Bill Longley
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Will the surge work? Rasul Bakhsh Rais
This is a war of attrition, and the surge will not make a difference, except raising costs on both sides. Time in such long cycles of war becomes a crucial variable. Local combatants, in this case the Pashtun Taliban, think it is on their side
The US-led war in Afghanistan has now entered its eighth year and victory against the insurgent Taliban is nowhere in sight. Rather, both the Taliban insurgency and the recent expansion of the counter-insurgency campaign mainly by the American and British components of the NATO/ISAF forces has intensified the conflict.
Afghanistan is more troubled today than it was about four years ago. The Taliban, entirely from the Pashtun ethnic background, have regrouped, reconstituted their networks of fighters and have greatly improvised their insurgency tactics.
Far from being defeated, the Taliban present existential threat to the Afghan state that is still in the process of reconstruction and development. Will the Afghan state, its leadership and power structure, survive the Taliban offensive if international coalition forces leave the country?
No. The Afghan state and its security apparatus are very weak, and everything that has been built so far may collapse. Nobody in the international community would like to see that happen. The implications of the post-Taliban Afghan states defeat for the peace and stability of the country and the entire region would be disastrous.
What, then, is the solution to the Afghan conflict?
The American view, shared to a great degree by Western countries, is that quitting Afghanistan mid-way before achieving the objectives is not an option. Therefore, the public face of their strategy is that they will do whatever it takes, no matter how long it takes, to destroy the Al Qaeda leadership and prevent it from regrouping and using Afghanistan as a base to attack western security interests in the region or on their home turf.
The Americans and their British allies are apparently not deterred by the recent rise in the number of casualties in the war against the Taliban, and say that the sacrifices they have made are worth the effort to defeat their enemies.
There are many unexplained and unanswered questions about the American-led war in Afghanistan. One troubling question is why this war targets the Pashtun regions, leaving so many of warlords from other ethnic groups that have committed heinous war crimes against fellow Afghans unharmed? And we even find these warlords in the ruling establishment in Kabul, which has been set up with American money and the sacrifice of its young soldiers.
The answer lies in the fact that the many things the Americans did or didnt do at the time of military intervention in the fall of 2001 to rout the Taliban regime were done in a rage, without time to pause and reflect calmly on the effects of that war on Afghan society and bordering countries.
While reeling from the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US did not care about what might happen next, to them or to Afghan society, which they were attacking with the most modern and lethal war machine on the planet. Never in modern history was there such disequilibrium of power, and such disproportionate use of indiscriminate force without much thought to where bombs fell or what damage was done to the civilian population.
An odious aspect of the military intervention was the alliance with northern warlords, filled to the brim with anger and hate for the Taliban, who had defeated their forces and were instrumental in the assassination of their hero, Ahmed Shah Masud.
They allowed the warlords to apply whatever barbaric methods they wanted against their captured enemies, the Pashtun Taliban. There is no evidence that American forces encouraged them to torture their captives, but then there are stories of terror suspects being held in other countries, being tortured there for information.
Further, the fact that the Bush administration hushed up war crimes investigations and the Obama administration is equally not open to a war crimes investigation against allied Afghan warlords will not bring them closer to the Pashtun Taliban or create an environment of trust.
American strategy in Afghanistan has alienated the Pashtuns. If they have read any old Afghan history, they shouldnt be surprised if they face greater resistance today than they did in the first couple of years.
The larger part of Afghanistan is reportedly under Taliban influence. The state-building efforts that were not part of the original objectives of the American forces have faltered. Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan are in turmoil; this has created a grave security situation for us.
The Americans may want an exit strategy, but given that they are deep in conflict, they cannot openly say anything about it or the fact that they cannot achieve a decisive victory in this war, or be sure if post-American Afghanistan will be stable and peaceful.
The war that the Americans have landed themselves in, and in a society that has resisted foreign forces by combining Islam and nationalism, cannot really produce the kind of victory the Americans might be thinking of. And if it is ever achieved, it will come at a tremendous material and human cost.
Fearing the collapse of everything that the Americans have tried to build in Afghanistan, we dont think that American leadership, Democrat or Republican, will exit Afghanistan without achieving its objective of nabbing or killing Al Qaeda leaders. That will be the kind of face-saving that would allow the Americans to wind up their war in Afghanistan.
In the meantime, their focus is on securing the Afghan state and building its capacity to defend itself against internal enemies, notably the Taliban. There has been some progress on the political aspects of state-building, like the drafting of a constitution, elections and parliaments. These gains are now increasingly threatened by the deteriorating security situation in the country.
The surge of American forces in Afghanistan has come in the light of the Iraqi experience, and is also dictated by the need to ensure that the presidential elections scheduled for August 20 have a respectable level of participation among the Pashtuns, largely the constituency of Hamid Karzai.
The surge may temporarily push the Taliban back into remote areas, or force them to disperse, but it may not end the insurgency. Around eight years of wars are by any measure too much. And if other options, like negotiations with the adversary, are not exercised because that would convey an impression of weakness, we will see more bloodshed and mayhem in Afghanistan unless one side realises it cannot go on fighting.
