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Who are World's Top 10 Largest Creditor Nations?

Correct if wrong:

With the US/China trade deficit, Yuan was in high demand, low supply. Dollar was in low demand high supply, so China central bank printed more currency increasing Yuan supply to keep it's currency artificially low. China was also buying Dollars with Yuan, which they then used to buy Treasuries effectively loaning US with credit.

How Did China Become One of America's Biggest Bankers?

China is more than happy to own close to a third of the U.S. debt. Owning U.S. Treasury notes helps China's economy grow by keeping its currency weaker than the dollar. That keeps Chinese exports cheaper than U.S. products.

China's highest priority is to create enough jobs for its 1.4 billion people.

The United States allowed China to become one of its biggest bankers because the American people enjoyed low consumer prices. Selling debt to China allows the U.S. economy to grow by funding federal government programs. It also keeps U.S. interest rates low. But China's ownership of U.S. debt is shifting the economic balance of power in its favor.

What Would Happen If China Called in Its Debt Holdings?
China would not call in its debt all at once. If it did so, the demand for the dollar would plummet like a rock. This dollar collapse would disrupt international markets worse than the 2008 financial crisis. China's economy would suffer along with everyone else's.

It's more likely that China would slowly begin selling off its Treasury holdings. Even when it just warns that it plans to do so, dollar demand starts to drop. That hurts China's competitiveness, as it raises its export prices, so U.S. consumers start buying U.S.-made products instead. China must further expand its exports to other Asian countries and increase domestic demand. Only then can it call in its U.S. debt holdings.

China's Debt-Holder Strategy Is Working
Because of its ability to ship low-priced goods, China's economy grew 10% annually for the three decades before the recession. Now it's growing at 7%, a more sustainable rate. China has become the largest economy in the world. It's outpaced the United States and the European Union. China became the world's biggest exporter in 2010. China needs this growth to raise its low standard of living. Therefore, despite its threats, China will continue its position as the world's largest holder of U.S. debt.

The above shows that China has to keep loaning and buying treasuries to keep Yuan devalued, or they can inflate slowly to not cause crashing of the Dollar, otherwise all their Dollar holdings would become worthless.

This currency manipulation was on going for decades right. Hu Jintao was giving cheap credit during 2008 financial crisis.
Seems to me China has played a long term master plan in finance, I hope this cancels out the BS Rothschild conspiracy because unlike the privately owned FED, China's central bank is state owned like Vietnams.

We are running a ponzi scheme and you guys and the rest of the world knows it. But by taking on the debt , you are perpetuating the ponzi.

I would like to see how you will extricate yourself from debt. trap without causing some major shakeup of your economy and that of US. By purchasing our debt, you are making us spend like there is no tomorrow.

We consume more than we produce, and those who buy our debt continue to pump money into the system, which perpetuates the cycle. It is working for you because we are making your factories buzzing in Beijing and Shanghai to meet our ferocious appetite. What will happen if foreign countries (especially China)stop buying our debt?? What will happen to dollar??
 
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Correct if wrong:

With the US/China trade deficit, Yuan was in high demand, low supply. Dollar was in low demand high supply, so China central bank printed more currency increasing Yuan supply to keep it's currency artificially low. China was also buying Dollars with Yuan, which they then used to buy Treasuries effectively loaning US with credit.

How Did China Become One of America's Biggest Bankers?

China is more than happy to own close to a third of the U.S. debt. Owning U.S. Treasury notes helps China's economy grow by keeping its currency weaker than the dollar. That keeps Chinese exports cheaper than U.S. products.

China's highest priority is to create enough jobs for its 1.4 billion people.

The United States allowed China to become one of its biggest bankers because the American people enjoyed low consumer prices. Selling debt to China allows the U.S. economy to grow by funding federal government programs. It also keeps U.S. interest rates low. But China's ownership of U.S. debt is shifting the economic balance of power in its favor.

What Would Happen If China Called in Its Debt Holdings?
China would not call in its debt all at once. If it did so, the demand for the dollar would plummet like a rock. This dollar collapse would disrupt international markets worse than the 2008 financial crisis. China's economy would suffer along with everyone else's.

It's more likely that China would slowly begin selling off its Treasury holdings. Even when it just warns that it plans to do so, dollar demand starts to drop. That hurts China's competitiveness, as it raises its export prices, so U.S. consumers start buying U.S.-made products instead. China must further expand its exports to other Asian countries and increase domestic demand. Only then can it call in its U.S. debt holdings.

