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International Media account on PAF’s role in 1965 war

Reality is your pm call Clinton asking to control Pak this fact every one knows

I wonder how much you are ignorant, NS himself speaks, how he ran to Clinton asking Hamari Jaan Bachao, and then a hotline was made from Washington to New Delhi, and Atal Bihari at that time PM of Republic of India was sleeping, when he was awaken, and Clinton asked India to stop Indian bombardment, which our PM said could only be stopped when PA intruders will return to their side.

And who run out to in for Kashmir issue after UN put its decision how to resolve it u still running out

It was Nehru, which raise this issue in UN (a mistake, highly opposed by Home minister Sardar Vallab Bhai Patel), due to which UN demands cease fire, the real cause what we are facing at present, otherwise India could get back the land illegally occupied by Pakistan.

Don't show me stupid edited videos of Bollywood fact every one knows

B.S Check it yourself, its not Bollywood rather Hollywood, a U.S story on Kargil.

How I Crossed Swords With Chuck Yeager

Written by Admiral Arun Prakash

This piece is a "first person" account of an episode of the 1971 Indo-Pak war written a lighter vein by Adm Arun Prakash for Vayu magazine. He was on deputation to No. 20 Squadron, commanded by (then) Wing Commander CV Parker, MVC, VM. This IAF unit is credited with having won the highest number of gallantry awards in the conflict.



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The First Supersonic Man


Lest the title of this story mislead people into thinking that I am attempting to wreck the newborn Indo-US détente, let me start by quoting Henry Kissinger's words from his book "My White House Years". He says, "An aircraft carrier task force that we had alerted previously was now ordered to move towards the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly for the evacuation of Americans, but in reality to give emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan".

There can be little doubt that the sailing of Task Force 74, headed by the carrier Enterprise into India's backyard on 10th December 1971 is something that has rankled Indians ever since. Especially since attacking West Pakistan was not on the agenda. However, with the Henry Hyde Indo-US Cooperation Act of Congress now in place, it is time to iron out these wrinkles. Fortunately, information has come to light recently, which shows that there may have been good and valid reasons for this action by the Nixon administration. And what's more, it also appears that Brig Gen Charles "Chuck" Yeager USAF, and I may have contributed to this denouement!

For those (very few) readers who may not be familiar with Chuck Yeager, let me just mention that he is the person who inspired the book "The Right Stuff" by Tom Wolfe, and the famous Hollywood movie of the same name. A few words about this legendary test pilot's career would not be out of place here.

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The first man to break the sound barrier - Brigadier General Charles E "Chuck" Yeager, USAF.
He enlisted as a Private in the US Army Air Corps in 1941 and entered pilot training to graduate two years later as a flight officer. During World War II, he flew 56 combat missions, which he shot down 12 German aircraft (including five Me-109s during a single mission). Returning to the USA in 1945, his remarkable flying skills caught the eye of his superiors and he was assigned to the USAF Test Pilot School then at Wright Field.

On graduation, Yeager was selected as project pilot for one of the most important flight test programmes in history; to fly the rocket powered Bell X-1. On 14 Oct 1947, after launch from the belly of a B-29, he accelerated to Mach 1.06 at 42,000 feet and became the first pilot to shatter the once dreaded "Sound barrier". During his career he flew over 10,000 hours on 330 different types and models of aircraft.

After commanding the USAF Test Pilot School and a fighter wing in Philippines, (flying 127 missions over Vietnam). In 1969 he was promoted to Brigadier General and in January 1971, in his penultimate assignment, he was sent as the US Defence Representative to Pakistan in Islamabad. And that is where fate decided that our paths should cross.

Tribe Twenty

The cramped and cryptic entry in my flying logbook for 4th December 1971 reads as follows:

Date Type Flown No. Mission: Duration Results
4 Dec Hunter Mk 56-A 463 2 aircraft gun strike (Lead) PAF Base Chaklala 1 hr 15 mts 424 rounds HE fired, one C-130 on ground
The preceding entry for the same day says simply: "Delhi-Home Base". And thereby hangs the somewhat unusual tale that I am going to relate.

As a young naval Lieutenant, in the late 1960s, having recently carrier-qualified on the Armstrong-Whitworth Sea Hawk, from the deck of the Indian Navy's sole flat-top Vikrant (R-11) I was just settling down to polish up my embarked flying skills when I received orders for an exchange posting with the Indian Air Force (IAF). So I packed my bags and with great reluctance, left the sunny beaches of Goa (where our Naval Air Station was located) and headed for north India.

Having converted to the British Hawker Hunter ground attack fighter (a second-generation trans-sonic descendant of the Sea Hawk) I was posted to No.20 Squadron "The Lightnings" based close to New Delhi in end-1970. It did not take me long to find my feet on terra firma; the air force did everything more or less like the navy, except that they were very serious and professional. But we thought that we performed with greater style and panache, and wore orange "mae wests' while doing it!

The IAF was good enough to give me a longish spell of leave in mid-1971, during which a friend and I hitch hiked to Europe via Iran, Turkey, Greece and the Balkans. We spent 4th of July amidst boisterous GIs in the Hoffbrauhaus in Munich, and Bastille Day amongst celebrating Parisian crowds on the Champs Elysees. But everywhere we went, the newsstands flashed an unfamiliar but ominous new word: "Bangladesh".

I returned to New Delhi to find that my IAF squadron had been moved further north and went looking for it. Our new base was located within 2 minutes flying time (at 420 knots) from the India-Pakistan border and would certainly be an interesting place to be in when the "Balloon" went up.

My Squadron "Boss" was an unusual combination; a great flyer, and also a martinet1]. He made it clear that if we ever went to war, he wanted to be sure of two things: (a) that he had prepared us for it in the best possible manner, and (b) that he went in ahead of everyone else. So for the next four months we were put through a most rigorous training programme, focusing on target recognition, low-level navigation, weapon delivery at dawn/dusk and air combat.

The only long-range combat aircraft in the sub-continent in that era were the Canberra light bomber in the IAF inventory, and its US derivative, the Martin B-57 that equipped our rival, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The Hunter Mark 56-A that my squadron flew carried four large under-wing fuel tanks, which gave it (for those days) an extraordinary radius of action at low level. Therefore, as far as reach was concerned, apart from the Canberra, my outfit had the longest legs in the IAF.

