What's new

What is Electronic Warfare? - The Basics

SvenSvensonov

PROFESSIONAL
Joined
Oct 15, 2014
Messages
1,617
Reaction score
207
Country
United States
Location
Sweden
I put this together for those interested in electronic warfare, it's just the basics, but it provides a good foundation for further lessons that I will provide throughout the coming months. All information is referenced from publicly available US military documents as well as my own experience with ECM and ECCM. No classified information will be provided. Information can be cross-referenced with future lessons/posts using the JP/FM codes provided within the document.

*Example - FM 1-12 = document FM, Chapter 1 section 1-12.

This first document is has the FM code, FM 1.XX to be more accurate as it is the first chapter. Code designated post JP will follow at a yet-to-be-determined date (still working on it).

*EDIT - this document is now complete, all sections posted.

*a "z" prior to a word indicates a line-break, but the document didn't translate well from Microsoft Word - where I put the document together. Sorry for that inconvenience.

SvenSvensonov

Electronic Warfare Overview


OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-1.An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An operational environment includes physical areas—the air, land, maritime, and space domains. It also includes the information that shapes the operational environment as well as enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems relevant to a joint operation. Joint planners analyze operational environments in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. To these variables Army doctrine adds two more: physical environment and time. (See FM 3-0 for additional information on the operational variables). Army leaders use operational variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they are conducting operations.

1-2.Army leaders use mission variables to synthesize operational variables and tactical-level information with local knowledge about conditions relevant to their mission. They use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements that directly affect their mission. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army tactical leaders narrow their focus to six mission variables known as METT-TC. They are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations. The mission variables outline the situation as it applies to a specific Army unit.

1-3.Commanders employ and integrate their unit’s capabilities and actions within their operational environment to achieve a desired end state. Through analyzing their operational environment, commanders understand how the results of friendly, adversary, and neutral actions may impact that end state. During military operations, both friendly and enemy commanders depend on the flow of information to make informed decisions. This flow of information depends on the electronic systems and devices used to communicate, navigate, sense, store, and process information.

INFORMATION AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

1-4.Commanders plan for and operate electronic systems and the weapon systems that depend on them in an intensive and non-permissive electromagnetic environment. They ensure the flow of information required for their decision making. Within the electromagnetic environment, electronic systems and devices operate in the electromagnetic spectrum.

1-5.The electromagnetic spectrum has been used for commercial and military applications for over a century. However, the full potential for its use as the primary enabler of military operations is not yet fully appreciated. New technologies are expanding beyond the traditional radio frequency spectrum. They include high-power microwaves and directed-energy weapons. These new technologies are part of an electronic warfare (EW) revolution by military forces. Just as friendly forces leverage the electromagnetic spectrum to their advantage, so do capable enemies use the electromagnetic spectrum to threaten friendly force operations. The threat is compounded by the growth of a wireless world and the increasingly sophisticated use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies.

1-6.Adversaries and enemies, from small and single actors to large state, multinational, and non-state actors, use the most modern technology. Such technology is moving into the cellular and satellite communications area. Most military and commercial operations rely on electromagnetic technologies and are susceptible to the inherent vulnerabilities associated with their use. This reliance requires Army forces to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum (within their operational environment) with the same authority that they dominate traditional land warfare operations. Emerging electromagnetic technologies offer expanded EW capabilities. They dynamically affect the electromagnetic spectrum through delivery and integration with other types of emerging weapons and capabilities. Examples are directed-energy weapons, high-powered microwaves, lasers, infrared, and electro-optical and wireless networks and devices.

1-7.In any conflict, commanders attempt to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum. They do this by locating, targeting, exploiting, disrupting, degrading, deceiving, denying, or destroying the enemy’s electronic systems that support military operations or deny the spectrum’s use by friendly forces. The increasing portability and affordability of sophisticated electronic equipment guarantees that the electromagnetic environment in which forces operate will become even more complex. To ensure unimpeded access to and use of the electromagnetic spectrum, commanders plan, prepare, execute, and assess EW operations against a broad set of targets within the electromagnetic spectrum.


DIVISIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1-8.Electronic warfare is defined as military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

ELECTRONIC ATTACK

1-9.Electronic attack is a division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires.

13.1). Electronic attack includes— zActions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception.

z Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).

z Offensive and defensive activities including countermeasures.

1-10.Common types of electronic attack include spot, barrage, and sweep electromagnetic jamming. Electronic attack actions also include various electromagnetic deception techniques such as false target or duplicate target generation. (See paragraphs 1-23 to 1-31 for further discussion of electronic attack activities.)

1-11.Directed energy is an umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles (JP 1-02). A directed-energy weapon uses directed energy primarily as a direct means to damage or destroy an enemy’s equipment, facilities, and personnel. In addition to destructive effects, directed-energy weapon systems support area denial and crowd control. (See appendix A for more information on directed energy.)

1-12.Examples of offensive electronic attack include— z Jamming enemy radar or electronic command and control systems.

z Using antiradiation missiles to suppress enemy air defenses (antiradiation weapons use radiated energy emitted from the target as their mechanism for guidance onto targeted emitters).

z Using electronic deception techniques to confuse enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

z Using directed-energy weapons to disable an enemy’s equipment or capability.

1-13.Defensive electronic attack uses the electromagnetic spectrum to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment. Examples include self-protection and other protection measures such as use of expendables (flares and active decoys), jammers, towed decoys, directed-energy infrared countermeasure systems, and counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device systems. (See JP 3-13.1 for more discussion of electronic attack.)

ELECTRONIC PROTECTION

1-14.Electronic protection is a division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-13.1). For example, electronic protection includes actions taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as frequency agility in a radio, or variable pulse repetition frequency in radar. Electronic protection should not be confused with self-protection. Both defensive electronic attack and electronic protection protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment. However, electronic protection protects from the effects of electronic attack (friendly and enemy), while defensive electronic attack primarily protects against lethal attacks by denying enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum to guide or trigger weapons.

1-15.During operations, electronic protection includes, but is not limited to, the application of training and procedures for countering enemy electronic attack. Army commanders and forces understand the threat and vulnerability of friendly electronic equipment to enemy electronic attack and take appropriate actions to safeguard friendly combat capability from exploitation and attack. Electronic protection measures minimize the enemy’s ability to conduct electronic warfare support (electronic warfare support is discussed in paragraphs 1-18 to 1-20) and electronic attack operations successfully against friendly forces. To protect friendly combat capabilities, units— zRegularly brief force personnel on the EW threat.

z Ensure that electronic system capabilities are safeguarded during exercises, workups, and predeployment training.

z Coordinate and de-conflict electromagnetic spectrum usage.

z Provide training during routine home station planning and training activities on appropriate electronic protection active and passive measures.

z Take appropriate actions to minimize the vulnerability of friendly receivers to enemy jamming (such as reduced power, brevity of transmissions, and directional antennas).

1-16. Electronic protection also includes spectrum management. The spectrum manager works for the G-6 or S-6 and plays a key role in the coordination and de-confliction of spectrum resources allocated to the force. Spectrum managers or their direct representatives participate in the planning for EW operations.

1-17. The development and acquisition of communications and electronic systems includes electronic protection requirements to clarify performance parameters. Army forces design their equipment to limit inherent vulnerabilities. If electronic attack vulnerabilities are detected, then units must review these programs.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

1-18.Electronic warfare support is a division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under the direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations (JP 3-13.1).

1-19.Electronic warfare support systems are a source of information for immediate decisions involving electronic attack, electronic protection, avoidance, targeting, and other tactical employments of forces.