This is a war of attrition, and the surge will not make a difference, except raising costs on both sides. Time in such long cycles of war becomes a crucial variable. Local combatants, in this case the Pashtun Taliban, think it is on their side.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email protected]
This is a war of attrition, and the surge will not make a difference, except raising costs on both sides. Time in such long cycles of war becomes a crucial variable. Local combatants, in this case the Pashtun Taliban, think it is on their side
The US-led war in Afghanistan has now entered its eighth year and victory against the insurgent Taliban is nowhere in sight. Rather, both the Taliban insurgency and the recent expansion of the counter-insurgency campaign mainly by the American and British components of the NATO/ISAF forces has intensified the conflict.
Afghanistan is more troubled today than it was about four years ago. The Taliban, entirely from the Pashtun ethnic background, have regrouped, reconstituted their networks of fighters and have greatly improvised their insurgency tactics.
Far from being defeated, the Taliban present existential threat to the Afghan state that is still in the process of reconstruction and development. Will the Afghan state, its leadership and power structure, survive the Taliban offensive if international coalition forces leave the country?
No. The Afghan state and its security apparatus are very weak, and everything that has been built so far may collapse. Nobody in the international community would like to see that happen. The implications of the post-Taliban Afghan states defeat for the peace and stability of the country and the entire region would be disastrous.
What, then, is the solution to the Afghan conflict?
The American view, shared to a great degree by Western countries, is that quitting Afghanistan mid-way before achieving the objectives is not an option. Therefore, the public face of their strategy is that they will do whatever it takes, no matter how long it takes, to destroy the Al Qaeda leadership and prevent it from regrouping and using Afghanistan as a base to attack western security interests in the region or on their home turf.
The Americans and their British allies are apparently not deterred by the recent rise in the number of casualties in the war against the Taliban, and say that the sacrifices they have made are worth the effort to defeat their enemies.
There are many unexplained and unanswered questions about the American-led war in Afghanistan. One troubling question is why this war targets the Pashtun regions, leaving so many of warlords from other ethnic groups that have committed heinous war crimes against fellow Afghans unharmed? And we even find these warlords in the ruling establishment in Kabul, which has been set up with American money and the sacrifice of its young soldiers.
The answer lies in the fact that the many things the Americans did or didnt do at the time of military intervention in the fall of 2001 to rout the Taliban regime were done in a rage, without time to pause and reflect calmly on the effects of that war on Afghan society and bordering countries.
While reeling from the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US did not care about what might happen next, to them or to Afghan society, which they were attacking with the most modern and lethal war machine on the planet. Never in modern history was there such disequilibrium of power, and such disproportionate use of indiscriminate force without much thought to where bombs fell or what damage was done to the civilian population.
An odious aspect of the military intervention was the alliance with northern warlords, filled to the brim with anger and hate for the Taliban, who had defeated their forces and were instrumental in the assassination of their hero, Ahmed Shah Masud.
They allowed the warlords to apply whatever barbaric methods they wanted against their captured enemies, the Pashtun Taliban. There is no evidence that American forces encouraged them to torture their captives, but then there are stories of terror suspects being held in other countries, being tortured there for information.
Further, the fact that the Bush administration hushed up war crimes investigations and the Obama administration is equally not open to a war crimes investigation against allied Afghan warlords will not bring them closer to the Pashtun Taliban or create an environment of trust.
American strategy in Afghanistan has alienated the Pashtuns. If they have read any old Afghan history, they shouldnt be surprised if they face greater resistance today than they did in the first couple of years.
The larger part of Afghanistan is reportedly under Taliban influence. The state-building efforts that were not part of the original objectives of the American forces have faltered. Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan are in turmoil; this has created a grave security situation for us.
The Americans may want an exit strategy, but given that they are deep in conflict, they cannot openly say anything about it or the fact that they cannot achieve a decisive victory in this war, or be sure if post-American Afghanistan will be stable and peaceful.
The war that the Americans have landed themselves in, and in a society that has resisted foreign forces by combining Islam and nationalism, cannot really produce the kind of victory the Americans might be thinking of. And if it is ever achieved, it will come at a tremendous material and human cost.
Fearing the collapse of everything that the Americans have tried to build in Afghanistan, we dont think that American leadership, Democrat or Republican, will exit Afghanistan without achieving its objective of nabbing or killing Al Qaeda leaders. That will be the kind of face-saving that would allow the Americans to wind up their war in Afghanistan.
In the meantime, their focus is on securing the Afghan state and building its capacity to defend itself against internal enemies, notably the Taliban. There has been some progress on the political aspects of state-building, like the drafting of a constitution, elections and parliaments. These gains are now increasingly threatened by the deteriorating security situation in the country.
The surge of American forces in Afghanistan has come in the light of the Iraqi experience, and is also dictated by the need to ensure that the presidential elections scheduled for August 20 have a respectable level of participation among the Pashtuns, largely the constituency of Hamid Karzai.
The surge may temporarily push the Taliban back into remote areas, or force them to disperse, but it may not end the insurgency. Around eight years of wars are by any measure too much. And if other options, like negotiations with the adversary, are not exercised because that would convey an impression of weakness, we will see more bloodshed and mayhem in Afghanistan unless one side realises it cannot go on fighting.
This is a war of attrition, and the surge will not make a difference, except raising costs on both sides. Time in such long cycles of war becomes a crucial variable. Local combatants, in this case the Pashtun Taliban, think it is on their side.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email protected]