As single a single-seat fighter, the Hunter's operating milieu was, however, restricted to daylight hours, whereas night bombing missions were the forte' of the Canberra. It was therefore an unstated sine qua non that wars on the Indian sub-continent would commence only on a full moon night so that the Canberras and B-57s could be fully exploited.

During summer of 1971, as we watched the sequence of tragic events unfolding in East Pakistan, most of us were convinced about the inevitability of conflict. At the end of the monsoons, to avoid becoming "Sitting ducks" for a PAF pre-emptive strike; every full moon phase saw my squadron retiring to a rear base (a few hundred miles away from the international border). Since the December full moon was to be on the 2nd of the month, on 25th November we flew down to Ambala (in Punjab) for some firing exercises and on 1st December we flew even further south (and east) to Delhi.

Sure enough, on the evening of Friday 3rd December the radio announced that at 5.40 pm, PAF fighters had carried out a coordinated strike on nine Indian air bases all along the western border. Later that night we clustered around the radio to hear Prime Minister Indira Gandhi tell the nation that we were at war with Pakistan.

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TRIBE TWENTY: The Pilots of No.20 Squadron. The author, Arun Prakash can be seen kneeling in the middle row , 2nd from left.
Lightning Strike

Since the die had now been cast, our first task was to get back to base and commence the retaliatory air war ASAP. Having briefed for a 5.30 am take-off, we grabbed a couple of hours of fitful sleep, and tumbled out of bed at 4 on a bitterly cold morning to find the base completely fog bound! Starting up and taxying in blackout conditions would have been bad enough, but the fog made things even more interesting. Some people took a wrong turn on the taxiway and got lost, but my wingman and I were glad to find ourselves lined up for a timely take-off.

It was eerie to be airborne in the pre-dawn dark, flying at 500 feet with a hint of moonlight in the sky and a sheet of fog below. We knew no enemy fighter could be around, but that did not prevent the hair on your neck prickling now and then. We had a safe transit of about 45 minutes to base, save two minor incidents.

As we neared home, one could see in the distance, a very pretty but intense fireworks display. It was the "Friendly" tracer, which our local air-defence gunners seemed to be putting up to welcome us back! Some frightfully bad language on RT from the Flight Commander soon put a stop to it.

Shortly after I had touched down on the darkened runway, I saw from the corner of my eye, a green light whizzing rapidly past my port wingtip. It was my wingman who, in his excitement, had landed a few knots "hot" and after overtaking my aircraft came back on the centerline ahead of me, luckily missing the runway lights! I heard a muttered apology on the radio, but we had more important things on our minds.

It was still dark as we taxied into our blast pens, and there was just time for a quick wash and bite, while the aircraft were fuelled and armed. Briefing for the first wave of retaliatory strikes on Pakistan was businesslike and we walked to our aircraft just behind the Boss. I had drawn a two-aircraft mission against PAF base Chaklala, located a few miles SE of the new capital city of Islamabad. The briefing was to carry out a single pass attack on briefed targets and to look out sharply for enemy Mirage III fighters on patrol, both over target and en-route.

The direct distance to Chaklala was not great, but we were going to do some tactical routing over mountainous terrain and approach from the northwest, so that the radars would not see us till very late. A few minutes into the mission, the butterflies settled down in the stomach as one concentrated on the map, compass, airspeed and stop-watch (which were all the navigational aids one had 35 years ago!). As we approached the target, it became apparent that the fog, which had bedeviled us over north India a few hours ago, was going to spoil our fun again; the sun was still low, and the slant visibility poor, but one could see tall objects and feature right below.

Anyway, we pulled up from low level to about 2000 feet by the stopwatch, and were gratified to see the murky outlines of the cross-runways of Chaklala airfield, but little else. Then a huge tower appeared out of the haze and I thought that the air traffic control would be a worthwhile target for want of anything better. A short burst from my four canon saw the tower collapsing, and as I flew over it, a huge column of water rose to greet me from the debris. Oops! A water tower! I consoled myself with the thought that the PAF would at least go thirsty tonight.

Pulling out of the dive, I desperately scanned the airfield for something more lucrative on the surprisingly bare tarmacs. Suddenly, from the corner of my eye, I spied protruding from a large mango grove, the unmistakable shape of a tall aircraft fin, and a sharply swept-up rear ramp section. A Hercules C-130 under camouflage!

With a bootful of rudder, and the stick hard over, I swung my fighter around and in a shallow dive, hosed the grove with 30 mm shells. A thin wisp of black smoke gave cause for optimism, and I thought that another pass would be necessary. My wingman2], keeping a vigilant eye for enemy combat air patrols felt that we were stretching our luck in hostile territory and made his views known.

Pulling out of the second dive, through a gap in the fog I caught a glimpse of a row of small transport aircraft lined up on the secondary runway. The sight was too tempting. Putting all thought of the Hercules out of my mind, and ignoring the multiple arcs of tracer fire, I swung around in a tight high-G turn and emptied my guns on whatever was visible of the light aircraft. By now my wingman had lost patience and was yelling on RT. We departed Chaklala at full throttle hugging the deck amidst intense antiaircraft fire, which seemed to grow by the minute.

Fate was kind, and empty guns notwithstanding; we had an uneventful return passage. We landed back safely at base, feeling elated that we had opened our account and given the enemy a dose of his own medicine. In the de-brief, I concentrated on the hidden Hercules, and other target details, with a passing mention of the light aircraft and skipped the water tower episode altogether.

That evening I heard that Radio Pakistan had complained bitterly about an IAF attack on UN aircraft but decided to ignore it as enemy propaganda. The Boss, sharp as ever, would however not let go, and for many months after the war, I had my leg pulled mercilessly about the Navy attacking "unarmed neutrals".

The Right Stuff in the Wrong Place

The 1971 war had receded into the depths of my memory when last year, I received via e-mail from a young aviation journalist, a copy of an article published in the Washington Monthly of October 1985, with the cryptic remark: "You may find this of interest!"

The article titled, "The Right Stuff in the Wrong Place", was written by Edward C. Ingraham, a (former?) US diplomat, who had served as political counselor to Ambassador Farland in Islamabad, when Brig Gen Yeager was head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Since the article dwelt exclusively on Chuck Yeager, and touched upon events of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, I did find it of interest, and the reason will emerge shortly. However, at this juncture, I must emphasize that the views and opinions that I am going to quote, are entirely Ingraham's and I continue to hold Yeager in great regard for his professional skills.