Electronic warfare support systems collect data and produce information or intelligence to— z Corroborate other sources of information or intelligence. z Conduct or direct electronic attack operations.

z Initiate self-protection measures. z Task weapon systems.

z Support electronic protection efforts.

z Create or update EW databases. z Support information tasks.

1-20.Electronic warfare support and signals intelligence missions use the same resources. The two differ in the detected information’s intended use, the degree of analytical effort expended, the detail of information provided, and the time lines required. Like tactical signals intelligence, electronic warfare support missions respond to the immediate requirements of a tactical commander. Signals intelligence above the tactical level is under the operational control of the National Security Agency and directly supports the overarching national security mission. Resources that collect tactical-level electronic warfare support data can simultaneously collect national-level signals intelligence. (See FM 2-0 for more information on signals intelligence.)

ACTIVITIES AND TERMINOLOGY

1-21.Although new equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures continue to be developed, the physics of electromagnetic energy remains constant. Hence, effective EW activities remain the same despite changes in hardware and tactics. Principal EW activities are discussed in the following paragraphs.

PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES
1-22.Principal EW activities support full spectrum operations by exploiting the opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The numerous EW activities are categorized by the EW subdivisions with which they are most closely associated: electronic attack, electronic warfare support, and electronic protection. JP 3-13.1 discusses these principal activities in detail.

Electronic Attack Activities
1-23.Activities related to electronic attack are either offensive or defensive and include— zCountermeasures.

z Electromagnetic deception. z Electromagnetic intrusion. z Electromagnetic jamming. z Electromagnetic pulse. zElectronic probing.

Countermeasures
1-24.Countermeasures are that form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity (JP 1-02). They can be deployed preemptively or re-actively. Devices and techniques used for EW countermeasures include electro-optical-infrared countermeasures and radio frequency countermeasures.

1-25.Electro-optical-infrared countermeasures consist of any device or technique employing electro-optical-infrared materials or technology that is intended to impair or counter the effectiveness of enemy activity, particularly with respect to precision guided weapons and sensor systems. Electro-optical-infrared is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum between the high end of the far infrared and the low end of ultraviolet. Electro-optical-infrared countermeasures may use laser and broadband jammers, smokes/aerosols, signature suppressants, decoys, pyrotechnics/pyrophorics, high-energy lasers, or directed infrared energy countermeasures (JP 3-13.1).

1-26.Radio frequency countermeasures consist of any device or technique employing radio frequency materials or technology that is intended to impair the effectiveness of or counter enemy activity, particularly with respect to precision guided weapons and sensor systems (JP 3-13.1).

Electromagnetic Deception
1-27.Electromagnetic deception is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability (JP 3-13.4). Among the types of electromagnetic deception are the following:

z Manipulative electromagnetic deception involves actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, electromagnetic telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces.

z Simulative electromagnetic deception involves actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.

z Imitative electromagnetic deception introduces electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitates enemy emissions.

Electromagnetic Intrusion
1-28.Electromagnetic intrusion is the intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner, with the objective of deceiving operators or of causing confusion (JP 1-02).

Electromagnetic Jamming
1-29.Electromagnetic jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability (JP 1-02).

Electromagnetic Pulse
1-30.Electromagnetic pulse is the electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges (JP 1-02).

Electronic Probing
1-31.Electronic probing is the intentional radiation designed to be introduced into the devices or systems of potential enemies for the purpose of learning the functions and operational capabilities of the devices (JP 1-02). This activity is coordinated through joint or inter-agency channels and supported by Army forces.

Electronic Warfare Support Activities
1-32.Activities related to electronic warfare support include— z Electronic reconnaissance. z Electronic intelligence. z Electronics security.

Electronic Reconnaisance
1-33.Electronic reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations (JP 1-02).

Electronic Intelligence
1-34.Electronic intelligence is technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources (JP 1-02).

Electronics Security
1-35.Electronics security is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of non-communications electromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar (JP 1-02).

Electronic Protection Activities
1-36.Activities related to electronic protection include— z Electromagnetic hardening. z Electromagnetic interference. z Electronic masking.

z Electronic warfare reprogramming. z Emission control. z Spectrum management. zWartime reserve modes. z Electromagnetic compatibility.

Electromagnetic Hardening
1-37.Electromagnetic hardening consists of action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/or equipment by filtering, attenuating, grounding, bonding, and/or shielding against undesirable effects of electromagnetic energy (JP 1-02).

Electromagnetic Interference
1-38.Electromagnetic interference is any electromagnetic disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics and electrical equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of electronic warfare, or unintentionally, as a result of spurious emissions and responses, inter-modulation products and the like (JP 1-02).

Electronic Masking
1-39.Electronic masking is the controlled radiation of electromagnetic energy on friendly frequencies in a manner to protect the emissions of friendly communications and electronic systems against enemy electronic warfare support measures/signals intelligence, without significantly degrading the operation of friendly systems (JP 1-02).

Electronic Warfare Reprogramming
1-40.Electronic warfare reprogramming is the deliberate alteration or modification of electronic warfare or target sensing systems, or the tactics and procedures that employ them, in response to validated changes in equipment, tactics, or the electromagnetic environment. These changes may be the result of deliberate actions on the part of friendly, adversary, or third parties; or may be brought about by electromagnetic interference or other inadvertent phenomena. The purpose of electronic warfare reprogramming is to maintain or enhance the effectiveness of electronic warfare and target sensing system equipment. Electronic warfare reprogramming includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems, and intelligence collection systems (JP 3-13.1).

Emission Control
1-41.Emission control is the selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing transmissions for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors; b. mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c. enemy interference with the ability to execute a military deception plan (JP 1-02).

Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
1-42.Electromagnetic spectrum management is planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. The objective of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference (JP 6-0).

Wartime Reserve Modes
1-43.Wartime reserve modes are characteristics and operating procedures of sensors, communications, navigation aids, threat recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that will contribute to military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but could be exploited or neutralized if known in advance. Wartime reserve modes are deliberately held in reserve for wartime or emergency use and seldom, if ever, applied or intercepted prior to such use (JP 1-02).

Electromagnetic Compatibility
1-44.Electromagnetic compatibility is the ability of systems, equipment, and devices that utilize the electromagnetic spectrum to operate in their intended operational environments without suffering unacceptable degradation or causing unintentional degradation because of electromagnetic radiation or response. It involves the application of sound electromagnetic spectrum management; system, equipment, and device design configuration that ensures interference-free operation; and clear concepts and doctrines that maximize operational effectiveness (JP 1-02).

APPLICATION TERMINOLOGY
1-45.EW capabilities are applied from the air, land, sea, and space by manned, unmanned, attended, or unattended systems. Units employ EW capabilities to achieve the desired lethal or nonlethal effect on a given target. Units maintain freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum while controlling the use of it by the enemy. Regardless of the application, units employing EW capabilities must use appropriate levels of control and protection of the electromagnetic spectrum. In this way, they avoid adversely affecting friendly forces. (Improper EW actions must be avoided because they may cause fratricide or eliminate high-value intelligence targets.)

1-46.In the context of EW application, units use several terms to facilitate control and protection of the electromagnetic spectrum. Terms used in EW application include control, detection, denial, deception, disruption and degradation, protection, and destruction. The three subdivisions of EW—electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support—are specified within the following descriptions.

