missiles,

Hyunmoo-3A - 500 km
Hyunmoo-3B - 1,000 km
Hyunmoo-3C - 1,500 km

They're not so different to to the Babur series. I would expect the new S20 submarines to be equipped with the Babur 3 MK 2 version and be capable of fielding the MK 3.
VLS will be needed for longer range cruise missiles like on the Amur-class sub.
Otherwise the 533m torpedo tubes will continue to limit range on both Agosta and the new upcoming subs.
 
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Pakistan’s Tests New Sub-Launched Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile. What Now?
Pakistan’s successful test of the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile presents new challenges.

By Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang
January 10, 2017


On Monday, Pakistan announced that it had successfully carried out the first-ever test of its nuclear-capable Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) from a submerged platform. The test took place at an unspecified location in the Indian Ocean off the Pakistani coast. Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations released limited footage of the test on Twitter that shows the missile’s ejection, launch, and finally striking a target with reasonable accuracy. The Babur-3 SLCM is officially rated for a range of 450 kilometers.

Pakistan’s Babur-3 SLCM is ultimately designed for use with its Agosta 90bBdiesel-electric submarines, which have reportedly been modified to enable SLCM launches, but remain untested in this regard. Per the Pakistani military’s statement regarding the test, the Babur-3 “is a sea-based variant of Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) Babur-2, which was successfully tested earlier in December, last year.”

Critically, the Babur-3 is capable of nuclear payload delivery. Once fully developed and tested on-board a submarine, Pakistan would possess – in theory, at least – a sea-based second strike capability. Pakistan has been working toward this capability for years; in 2012, it set up a Naval Strategic Force Command. Pakistan’s statement notes this with little ambiguity: “Babur-3 SLCM in land-attack mode, is capable of delivering various types of payloads and will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence.” Specifically, the statement noted that the Babur-3 test was a “step towards reinforcing [Pakistan’s] policy of credible minimum deterrence.”

Pakistan’s inaugural test of the Babur-3 SLCM raises several questions regarding the future of strategic stability between it and India, as both march toward a nuclear triad. For reference, India tested a 3,000 km submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) variant dubbed K-4 (the naval version of the Agni III missile) from an underwater pontoon in March 2014 before testing it from the Arihant submarine last year. Specifically, the consequences of Pakistan acquiring what it perceives as a credible sea-based second strike capability, depending on a range of factors, may both stabilize and destabilize the delicate nuclear balance between South Asia’s two nuclear-armed rivals.

First, regarding a nuclear SLCM capability, the upside is that if Pakistan believes the Babur-3 will enhance the survivability of its second strike forces, it can afford to have a less forward-leaning posture with its land-based tactical nuclear forces. This is primarily because Pakistani military planners will have less reason to fear the “use it or lose it” dilemma at the start of a conflict with India. So if this is a step toward bolstering Pakistan’s belief in the survivability of its strategic forces, that should contribute to strategic stability and may not require its planning to necessarily prepare for the early use of lower-order nuclear options. Pakistan’s possession of the Babur-3 means that it can be more confident overall that any first Indian strike would not be totally disarming.

Nevertheless, there are several problems with the above. First, are Pakistani nuclear submarines actually survivable? The belief that submarine-based nuclear forces are almost completely invulnerable against modern anti-submarine warfare techniques is overstated. The United States’ SSBN force might be, but regional power submarines – such as Pakistan’s Agostas – almost certainly are not. They are noisy and are theoretically more easily detectable than U.S. nuclear submarines. The Pakistani Agosta-class submarines are diesel-electric and so they are quieter than first-generation nuclear submarines, but these boats are far from completely invulnerable. Pakistan possesses just three Agosta 90B submarines, the PNS/M Khalid, the PNS/M Saad, and the PNS/M Hamza. (Pakistan may receive eight modified Chinese S20 Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines that may be capable of fielding the SLCM.)

Like India, Pakistan will have to choose which model to manage its limited nuclear submarines. A ‘bastion’ model that keeps them in port until a crisis makes them extremely vulnerable to being sunk as they are flushed out of known locations. A ‘continuous deterrent patrol’ model runs the risk of unauthorized use and accidents in a crowded Indian Ocean, with possibly limited suitable deterrent patrol boxes, while also giving the Indian Navy ample opportunity to track the signature of the submarines to sink them in war.

Of course, the survivability problem is not one for not only China and India, and certainly Pakistan, but there is increasing evidence that the U.S. was pretty good at tracking even Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War. Whether India can track and kill Agostas remains an unknown, but is theoretically possible. So despite Pakistani perceptions of the Babur-3-equipped Agosta-class submarines contributing to its deterrent, the survivability question may prove destabilizing.

Second, will Pakistan deploy both conventional and nuclear Agostas, and how will adversaries know the difference? Pakistan having its Agosta-class submarines carry missiles tipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads is a recipe for a major catastrophe borne of misperception. In a crisis or war, the Indian Navy will try to sink anything it can find. If Indian ASW forces find a Pakistani Agosta-class submarine, they may have to operate under the assumption that the submarine in question is carrying nuclear SLCMs in addition to conventional warheads. Discrimination, thus, will be a major problem and portends serious accidents and unintended escalation.

Finally, does Pakistan have a sufficient and robust enough command and control infrastructure to safely and reliable manage a submarine based nuclear force? This is another area where the Pakistani Navy faces a problem common to many countries in possession of nuclear submarine forces. How exactly will Pakistan manage a submarine-based nuclear force, where the warhead will have to be pre-mated with the Babur-3 SLCM before the submarine leaves port? Does Pakistan have enough confidence in its very low frequency (VLF) and extremely low frequency (ELF) communication with these Agosta submarines that it can afford to put negative controls on the weapons such that they cannot be fired without central inputs? Probably not.