"In 1971" says Ingraham, "Yeager arrived in Pakistan's shiny new capital of Islamabad to head the MAAG. Yeager's new command was a modest one: about four officers and a dozen enlisted men charged with the equally modest task of seeing that the residual trickle of American military aid was properly distributed to the Pakistanis. All the chief of the advisory group had to do was to teach Pakistanis how to use American military equipment without killing themselves in the process. The job wasn't all that difficult because the Pakistani armed forces were reasonably sophisticated."

He goes on, "One of the perks of Yeager's position was a twin-engined Beechcraft, a small airplane supplied by the Pentagon to help keep track of the occasional pieces of American military equipment that sporadically showed up in the country. Farland, however, had other designs on the plane. An ardent fisherman, he found that the Beechcraft was the ideal vehicle for transporting him to Pakistan's more remote lakes and rivers, with Yeager often piloting him to and fro."

Speaking of the worsening situation in East Pakistan, Ingraham says, "We at the Embassy were increasingly preoccupied with the deepening crisis. Meetings became more frequent and more tense. We were troubled by the complex questions that the conflict raised. No such doubts seemed to cross the mind of Chuck Yeager. I remember one occasion on which Farland asked Yeager for his assessment of how long the Pakistani forces in the East could withstand an all-out attack by India. "We could hold them off for maybe a month" he replied, "but beyond that we wouldn't have a chance without help from outside?". It took the rest of us a moment to fathom what he was saying, not realizing at first that "we" was West Pakistan, not the United States."

He continues, "The dictator of Pakistan at the time, the one who ordered the crackdown in the East, was a general named Yahya Khan. Way over his head in events he couldn't begin to understand, Yahya took increasingly to brooding and drinking. In December of 1971, with Indian supplied guerrillas applying more pressure on his beleaguered forces, Yahya decided on a last, hopeless gesture of defiance. He ordered what was left of his armed forces to attack India directly from the West. His air force roared across the border on the afternoon of December 3 to bomb Indian air bases, while his army crashed into India's defences on the Western frontier."

"It was the morning after the initial Pakistani strike that Yeager began to take the war with India personally. On the eve of their attack, the Pakistanis had been prudent enough to evacuate their planes from airfields close to the Indian border and move them back into the hinterlands. But no one thought to warn General Yeager. Thus when an Indian fighter pilot swept low over Islamabad airport in India's first retaliatory strike, he could see only two small planes on the ground. Dodging antiaircraft fire, he blasted both to smithereens with 20-millimeter (sic) canon fire. One was Yeager's Beechcraft. The other was a plane used by United Nations forces to supply the patrols that monitored the ceasefire in Kashmir."

"I never found out how the UN reacted to the destruction of its plane, but Yeager's response was anything but dispassionate. He raged to his cowering colleagues at a staff meeting. His voice resounding through the embassy, he proclaimed that the Indian pilot not only knew exactly what he was doing but had been specifically instructed by Indira Gandhi to blast Yeager's plane. In his book he later said that it was the Indian way of giving Uncle Sam "the finger" ".

Ingraham's suggestion that "To an Indian pilot skimming the ground at 500 mph under antiaircraft fire, precise identification of targets on an enemy airfield might take lower priority than simply hitting whatever was there and then getting the hell out" was met by withering scorn from Yeager.

"Our response to this Indian atrocity, as I recall," adds Ingraham (tongue firmly in cheek), "was a top priority cable to Washington that described the incident as a deliberate affront to the American nation and recommended immediate countermeasures. I don't think we ever got an answer?".

Ingraham says that Yeager's movements and activities during the subsequent conflict remained uncertain, but "A Pakistani businessman, son of a general, told me excitedly that Yeager had moved into the big air force base at Peshawar and was personally directing PAF operations against the Indians. Another swore that he had seen Yeager emerge from a just landed jet fighter at the Peshawar base."

After reading Ingraham's account, and especially after retiring from the navy, the thought has often crossed my mind that perhaps Yeager had it coming to him from Mrs. Gandhi.

And if Indira Gandhi did indeed personally order the destruction of Chuck Yeager's Beechcraft, then Nixon may have been quite justified in personally directing the Enterprise task force to sail into the Bay of Bengal as an 'immediate countermeasure'..

In which case the honours are equally shared, and I owe no apologies to anyone, except perhaps UN Secretary U Thant!

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An Old warrior revisited - Hunter Mk56a A463, seen at Kalaikunda in the late 90s. This aircraft was flown on the fateful day by then Lt Arun Prakash on the mission to Chaklala.
This article appeared in Vayu Aerospace and Defence Review , Issue 1/2007


@Windjammer

Jammie Bhai Something Interesting for you as you show interest in 1965 stories

Daylight Forays into Pakistan
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There was one aircrew in the Indian Air Force who could fly anywhere into Pakistan as they pleased. Whether it was Skardu or Karachi or Quetta, they would foray deep into Pakistan during day and come back with valuable intel and imagery. The crew was led by Squadron Leader 'Jaggi Nath' MVC and Bar.


Till September 5th, the IAF had not committed any other aircraft beyond the Mysteres, Vampires and Gnats at Pathankot. The Hunters had not seen any action being based entirely at Halwara and Palam. The same was not true of the Canberras.


Unknown to the Pakistanis, and even many on the Indian side, a lone Canberra PR57 was being regularly flown by an intrepid pilot over key Pakistani locations in broad daylight for photographic information. The pilot was Sqn Ldr Jag Mohan Nath, a veteran of the 1962 Ops. Nath already had a Mahavir Chakra under his belt for the daring photorecce missions he carried out over Tibet at the height of the 1962 war with China: perhaps the only operations carried out by IAF aircraft not belonging to transport or helicopter units.


In this rare wartime photograph, Wg Cdr (Then Squadron Leader) Jag Mohan "Jaggi" Nath, MVC and Bar, poses on top of a PR Canberra with various other Squadron members of No.106 Squadron.



The Canberra PR.57

The photo reconnaissance Canberra is an unqualified success with the Indian Air Force. The 106 Squadron Canberra flight (it has a flight of H.S. 748 "Avro" PR modified aircraft as well) with just five aircraft and no trainer would more often than not fly more hours than the Canberra bomber squadrons which had 16 bombers and 2 trainers.