Control
1-47.In the context of EW, control of the electromagnetic spectrum is achieved by effectively coordinating friendly systems while countering enemy systems. Electronic attack limits enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic protection secures use of the electromagnetic spectrum for friendly forces, and electronic warfare support enables the commander’s accurate assessment of the situation. All three are integrated for effectiveness. Commanders ensure maximum integration of communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and information tasks.

Detection
1-48.In the context of EW, detection is the active and passive monitoring of the operational environment for radio frequency, electro-optic, laser, infrared, and ultraviolet electromagnetic threats. Detection is the first step in EW for exploitation, targeting, and defensive planning. Friendly forces maintain the capability to detect and characterize interference as hostile jamming or unintentional electromagnetic interference.

Denial
1-49.In the context of EW, denial is controlling the information an enemy receives via the electromagnetic spectrum and preventing the acquisition of accurate information about friendly forces. Degradation uses traditional jamming techniques, expendable countermeasures, destructive measures, or network applications. These range from limited effects up to complete denial of usage.

Deception
1-50.In the context of EW, deception is confusing or misleading an enemy by using some combination of human-produced, mechanical, or electronic means. Through use of the electromagnetic spectrum, EW deception manipulates the enemy’s decision loop, making it difficult to establish accurate situational awareness.

Disruption and Degradation
1-51.In the context of EW, disruption and degradation techniques interfere with the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum to limit enemy combat capabilities. This is achieved with electronic jamming, electronic deception, and electronic intrusion. These enhance attacks on hostile forces and act as force multipliers by increasing enemy uncertainty, while reducing uncertainty for friendly forces. Advanced electronic attack techniques offer the opportunity to non-destructively disrupt or degrade enemy infrastructure.

Protection
1-52.In the context of EW, protection is the use of physical properties; operational tactics, techniques, and procedures; and planning and employment processes to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This includes ensuring that offensive EW activities do not electronically destroy or degrade friendly intelligence sensors or communications systems. Protection is achieved by component hardening, emission control, and frequency management and de-confliction. Frequency management and de-confliction include the capability to detect, characterize, geolocate, and mitigate electromagnetic interference that affects operations. Protection includes other means to counterattack and defeat enemy attempts to control the electromagnetic spectrum. Additionally, organizations such as a joint force commander’s EW staff or a joint EW coordination cell enhance electronic protection by de-conflicting EW efforts.

Destruction
1-53.Destruction, in the context of EW, is the elimination of targeted enemy systems. Sensors and command and control nodes are lucrative targets because their destruction strongly influences the enemy’s perceptions and ability to coordinate actions. Various weapons and techniques ranging from conventional munitions and directed energy weapons to network attacks can destroy enemy systems that use the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare support provides target location and related information. While destroying enemy equipment can effectively deny the enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum, the duration of denial will depend on the enemy’s ability to reconstitute. (See JP 3-13.1.)

MEANS VERSUS EFFECTS
1-54.EW means are applied against targets to create a full range of lethal and nonlethal effects. Choosing a specific EW capability depends on the desired effect on the target and other considerations, such as time sensitivity or limiting collateral damage. EW capabilities provide commanders with additional options for achieving their objectives. During major combat operations there may be circumstances where commanders want to limit the physical damage on a given target. Under such circumstances, the EW staff articulates clearly to the commander the lethal and nonlethal effects EW capabilities can achieve. For example, a target might be enemy radar mounted on a fixed tower. Two EW options to defeat the radar could be to jam the radar or destroy it with antiradiation missiles. If the commander desired to limit damage to the tower, an electronic attack jamming platform would be preferred. In circumstances where commanders cannot sufficiently limit undesired effects such as collateral damage, they may be constrained from applying physical force. The EW staff articulates succinctly how EW capabilities can support actions to achieve desired effects and provide lethal and nonlethal options for commanders.


SUMMARY
1-55.As the modern battlefield becomes more technologically sophisticated, military operations continue to be executed in an increasingly complex electromagnetic environment. Therefore, commanders and staffs need to thoroughly understand and articulate how the electromagnetic environment impacts their operations and how friendly EW operations can be used to gain an advantage. Commanders and staffs use the terminology presented in this chapter to describe the application of EW. This ensures a common understanding and consistency within plans, orders, standing operating procedures, and directives.

@Slav Defence - as promised here's the first of the Electronic Warfare threads I will be providing. I really hope this helps and will provide good information to improve the quality of PDF. More will be following as soon as I can get them finished.
 
Last edited:
This is section 2.XX of document FM. FM 3.XX to follow as soon as it's finished.

SvenSvensonov

Electronic Warfare in Full Spectrum Operations


Information technology is becoming universally available. Most enemies rely on communications and computer networks to make and implement decisions. Radios remain the backbone of tactical military command and control architectures. However, most communications relayed over radio networks are becoming digital as more computers link networks through transmitted frequencies. Therefore, the ability to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is central to full spectrum operations. This chapter describes how commanders apply electronic warfare capabilities to support full spectrum operations.

THE ROLE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2-1. Army electronic warfare (EW) operations seek to provide the land force commander with capabilities to support full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations consist of the purposeful, simultaneous combination of offense, defense, and stability or civil support. The goal of full spectrum operations is to change the operational environment so that peaceful processes are dominant. Nonetheless, operational environments are complex; commanders must conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. The Army maintains flexible forces with balanced capabilities and capacities. These flexible and balanced forces remain able to conduct major operations while executing other day-to-day smaller-scale operations. (See FM 3-0.)

2-2. Overseas, Army forces conduct full spectrum operations (offensive, defensive, and stability) simultaneously as part of a joint force. Within the United States, Army forces conduct homeland defense and civil support operations as part of homeland security. Army electronic warfare (EW) operations seek to provide the land force commander with capabilities to support full spectrum operations.

2-3.Full spectrum operations involve more than executing all elements of operations simultaneously. They require that commanders and staffs consider their unit’s capabilities and capacities relative to each of the elements of full spectrum operations. Commanders consider how much can be accomplished simultaneously, how much can be phased, and what nonorganic resources may be available to solve problems. The same applies to EW in support of full spectrum operations. Commanders and staffs determine which resident and joint force EW capabilities to leverage in support of each element of full spectrum operations. Weighting the EW focus of effort within each of the elements assists commanders and their staffs in visualizing how EW capabilities can support their operations. Commanders combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. As they apply the appropriate level of EW effort to support these elements, commanders can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative within the electromagnetic environment.

THE APPLICATION OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2-4.To support full spectrum operations and achieve the goal of electromagnetic spectrum dominance, commanders fully integrate EW capabilities and apply them across the elements of combat power. Leadership and information are applied through, and multiply the effects of, the other six elements of combat power. Paragraphs 2-5 through 2-16 discuss the elements of combat power and how EW capabilities can support them.

IN SUPPORT OF LEADERSHIP
2-5.Leadership initiates the conditions for success. Commanders balance the ability to mass the effects of lethal and nonlethal systems with the requirements to deploy and sustain the units that employ those systems. Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential. Today’s operational environments require leaders who are competent, confident, and informed in using and protecting combat capabilities that operate within the electromagnetic spectrum. Commanders plan, prepare, execute, and assess EW operations to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum within their operational environment. To accomplish this domination, commanders effectively apply and integrate EW operations across the warfighting functions.

IN SUPPORT OF INFORMATION TASKS AND CAPABILITIES
2-6.Information is the element of combat power consisting of meaningful facts, data, and impressions used to develop a common situational understanding, to enable battle command, and to affect the operational environment. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of combat power.) In modern conflict, gaining information superiority has become as important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (JP 3-13). To achieve this operational advantage, Army commanders direct efforts that contribute to information superiority. These efforts fall into four primary areas: Army information tasks; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; knowledge management; and information management. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of information superiority.)

