The Terminator
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its ur ill doings in our lands. read a portion of ur own Indian friend's article. that was not written by us at all.
"How to Make Proxy War Succeed in Baluchistan
By Dr Amarjit Singh
Date : 20 Dec , 2014
Implementation of the Baluch Proxy War:
So, inasmuch as India needs to foment Baluch rebellion, let’s apply the four principle requisites to the problem. First, there are an insufficient number of Baluch rebels available who will fight for independence. The total rebel strength is still not estimated at more than 5,000 armed fighters – perhaps as low as 2,000. This number is much too small to sustain an effective armed uprising. In contrast, the Free Syrian Army has a maximum of 50,000 fighters,7 including deserters from the Syrian Army, but is still in a tough face-off with the Syrian Army, which is much smaller and less professional than the Pakistani army.
In comparison, the Pakistani army is 450,000 strong, and so Pakistan can very easily suppress any armed rebellion by 2,000 Baluch rebels. That the people of Baluchistan may suffer in the process or that the province may become poorer is not of concern to Pakistani Punjabis. All that the Pakistani Punjabis want are the minerals and resources of Baluchistan, the rest being damned. Hence, an armed rebellion in Baluchistan may not be more than a bee sting for Pakistan that Pakistan can easily shrug and forget.
Pakistani resolve to retain Baluchistan is firm. Pakistan’s ISI and military is pro-active in weeding possible Baluch rebels, often kidnapping innocent men and women in the process.
Thus we see that requisite 1 is difficult to fulfill, notwithstanding British, American, Iranian, and Indian wishes in the matter. Requisite 2 is hard to come by, because effective weaponry is not being given yet, in spite of what people may believe. The Western powers are forever wary that their assistance may fall into the wrong hands. India’s hardware assistance is miniscule. Russian assistance stopped in 1989, even though the Russians first raised the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA). But, with RAW and RAD (Russian Intelligence) help, America trained some 30 Baluch fighters in 2002 that RAW helped select.8 But anyone can understand that 30 fighters is a pitiable joke for a huge province! Other reports claim that numerous training camps have come up across Pakistan,9 but how many fighters do they produce? Thirty per camp in ten camps? This is still an extremely small number to stir a rebellion. The numbers of camps that have been discovered and destroyed by Pakistani forces are also significant, so India’s results are certainly not 100%, but closer to 50%, in all likelihood. Thus, the proxy war situation is even more pathetic than expected. The deaths and assaults reported for Baluchistan are of Baluch by Taliban and Pakistani security forces rather than the other way around. Baluch rebel assaults on Pakistani military forces are all but non-existent. If the rebellion were meaningful and strong, more Pakistani military casualties would be registered. Foreign weapon assistance, including from India, is minimal.10 The assistance from America and Britain has slid to lip-service and hearings at the US Congress. The action on the ground is far from meaningful. The rhetoric, as usual, especially in Indian security analysis circles is hyped up. They catch a mouse and claim to have caught a tiger! This is typical Indian personality, characterized by some degree of inferiority. The truth is that the Baluch proxy war is close to dreaming of action but having none of it; impotence is a better way to characterize it. India knows how to count its chickens, but not hatch them.
On the other hand, Pakistani resolve to retain Baluchistan is firm. Pakistan’s ISI and military is pro-active in weeding possible Baluch rebels, often kidnapping innocent men and women in the process. “In the period from 2003-2012 it is estimated that 8,000 people were kidnapped by Pakistani security forces in the province. In 2008 alone an estimated 1,102 Baluch people disappeared. There have also been [widespread] reports of torture.”11 These reports widely resemble Indian army actions in Nagaland in the 1960s and Punjab in the 1980s, and even now both those provinces are firmly in Indian territory. Pakistan has systematically eliminated members of the BLA and other would-be rebels, even though General Kakar, former Chief of Army of Staff of Pakistan, called Musharraf’s actions in killing Bugti a mistake.12 The will of the Pakistani political and military machinery to squash Baluch rebellion is strong; this thereby indicates that requisite 3 is not adequate for a rebellion to succeed.
Thus, requisites 1, 2, and 3 are wanting. However, it is possible to tilt these by using requisite 4 in such a way that it overcomes all other requisites. Thus, by the Indian army opening its guns all along the 1,850 mile Indo-Pak border, and stepping up weapon supplies to the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA), much as it did to the Mukti Bahini, India can hope to tie down Pakistani forces on its Eastern front, while military installations in Baluchistan can be torched by rebels, and bombarded by Indian naval gunships and missile ships. Much as India loaned its Bengali officers and soldiers to the Mukti Bahini in 1971, it may have to do something similar with the BLA, albeit in a different shape. Again, Indian Special Forces and Marcos can be a great asset here, though the Indian establishment can brainstorm other options. Cooperation with Iran in this respect must not be ruled out, but must be negotiated. USA and Britain must be more closely consulted. For instance, Iran could press troops on the Baluchistan border, or US troops could come down into Quetta in Baluchistan from Kandahar, even if these are distant dreams, because the USA is simply scared to send troops into Pakistan for various military, economic, and political reasons. Nevertheless, without external military intervention it is difficult to see how Pakistan will relinquish control over a huge, mineral-rich province.
Eventually, the paltry Indian assistance to the Baluch Liberation Army must increase by gargantuan amounts for the liberation action to succeed.
The execution of the proxy war will also require allocation of a special status by the Indian cabinet and a large budget to go with it. Hence, requisites 1, 2, and 4 can be ramped up and the will of resistance that is in requisite 3 can be gradually broken by the measures mentioned. This is how the proxy war can succeed; else its success is only in the imagination of dreamers, because even a weak and fatigued Pakistan will not relinquish its hold on Baluchistan.
Conclusion
Four requisites for the success of a proxy war were outlined, and examples given from world situations. In conclusion, it sounds unlikely that a proxy war as currently being waged by India or the Western powers in Baluchistan can severe Baluchistan from Pakistan, even though they need it for their strategic interests. The four requisites to make this happen in Baluchistan simply don’t seem to exist, and Pakistan’s will to retain Baluchistan is strong. However, the deficiency in requisites can be overcome if India ties down Pakistani forces along the Indo-Pak border after opening its guns in fire along the entire 1,850 mile border. This must be supplemented by loaning Special Forces soldiers and officers to the Baluch National Army to damage and destroy Pakistani installations in Baluchistan. Eventually, the paltry Indian assistance to the Baluch Liberation Army must increase by gargantuan amounts for the liberation action to succeed. In the end, a freedom fight and proxy war in Baluchistan is morally justified for the human rights abuses and excesses by Islamabad in Baluchistan. It is undeniable that a successful proxy war in Baluchistan is in India’s strategic interest. This proxy war can be fought as overtly as covertly because India has been at war with Pakistan for 65 years."
Now go have some burnol too
