War, as preeminent military analyst Carl von Clausewitz asserted, is an instrument of policy--a means by which nations may achieve political ends. In October 1973, Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria chose war as their instrument of policy--their primary policy objective in waging war: to recover Arab lands occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Days' War.
Arab leaders translated their policy objective to recover the occupied territories into a grand strategy designed to achieve that objective. The Arab grand strategy contemplated limited military action followed by political pressure to compel recovery of the occupied territories in total. Their return to Middle East hostilities, the Arab leadership reasoned, would militarily compel partial Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and create international and internal political pressure upon Israel to concede the remaining Arab lands for the sake of regional peace.
Arab military strategy planned limited Egyptian and Syrian offensive campaigns against Israel to secure lodgments within the occupied territories, thereby achieving the military aspect of their grand strategy, followed by immediate Arab reversion to the defensive to facilitate the political aspect of the strategy.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is particularly relevant to study of the relationship between the strategic and operational levels of war. It clearly illustrates how political objectives influence grand strategy designed to achieve those strategic aims and how these policy objectives control the planning and execution of military strategy as campaign plans at the operational level of war.
...
The enormous rates of attrition suffered by both sides and the rates of consumption of equipment and ammunition were staggering. In a war lasting less than three weeks, the forces suffered nearly 40,000 casualties between them. Both forces expended equipment at the cyclic rate, including, for example: 3,394 tanks destroyed; 1,250+ armored personnel carriers (APCs) destroyed; 550+ artillery pieces destroyed (Israeli losses unreported); 554 aircraft destroyed; 15 ships destroyed, and the list goes on. These destruction and consumption rates strained the logistics systems of the opposing forces mightily. Both sides had expended nearly all their ammunition by the end of the first week of murderous, but indecisive fighting. Each combatant required and received massive strategic replenishment, the Arabs from the USSR and the Israelis from the United States. The Soviets sent supplies by sea and air. The United States, because of sealift distances involved, immediately began an airlift to Israel; American sealifted equipment did not arrive until after the war's end. The U.S. was forced to deplete NATO war stocks in Europe and U.S. war stocks from the continental U.S., in an effort to match the Soviet's resupply of the Arab forces. Without the U.S. resupply effort, the Israelis could not have sustained offensive operations in the Sinai or sustained its Golan efforts in the face of further Syrian offensive operations beyond 17 October 1973.
...
The Syrians halted their advance just short of their operational objective for reasons which remain historically unclear. This operational pause, lasting all night, ended their attack's momentum and allowed mobilized Israeli reserve troops, tanks, and supplies to arrive in reinforcement. The Israeli government viewed the situation on the Golan as extremely grave and determined that it must focus efforts upon stopping the Syrian advance.
...
CONCLUSION
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ended with no clear decisive outcome on the battlefield. Militarily, the war was a stalemate, though on 24 October when the cease-fire took effect, Israel had seized the initiative, crossed the Suez Canal and maneuvered elements of three divisions on the west bank between the Egyptian Third Army, located primarily on the east bank, and Cairo. The Egyptians, however, clearly were not defeated, as was readily apparent by the significant casualties their forces inflicted on Adan's division in Suez City immediately prior to the cease-fire. Both sides suffered casualties and equipment destruction and supply consumption at rates neither could support, even with resupply from the superpowers. Time worked against the Israelis much more so than against the Arab side. Thus, whether the Israelis could have destroyed the Third Army in detail, as they claim, one may only speculate.
What seems clear, however, is that the Arab grand strategy eventually proved successful in achieving most of thei Arab's strategic policy objectives. While as an immediate result of the war, Egypt recovered only a small portion of the territory seized by the Israelis in 1967, and the Syrians lost some territory, a clear shift in the political balance occurred in the Arab's, particularly Egypt's favor.
Just as the Arab alliance planned, the return to Middle East hostilities broke the political impasse, refocused world attention on the Arab question, and forced international negotiations concerning the occupied territories. These negotiations ultimately resulted in the return of the Suez Canal and land in the western Sinai to Egypt and more Golan Heights territory to Syria than it lost during the fighting. Further, the war shocked and embarrassed Israel internationally. The Arab's military successes, particularly the deception campaign resulting in strategic surprise, shattered the twin myths of Israeli invincibility and Arab incompetence. This restored Arab confidence and morale, a psychological victory for them, while conversely, Israel was downcast and very paranoid about its future.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns
This is a thesis about the 1973 war strategy, a very interesting read,with a unique perspective and still confirming all the facts of the Usraeli myth.