China's Debt-Holder Strategy Is Working
Because of its ability to ship low-priced goods, China's economy grew 10% annually for the three decades before the recession. Now it's growing at 7%, a more sustainable rate. China has become the largest economy in the world. It's outpaced the United States and the European Union. China became the world's biggest exporter in 2010. China needs this growth to raise its low standard of living. Therefore, despite its threats, China will continue its position as the world's largest holder of U.S. debt.

The above shows that China has to keep loaning and buying treasuries to keep Yuan devalued, or they can inflate slowly to not cause crashing of the Dollar, otherwise all their Dollar holdings would become worthless.

This currency manipulation was on going for decades right. Hu Jintao was giving cheap credit during 2008 financial crisis.
Seems to me China has played a long term master plan in finance, I hope this cancels out the BS Rothschild conspiracy because unlike the privately owned FED, China's central bank is state owned like Vietnams.


Well written piece of opinion.

After WWII, a series of key global events took place that transformed the world geostrategic order into what it is today, those include resurgence of Germany & Japan, collapse of Bretton Woods, oil crisis & rise of Petrodollar, Plaza Accord, Reaganism, end of Soviet economies, inception of Euro, economic reform of Mainland China. The momentum to maintain status quo is strong, I don't see any drastic change unless another major strategic event at global level takes place.

US recently added Switzerland to their monitor list, on top of the five usual targets (China Mainland, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Germany), reason? Accusing six major creditor nations at once? Perhaps it's a stunt to divert attention outward, or it's just politically correct for bureaucrats to do so, either way I don't see any political willingness, however slightly, to take internal reform.
  1. Cut discretionary, defence expenditure? No one dares to touch this.
  2. Cut entitlements, social security, medicare? Difficult to convince the public.
  3. Raise tax? Perhaps.
  4. Monetary aka more debt and printing? When all three fiscal measures above don't apply, this is the only path US can go.
China already has a gigantic industrial base, many fundamental capacities (e.g. metal & steel, concrete, elctro-mechanicals, semiconductor) even bigger than rest of the world combined. However, a deep-rooted savings culture (47.9% of GDP in 2015, world's 2nd highest) only fuels investment (both domestic credits, and increasingly outbound), not consumption.

Under these circumstances, what can China do?
  1. Soft landing of forex holdings especially US treasury bills, gradually offload or move to offshore custodian accounts e.g. Belgium, Caribbean.
  2. Increase use of RMB, and continue to boost reform in international currency system e.g. SDR.
  3. Pivot to outbound direct investments (OBI), through both sovereign investment funds and private sector. Use M&A to acquire matured assets, build new assets on greenfields.
  4. Pivot to non-financial reserves. Strategic reserves (metals, energy) at home, overseas mining or energy fields.
  5. Upgrade capital-industrial integration with East Asia, Germany/Switzerland. Reinvent national economy with "Made in China 2025" at home. Relocate Industry 1.0 offshore.
  6. Buildup the global south, say BRICS, Sino-Russia nexus, Eurasian economic belt (CAR, CEE), Maritime silk route (Africa, MENA, ASEAN) and South America.
China is relatively new to the league of creditors, now world's largest nation (including Taiwan, HK), and continues to walk the path of East Asia or Germany, only in bigger steps. Though China and US are going in exactly opposite directions, both sides should seriously sit down, act responsibly and find a way out for a new, sustainable, international order.
 
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Well written piece of opinion.

After WWII, a series of key global events took place that transformed the world geostrategic order into what it is today, those include resurgence of Germany & Japan, collapse of Bretton Woods, oil crisis & rise of Petrodollar, Plaza Accord, Reaganism, end of Soviet economies, inception of Euro, economic reform of Mainland China. The momentum to maintain status quo is strong, I don't see any drastic change unless another major strategic event at global level takes place.