Both in war and peace, the PR.57s and PR.67s were used for gathering intelligence and information. They took photographs of enemy installations, mapped India from coast to coast and head to toe, took photographs of ships at sea and of enemy redoubts in the high mountains. Building on the foundations set by the pioneers of 101 Sqn and 108 Sqn, 106 sqn with its PR.57s/PR.67s built a professional PR and survey organization which spanned many generations of IAF personnel.


Nath’s unit, No.106 SPR Squadron was the Air Force equivalent of “Army HQ Reserve”. They operated directly under the Chief of Air Staff, Arjan Singh and their level of briefing and mission objectives were always top secret – known only to the Chief and the pilots on the mission. To this end, Nath always had special access directly to the Chief’s office. The squadron was commanded by Wg Cdr MR Agtey and had a unit establishment of just eight aircraft (keeping in line with the U/E of PR Squadrons). However during the 1965 operations barely four Canberras were serviceable at any point of time.

Typical missions carried out before the operations broke out on Sept 1st were sorties over forward areas to photograph enemy Army formations. Photorecce sorties in a Canberra were not for the meek hearted. They had to be carried out in broad daylight at extremely low altitudes or as Nath put it, at ‘deck level”:

All my missions were done at deck level during daytime. Tree top level. 30-40 feet off the ground. Because you did not want the radar to pick you up. So it was all low-level navigation based on timing. Flying at low level limits your area of vision, making navigation much more difficult. If you had been flying at a higher altitude, you have a greater field of vision allowing you to pinpoint your position much easier on a map. So while flying at low level, your mind always has to keep up with the calculations, how many seconds it takes, how long it takes all on large scale maps. And when I felt I was somewhere in the area that I wanted to photograph, I would accelerate the Canberra to its maximum speed possible and pull up steeply to gain height to 12,000 feet, where the cameras are switched on to take the photographs.


Why 12000 feet? You may ask. The 12000 feet was the limiting factor, because of the cameras, which were meant for the high altitude aerial photography. The cameras that we were using were the 20-inch and 36-inch cameras used for high-resolution pictures. They used to give identical coverage and work as telephoto cameras. Whenever you plot it on the map, these smaller scale photographs would tally almost exactly with all the features on a similar scale map. For this camera the lowest altitude at which they would be effective is 12000 feet.


So if you were lower than stipulated, there will be incremental movement due to the forward motion of the Canberra, which would result in blurring. So the definition in the photographs will not be up to the mark. Thus it always required us to fly at a speed of 120-140knots.


So my technique was to fly low-level, pick up speed in the last moments, and then climb on to 12000 feet till such time the speed itself fell down closing to stall. The aircraft would almost be staggering.


So there was Nath, flying a huge aircraft like the Canberra at less than 50 feet altitude, climbing to 12000 feet to take pictures and then diving down to the same low-level altitude on the way back home. It was a miracle that Nath came back unscathed.


A view of a Canberra PR 57 Recce Bomber. clearly showing the oblique Camera window panes in the belly of the aircraft. The PR variant did not carry any armament.


September 5th brought a new task for Nath: to take a Canberra to the Lahore sector in the Ichogil Canal area and to take photographs along the Canal. No doubt this was in preparation for the impending Indian Army move across the international border. The Army would have needed information on not only the fortifications and bridges but also on the degree of preparedness of Pakistani Army formations.

Accordingly Nath took off from Agra in his PR57 and then proceeded over to Pathankot. After crossing over from Pathankot into Pakistan territory, he turned southwest to go over the Ichogil Canal area to start his filming. As was usual with his sorties, the timing and routing of the sortie were not disclosed to other Indian airbases.

As soon as the task at hand was accomplished, and as Nath turned back towards Indian territory, Nath noticed two PAF Sabres trying to get in a position to intercept him. As he was almost over Indian territory or had already crossed over, Nath called out over the R/T for help from Indian fighters.

Meanwhile, Wg Cdr Wollen was flying back in his MiG-21 to Pathankot after completing a regular ‘show of force’ sortie over the forward areas. Wollen was on landing approach when he heard Nath’s call. Though low on fuel, Wollen elected to abandon his approach and go to Nath’s aid. But his help was not needed. As Wollen approached the Canberra, the ‘Sabres’ chasing Nath turned out to be two IAF Mysteres. Since Nath’s sortie was kept secret from all formations, No.230 SU assumed Nath’s returning Canberra was a PAF B-57 and scrambled two Mysteres. With the confusion sorted out the aircraft returned to their respective bases without further excitement. But not before Wollen’s MiG flamed out due to fuel starvation as he completed his landing run and taxied back.

Nath was to carry out more daring ‘raids’ during the remaining days of the war, including a daylight mission to Quetta, right on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and a photo recce sortie on Badin. Unsurprisingly, at the end of the war, Nath became the first IAF officer to be awarded a Bar to the Mahavir Chakra, an achievement that makes him the highest decorated living IAF officer today.



Apart from Jaggi Nath who was awarded a Bar to his MVC (i.e a second MVC Award), the Navigators who flew with Nath, G K Garud and G Railkar were both awarded the Vir Chakra. Jaggi Nath's Citation is reproduced below. Note the date effective date which was given as 1st Sept 1965.



Sqn Ldr Jag Mohan Nath 3946 GD(P) Award Date 01 Sep 65 Announced 01 Sep 65
Details :
Bar to MVC
During the Indo-Pak War 1965, Sqn Ldr Nath was again the Flight Commander with the Strategic Photo Reconnaissance Squadron flying the Canberra aircraft. He led his unit several times over the hostile territory to obtain vital information about the enemy. The unescorted missions, which were in the nature of reconnaissance, entailed flying long distances over the enemy territory and well-defended airfields and installations during day light. Sqn Ldr Nath was fully aware of the risk he was running on each of these missions. Still, he chose to undertake the risky missions himself. It was after great persuasion that he allowed his colleagues to do some risky assignments. The information gathered by him during his missions proved vitally important to Indian air effort. The missions enabled our Air Force to attack vital enemy targets and this adversely affected enemy's war effort. Sqn Ldr Nath was awarded Bar to Mahavir Chakra for displaying courage, determination and devotion to duty

Unit : 106 Squadron
Reference : Gazette of India , 12th February 1966 - No.9 - Pres/65 dated 1st January 1966
 
@Windjammer

Some More stories from 1965

One Vs Four : The complete story of Alfred Cooke's epic air combat.


