Lord ZeN
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On August 6, 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman informed the world that an atomic weapon had been detonated on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Nicknamed Little Boy, the bomb with a power of over 20,000 tons of TNT destroyed most of Hiroshima, killing an estimated 130,000 people. Three days later on August 9, a second bomb nicknamed Fat Man was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki destroying most of Nagasaki and killing roughly between 60,000 - 70,000 people. Six days after the bombing of Nagasaki, Japan surrendered, marking the end of World War II.
The destructive power of these nuclear weapons and the subsequent casualties of the Japanese have continued to prompt questions over whether the U.S. should have decided to use these deadly weapons against Japan during World War 2 even though many alternatives were available.
Certainly, the power of this new weapon was understood before its use against Japan. President Truman stated that “it was the most terrible thing ever discovered.” To that end, the decision to use this new weapon was not taken lightly, nor was it made in a vacuum devoid of dissent, despite what historical accounts may depict. Specifically, historian J. Samuel Walker purports that history has painted a false dichotomy which posited that Truman had to choose between using the atomic bomb and risking hundreds of thousands of American lives. Instead, as Walker highlights in his book “Prompt and Utter Destruction,” the historical records show a much more complex situation.
To be sure, as the development of the atomic bomb was nearing its completion, the U.S. was still engaged in a massive war with the Japanese. By all accounts, from the middle of 1944, it was clear to both the Japanese and the United States that the Japanese were losing the war and that the question was when Japanese would finally capitulate. As the summer of 1945 began, the U.S. military campaign continued to involve numerous aerial raids as well as large scale invasion of Japanese islands. Accordingly, before the atomic bomb became available, the U.S. was planning another large scale invasion of Japan codenamed Operation Downfall for the fall of 1945, which it hoped would overwhelm the Japanese and end the war.
Deciding to Drop the Bomb
The six reasons why Truman chose to use the bomb.
Ending the war at the earliest possible moment -The primary objective for the U.S. was to win the war at the lowest possible cost. Specifically, Truman was looking for the most effective way to end the war quickly, not for a way to not use the bomb.
To justify the cost of the Manhattan Project-The Manhattan Project was a secret program to which the U.S. had funneled an estimated $1,889,604,000(in 1945 dollars) through December 31, 1945.
Use of the bomb was more to scare Russia than to defeat Japan.-With the end of the war nearing, the Soviets were an important strategic consideration, especially with their military control over most of Eastern Europe. As Yale Professor Gaddis Smith has noted,“It has been demonstrated that the decision to bomb Japan was centrally connected to Truman's confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.” However, this idea is thought to be more appropriately understood as an ancillary benefit of dropping the bomb and not so much its sole purpose.
A lack of incentives not to use the bomb -Weapons were created to be used. By 1945, the bombing of civilians was already an established practice. In fact, the earlier U.S. firebombing campaign of Japan, which began in 1944,killed an estimated 315,922 Japanese, a greater number than the estimated deaths attributed to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The firebombing of Tokyo alone resulted in roughly 100,000 Japanese killed.
Racially Motivated
Racism played an important role in the decision in President Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb ; that had the bomb been ready in time it never would have been used against Germany. All of America’s enemies were stereotyped and caricatured in home front propaganda, but there was a clear difference in the nature of that propaganda were anti-Japanese racism in American society targeted the Japanese as a race of people, and demonstrated a level of hatred comparable with Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda.
To justify the cost of the Manhattan Project-The Manhattan Project was a secret program to which the U.S. had funneled an estimated $1,889,604,000(in 1945 dollars) through December 31, 1945.
The actual signed-off document authorizing the use of deadly nuclear weapons, and comes under the direction of George Marshall’s directive to General Handy
Alternatives to dropping the bomb
1. Intensifying conventional bombing and the naval blockade- General MacArthur felt that air power alone could force a Japanese surrender within six months with little risk to American lives. However, it was also argued that this may be a best case scenario where in actuality it could take substantially longer.
2. Allowing the Japanese to retain their Emperor
The second and perhaps most important alternative to both the bomb and the land invasion was to modify the demand for unconditional surrender and allow the Japanese to keep their emperor. Of course, he would have to be demoted to a powerless figurehead, but it was possible that this one condition alone might have been enough to satisfy the American War Department’s conclusion that it was necessary to convince the Japanese that they would not be “annihilated” if they surrendered. The American government clearly understood that if they harmed the emperor, whom the Japanese revered as a god, the Japanese would resist forever. And the key to this argument lies in the fact that the American government already planned on letting the emperor stay. All they had to do was find a way to hint their intentions loud enough for the Japanese to hear.
3. Waiting for the Soviets
American President, and at least some Japanese all were of a mind that a Soviet intervention in the war would prove decisive. And, a date for this intervention had been set. So why the United States used atomic bombs on August 6 and 9, when they knew the Russians were coming a week later, and when Operation Torch wasn't scheduled for months. Why not wait?
4. A Demonstration of the bomb
One alternative might have been to arrange a demonstration of the bomb. Although the U.S. and Japan had no diplomatic relations after Pearl Harbor, a demonstration might have been arranged discretely through some back channel, perhaps through the Russians.
In the end, none of these alternatives were chosen.
Aerial view of Hiroshima after atomic bomb is dropped
Conclusions
The purpose of this article is not to give arguments against the use of Atomic Bomb but is instead intended to highlight the complexities of the situation.It is clear that there were multiple reasons for using the atomic bomb, but that at the same time there were also alternatives which may have proved equally effective in prompting a Japanese surrender.
