Wikileaks Diplomatic Cables

[sensenreason]

wow!!! i never knew that .thats why he has such a good term with royals .

Oh..no..Dr Singh had a daughter but she is already married !!!..Hereby we offer Rahul Gandhi as a husband to the royal family !!!

This sounds like the old times when Kings married their kids to other Kings to buy peace.Historical.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Wikileaks just released a new batch of US embassy cables from Islamabad -

Cable Viewer

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Monday, 05 January 2009, 13:11
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 000024
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: ZARDARI COMMENTS ON INDIA/NAWAZ SHARIF
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


¶1. (S) Summary: President Zardari told the Ambassador January 2 he would have no choice but to respond militarily to an Indian attack. There was no more politically sensitive issue in Pakistan than Kashmir, he said. Zardari had been briefed by ISI Director General, LTG Pasha, on his meeting with the DCIA in Washington, and he had concurred in the release of the “tearline” information to be passed to the Indians. Zardari also discussed his increasing frustration with Nawaz Sharif’s government in the Punjab, whom he believed had tipped off Jamaat ul-Dawa (JUD) about the assets freeze ordered by the federal government. Zardari discussed his concern about relations with India and his conviction that he (and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani) represented the best hope for better relations with India. Zardari needs additional resources for the police, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), and he was looking forward to his upcoming trip to Afghanistan. End summary.
¶2. (S) Ambassador called on President Zardari January 2 to discuss follow-up to the Mumbai investigation. Zardari said he had been briefed by Lt. General Pasha on his meeting with DCIA, and he had approved the release of “tearline” information to the Indians. He wanted to emphasize he (and General Kayani) were fully committed to better relations with India. He reminded the Ambassador that it had only taken a “phone call” from the U.S. to ensure that Pakistan did not oppose the U.S./India civil nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Zardari emphasized he had no problem making decisions, recalling that we had asked him to refuse the release of detainees in the context of “peace deals” when the Army and ISI were pressing to do so. But he said there was no way that he could let India attack Pakistan: many in the West did not understand the importance of Kashmir in Pakistani public opinion.
¶3. (C) Zardari indicated clearly that he was disinclined to repeal with 17th amendment (which gives the President the power to appoint the service chiefs, judges, and the Election Commissioner.) He justified this on the grounds that the initiative had to come from parliament. (Nawaz Sharif lately has been pressing Zardari to fulfill his electoral commitment to repeal this amendment, which codified Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order.)
¶4. (S) Zardari said that he was increasingly losing patience with Nawaz Sharif’s government in the Punjab, and he believed that a confrontation was looming. He said that Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz Chief Minister Shabbaz Sharif had tipped off the JUD about the UNSCR 1267 mandated asset freeze, resulting in almost empty bank accounts. (Information from MOI does indicate that bank accounts contained surprisingly small amounts.) Zardari suggested Lahore Principal Officer might mediate between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Governor and Shabbaz Sharif who increasingly are publicly at odds. Ambassador noted that his government had been “holding over Nawaz’s head” the Supreme Court’s decision on Nawaz’s eligibility to run for office. Zardari replied, “yes, but it doesn’t seem to be doing much good anymore.” Zardari dismissed Nawaz’s ability to bring crowds into the street in the Punjab if his party was removed from the Punjab government.
¶5. (S) Ambassador and Zardari discussed U.S. assistance issues, particularly in regard to upcoming visits of A/S Boucher and CODEL Reed. As usual, Zardari asked for additional support, particularly to fund additional police in FATA and NWFP, which could hold territory after the army and the Frontier Corps moved out. He said that he needed 100,000 police in each province. (There are now 48,000 police in NWFP.) And he needed equipment quickly. He said that he was going to ask us to reprogram some of our funding, since “without security, none of the other programs matter.”
¶6. (S) Zardari confirmed again at the end of the conversation that Pakistan would not allow non-state actors to dictate state policy, but that the GOP would respond if the Indians attacked. He recommended a report done in India which indicated that Indian Muslims are treated poorly and are among the least prosperous members of society. He said that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was trying to whip up anti-Muslim sentiment. Morever, there were plenty of extremist groups in India that could have assisted Lashkar-e-Taiba.
¶7. (C) Ambassador asked about Swat. He said flatly they did not have the troops to hold it. Ambassador asked the status of Asfandyar Wali Khan, the head of Awami National Party, who was ostensibly in charge of the NWFP government. Zardari just rolled his eyes.
¶8. (S) Zardari said his trip to Afghanistan had been rescheduled for January 7. He laughed about the rumors that civilian military struggles in Pakistan had prompted the delay. In truth, he said, he did not like to fly in bad weather, and he was worried about security. Ambassador had asked Interior Minister Rehman Malik several times about the status of Brahamdagh Bugti who is in exile in Afghanistan. (Readers will recall that the status of Mr. Bugti was a major bilateral irritant between Afghanistan and the Musharraf government, since Musharraf wanted Bugti “deported” to Pakistan by Karzai to “face justice” for participation in separatist activities.) Zardari said he was going to ask Karzai to keep him in Afghanistan: Bugti was now involved in conflicts for supremacy in his tribe. Zardari said that government was drafting legislation to give the Balochis more autonomy and political control.