2-7.The Army information tasks are used to shape a commander’s operational environment. These tasks are information engagement, command and control warfare, information protection, operations security, and military deception. Information capabilities can be used to produce both destructive and constructive effects. For example, destructive actions use information capabilities against the enemy’s command and control system and other assets to reduce their combat capability. Constructive actions use information capabilities to inform or influence a particular audience or as a means to affect enemy morale. Although applicable to all elements of full spectrum operations, EW capabilities play a major role in enabling and supporting the execution of the command and control warfare and information protection tasks.

2-8.Command and control warfare is the integrated use of physical attack, electronic warfare, and computer network operations, supported by intelligence, to degrade, destroy, and exploit an enemy’s or adversary’s command and control system or to deny information to it (FM 3-0). It includes operations intended to degrade, destroy, and exploit an enemy’s or adversary’s ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum and computer and telecommunications networks. Information protection is active or passive measures that protect and defend friendly information and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant friendly information. Information protection denies enemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes (FM 3-0).

2-9.To support these information tasks, commanders ensure EW is coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with all other tasks. This occurs within the operations process through the various functional and integrating cells.


IN SUPPORT OF THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
2-10.EW capabilities support each of the six warfighting functions. Examples of specific supporting capabilities are given in the following paragraphs.

Movement and Maneuver
2-11.The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat (FM 3-0). EW capabilities that enable the movement and maneuver of Army forces include— zSuppression and destruction of enemy integrated air defenses.

z Denial of enemy information systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors.

z Target designation and range finding.

z Protection from effects of friendly and enemy EW.

z Lethal and nonlethal effects against enemy combat capability (personnel, facilities, and equipment).

z Threat warning and direction finding.

z Use of the electromagnetic spectrum to counter improvised explosive device operations. z Electromagnetic spectrum obscuration, low observability, and multispectral stealth.

Intelligence
2-12.The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations (FM 3-0). It includes tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. EW capabilities that enable the intelligence warfighting function include— zIncreased access for intelligence collection assets (systems and personnel) by reducing anti-access, antipersonnel, and anti-systems threats.

z Increased capability to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy in support of targeting, information tasks, and future operations.

z Increased capability in providing threat recognition and threat warning to the force. z Indications and warning of threat emitters and radar. z Denial and destruction of counter-intelligence, -surveillance, and -reconnaissance systems.

Fires
2-13.The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, joint fires, and command and control warfare, including nonlethal fires, through the targeting process (FM 3-0). It includes tasks associated with integrating command and control warfare. EW capabilities that enable the fires warfighting function include— zDetection and location of targets radiating electromagnetic energy.

z Disruption, degradation, and destruction options for servicing targets. This includes information systems, targets requiring precision strike (such as minimal collateral damage and minimal weapons signature), hard and deeply buried targets, weapons of mass destruction, and power generation and infrastructure targets. zControl, dispersion, or neutralization of combatant and noncombatant personnel with non-persistent effects and minimum collateral damage (scalable and nonlethal).

z Area denial capabilities against vehicles, vessels, and aircraft.

Sustainment
2-14.The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (FM 3-0). EW capabilities that enable the sustainment warfighting function include— zProtection of sustainment forces from friendly and adversary use of EW in static or mobile environments. zEnhanced electromagnetic environment situational awareness through the interception, detection, identification, and location of adversary electromagnetic emissions and by providing indications and warnings. (This information can assist in convoy planning, asset tracking, and targeting of potential threats to sustainment operations.)

z Countering improvised explosive devices to support ground lines of communication (includes counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device systems and countering other threats triggered through the electromagnetic spectrum, such as lasers).

z Spectrum de-confliction and emissions control procedures in support of sustainment command and control.

z Electromagnetic spectrum obscuration, low-observability, and multispectral stealth (These capabilities provide protection during sustainment operations).

Command and Control
2-15.The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction (FM 3-0). EW capabilities that enable the command and control warfighting function include— zProtection of friendly critical information systems and command and control nodes, personnel, and facilities from the effects of friendly and adversary EW operations.

z Control of friendly EW systems through—

„ Frequency de-confliction.

„ Asset tracking.

„ Employment execution.

„ Reprogramming of EW systems.

„ Registration of all electromagnetic spectrum emitting devices with the spectrum manager (both prior to deployment and when new systems or devices are added to the deployed force).

z The development of EW command and control tools to enhance required coordination between Army and joint EW operations.

z EW operations integration, coordination, de-confliction, and synchronization through the EW working group

z Increased commander situational understanding through improved common operational picture input of electromagnetic spectrum- and EW-related information.

z EW operations monitoring and assessment.

Protection
2-16.The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power (FM 3-0). EW capabilities and actions that enable the protection warfighting function include— zEnhanced electromagnetic spectrum situational awareness through the interception, detection, identification, and location of adversary electromagnetic emissions used to providing indications and warnings of threat emitters and radars.

z Denial, disruption, or destruction of electromagnetic-spectrum-triggered improvised explosive devices and enemy air defense systems.

z Deception of enemy forces.

z Electromagnetic spectrum obscuration, low-observability, and multispectral stealth.

z EW countermeasures for platform survivability (air and ground). z Area denial capabilities (lethal and nonlethal) against personnel, vehicles, and aircraft.

z Protection of friendly personnel, equipment, and facilities from friendly and enemy electronic attack, including friendly information systems and information. (This includes the coordination and use of both airborne and ground-based electronic attack with higher and adjacent units.)

SUMMARY
2-17.Army EW operations provide the land force commander capabilities to support full spectrum operations (offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations). EW supports full spectrum operations by applying EW capabilities to detect, deny, deceive, disrupt, or degrade and destroy enemy combat capability and by controlling and protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. These capabilities—when applied across the warfighting functions—enable commanders to address a broad set of electromagnetic-spectrum-related targets to gain and maintain an advantage within the electromagnetic spectrum.
 
@SvenSvensonov

Wonderful post:D
This technology is very useful and wonderful in many cases,
For example,
Two terrorists organizations are competent and enemy of each other have planned to destroy you.
With this technology,what if you track their messages without letting them to find out or divert messages taking place b/w members of TA(TTP for instance) against TB( fazullah group) and divert it to TB without disclosing your presence. This is done so that they began to fight with each other and you get a chance to break them and to destroy them.Also to divert their attention from your army to one of their temporary ally?Is it possible?how?
@Horus @WebMaster and others..please make it featured:D
@jhungary take a look at this-
 
This is section 3.XX of document FM. FM 4.XX to follow as soon as it's finished.

SvenSvensonov

Electronic Warfare Organization


A flexible organizational framework and capable, proficient electronic warfare personnel enable the commander’s electronic warfare capability on the battlefield. This chapter discusses a framework that ensures coordination, synchronization, and integration of electronic warfare into full spectrum operations. This electronic warfare organizational framework supports current operations and is adaptable for future operations.

ORGANIZING ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS
3-1.Operational challenges across the electromagnetic spectrum are expanding rapidly. As Army electronic warfare (EW) capabilities expand to meet these challenges, the organizational design required to coordinate, synchronize, integrate, and de-conflict these capabilities must transform as rapidly. To meet current and future requirements, command and control of EW operations is built around the concept of EW working groups.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND, CORPS, AND DIVISION LEVELS
3-2.A working group is a temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function (FMI 5-0.1). The EW working group, when established, is responsible to the G-3 through the fires cell. An EW working group usually includes representation from the G-2, G-3, G-5, G-6, and G-7. (Joint doctrine calls this organization the EW coordination cell.) The EW working groups facilitate the internal (Army) and external (joint) integration, synchronization, and de-confliction of EW actions with fires, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, sustainment and protection warfighting functions. Normally, EW working groups do not add additional structure to an existing organization. Working groups vary in size and composition based on echelon.