The story of Flt Lt Alfred Cooke's air combat remained untold for many years. While the stories of the Keelors and the Gnats and Halwara Hunters were told with great pride over the years, the story of a similarly epic air battle conducted by Flt Lt Alfred Cooke and his wingman Fg Offr S C Mamgain, were suprisingly not very well known. In early 2000, Samir Chopra, one of the the co-authors of the book "The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965" managed to meet Cooke in person and record his experiences. what they received was not just his story, but also the treasure trove of his gun camera photographs. Cooke's epic battle should be etched in the annals of the IAF's history.

The morning of September 7th at Kalaikunda started with a gloom. Early in the day, a force of six F-86 Sabres attacked Kalaikunda and wrought considerable damage on the airfield. Four Vampires and Two Canberras were destroyed. The Pakistanis followed it up by another raid of six F-86 Sabres at around 10.30 am. Thats where this story picks up...

At around 10.30 am, the pall of gloom at Kalaikunda was swept aside as an alarm was raised, warning of incoming Sabres. The four Sabres came roaring in low led by Flight Lieutenant Haleem. Squadron Leader ‘Mama’ Sahni - the radar officer at 55 SU in Kalaikunda – briefly picked up a blip on his scope near Port Canning. He immediately alerted Wing Commander Dicky Law, the OC Flying and informed him of the possibility of multiple aircraft coming in for another raid. Law looked up his roster; two Hunters were flying a CAP to the north of Kalaikunda, taking care of Dum-Dum and Barrackpore. Law told Sahni to call this section back to Kalaikunda to intercept the incoming raid immediately.

Flight Lieutenant Alfred Cooke and Flying Officer SC Mamgain of No.14 Squadron, were on CAP 60 miles north of the airfield at 20,000 feet. Cooke, a lanky 6’ 3” youngster, universally regarded as the squadron’s top air defense pilot, had grown up dreaming of being a fighter pilot as he watched Hurricanes, Spitfires, P-51 Mustangs and P-38 Lightnings tangling in practice air combat near his childhood home of Agra. Now, with 600 hours of Hunter flying under his belt including grueling practice in low-level aircombat with ‘Piloo’ Kacker, the moment of truth for Cooke had arrived. ‘Piloo’ had constantly defied IAF regulations on low-level combat training to put Cooke through his paces – it would stand Cooke in good stead for what lay ahead. Even as his mentor and dear friend ‘Piloo’ was baling out over Sargodha, Cooke was getting ready to put his training at the hands of Kacker to good use. The stage was set for the one of the greatest air battles in the history of air combat in the subcontinent.



‘I was taught the right way by Piloo - learn by the book, and then when you are done, throw the book away’ – Cooke with his beloved Hunter (BA 339). His steed during his epic air battle would be BA-250.

Earlier in the day, while having breakfast at Dum-Dum in their tent, the pair had received a scramble order and took off. They were under the control of 411 SU at Rampur Hat, approximately 130 nautical miles away from Dum-Dum. Cooke and Mamgain were vectored to an area about 80 miles north of Dum-Dum at 25,000 feet. 411 SU informed the pair that there were two bogeys at 25,000 feet just east of the India/Pakistan border, and that they were only to engage in case the bogies crossed the border and entered Indian airspace. Cooke and Mamgain orbited on their side, and presumably the PAF Sabres did the same, about 15 kilometers away. No visual contact was made. As the bogeys left, Cooke and Mamgain returned to Dum-Dum at approximately 9 AM.

The excitement for the day, so far a case of simple false alarms, began with the next call from 411 SU. Cooke and Mamgain were given another scramble order and vectored north of Dum-Dum to approximately the same area covered by the previous sortie. Two PAF bogeys were reported flying at 25,000 feet on the Pakistani side of the border. The IAF pair was told to orbit at 25,000 feet on the Indian side of the border and to only engage the bogeys if they crossed over into Indian airspace. The pair complied but as before made no visual contact with any PAF Sabres.

The Vector

After about 15 minutes of orbiting the 411 SU controller informed Cooke that Kalaikunda was under attack again and asked if they had enough fuel to go there and intercept. Cooke checked his fuel and asked Mamgain about his fuel state – the two pilots both had enough to Kalaikunda to carry out the interception. Cooke informed the Controller at 411 SU and immediately asked for “pigeons back to base”. They were told that they were approximately 120 nautical miles away and given a heading for Kalaikunda. The Hunters headed back at approximately .9 Mach (500 knots).

During the flight to Kalaikunda Mamgain was falling back at one stage; Cooke lost visual contact with him and kept calling out on R/T “Keep up, keep up” and even throttled back a bit to assist him. As Mamgain was still lagging and as Cooke needed him level, Cooke told him to catch up and get into position – or else, he would ask the Controller to vector him onto Mamgain. These stern words from a man Mamgain respected dearly broke through his apprehension. Remarkably, Mamgain caught up, and informed Cooke that he was scared. With candour, Cooke admitted he was scared as well - this was the first time that any one of them would be facing hostile aircraft. In a moment of solemnity, Cooke informed Mamgain of their duty to defend their base and their squadron. Cooke continued to talk to Mamgain, urging him to use all his skills in the dogfight that lay ahead.

Cooke led both Hunters in a shallow dive at .9 Mach towards Kalaikunda, calculating his speed and rate of descent so as to arrive 10 kilometres short of Kalaikunda at 500 feet, aiming to keep any and all Sabres in front and above. As planned, about ten kilometers from Kalaikunda the IAF pair was now down to about 500 feet and flying at about 500 knots. Once below 10, 000 feet they had lost R/T contact with 411 SU and had tried contact with Kalaikunda but to no avail.

On arriving at Kalaikunda, as Cooke made visual contact with the Sabres, the IAF pilots were treated to a chilling sight: three PAF Sabres were employing a classic front gun racecourse pattern of attack as another kept top cover. Three Sabres were making the attack run on the western side of the airbase i.e., the runway, while the other kept top cover on the eastern/ATC hangar side of the runway. Cooke’s response was immediate, a classic piece of bravado, as he called out to Mamgain, “Look at those bastards! – Lets get them – I’m taking these three this side – you break and take on the ones on the other side. Good luck!” As Cooke was to note later, this was not in accordance with tactics, as normally the wingman would have stayed glued to the leader’s tail. But Cooke, seeing the three Sabres on the western end had thought there were three on the eastern side as well. Under the circumstances, he decided the best thing to do was to take a chance, split up and take on three Sabres each: a remarkable decision.