PATTERSON

 

[Cent4]

Nawaz disappointed Saudia by breaking promise: WikiLeaks

Updated at: 1750 PST, Thursday, December 02, 2010
WASHINGTON: The US diplomat reported to Washington that the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US Adel Al-Jubeir maintained that Nawaz Sharif first promised the Saudis not to engage in political activity or return to Pakistan, but he then flew to Pakistan from London in a direct violation of his commitment.

According to a leaked US cable, Saudia Arabian authorities backed Pervez Musharraf to have Nawaz Sharif arrested if he returned from exile.

"We can either support Musharraf and stability, or we can allow bin Laden to get the bomb,", Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US Adel Al-Jubeir told Charge d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller at a lunch in November 2007.

The then Pakistani President visited Saudi Arabia in 2007 and meet King Abdullah after completing Umra in Mecca. Al-Jubeir told the US diplomats that Musharraf had not come to the Kingdom to meet exiled former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but carefully avoided ruling out such meeting.

The US diplomats claimed that during the meeting the Saudi Ambassador boldly asserted that, "We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants." Al-Jubeir is a senior royal advisor who has worked for King Abdullah almost a decade.

"He (Al-Jubeir) asserted that the Saudi government had offered Sharif a pledge of protection and asylum in the Kingdom after his ouster by Musharraf in return for a promise that he would refrain from political activity for ten years," Gfoeller said in the cable.

The US diplomat also reported to Washington that the Saudi ambassador maintained that Sharif instead of sticking to his promise began attempting to test the limits of this promise five or six years in his exile.

"Sharif broke his promise by conducting political activity while in the Kingdom," al-Jubeir reportedly charged.

Jubeir also supposedly told the the US officials that when the Saudi Government had permitted Sharif to travel to London, he first promised the Saudis not to engage in political activity or return to Pakistan, but he then flew to Pakistan from London in a direct violation of his commitment.

Expressing 'disappointment' with Sharif, the Saudi Government 'worked directly with Musharraf to have Sharif arrested on his return to Pakistan and immediately deported to the Kingdom, according to the ambassador.

In the document, US officials claimed that Al-Jubeir stated the terms of Sharif's asylum agreement that the Kingdom would seek to control Sharif's movements in the future, even suggesting that he would be kept in a state only a little less severe than house arrest.

"Al-Jubeir added that he sees neither Sharif nor former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as a viable replacement for Musharraf. 'With all his flaws,' he said of Musharraf, 'he is the only person that you or we have to work with now,'" Gfoeller reported back to Washington.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

WikiLeaks shows America's imperious attitude to Pakistan

The WikiLeaks US embassy cables reveal just how dangerously involved the Americans are in every aspect of Pakistan's affairs

Pakistan was already under the American hammer before the WikiLeaks crisis blew. But leaked US diplomatic cables published by the Guardian show the extraordinary extent to which Pakistan is in danger of becoming a mere satrapy of imperial Washington.