US recently added Switzerland to their monitor list, on top of the five usual targets (China Mainland, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Germany), reason? Accusing six major creditor nations at once? Perhaps it's a stunt to divert attention outward, or it's just politically correct for bureaucrats to do so, either way I don't see any political willingness, however slightly, to take internal reform.
  1. Cut discretionary, defence expenditure? No one dares to touch this.
  2. Cut entitlements, social security, medicare? Difficult to convince the public.
  3. Raise tax? Perhaps.
  4. Monetary aka more debt and printing? When all three fiscal measures above don't apply, this is the only path US can go.
China already has a gigantic industrial base, many fundamental capacities (e.g. metal & steel, concrete, elctro-mechanicals, semiconductor) even bigger than rest of the world combined. However, a deep-rooted savings culture (47.9% of GDP in 2015, world's 2nd highest) only fuels investment (both domestic credits, and increasingly outbound), not consumption.

Under these circumstances, what can China do?
  1. Soft landing of forex holdings especially US treasury bills, gradually offload or move to offshore custodian accounts e.g. Belgium, Caribbean.
  2. Increase use of RMB, and continue to boost reform in international currency system e.g. SDR.
  3. Pivot to outbound direct investments (OBI), through both sovereign investment funds and private sector. Use M&A to acquire matured assets, build new assets on greenfields.
  4. Pivot to non-financial reserves. Strategic reserves (metals, energy) at home, overseas mining or energy fields.
  5. Upgrade capital-industrial integration with East Asia, Germany/Switzerland. Reinvent national economy with "Made in China 2025" at home. Relocate Industry 1.0 offshore.
  6. Buildup the global south, say BRICS, Sino-Russia nexus, Eurasian economic belt (CAR, CEE), Maritime silk route (Africa, MENA, ASEAN) and South America.
China is relatively new to the league of creditors, now world's largest nation (including Taiwan, HK), and continues to walk the path of East Asia or Germany, only in bigger steps. Though China and US are going in exactly opposite directions, both sides should seriously sit down, act responsibly and find a way out for a new, sustainable, international order.
Good observation. bro.

You just let me think another bubble economy entity and this time is US. I just wonder what will Jewish people do.

I'd like to add another advice that is keeping building up military strength. You got money then you need a big gun to protect it.
 
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i bet you $1000 rupee that some indian is going to rebuttal you with something to the effect of "as long as US is reserve currency, debt is no issue!"

Bringing India in threads which don't matter to us seems to be your favorite thing

I love how Chinese like @Jlaw @dy1022 think about us Indians all the time :lol:

What about India @Shotgunner51 ?
Too small to talk about big credit or big debt.


India increased its Treasury debt holdings to $116.3 billion at the end of July 2015 from $79.7 billion a year ago.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/once-th...starts-dumping-u-s-government-debt-1444196065
 
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India increased its Treasury debt holdings to $116.3 billion at the end of July 2015 from $79.7 billion a year ago.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/once-th...starts-dumping-u-s-government-debt-1444196065


Good to know, thanks!

Yes that's about India increased holdings of US T-bills (to $116.3 billion at the end of July 2015) last year, it's a kind of external assets hold by India, booked under item "Reserve Assets". When you want to see the full picture of India's external (international) position, accounting for both assets and liabilities, check Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data:

fwqkfkf.png

The Net IIP stood at US$ -353.1 billion by June 2016, meaning India is a debtor nation. Such a degree of indebtedness is very normal given current stage of development, I think inbound FDI, which is now less than 1/3 of total liabilities, can grow more. Overall position has slightly improved from 1 year ago when position was US$ -361.6 billion, trend is stable.
 
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Good to know, thanks!

Yes that's about India increased holdings of US T-bills (to $116.3 billion at the end of July 2015) last year, it's a kind of external assets hold by India, booked under item "Reserve Assets". When you want to see the full picture of India's external (international) position, accounting for both assets and liabilities, check Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data:

The Net IIP stood at US$ -353.1 billion by June 2016, meaning India is a debtor nation. Such a degree of indebtedness is very normal given current stage of development. In fact position has slightly improved from 1 year ago when position was US$ -361.6 billion, trend is stable.

My statement was in response to this "Too small to talk about big credit or big debt." by a certain member
 
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Brothers,

If these Loans were used in the Development of Infra structure then, its no harm for any country, because Infra structure development will return more benefits for Economy as compere to interest paid by any nation.
 
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Good to know, thanks!

Yes that's about India increased holdings of US T-bills (to $116.3 billion at the end of July 2015) last year, it's a kind of external assets hold by India, booked under item "Reserve Assets". When you want to see the full picture of India's external (international) position, accounting for both assets and liabilities, check Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data:

The Net IIP stood at US$ -353.1 billion by June 2016, meaning India is a debtor nation. Such a degree of indebtedness is very normal given current stage of development, I think inbound FDI, which is now less than 1/3 of total liabilities, can grow more. Overall position has slightly improved from 1 year ago when position was US$ -361.6 billion, trend is stable.
Agree, such indebtedness is not really big.
 