Flight Lieutenant Haleem was leading the Sabre formation, with Flight Lieutenant Basheer as his wingman. Flight Lieutenants Tariq Habeeb Khan and Afzal Khan formed the second pair in the formation. It is not clear which of the pilots were in the attacking three. One Sabre was in its strafing run as Cooke and Mamgain pounced. Though the Sabres were operating on the extreme range of their endurance, they outnumbered the Hunters two to one.

The first Sabre -Flt Lt Afzal Khan

Cooke got behind one Sabre, fired at it and chased it so low that one can see the trees in his gun camera film. In the confusion that ensued, Cooke got behind Afzal Khan’s Sabre in what became a classic dogfight employing scissor maneuvers. Both the Sabre and the Hunter did their best to cut speed, fall back, turn and get behind each other or to break out by accelerating when their speed fell too sharply. Cooke seized the initiative on one such occasion: as Khan tried to straighten out of the turning dogfight and break out, Cooke used his better acceleration to catch up and open fire with his 30mm cannon, hitting the Sabre which broke up in the air. Flight Lieutenant Afzal Khan, the pilot, was killed.

Those are the bare bones of the story. The details as recounted by Cooke make for exhilarating reading - an account notable for the range of emotions expressed - from the moment of engagement to the kill:

I went straight for the Sabre who was in a dive for front gun attack. There was another one just turning to dive for his attack- this guy warned the Sabre in the dive that I was coming for him and he abandoned his front gun attack and pulled out of the dive and did a hard right turn. I was closing in very fast. Got my gunsight on him momentarily and fired a short burst (1/4 sec) as he pulled away from me and I overshot his line of flight. I lost sight momentarily and when I made visual contact again I got behind the Sabre. He jettisoned his drop tanks and I did the same. I was terrified when I saw how easily he could out-turn me. They employed the classic scissors movement – Turn – Reverse – Turn. The wider turning aircraft would land up in front. I did notice that that his speed would drop off very quickly and that he had to dive towards the ground to build up speed again. At this stage of the dogfight I made sure that I was always above him and tried to stay behind him. I made use of the better thrust/weight ratio of the Hunter to achieve this. I noticed that his leading edge slats would open when turning and this would increase his rate of turn but he would sacrifice his speed in do doing. When I saw this, my mind went back to the classroom when I was a cadet learning about the Principles of Flight – how slats increase the stalling angle and give you more lift. However, with it comes increased drag and unless you have increased power to overcome the drag – speed will drop off. I knew then that these guys were going exactly as per the Book and I knew verse + chapter what they were doing. When his speed dropped off he would dive down to build up speed and then start fighting again – pulling out of the dive at tree height (50 ft or less) with me following- hoping that I would “mush” into the ground. I got my gunsight on him when we very low and took a shot at him. I started firing at a range of 600 yards and I could see that he was below tree-line height. I did not realize that I was that low and that my wing tip was actually hitting the scrub. I stopped firing to get away from the ground and saw his aircraft explode into a ball of flame and I could not avoid flying through the fireball and debris.

Cooke’s baptism by fire had just begun but Piloo’s training had already paid off.



This gun camera shot from Cooke’s Hunter shows the last moments of Flight Lieutenant Afzal Khan's Sabre as it skimmed the tree tops (circled in white). Moments later the Sabre would run into a volley of 30-mm cannon shells from Cooke’s Hunter, which would destroy it and kill its pilot.

The citizens of Kharagpur had a grandstand view of the roaring air battle from the top of their homes. The IIT students cheered loudly every time the Sabres - or the Hunters, it didn't seem to matter - seemed to be on the receiving end. During the scissors, Cooke could see Khan’s face clearly and still remembers him wearing a white helmet like his own with the name stenciled on the back. Khan’s Sabre crashed near the IIT campus on a farmer’s hut killing two civilians.



The remains of Afzal Khan's F-86 Sabre that crashed outside of the Indian Institute of Technology at Kharagpur. Several students made it to the site to pick up souvenirs and mementos. A reconstructed eye-witness account of an IIT Student of this epic battle can be heard on Youtube.video made by CyberSurg based on an account by Rajan B.



Meanwhile Mamgain went after the two Sabres trying to sneak in on attacking the ground targets. The Sabres had already finished one attacking run when Mamgain arrived on the scene. The two Sabres immediately turned and engaged Mamgain. In the dogfight that followed, Mamgain hit one of the Sabres and claimed it shot down.

The Second Sabre - Flt Lt Tariq Habib Khan

Cooke then immediately latched onto the tail of a second Sabre, which had attempted to get behind him, and fired at it, damaging it severely. Large bits of the Sabre’s wings were torn off as Cooke’s bullets repeatedly found their mark. We return to Cooke’s own words as he chased his second opponent:

On recovering from this [Afzal Khan’s kill] a quick look around and I saw another Sabre behind me. I took violent evasive manoeuvres and during the criss-cross scissors we would cross very close to each other. I got into an advantageous position behind him and started firing while he was trying to get away from me by diving and turning towards the ground – (All this action took place between ground level and about 4000 feet). While firing at him I noticed that he steepened his bank and dive even more and something at the back of my mind warned me that that he was being warned by another Sabre who could be behind me. I kept on firing and closing in rapidly on him and I could see pieces of his aircraft disintegrating. I stopped firing, as I was so close (100 yards) that if I did not break away I would collide with him.

(LEFT) Cooke’s second target was a Sabre with a drop tank hang up. Almost certainly the Sabre flown by Flight Lieutenant Tariq Habib Khan, this Sabre’s fate is described as "written off due to lack of spares" in PAF accounts. In the photo on right, the PAF roundels on the wing can just be made out as well as the forward slats of the Sabre, which have opened up. What is significant in Cooke's gun camera photos is the amount of terrain detail captured. Most air combats typically happened at higher altitude that does not show any such detail in film.