This leaves us with a dangerous and destabilizing state of affairs where the captain of a Pakistani Navy submarine will likely end up in possession of at least the physical ability to release nuclear weapons when on deterrent patrol. This could lead to serious unauthorized use or accidents. If the submarine captain cannot reach the civilian-led National Command Authority, will he assume it has been destroyed and release nuclear weapons of his own volition? If the answer to this is “yes,” then Pakistan’s sea-based deterrent will be based around a drastically different overarching principle from how it claims to manage its land-based forces, which are kept under central control until deep into a crisis.

Monday’s test of the Babur-3 should encourage analysts in New Delhi and Islamabad to seriously think through some of the above questions. For both India and Pakistan — but especially Pakistan — a question to mull over seriously is whether the command and control (C2) challenges of maintaining a submarine nuclear force are so great and simply generate more vulnerabilities than the deterrence benefits of a questionably survivable platform in a shooting war. Despite the Pakistani military exhortations that the Babur-3 reinforces its doctrine of “credible minimum deterrence,” pushing ahead with an undersea deterrent without full consideration of the associated costs may ultimately prove deleterious to South Asian strategic stability.

Ankit Panda (@nktpnd) is senior editor at The Diplomat. Vipin Narang (@NarangVipin) is an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.


Thanks for pointing out the gaps but these are already taken care of as in 2012 a complete spectrum study has been carried out for this purpose Naval Nuclear force establishment was in line with this ,also most recently Pakistan has done studies related to Nuclear spectrum for PN and specially subs ,Writer is in denial and we have seen many Indians writing the similar articles over battle field Nasr for the same , Problem lies here is not Pakistan and its development but India itself which is pushing Pakistan to do all this , Indian weapons and other programs are poorly managed with many reported incidences such as

Forgetting missiles after exhibitions
Failure to separate civilian and military installations
Fissile material subject to theft
Exposure to Fissile material at airports
Extremist Govt Taliban style incharge of Nuclear weapons
 

http://media.defenceindustrydaily.com/images/ORD_UGM-109_Launch_Periscope_Silhouette_Raytheon_lg.jpg

A very informative documentary related to cruise missiles, especially tomahawk one.

Watch the first 5.30 minutes and the same method and tech is used in launching Babur CM yesterday. If you watch the Babur missile launch, in initial first few secs you will see the same debris (covers between the booster & missile holding the tail fins folded) falling as seen here in Tomahawk. The rocket booster fires underwater and propels the missile to a certain height from where the internal turbo jet / fan engine takes over.



Bye another troll.

Same treatment for the ones who keep doing that.
simply way to defeat the deniers is it simply say the pontoon is not vertical but actually horizontal to simulate a launch from a sub
 
another bites the dust.

Keep them coming.
61939519.jpg
 
Hopefully not strap-on boosters. I'm guessing lengthened first stage, two shorter second and third stages (same dia as 1st) and an upper liquid? Maybe new propellant.


The former, but let's just say the dia problem has been solved in a fairly obvious way. You'll see soon hopefully.

Thought the S20 will have 4 650mm torpedo tubes.


VLS will be needed for longer range cruise missiles like on the Amur-class sub.
Otherwise the 533m torpedo tubes will continue to limit range on both Agosta and the new upcoming subs.
 
simply way to defeat the deniers is it simply say the pontoon is not vertical but actually horizontal to simulate a launch from a sub

It was launched from a pontoon or from real sub, i damn care. What i care is that we have got the tech.

From what i know work was being done for years now. After successful results of earlier tests and confirming we have the tech, one of the reason the Naval arm of strategic forces was raised.

And whats the use of showing the world the tech that we have if we can't use it on our current subs, that's ridiculous. Why show someone something when the launching platform is years away. Atleast it will take 3-5 years when we get Chinese sub, why wait till then, when we can have them now.

Someone remember this: http://www.dawn.com/news/914345/pakistan-illegally-modified-us-made-missiles-white-house

Was it really a Harpoon ?

" Pakistan has denied the charge, saying it developed the missile itself. But according to the report, US intelligence agencies detected on April 23 a suspicious missile test that appeared to indicate that Pakistan had a new offensive weapon. "
 
Hopefully not strap-on boosters. I'm guessing lengthened first stage, two shorter second and third stages (same dia as 1st) and an upper liquid? Maybe new propellant.
Oh God no, no boosters. You're almost correct, good guesses.
 
Hopefully not strap-on boosters. I'm guessing lengthened first stage, two shorter second and third stages (same dia as 1st) and an upper liquid? Maybe new propellant.

It has one booster rocket (solid Fuel), which disengages after the initial lift and thrust.
The air breathing engine (liquid Fuel) takes over for the rest of the flight path.
 
Hopefully not strap-on boosters. I'm guessing lengthened first stage, two shorter second and third stages (same dia as 1st) and an upper liquid? Maybe new propellant.




Thought the S20 will have 4 650mm torpedo tubes.
???
No way in hell.
China's current AIP subs implement the 533 mm torpedo tubes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_039A_submarine

It would be crazy for the Pak navy to change from 533mm torpedoes considering it uses the DM2A4
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DM2A4

Even China's torpedoes are 533mm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yu-6_torpedo
 
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