The US assault on Pakistani sovereignty, which is how these developments are widely viewed in the country, is multipronged. At one end of the spectrum, in the sphere of "hard power", US special forces are increasingly involved, in one way or another, in covert military operations inside Pakistan.


These troops are being used to help hunt down Taliban and al-Qaida fighters in the tribal areas and co-ordinate drone attacks, as revealed by the Guardian's Pakistan correspondent, Declan Walsh. Their activities come in addition to previous air and ground cross-border raids; and to the quasi-permanent basing of American technicians and other personnel at the Pakistani air force base from which drone attacks are launched.


The US hand can be seen at work in Pakistan's complex politics, with the standing and competence of President Asif Ali Zardari seemingly constantly under harsh review. At one point, the military chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, reportedly consults the US ambassador about the possibility of a coup, designed in part to stop the advance of the opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif.


At the same time, Pakistani diplomats are convinced the Americans are somehow trying to commandeer the country's nuclear deterrent, which they see as its only real defence against India. And all this importunity is underpinned by "soft power", by a reverse cash tribute from Washington to Islamabad, approaching $2bn a year. In a very real sense, the Americans buy their way in.


This sort of helpful meddling, or shameless intrigue, or outrageous interference – decide yourself what you want to call it – in the internal affairs of a sovereign country is supposed to have gone out of fashion with the retreat of the British empire and the end of the Raj.


But that was never true in reality, of course. All great powers intrude in pursuit of their own interests; it's what they do – and picking up where the British left off, the US is no different. It is a measure of the Pakistani state's weakness that the Americans apparently have such scope and leeway to influence and direct its affairs.


What is equally remarkable, however, is how little the Americans appear able, ultimately, to control their satraps. Zardari talks a good game but achieves little. Millions of US taxpayer dollars earmarked for fighting Islamist extremists allegedly disappears into government coffers, never to be seen again. Washington's staunch Pakistani allies in the "war on terror" play both sides, maintaining their ties to friendly Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group while simultaneously accepting America's largesse. Being an imperialist is never easy.


So the Americans don't get what they want. But neither do ordinary Pakistanis. The larger point is that Pakistan is suffering grievously, in terms of lives lost to terrorism; in soldiers and civilians killed and wounded in the campaigns against Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas; in a ravaged economy, acute poverty and lack of education; and in the all but forgotten but still terrible aftermath of this year's floods.


Pakistan needs less foreign interference, not more. And that applies to Arab jihadi fanatics as much as it does to imperious Americans. But on current trends the opposite is happening. The clear danger, highlighted by the leaked cables, is that the west's unwinnable war in Afghanistan is spilling over into its weak, ill-led and much put-upon neighbour – and that Pakistan, too, could become a war zone.

WikiLeaks shows America's imperious attitude to Pakistan | Simon Tisdall | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

 

[Solomon2]

^^^^^^^^^
How can anyone believe Tisdall? He accuses America of being as controlling as the British were, but he himself points to examples of how Pakistani leaders are in charge. At the end he labels the West's war in Afghanistan as "unwinnable" - but he did the same with the war in Iraq, claiming that by removing Saddam the U.S. was "not trusting the Iraqis with their own country". If he wasn't credible then, why should his words be thought credible now?

 

[T-Faz]

Solomon is quick to deflect his nations blunder in supporting extremists like Zia, Jamaat Islami and the mujahideen. The clear fact is that US has a very big hand in the internal matters of Pakistan and it is equally as responsible for the current situation.

Even with the Iran debacle in front of them, they still pursue the same old policies of keeping the moderate and nationalistic groups away in favour of yes men who at the end make the situation even worse.

 

[Solomon2]

The clear fact is that US has a very big hand in the internal matters of Pakistan and it is equally as responsible for the current situation.

"Equally"? Why not more? Why not less? Can't you see that both you and this Britisher have the same thing in common: a desire to seek moral equivalence in the actions of the U.S.?