The third and the fourth

The Sabre damaged by Cooke disengaged to escape and head back to base. Other Sabres were around – including the one that Cooke had suspected of being on his tail:

On recovering from this I immediately pull upward to the right and saw another Sabre behind me. I out-manoeuvred him and got behind as he pulled up in a vertical climb and then winged over to go into a vertical dive with me following and firing at him all the time. In the vertical dive I kept firing at him as he pulled out of the dive and moved away from me. I was mesmerised and so full of adrenaline that it took me some time to realise that I would be flying into the ground unless I pulled out of the dive myself. I pulled back on the joystick with my finger on the trigger and got out of the dive with guns still firing until I had expended my ammunition.

(RIGHT) Sabre No.3 in Cooke’s guns shows an aircraft in a steep dive with a starboard drop tank hang up. Cooke expended his ammunition as he chased this Sabre in a steep dive.

One down, two chased off. But another Sabre lurked and in fact, Cooke’s No. 2, Mamgain, was in danger of getting shot down by that Sabre before Cooke intervened:

I was very shaken at this stage and I turned back towards the airfield to get my bearings and equilibrium back. It was then that I noticed my No. 2 Mamgain over the airfield doing a leisurely turn at about 1500 feet with a Sabre about 1500 yds behind him and closing in fast. I warned him and gave him a “break port” order and then came up to taken on this Sabre also.

Cooke would have been justified in escaping at that point himself, as he had no ammunition left. But Cooke chased this Sabre anyway armed with little more than film in his gun camera. He stuck to the Sabre’s tail as the PAF pilot made some desperate moves in an effort to try and get away from Cooke:

This guy tried to shake me off by doing loops and barrel rolls right over the airfield. I got behind him to firing range and tried to take a shot but there was no ammo – I closed in even closer and tried another shot, but again, no luck – no ammo. While I was behind him during this aerobatic display I called up No. 2 to come and take over and shoot this bastard down – I got no answer and thought the worst – that Mamgain may have been shot down- I called up again on R/T pleading with any other Hunter who could be airborne to come and take over and shoot this bastard out of the sky. It was at this stage that I noticed grey puffs of smoke appearing in front of me and all around me and I realised that the AA was firing at me as well.



Sabre No. 4, after being chased off Mamgain’s tail, does aerobatics over Kalaikunda as Cooke chases him with no ammunition in his guns.

Wing Commander Law commented on the amusement evoked by the PAF pilot’s aerobatics display as he was chased by Cooke: rarely can have a pilot gone through such desperate evasive maneuvers while not realizing that his adversary was out of ammunition. The unnerved Pakistani pilot finally disengaged, started climbing and headed towards East Pakistan. Cooke followed about 2000 yards behind. The chase took Cooke all the way to the border, whereupon he finally called it a day and decided to head for Dum-Dum. But his adventures had not yet ended. Once Cooke was away from the not-so-friendly AA fire he looked around and noticed that he had sustained some damage to his portside wingtip and saw the pitot tube bent up about 70 degrees. Gun film would reveal that this had probably happened on one of his close approaches to the ground – most probably as he took his shot at Afzal Khan’s Sabre. This meant that Cooke had no air speed indicator (ASI).

By this stage, Cooke was up to about 10,000 ft and had made R/T contact with 411 SU. Cooke reported the dogfight and told 411 SU that he was very low on fuel, had no ASI and asked to get Hunters airborne from Dum-Dum to shepherd him in and cover his landing. 411 SU had no joy trying to contact the 14 Squadron detachment at Dum-Dum. In the meantime, Cooke was over Calcutta and changed to Dum-Dum Airport’s civil frequency and told them that he was coming to land in emergency. The ATC informed Cooke that there was a Pan American Boeing 707 on long finals. This failed to impress Cooke; he insisted that he was very low on fuel and cut in ahead in front of the Boeing 707 to put his Hunter onto the runway at what felt like excessive speed. Cooke deployed the tail chute and using heavy braking was able to safely bring the aircraft under control and turned on to the taxi track. While taxi-ing back to the Bull’s dispersal area his engine cut out about 600 yards from the parking area. The Hunter was out of fuel. A day of action quite unlike any other for pilots in this war had come to an end.

The ground crew ran over and Corporal Bhasin asked Cooke to jump out of the cockpit, as there was no ladder with them. Cooke jumped and the burly Bhasin caught him like a baby. Cooke slumped, his overalls soaked in sweat. The airmen were perturbed to find that Cooke had no drop tanks and that his gun ports were blackened. The stern Flight Sergeant was even more concerned because Cooke had damage to his left wingtip and there were branches and leaves stuck there. He said, “Sir, I’ll have to tell the CO that you have been flying low!”


The actual Gun Camera video showing Sabre No 2 and 3.

The de-brief

La Fontaine spoke to Cooke after he landed; the adrenaline of combat had momentarily wiped out Cooke’s recollection of any details of the fight. Later in the evening, after the remaining pilots had seen the gun film a startled La Fontaine was moved to say: “It was frightening, bits and pieces of the Sabre were flying off and the trees were scraping the wing tips.” In conversation with Cooke La Fontaine said, “Alfred, you fired at four different Sabres!” “I don’t know sir!” replied Cooke, “I just can’t remember!” Cooke returned to Kalaikunda later that night, spent and exhausted. He would be able to reconstruct the battle with amazing detail once he had recovered from the intense adrenalin rush. The dogfight had felt like a blur – not just of emotions but of visual impressions as well: Cooke went into a turn, there was a Sabre in front of him, he fired and broke away “to avoid the trees”, another Sabre came up in front of him, and, “I fired again”. More trees; break away, fire at the Sabre again and so on. It had been fought at frighteningly low-level and often at dangerously close range. It had seen one pilot, Cooke, take on four different Sabres and fight them in contrasting styles. His mastery of the Hunter and his knowledge of how to best exploit its strengths against a formidable adversary like the Sabre had seen him emerge triumphant.

Amazingly, Cooke had tangled with all four Sabres: his gun camera film shows that he fired at four different Sabres and hit three. The first obviously got hit and broke up. A second Sabre, hit repeatedly, is seen with a tank hung under its left wing. The third Sabre had a tank hung on the starboard wing. This is followed by another Sabre, which Cooke remembers as being clean with no underwing tanks. However, a closer look at the film reveals the fourth Sabre as carrying a starboard drop tank as well. But it seems clear that this was the fourth Sabre, as the second (Tariq Habib Khan’s) had already disengaged and the third had escaped after making a steep dive.