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I'd like to add another advice that is keeping building up military strength. You got money then you need a big gun to protect it.


China does have: https://defence.pk/threads/chinas-294-megatons-of-thermonuclear-deterrence.107079/

Looking forward, re-investing a pacifist amount (~1.2% GDP) into defending frontiers of interests, maintaining a war chest (of heavy industries and strategic serves) at home and abroad, is financially sustainable during a peace-time economy.
 
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US government has just released data for 2016Q4, here it goes

EMBARGOED UNTIL RELEASE AT 8:30 A.M. EDT, Wednesday, March 29, 2017
BEA 17—13

U.S. Net International Investment Position
Fourth Quarter and Year 2016


Year 2016

The U.S. net international investment position decreased to -$8,109.7 billion (preliminary) at the end of 2016 from -$7,280.6 billion at the end of 2015. The $829.0 billion decrease reflected a $575.9 billion increase in U.S. assets and a $1,404.9 billion increase in U.S. liabilities.

intinv416-chart-01.png

U.S. assets increased $575.9 billion to $23,916.7 billion at the end of 2016.
  • Assets excluding financial derivatives increased $762.3 billion to $21,707.7 billion, mostly reflecting increases in direct investment and portfolio investment. The $762.3 billion increase resulted from other changes in position of $431.3 billion and financial transactions of $331.0 billion (table C). Other changes in position reflected price increases on equity assets that were partly offset by decreases from exchange-rate changes. Financial transactions were driven by net U.S. acquisition of direct investment assets.
  • Financial derivatives decreased $186.4 billion to $2,209.0 billion, mostly reflecting a decrease in single-currency interest rate contracts.
U.S. liabilities increased $1,404.9 billion to $32,026.3 billion at the end of 2016.
  • Liabilities excluding financial derivatives increased $1,595.3 billion to $29,878.6 billion, mostly reflecting increases in direct investment and portfolio investment. The $1,595.3 billion increase resulted from other changes in position of $836.0 billion and financial transactions of $759.4 billion. Other changes in position were driven by price increases on equity liabilities. Financial transactions reflected net U.S. incurrence of direct investment liabilities and net foreign purchases of U.S. debt securities that exceeded net foreign sales of U.S. equity and investment fund shares.
  • Financial derivatives decreased $190.4 billion to $2,147.7 billion, mostly reflecting a decrease in single-currency interest rate contracts.
C.png

Source: https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/2017/intinv416.htm

 
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I am a American citizen of Indian origin presently working in India.
You care for americano interests or indian interests?
It seems from your discourses you put murico corporate interests way beyond murico people or indian people's interests. Do you really care for any of those two countries?
 
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Following the release of US 2016 NIIP data by BEA, below is an analysis by PIIE

The Unsustainable Trajectory of US International Debt
Joseph E. Gagnon (PIIE) March 29, 2017 9:45 AM

On March 29 the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its estimate (link is external) of the US net international investment position (NIIP) as of year-end 2016. Foreign financial claims on US residents and institutions exceeded US claims on foreign residents and institutions by $8.4 trillion, implying a negative NIIP of ‑45 percent of GDP (figure 1).[1] Never in history has one country owed so much to the rest of the world.

The NIIP is projected to decline further to ‑53 percent of GDP by 2021.[2] The United States is approaching a range in which other countries have encountered difficulties. This post explains why the declining NIIP is a problem. A companion post discusses policies to solve the problem.

Untitled.png


In 2000, two leading professors of international finance—who are also the current and former chief economists of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Maurice Obstfeld of Berkeley and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard, wrote that the US trade deficit (figure 2) was not sustainable (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000).[3] Each year the NIIP declines (becomes more negative) by an amount equal to the trade deficit, and the NIIP is growing faster than US GDP. They estimated that returning trade to balance would require a real depreciation of the dollar of around 13 percent. Five years later, in light of the widening of the trade deficit to a record 6 percent of GDP, they calculated that eliminating the trade deficit would require a real depreciation of around 33 percent (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005). Independently, William Cline (2005) estimated that cutting the deficit in half would require a real depreciation of 17 percent. In a later paper, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007, 365) stated, “if greater financial integration allows bigger and more protracted deficits, however, the ultimate relative price adjustments will have to be more extreme.”