3-3.Normally, the senior EW officer heads the EW working group and is accountable to the G-3 for integrating EW requirements. Working within the fires cell, the EW officer coordinates directly with the fire support coordinator for the integration of EW into the targeting process. This ensures EW capabilities are fully integrated with all other effects. Additional staff representation within EW working groups may include a fire support coordinator, a spectrum manager, a space operations officer, and liaison officers as required. Depending on the echelon, liaisons could include joint, interagency, and multinational representatives. When an Army headquarters serves as the headquarters of a joint task force or joint force land component command, the Army headquarters’ working group becomes the joint force EW coordination cell.

3-4.When Army forces are employed as part of a joint or multinational force, they normally have EW representatives supporting higher headquarters’ EW coordination organizations. These organizations may include the joint force commander’s EW staff or the information operations cell within a joint task force. Sometimes a component EW organization may be designated as the joint EW coordination cell. The overall structure of the combatant force and the level of EW to be conducted determine the structure of the joint EW coordination cell. The organization to accomplish the required EW coordination and functions varies by echelon.


3-5.Regardless of the organizational framework employed, EW working groups perform specific tasks


BRIGADE LEVEL
3-6.At the brigade level, the EW officer heads the EW working group and is accountable to the S-3 for integrating EW requirements. Additional staff representation within EW working groups at the brigade combat team level may include the fire support coordinator, EW targeting technician, S-2, S-6, spectrum manager, S-7, and liaison officers as required.

3-7.The EW working group at the brigade combat team coordinates with the higher echelon EW working groups. The brigade working group plays an important role in requesting and integrating joint air and ground EW support. It also manages the brigade’s organic EW “fight” within the fires cell. The EW officer works as part of the brigade combat team staff. In this position, the EW officer synchronizes, integrates, and de-conflicts brigade combat team EW actions with the EW working group at division level. Although EW falls under the control of the S-3, EW officers are fully immersed in fires targeting and planning to ensure proper use and coordination of EW.

BATTALION LEVEL
3-8.At the battalion level, the EW officer or noncommissioned officer leads the EW working group and is accountable to the S-3 for integrating EW requirements. Additional staff representation within EW working groups at the battalion level may include the S-2, S-6, fire support officer, and a joint terminal attack controller when assigned. The battalion EW working group coordinates battalion EW operations with the brigade combat team EW working group.

COMPANY LEVEL
3-9.At the company level, trained EW personnel holding an additional skill identifier of 1K (tactical EW operations) or 1J (operational EW operations) perform several tasks. They advise the commander on the employment of EW equipment, track EW equipment status, assist operators in the use and maintenance of EW equipment, and coordinate with higher headquarters EW working groups.

PLANNING AND COORDINATING ELECTRONIC WARFARE ACTIVITIES
3-10.Key personnel involved in the planning and coordination of EW activities are— z G-3 and S-3 staff.

z EW officer.

z Fire support coordinator.

z G-2 and S-2 staff. z G-6 and S-6 staff. z Electromagnetic spectrum manager. z Liaisons.

G-3 OR S-3 STAFF
3-11.The G-3 or S-3 staff is responsible for the overall planning, coordination, and supervision of EW activities, except for intelligence. The EW officer is part of the G-3 or S-3 staff. The G-3 or S-3 staff— zPlans for and incorporates EW into operation plans and orders, in particular within the fire support plan and the information operations plan (in joint operations).

z Tasks EW actions to assigned and attached units.

z Exercises control over electronic attack, including integration of electromagnetic deception plans.

Electronic Warfare Organization


z Directs electronic protection measures the unit will take based on recommendations from the G6 or S-6, the EW officer, and the EW working group.

z Coordinates and synchronizes EW training with other unit training requirements. z Coordinates and synchronizes EW training with other unit training requirements.

z Issues EW support tasks within the unit intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan. These tasks are according to the collection plan and the intelligence synchronization matrices developed by the G-2 or S-2 and the collection manager.

z Coordinates with the EW working group to ensure planned EW operations support the overall tactical plan.

z Integrates electronic attack as a form of fires within the fires cell.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER
3-12.As a member of the G-3 or S-3 staff, the EW officer plans, coordinates, and supports the execution of EW. The EW officer— zLeads the EW working group.

z Plans, coordinates, and assesses EW offensive, defensive, and support requirements. z Supports the G-2 or S-2 during intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

z Supports the fire support coordinator to ensure electronic attack fires are integrated with all other effects.

z Plans, assesses, and implements friendly electronics security measures. z Prioritizes EW effects and targets with the fire support coordinator. z Plans and coordinates EW operations across functional and integrating cells. z De-conflicts EW operations with the spectrum manager. z Maintains a current assessment of available EW resources. z Participates in other cells and working groups (as required) to ensure EW integration. z Serves as EW subject matter expert on existing EW rules of engagement. z When designated, serves as the jamming control authority.

z Prepares, submits for approval, and supervises the issuing and implementation of fragmentary orders for EW operations.

G-2 OR S-2 STAFF
3-13.The G-2 or S-2 staff advises the commander and staff on the intelligence aspects of EW. The G-2 or

S-2 staff— zProvides threat data to support programming of unit EW systems and de-confliction of their use by the EW working group.

z Ensures that electronic order of battle requirements are included in the intelligence collection plan.

z Determines enemy EW organizations, disposition, capabilities, and intentions via collection and analysis.

z Determines enemy EW vulnerabilities and high-value targets. z Assesses effects of friendly EW operations on the enemy.

z Helps prepare the intelligence-related portion of the EW running estimate. z Provides input to the restricted frequency list by recommending guarded frequencies. z Provides updates on the rapid electronic order of battle. z Maintains appropriate threat EW databases.

z Works with the EW working group to ensure that intelligence collection is synchronized with EW requirements and de-conflicted with planned EW actions. Ensures that EW threat data is de-conflicted with friendly electromagnetic spectrum needs.

NETWORK OPERATIONS OFFICER
3-14.The network operations officer (in the G-6 or S-6 staff) coordinates the communications network for the following services:

z Preparing the electronic protection policy on behalf of the commander. z Assisting in preparing EW plans and orders.

z Reporting all enemy electronic attack activity detected by friendly communications and electronics elements to the EW working group for counteraction.

z Assisting the unit EW officer with resolving EW systems maintenance and communications fratricide problems.

SPECTRUM MANAGER
3-15.The spectrum manager coordinates electromagnetic spectrum use for a wide variety of communications and electronic resources. The spectrum manager— z Issues the signal operating instructions.

z Provides all spectrum resources to the task force.

z Coordinates for spectrum usage with higher echelon G-6 or S-6, and applicable host-nation and international agencies as necessary.

z Coordinates the preparation of the restricted frequency list and issuance of emissions control guidance.

z Coordinates frequency allotment, assignment, and use.

z Coordinates electromagnetic deception plans and operations in which assigned communications resources participate.

z Coordinates measures to reduce electromagnetic interference.

z Coordinates with higher echelon spectrum managers for electromagnetic interference resolution that cannot be resolved internally.

z Assists the EW officer in issuing guidance in the unit (including subordinate elements) regarding de-confliction and resolution of interference problems between EW systems and other friendly systems. zParticipates in the EW working group to de-conflict friendly electromagnetic spectrum requirements with planned EW operations and intelligence collection.