There are conflicting reports about the actual number of Sabres shot down. Dicky Law, the OC Flying, who watched the entire aircombat, reported seeing two Sabres go down: one in the immediate vicinity of the airfield and another that flew some distance away from the town. The Sabres had in fact circled the Dhudkundi range before coming in to attack Kalaikunda. This coupled with the fact that they had to exit out of Kalaikunda at high speed with Hunters in the chase burned up the meagre fuel reserves of the Sabres. This is corroborated by reports from a police station near the border of a lone jet aircraft coming in low, trailing smoke and the pilot ejecting just across the border. Radio intercepts also reported ejections due to the low fuel situations of the Sabres. Mamgain’s gun camera evidence was inconclusive but, keeping in mind Dicky Law’s report of two Sabres being downed, was given the credit for a Sabre kill. The PAF only admitted the loss of one Sabre – that of Afzal Khan’s. Years later, the PAF was to admit the loss of another Sabre, that returned too badly damaged to be recovered, apparently written off after returning from this raid due to ‘lack of spares’. The extent of the spares required is not known. Flight Lieutenant Tariq Habib Khan, who suffered a drop tank hang up just before the combat, was flying this Sabre: the one recorded in Cooke’s film. If the report is to be believed, Cooke had two kills that day. (More recently in 2015 : Air Commodore Sajjad Haider, in a correspondence denied that the any second Sabre was damaged and attributed it to incomplete research by an earlier author)

"I thought, wow, what a compliment, thanks very much – did it feel like there were nine Hunters in the sky?"

- A.T. Cooke

Unfortunately for Cooke, the Hunter he flew that day (BA 250) was loaded with ball ammo rather than HE ammo. Tariq Habib Khan’s Sabre would have met a more spectacular end than just being ‘written off due to lack of spares’ had that been the case. The ball ammo probably saved the third Sabre from going down, since it was the recipient of only a short burst or two. In the annals of aircombat, Cooke’s battle ranks as a classic. Later, in its official history, the PAF would claim that nine Hunters took on the attacking Sabres. The PAF versions are a backhanded compliment to the Indian pilots, as Cooke would comment years later, on finding this particular story:

I thought, wow, what a compliment, thanks very much – did it feel like there were nine Hunters in the sky?




IAF Chief of Staff Arjan Singh talks to Cooke and Mamgain during a visit to Kalaikunda after the war. Cooke was not shy in extolling the virtues of the Hunter over the Sabre. Mamgain would buy Cooke a Gurkha kukri after the war as a token of appreciation.



Post Script:

Flt Lt Alfred Cooke and Fg Offr S C Mamgain were both awarded the Vir Chakra for their courageous action over Kalaikunda on that day. Cooke left the IAF in 1967 and settled down in Australia. On the 50th Anniversary of the war, Flt Lt Alfred Cooke iwould be visiting his Squadron , No.14, currently flying Jaguars at Ambala . During his visit he will be presenting the Vir Chakra Medal he earned for his feat to the Squadron.

 
From what I can tell, the content is different. The other similar threads deals with tweets by Chuck Yeager and his autobiography. This thread deals with an interview he gave.if this thread has been previously posted, then moderators can delete it.

Plese let the mods decide that . That's the only reason I used @ MODS

Being a humble follower of this form from pat few years , I have seen them acting to the situation rather than leaving a tiered to a mud throwing session.

and about autobiography and the interview he made , if you find its different ..... dude... please ...
 
Facinating about how good the PAF pilots where 50 years ago in 1965.....

Can I ask ARE THE PAF PILOTS still better than the Indians .

I ASK simply because the Indian air force have better combat planes in far greater nos and better trainers like hawk aircraft from. uk,. The indian pilots also enjoy a annual budget of 5 times the PAF pilot.

As good as your pilots are ( according to this thread) they are having to make do with inferior equipment and modest training equipment and modest training budgets.

I have seen the Indians training in UK with RAF with the French Air force and rafale and just now with USA red Flag and UAE F16/60 IN UAE. .............. I ALSO HEAR they are now in pilot exchange programme with the mighty Israelis..

Don't dwell oin 1965 or 1971 WHAT ARE THE INDIANS doing in GWAILOR with Singpore F16 or the Israeli or thye USA in red Flag.

FOCUS at your enemys main strenghths NOT their weaknesess if you ever wish to beat them
 
Thank you for your advice.

Wish to say that the Singaporean F 16 is in West Bengal Kalaikunda AFB not in GWALIOR which is in Madhya Pradesh . As far as Im aware , our pilots getting good flying hours in entire Asia .
 
This Chuck Yeuger person ..... For him to suggest that PAF pilots are the best his flown with

MEANS his never flown with

RAF in Typhoon
German Luftwaffe in Typhoon
French in Rafale
Russian T50/SU35
Israelis F16/SUFI or F15E
Japanease F15J
South Africans Gripen
Aussies F18SH
American Top Guns
Indian SU30 mki
South Korean F15K
Taiwanease F16/52

PILOTS...

I bet my house the best of these professionals are equal or better than any PAF pilot. For the reasons I suggested above

Better hardware
more training hours
better overseas exposure
better training planes
superior support services

I AM OF COURSE TALKING ABOUT TODAY and not 50 years ago LIKE THE THREAD STARTER
 
Yes indeed . Indians infarct shown the same towards his favorite Beechcraft at Chaklala airfield .
 
They are the best , as simple as that.

Why do 'you' guys have to go gun blazing with lot of Indian articles ? are those articles prove that Pakistani pilots are not best in the world, it doesn't. So take chill pill bros :P.

It would have been cool if they posted articles from neutral sources. Instead they flooded the forum with Bollywood type articles claiming Indian pilots were flying with impunity all over Pakistan from Quetta, Peshwar and karachi. It's sad really.
 
It was just a comment in praise by the USAF Pilot and Indians got hurt...Seriously this nation is very immature..!
Inferiority Complex + Jealousy...Synonyms of being an Indian...!

Thanks Man, it really hurts :D:D:D
 
Never knew how one comment can create the level of butt hurt experienced in this threads
ByoWAlzCUAAWE-w.jpg

Gonna need these in large numbers :lol:
 
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