2.png


No country of even a modest size (GDP of at least US$50 billion) had a NIIP below roughly ‑60 percent of GDP in 2014 without experiencing a major reversal in its current account deficit, often accompanied by severe financial stress. Because it borrows entirely in its own currency, the United States likely will avoid a worst-case scenario, but the US and foreign economies nevertheless face serious adjustment costs that only rise as adjustment is delayed.

Recent research shows that workers who lose their jobs to rising imports face far greater difficulties in gaining reemployment than economists had believed (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016). These costs have already become a powerful political issue that threatens to roll back globalization. To the extent that shifts in trade are permanent, there is a strong case that the gains exceed the losses, at least in terms of aggregate income. But when imports increase beyond a sustainable level, the adjustment costs—including job losses—are a complete waste, especially as there will have to be adjustment costs—with further job losses—as economic activity shifts back into tradable industries at some future date.

Despite its negative NIIP, the United States reports higher earnings on its foreign assets than it pays on its foreign liabilities. This happy outcome does not imply that the US net debt is costless, as the excess of income over payments would be even larger if the NIIP were positive. Moreover, the excess of income is more apparent than real, as reported income and payments likely are distorted by the incentive to artificially book profits in low-tax jurisdictions, which depresses reported profits of foreign corporations in the United States and increases reported profits of US corporations overseas. In addition, a disproportionate share of foreign investment in the United States is held in Treasury securities and other ultra-safe debt instruments with record low interest rates. As US interest rates rise, payments to foreign investors also will rise.

Borrowing from the rest of the world might have made sense if it had financed higher investment in productive capital in the United States. But, the net debt has financed consumption not investment, as the US domestic investment rate has been among the lowest of the major economies. US domestic investment in the past 15 years averaged 21 percent of GDP, less than the world average of 24 percent and even less than investment in Japan or the euro area of 22 percent.[4]


Data Disclosure:

The data underlying this analysis are available here [zip].

References

Autor, David, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson. 2016. The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade. NBER Working Paper No. 21906. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Cline, William. 2005. The United States as a Debtor Nation. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Cline, William. 2016. Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates, November 2016. PIIE Policy Brief 16-22. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2000. Perspectives on OECD Economic Integration: Implications for US Current Account Adjustment. In Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges. Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2005. Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate Adjustments. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 67-146.

Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2007. The Unsustainable US Current Account Position Revisited. In G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, ed. Richard Clarida. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Notes

[1]
The BEA headline number includes US holdings of gold (about 1.5 percent of GDP), which are not a claim on foreigners. For comparability across countries, this post uses the definition of NIIP adopted by the External Wealth of Nations database (link is external) of Philip Lane and Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti.

[2]
Each year the projected NIIP is calculated as the sum of the previous year’s NIIP and the projected current account balance, taken from Cline (2016). Projected GDP is taken from the October 2016 IMF forecast. The projection ignores potential valuation adjustments, which averaged 0.8 percent of GDP over 1995-2014 and are highly volatile. Major causes of valuation adjustments are changes in equity market prices and exchange rates. Dollar depreciation tends to increase the value of US assets and has little effect on the value of US liabilities.

[3]
There are several measures of the trade balance. This post focuses on the current account balance, which is the broadest measure of income received from, and payments made to, the rest of the world.

[4]
IMF, World Economic Outlook database.



Source https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/unsustainable-trajectory-us-international-debt
 
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Following the release of US 2016 NIIP data by BEA, below is an analysis by PIIE

The Unsustainable Trajectory of US International Debt
Joseph E. Gagnon (PIIE) March 29, 2017 9:45 AM

On March 29 the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its estimate (link is external) of the US net international investment position (NIIP) as of year-end 2016. Foreign financial claims on US residents and institutions exceeded US claims on foreign residents and institutions by $8.4 trillion, implying a negative NIIP of ‑45 percent of GDP (figure 1).[1] Never in history has one country owed so much to the rest of the world.

The NIIP is projected to decline further to ‑53 percent of GDP by 2021.[2] The United States is approaching a range in which other countries have encountered difficulties. This post explains why the declining NIIP is a problem. A companion post discusses policies to solve the problem.