One could argue that by just modifying unconditional surrender, the U.S. could have saved both U.S. lives and the lives of those Japanese residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Or, as Walker noted, it seems reasonable to conclude that “a combination of B-29 raids with conventional bombs, the blockade, the Soviet invasion, and perhaps a moderation of unconditional surrender policy would have ended the war without an invasion and without the use of atomic bombs.”
The destructive power of these nuclear weapons and the subsequent casualties of the Japanese have continued to prompt questions over whether the U.S. should have decided to use these deadly weapons against Japan during World War 2 even though many alternatives were available.
Certainly, the power of this new weapon was understood before its use against Japan. President Truman stated that “it was the most terrible thing ever discovered.” To that end, the decision to use this new weapon was not taken lightly, nor was it made in a vacuum devoid of dissent, despite what historical accounts may depict. Specifically, historian J. Samuel Walker purports that history has painted a false dichotomy which posited that Truman had to choose between using the atomic bomb and risking hundreds of thousands of American lives. Instead, as Walker highlights in his book “Prompt and Utter Destruction,” the historical records show a much more complex situation.
To be sure, as the development of the atomic bomb was nearing its completion, the U.S. was still engaged in a massive war with the Japanese. By all accounts, from the middle of 1944, it was clear to both the Japanese and the United States that the Japanese were losing the war and that the question was when Japanese would finally capitulate. As the summer of 1945 began, the U.S. military campaign continued to involve numerous aerial raids as well as large scale invasion of Japanese islands. Accordingly, before the atomic bomb became available, the U.S. was planning another large scale invasion of Japan codenamed Operation Downfall for the fall of 1945, which it hoped would overwhelm the Japanese and end the war.
Deciding to Drop the Bomb
The six reasons why Truman chose to use the bomb.
Ending the war at the earliest possible moment -The primary objective for the U.S. was to win the war at the lowest possible cost. Specifically, Truman was looking for the most effective way to end the war quickly, not for a way to not use the bomb.
To justify the cost of the Manhattan Project-The Manhattan Project was a secret program to which the U.S. had funneled an estimated $1,889,604,000(in 1945 dollars) through December 31, 1945.
Use of the bomb was more to scare Russia than to defeat Japan.-With the end of the war nearing, the Soviets were an important strategic consideration, especially with their military control over most of Eastern Europe. As Yale Professor Gaddis Smith has noted,“It has been demonstrated that the decision to bomb Japan was centrally connected to Truman's confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.” However, this idea is thought to be more appropriately understood as an ancillary benefit of dropping the bomb and not so much its sole purpose.
A lack of incentives not to use the bomb -Weapons were created to be used. By 1945, the bombing of civilians was already an established practice. In fact, the earlier U.S. firebombing campaign of Japan, which began in 1944,killed an estimated 315,922 Japanese, a greater number than the estimated deaths attributed to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The firebombing of Tokyo alone resulted in roughly 100,000 Japanese killed.
Racially Motivated
Racism played an important role in the decision in President Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb ; that had the bomb been ready in time it never would have been used against Germany. All of America’s enemies were stereotyped and caricatured in home front propaganda, but there was a clear difference in the nature of that propaganda were anti-Japanese racism in American society targeted the Japanese as a race of people, and demonstrated a level of hatred comparable with Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda.
To justify the cost of the Manhattan Project-The Manhattan Project was a secret program to which the U.S. had funneled an estimated $1,889,604,000(in 1945 dollars) through December 31, 1945.
The actual signed-off document authorizing the use of deadly nuclear weapons, and comes under the direction of George Marshall’s directive to General Handy
Alternatives to dropping the bomb
1. Intensifying conventional bombing and the naval blockade- General MacArthur felt that air power alone could force a Japanese surrender within six months with little risk to American lives. However, it was also argued that this may be a best case scenario where in actuality it could take substantially longer.
2. Allowing the Japanese to retain their Emperor
The second and perhaps most important alternative to both the bomb and the land invasion was to modify the demand for unconditional surrender and allow the Japanese to keep their emperor. Of course, he would have to be demoted to a powerless figurehead, but it was possible that this one condition alone might have been enough to satisfy the American War Department’s conclusion that it was necessary to convince the Japanese that they would not be “annihilated” if they surrendered. The American government clearly understood that if they harmed the emperor, whom the Japanese revered as a god, the Japanese would resist forever. And the key to this argument lies in the fact that the American government already planned on letting the emperor stay. All they had to do was find a way to hint their intentions loud enough for the Japanese to hear.
3. Waiting for the Soviets
American President, and at least some Japanese all were of a mind that a Soviet intervention in the war would prove decisive. And, a date for this intervention had been set. So why the United States used atomic bombs on August 6 and 9, when they knew the Russians were coming a week later, and when Operation Torch wasn't scheduled for months. Why not wait?
4. A Demonstration of the bomb
One alternative might have been to arrange a demonstration of the bomb. Although the U.S. and Japan had no diplomatic relations after Pearl Harbor, a demonstration might have been arranged discretely through some back channel, perhaps through the Russians.
In the end, none of these alternatives were chosen.
Aerial view of Hiroshima after atomic bomb is dropped
Conclusions
The purpose of this article is not to give arguments against the use of Atomic Bomb but is instead intended to highlight the complexities of the situation.It is clear that there were multiple reasons for using the atomic bomb, but that at the same time there were also alternatives which may have proved equally effective in prompting a Japanese surrender.
One could argue that by just modifying unconditional surrender, the U.S. could have saved both U.S. lives and the lives of those Japanese residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Or, as Walker noted, it seems reasonable to conclude that “a combination of B-29 raids with conventional bombs, the blockade, the Soviet invasion, and perhaps a moderation of unconditional surrender policy would have ended the war without an invasion and without the use of atomic bombs.”
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