SUMMARY
3-16.The organizational framework for EW coordination and functions varies by echelon. The necessity to form an EW working group is largely based on the overall structure of the combatant force and the level of EW to be conducted. During unified actions, other Service EW officers, signals intelligence officers, and EW asset representatives are invaluable to Army EW working groups in the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of EW operations. As Army EW capabilities and concepts for employment continue to evolve, so do the organizational designs that ensure their effective command and control and execution in support of operations.
 
Last edited:
Sir,
You have missed his earlier post. I wish that we could have given him any higher title ie, military consultant :D
Regards

lol. Same, while reading it, I felt like I should be paying for this level of contribution. Also, a link to said post would be appreciated.
 
This is section 4.XX of document FM. FM 5.XX to follow as soon as it's finished.

SvenSvensonov

Electronic Warfare and the Operations Process

The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The commander drives the operations process (FM 3-0). These activities occur continuously throughout an operation, overlapping and recurring as required (see figure 4-1). The staff electronic warfare officer is actively involved in the operations process. Electronic warfare planning, preparation, execution, and assessment require collective expertise from operations, intelligence, signal, and battle command. The electronic warfare officer—through the unit’s electronic warfare working group—integrates efforts across the warfighting functions. This ensures that electronic warfare operations support the commander’s objectives.


SECTION I — ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING
4-1.Electronic warfare (EW) planning is based on three main considerations. The first is applying the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). EW planners understand and follow its seven steps. In a timeconstrained environment they still follow all seven steps, abbreviating the MDMP process appropriately. Additionally, EW planners apply EW integrating processes. They understand how EW actions contribute to operations. They integrate and synchronize EW activities starting with planning and continuing throughout operations. Finally, EW planners apply EW employment considerations according to the characteristics of EW capabilities.

THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
4-2.EW planning minimizes fratricide and optimizes operational effectiveness during execution. Therefore, EW planning occurs concurrently with other operational planning during the MDMP. The MDMP synchronizes several processes, including intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IBP) (see FM 34-130), the targeting process (see FM 6-20-10), and risk management (see FM 5-19). These processes occur continuously during operations.

4-3.Depending on the organizational echelon, the staff EW officer leads EW planning through the EW working group. (The EW working group at echelons above brigade is sometimes referred to as an EW coordination cell.) An EW working group is normally supported by representatives from the G-2 or S-2, G-3 or S-3, G-6 or S-6, and other staff as required. Other staff representatives can include the fire support coordinator or fire support officer, spectrum manager, air liaison officer, space officer, and liaison officers. Paragraphs 4-5 through 4-33 outline key EW contributions to the processes and planning actions that occur during the seven steps of the MDMP. (FM 5-0 discusses the MDMP.)

RECEIPT OF MISSION
4-4.Commanders begin the MDMP upon receiving or anticipating a new mission. During this first step, commanders issue their initial guidance and initial information requirements or commander’s critical information requirements.

4-5.Upon receipt of a mission, the staff EW officer alerts the staff members supporting the EW working group. The EW officer and support staff begin to gather the resources required for mission analysis. Resources might include a higher headquarters operation order or plan, maps of the area of operations, electronic databases, required field manuals and standing operating procedures, current running estimates, and reachback resources (see appendix F). The EW officer also provides input to the staff’s initial assessment and updates the EW running estimate. As part of this update, the EW officer identifies all friendly EW assets and resources and their status. The EW officer also provides this information throughout the operations process. This includes monitoring, tracking, and seeking out information relating to EW operations to assist the commander and staff.

MISSION ANALYSIS
4-6.Planning includes a thorough mission analysis. Both the process and products of mission analysis help commanders refine their situational understanding and determine their restated mission. (See FM 5-0 for more details.) The EW officer and supporting members of the EW working group contribute to the overall mission analysis by participating in IPB and through the planning actions discussed in paragraphs 4-7 through 4-14. (Paragraphs 4-35 to 4-40 discuss EW input to IPB during operations.)

4-7.The EW officer and EW working group members— z Convene the appropriate EW working group.

z Determine known facts, status, or conditions of forces capable of EW operations as defined in the commander’s planning documents, such as a warning order or operation order.

z Identify EW planning support requirements and develop support requests as needed.

4-8.The EW officer and EW working group members support the G-2 and S-2 in IPB by— zDetermining the threat’s dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum. z Determining the threat’s EW capability.

z Determining the threat’s intelligence system collection capability. z Determining which threat vulnerabilities relate to the electromagnetic spectrum.

z Determining how the operational environment affects EW operations using the operational variables and mission variables as appropriate.

z Initiating, refining, and validating information requirements and requests for information.

4-9.The EW officer and EW working group members— zDetermine facts and develop necessary assumptions relevant to EW such as the status of EW capability at probable execution and time available.

z Analyze the commander’s mission and intent from an EW perspective.

z Identify constraints relevant to EW— „ Actions EW operations must perform.

„ Actions EW operations cannot perform.

„ Other constraints.

z Analyze mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations from the EW perspective.

4-10.The EW officer and EW working group members determine enemy and friendly centers of gravity and list their critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities from an EW perspective. (They determine how EW capabilities can best attack an enemy’s command and control system.) The center of gravity analysis process outlined in figure 4-2 helps identify and list the critical vulnerabilities of enemy centers of gravity. The EW officer and EW working group members also list the critical requirements associated with the identified command and control critical capability (or command and control nodes) and then identify the critical vulnerabilities associated with the critical requirements. Through this process, the EW officer and EW working group members help determine which vulnerabilities can be engaged by EW capabilities to produce a decisive outcome.

4-11.Additionally, the EW officer and EW working group members determine how EW can help protect friendly centers of gravity. The center of gravity analysis process can also be used help identify critical vulnerabilities of friendly centers of gravity. The EW officer and EW working group members list the critical requirements associated with the identified friendly command and control critical capability. Then, the EW officer and EW working group members identify the critical vulnerabilities associated with the critical requirements. These vulnerabilities can help determine how to best use EW capabilities to defend or protect friendly centers of gravity from enemy attack. Key to this portion of the analysis is to assess the potential impact of EW operations on friendly information systems such as electromagnetic interference.

4-12.The EW officer and EW working group members identify and list— z High-value targets that can be engaged by EW capabilities.

z Tasks that EW forces perform according to EW subdivision (electronic attack, electronic warfare support, and electronic protection) in support of the warfighting functions. These include—

„ Determining specified EW tasks.

„ Determining implied EW tasks.

4-13.The EW officer and EW working group members— zConduct initial EW force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets are available to perform the identified EW tasks. (If organic assets are insufficient, they draft requests for support and augmentation.)

z Conduct an initial EW risk assessment and review the risk assessment done by the entire working group.

z Provide EW perspective in the development of the commander’s restated mission. z Assist in development of the mission analysis briefing for the commander.

4-14.By the conclusion of mission analysis, the EW officer and EW working group members generate or gather the following products and information:

z The initial information requirements for EW operations.

z A rudimentary command and control nodal analysis of the enemy.

z The list of EW tasks required to support the mission. z A list of assumptions and constraints related to EW operations. z The planning guidance for EW operations.

z EW personnel augmentation or support requirements. z An update of the EW running estimate. z EW portion or input to the commander’s restated mission.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
4-15.After receiving the restated mission, commander’s intent, and commander’s planning guidance, the staff develops courses of action (COAs) for the commander’s approval. Figure 4-3 depicts the required input to COA development and identifies the key contributions made by the EW officer and EW working group members during the process and output stages The actions the EW officer and EW working group members perform to support COA development are discussed in more detail in paragraphs 4-16 through 4-20.