The fact is that unlike the British rule of Imperial India, in Pakistan-U.S. relations Pakistani leaders make the decisions for Pakistan. Tisdall is trying to play up British guilt at their colonial legacy, but what excuse do you have?

 

[T-Faz]

"Equally"? Why not more? Why not less? Can't you see that both you and this Britisher have the same thing in common: a desire to seek moral equivalence in the actions of the U.S.?

When there is credible proof of unnecessary and unjust interference, why is it wrong to pinpoint that US has indeed prised a flawed policy of supporting leaders and parties which have only made the situation worse for Pakistan and America itself.

The fact is that unlike the British rule of Imperial India, in Pakistan-U.S. relations Pakistani leaders make the decisions for Pakistan. Tisdall is trying to play up British guilt at their colonial legacy, but what excuse do you have?

I don't have an excuse but proof of what happens when US supports leaders and parties in foreign countries to further it's goals.

Iran and Pakistan, two nations where hardline elements are at the forefront and US is very much responsible.

I think that the new US ambassador to Pakistan should meet Maulana Fazlur Rahman more often. Better yet support him like you did Maududi, and look how Maududi's Pakistan is causing you trouble today.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

Solomon my advice to American friends would be to work closer with the Pakistani ''street''

don't waste your time or money sending high ranking officials to have elaborate state-dinners, say a few words, then leave.....

send low and medium rank officials to tend to NGOs, schools, hospitals, civil society, private sector/trade developers etc.


Pakistani peoples are not cold as stone. We don't view friendships on transactional level. We are personal people. Learn our culture and our ways of conducting things.


why don't you understand this?

 

[VCheng]

Solomon my advice to American friends would be to work closer with the Pakistani ''street''

don't waste your time or money sending high ranking officials to have elaborate state-dinners, say a few words, then leave.....

send low and medium rank officials to tend to NGOs, schools, hospitals, civil society, private sector/trade developers etc.


Pakistani peoples are not cold as stone. We don't view friendships on transactional level. We are personal people. Learn our culture and our ways of conducting things.


why don't you understand this?

A huge problem in actually implementing such a plan is the incessant and adverse publicity anti-US demonstrations over there get over here.

As a result of this, and some other causes, an increasing percentage of the population is hostile to Pakistan, and voices for a more aggressive solution are growing louder.

This will not end well I fear.

 

[Bratva]

According to WIKI Leaks,, ISI Head Shujaa Pasha told the parliamentarians in an incamera brief that UAE, INDIA AND Russia is involved in Balochistan insurgency. India. Russia is providing training, funds and arms to them while India has established 9 camps along Afghanistan Pakistan Border and operating these cams while partially Funding them and UAE also providing funds partially to these insurgents because they are totally against the Gawadar Port which will cause harm to their interests

Daily Express News Story

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

A huge problem in actually implementing such a plan is the incessant and adverse publicity anti-US demonstrations over there get over here.

As a result of this, and some other causes, an increasing percentage of the population is hostile to Pakistan, and voices for a more aggressive solution are growing louder.

This will not end well I fear.

And the adversity on the Pakistani street is based on flaws in US policy in terms of its relationship with Pakistan going back decades, including the engagement issues outlined by AZ. So you cant expect pakistani public sentiment to change without changing the current dynamics of the US engagement with Pakistan.

As the dominant power in the world, the onus is on the US to reset and change the terms of its engagement with Pakistan.

 

[VCheng]

And the adversity on the Pakistani street is based on flaws in US policy in terms of its relationship with Pakistan going back decades, including the engagement issues outlined by AZ. So you cant expect pakistani public sentiment to change without changing the current dynamics of the US engagement with Pakistan.

As the dominant power in the world, the onus is on the US to reset and change the terms of its engagement with Pakistan.

I agree with your post generally, except the last point: Changing the terms of engagement is a two-way street, and no one side can change those unilaterally.

 

[dbc]

As the dominant power in the world, the onus is on the US to reset and change the terms of its engagement with Pakistan.

Except there are powerful elements in Pakistan that benefit from 'status quo'.