View attachment 387656

In 2000, two leading professors of international finance—who are also the current and former chief economists of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Maurice Obstfeld of Berkeley and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard, wrote that the US trade deficit (figure 2) was not sustainable (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000).[3] Each year the NIIP declines (becomes more negative) by an amount equal to the trade deficit, and the NIIP is growing faster than US GDP. They estimated that returning trade to balance would require a real depreciation of the dollar of around 13 percent. Five years later, in light of the widening of the trade deficit to a record 6 percent of GDP, they calculated that eliminating the trade deficit would require a real depreciation of around 33 percent (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005). Independently, William Cline (2005) estimated that cutting the deficit in half would require a real depreciation of 17 percent. In a later paper, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007, 365) stated, “if greater financial integration allows bigger and more protracted deficits, however, the ultimate relative price adjustments will have to be more extreme.”

View attachment 387657

No country of even a modest size (GDP of at least US$50 billion) had a NIIP below roughly ‑60 percent of GDP in 2014 without experiencing a major reversal in its current account deficit, often accompanied by severe financial stress. Because it borrows entirely in its own currency, the United States likely will avoid a worst-case scenario, but the US and foreign economies nevertheless face serious adjustment costs that only rise as adjustment is delayed.

Recent research shows that workers who lose their jobs to rising imports face far greater difficulties in gaining reemployment than economists had believed (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016). These costs have already become a powerful political issue that threatens to roll back globalization. To the extent that shifts in trade are permanent, there is a strong case that the gains exceed the losses, at least in terms of aggregate income. But when imports increase beyond a sustainable level, the adjustment costs—including job losses—are a complete waste, especially as there will have to be adjustment costs—with further job losses—as economic activity shifts back into tradable industries at some future date.

Despite its negative NIIP, the United States reports higher earnings on its foreign assets than it pays on its foreign liabilities. This happy outcome does not imply that the US net debt is costless, as the excess of income over payments would be even larger if the NIIP were positive. Moreover, the excess of income is more apparent than real, as reported income and payments likely are distorted by the incentive to artificially book profits in low-tax jurisdictions, which depresses reported profits of foreign corporations in the United States and increases reported profits of US corporations overseas. In addition, a disproportionate share of foreign investment in the United States is held in Treasury securities and other ultra-safe debt instruments with record low interest rates. As US interest rates rise, payments to foreign investors also will rise.

Borrowing from the rest of the world might have made sense if it had financed higher investment in productive capital in the United States. But, the net debt has financed consumption not investment, as the US domestic investment rate has been among the lowest of the major economies. US domestic investment in the past 15 years averaged 21 percent of GDP, less than the world average of 24 percent and even less than investment in Japan or the euro area of 22 percent.[4]


Data Disclosure:

The data underlying this analysis are available here [zip].


References

Autor, David, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson. 2016. The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade. NBER Working Paper No. 21906. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.


Cline, William. 2005. The United States as a Debtor Nation. Washington: Institute for International Economics.


Cline, William. 2016. Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates, November 2016. PIIE Policy Brief 16-22. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.


Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2000. Perspectives on OECD Economic Integration: Implications for US Current Account Adjustment. In Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges. Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.


Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2005. Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate Adjustments. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 67-146.


Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2007. The Unsustainable US Current Account Position Revisited. In G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, ed. Richard Clarida. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.


Notes

[1] The BEA headline number includes US holdings of gold (about 1.5 percent of GDP), which are not a claim on foreigners. For comparability across countries, this post uses the definition of NIIP adopted by the External Wealth of Nations database (link is external) of Philip Lane and Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti.


[2] Each year the projected NIIP is calculated as the sum of the previous year’s NIIP and the projected current account balance, taken from Cline (2016). Projected GDP is taken from the October 2016 IMF forecast. The projection ignores potential valuation adjustments, which averaged 0.8 percent of GDP over 1995-2014 and are highly volatile. Major causes of valuation adjustments are changes in equity market prices and exchange rates. Dollar depreciation tends to increase the value of US assets and has little effect on the value of US liabilities.

[3] There are several measures of the trade balance. This post focuses on the current account balance, which is the broadest measure of income received from, and payments made to, the rest of the world.


[4] IMF, World Economic Outlook database.



Source https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/unsustainable-trajectory-us-international-debt
Such a funny country.
Have money for immoral wars, but not on infra!
 
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