4-16.The EW officer and EW working group members contribute to COA development through the following planning actions— zDetermining which friendly EW capabilities are available to support the operation, including organic and nonorganic capabilities for planning.

z Determining possible friendly and enemy EW operations, including identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities.

4-17.Additionally, the EW officer and EW working group members help develop initial COA options by—

z Identifying COA options that may be feasible based on their functional expertise (while brainstorming of COAs).

z Providing options to modify a COA to enable accomplishing a requirement within the EW area of expertise.

z Identifying information (relating to EW options) that may impact other functional areas and sharing that information immediately.

z Identifying the EW-related tasks required to support the COA options.

4-18.The EW officer and EW working group members determine the forces required for mission accomplishment by— zDetermining the EW tasks that support each COA and how to perform those tasks based on available forces and capabilities. (Available special technical operations capabilities are considered in this analysis.)

z Providing input and support to proposed deception options.

z Ensuring the EW options provided in support of all possible COAs meet the established screening criteria.

4-19. The EW officer and EW working group members identify EW supporting tasks and their purpose in supporting any decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations as each COA is developed. These EW tasks include those— zFocused on defeating the enemy. zRequired to protect friendly force operations.

4-20. The EW officer and EW working group members assist in developing the COA briefing as required. By the conclusion of COA development, the EW officer and EW working group members generate or gather the following products and information:

z A list of EW objectives and desired effects related to the EW tasks. z A list of EW capabilities required to perform the stated EW tasks for each COA.

z The information and intelligence requirements for performing the EW tasks in support of each COA.

z An update to the EW running estimate.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WAR-GAMING)
4-21.The COA analysis allows the staff to synchronize the elements of combat power for each COA and to identify the COA that best accomplishes the mission. It helps the commander and staff to— zDetermine how to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage. zFurther develop a visualization of the battle.

z Anticipate battlefield events. z Determine conditions and resources required for success. z Determine when and where to apply force capabilities. z Focus IPB on enemy strengths and weaknesses as well as the desired end state. z Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results.

z Determine the most flexible COA.

Paragraphs 4-22 to 4-23 discuss actions the EW officer and EW working group members perform to support COA analysis. (See FM 5-0 for more information on war-gaming.)

4-22.During COA analysis, the EW officer and EW working group members synchronize EW actions and assist the staff in integrating EW capabilities into each COA. The EW officer and EW working group members address how each EW capability supports each COA. They apply these capabilities to associated time lines, critical events, and decision points in the synchronization matrix (see table 4-1). During this planning phase, the EW officer and EW working group members aim to— zAnalyze each COA from an EW functional perspective. zRecommend any EW task organization adjustments. zIdentify key EW decision points. zProvide EW data for synchronization matrix. zRecommend EW priority intelligence requirements.

z Identify EW supporting tasks to any branches and sequels. z Identify potential EW high-value targets.

z Assess EW risks created by telegraphing intentions, allowing time for enemy to mitigate effects, unintended effects of electronic attack, and the impact of asset or capability shortfalls.

4-23.By the conclusion of COA analysis (war-gaming), the EW officer and EW working group members generate or gather the following products and information: zThe EW data for the synchronization matrix. z The EW portion of the branches and sequels. z A list of high-value targets related to EW. z A list of commander’s critical information requirements related to EW. z The risk assessment for EW operations in support of each COA. z An update to the EW running estimate.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON
4-24.COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Staff members present their findings for the others’ consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed during COA analysis, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages with respect to each other. (See FM 5-0 for further discussion of COA comparison).

4-25.During COA comparison, the EW officer and EW working group members compare COAs based on the EW-related advantages and disadvantages (see center of figure 4-4). Typically, planners use a matrix to assist in the COA comparisons. The EW officer may develop an EW functional matrix to compare the COAs or to use the decision matrix developed by the staff. Regardless of the matrix used, the evaluation criteria developed prior to war-gaming are used to compare the COAs. Normally, the chief of staff or executive officer weights each criterion used for the evaluation based on its relative importance and the commander’s guidance. (See FM 5-0 for more information on COA comparison and a sample decision matrix.)


4-26.By the conclusion of COA comparison, the EW officer and EW working group members generate or gather the following products and information:

z A list of the pros and cons for each COA relative to EW. z A prioritized list of the COAs from an EW perspective. z An update to the EW running estimate if required.

COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL
4-27.The COA approval process has three components. First, the staff recommends a COA, usually in a decision briefing. Second, the commander decides which COA to approve. Lastly, the commander issues the final planning guidance.

4-28.During COA approval, the EW officer supports the development of the COA decision briefing and the development of the warning order as required. If possible, the EW officer attends the COA decision briefing to receive the commander’s final planning guidance. If unable to attend the briefing, the EW officer receives the final planning guidance from the G-3 or S-3. The final planning guidance is critical in that it normally provides— zRefined commander’s intent.

z New commander’s critical information requirements to support the execution of the chosen COA.

z Risk acceptance.

z Guidance on priorities for the elements of combat power, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation.

4-29. After the COA decision has been made, the EW officer and EW working group members generate or gather the following products and information:

z An updated command and control nodal analysis of the enemy relevant to the selected COA. z Required requests for information to refine the enemy command and control nodal architecture. z Latest electronic order of battle tailored to the selected COA. z Any new direction provided in the refined commander’s intent.

z A list of any new commander’s critical information requirements that can be used in support of EW operations.

z The warning order to assist developing EW operations required to support the operation order or plan.

z Refined input to the initial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan, including—

„ Any additional specific EW information requirements.

„ Updated potential collection assets for the unit’s ISR plan.

ORDERS PRODUCTION
4-30.Orders production consists of the staff preparing the operation order or plan by converting the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations. The staff also provides supporting information that enables subordinates to execute and implement risk controls. They do this by coordinating and integrating risk controls into the appropriate paragraphs and graphics of the order.

4-31.During orders production, the EW officer provides the EW operations input for several sections of the operation order or plan. See appendix B for the primary areas for EW operations input within an Army order or plan. The primary areas for EW input in a joint order, if required, also are shown in appendix B. (See CJCSM 3122.03C for the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System format).

DECISIONMAKING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT
4-32.In a time-constrained environment, the staff might not be able to conduct a detailed MDMP. The staff may choose to abbreviate the process as described in FM 5-0. The abbreviated process uses all seven steps of the MDMP in a shortened and less detailed manner.

4-33.The EW officer and core members of the EW working group meet as a regular part of the unit battle rhythm. However, the EW officer calls unscheduled meetings if situations arise that require time-sensitive planning. Regardless of how much they abbreviate the planning process, the EW officer and supporting members of the EW working group always— zUpdate the EW running estimate in terms of assets and capabilities available. zUpdate essential EW tasks with the requirements of the commander’s intent.

z Coordinate support requests and intelligence requirements with appropriate staff elements and outside agencies.

z Provide EW input to fragmentary orders through the G-3 or S-3 as necessary to drive timely and effective EW operations.

z Deconflict planned EW actions with other uses of the spectrum, such as communications.

z Synchronize electronic attack and EW support actions.

z Synchronize other intelligence collection in support of EW requirements. z Deconflict EW activities specifically with aviation operations.

z Synchronize EW support to the command and control warfare and information protection information tasks.

THE INTEGRATING PROCESSES AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES
4-34.Commanders use several integrating processes and continuing activities to synchronize operations throughout the operations process. (See figure 4-5.) The EW officer ensures EW operations are fully synchronized and integrated within these processes and continuing activities. Other staff members supporting the EW working group assist the EW officer. Paragraphs 4-35 through 4-52 outline some key integrating processes and continuing activities. These processes and activities require EW officer involvement throughout the operations process.


INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
4-35.Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is designed to support the staff estimate and military decisionmaking process. Most intelligence requirements are generated as a result of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process and its interrelation with the decisionmaking process (FM 34-130). The G-2 or S-2 leads IPB planning with participation by the entire staff. This planning activity is used to define and understand the operational environment and the options it presents to friendly and adversary forces. Only one IPB planning activity exists within each headquarters; all affected staff cells participate. (FM 2-0 provides more information on IPB.) Paragraphs 4-36 through 4-40 discuss how the EW officer and the EW working group support IPB during operations.

4-36.In addition to the input provided to the initial IPB (during step 2 of mission analysis), the EW officer supports IPB throughout the operations process by providing input related to EW operations. (See figure 46.) This input includes (but is not limited to) the following EW considerations:

z Evaluating the operational environment from an EW perspective. z Describing how the effects of the operational environment may impact EW operations.

z Evaluating the threat’s capabilities; doctrinal principles; and tactics, techniques, and procedures from an EW perspective. zDetermining threat COAs.

4-37. When evaluating the operational environment from an EW perspective, the EW officer— z Determines the electromagnetic environment within the defined physical environment:

„ Area of operations.

„ Area of influence.

„ Area of interest.

zUses electronic databases to identify gaps. zIdentifies adversary fixed EW sites such as EW support and electronic attack sites. zIdentifies airfields and installations that support, operate, or house adversary EW capabilities. zIn coordination with the G-2 or S-2 and G-6 or S-6, helps identify enemy electromagnetic spectrum usage and requirements within the area of operations and area of interest.


4-38.When describing how the variables of the operational environment may impact EW operations, the

EW officer— zFocuses on characteristics of both the land and air domains using the factors of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment.

z Identifies key terrain that may provide protection for communications and target acquisition systems from exploitation or disruption.

z Identifies how terrain affects line of sight, including effects on both communications and noncommunications emitters.

z Evaluates how vegetation affects radio wave absorption and antenna height requirements. z Locates power lines and their potential to interfere with radio waves.

z Assesses most likely and most dangerous avenues of approach (air, ground) and where EW operations would likely be positioned to support these approaches.

z If operating within urban terrain, considers how the infrastructure—power plants, power grids, structural heights, and communications and media nodes—may restrict or limit EW capabilities. zAssists the G-2 or S-2 with the development of a modified combined obstacle overlay.

z Determines how weather—visibility, cloud cover, rain, and wind—may affect ground-based and airborne EW operations and capabilities (for example, no-go weather conditions at an airborne EW launch and recovery base).

z Considers all other relevant aspects of the operational environment that affect EW operations, using the operational variables (PMESII-PT—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) and mission variables (METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations).

4-39.When evaluating enemy capabilities, the EW officer and supporting staff examine doctrinal principles; tactics, techniques and procedures; and observed patterns of operation from an EW perspective.

The EW officer— zUses the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and mission variables (METT-TC) to help determine the adversary’s critical nodes. zCollects the required data—operational net assessments, electronic order of battle, and electronic databases—to template the command and control critical nodes and the systems required to support and maintain them.

z Assists the G-2 in determining the adversary’s EW-related threat characteristics (order of battle) by identifying—

„ Types of communications equipment available.

„ Types of noncommunications emitters.

„ Surveillance and target acquisition assets.

„ Technological sophistication of the threat.

„ Communications network structure.

„ Frequency allocation techniques.

„ Operation schedules.

„ Station identification methods.

„ Measurable characteristics of communications and noncommunications equipment.

„ Command, control, and communications structure of the threat.

„ Tactics from a communication perspective. Examples are how the enemy deploys command, control, and communications assets; whether or not communications systems are remote; and the level of discipline in procedures, communications security, and operations security.

„ Electronic deception capabilities.

„ Reliance on active or passive surveillance systems

„ Electromagnetic profiles of each node.

„ Unique electromagnetic spectrum signatures.

z Assists the G-2 or S-2 in center of gravity analysis. Helps identify the critical system nodes of the center of gravity and determines what aspects of the system should be engaged, exploited, or attacked to modify the system’s behavior or to achieve a desired effect.

z Identifies organic and nonorganic EW capabilities available to achieve desired effects on identified high-value targets.

z Submits initial EW-related requests for information that describe the intelligence support required to support EW operations.

z Obtains the high-value target list, threat templates, and initial priority intelligence requirements list to assist in follow-on EW planning.

4-40. When determining adversary COAs, the EW officer— z Assists the G-2 or S-2 in development of adversary COAs.

z Provides EW input to the situation templates. z Ensures event templates include EW named areas of interests. z Assists in providing EW options for target areas of interest. z Assists in providing EW options to support decision points. z Provides EW input to the event template and event matrix.

TARGETING
4-41.Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). A decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology is used to direct friendly forces to attack the right target with the right asset at the right time. (See figure 4-7.) Targeting provides an effective method to match the friendly force capabilities against targets. Commander’s intent plays a critical role in the targeting process. The targeting working group strives to thoroughly understand the commander’s intent to ensure the commander’s intended effects on targets are achieved.

4-42.An important part of targeting is identifying potential fratricide situations and performing the coordination measures to manage and control the targeting effort positively. The targeting working group and staff incorporate these measures into the coordinating instructions and appropriate annexes of the operation plans and orders. (FM 6-20-10 has more information on targeting.)

4-43.The EW officer thoroughly integrates electronic attack in the targeting process and integrates electronic attack fires into all appropriate portions of the operation plan, operation order, and other planning products. In support of EW targeting, the EW officer— zHelps the targeting working group determine electronic attack requirements against specific high-payoff targets and high-value targets.

z Ensures electronic attack can meet the desired effect (in terms of the targeting objective).

z Coordinates with the signals intelligence staff element through the collection manager to satisfy EW support and electronic attack information requirements.

z Prepares the EW tab and the EW portion of the command and control warfare tab to the fires appendix.

z Provides electronic attack mission management through the tactical operations center or joint operations center and the tactical air control party (for airborne electronic attack).

z Provides electronic attack mission management as the jamming control authority for ground or airborne electronic attack when designated.

z Prepares and coordinates the EW annex for operation plans and operation orders.

z Determines and requests theater Army electronic attack support.

z Recommends to the G-3 or S-3 and the fire support coordinator or fire support officer whether to engage a target with electronic attack.

z Expedites electromagnetic interference reports to the targeting working group. (See appendix D for information on electromagnetic interference reporting.)

Decide
4-44.Decide is the first step in the targeting process. This step provides the overall focus for fires, a targeting plan, and some of the priorities for intelligence collection. As part of the staff in the fires cell, the EW officer assists the targeting working group in planning the target priorities for each phase and critical events of the operation. Initially, the targeting working group does not develop electronic attack targets using any special technique or separately from targets for physical destruction. However, as the process continues, these targets are passed through intelligence organizations and further planned using ISR procedures. The planned use of electronic attack is integrated into the standard targeting products (graphic or text-based). Products that involve electronic attack planning may include— zHigh-payoff target list. zAttack guidance matrix.

zAppendix 4 (Electronic Warfare) to Annex P (Information Operations) of the operation order. (At the time this manual was written, this was the current doctrine for operation orders. This appendix will be revised upon publication of the revised FM 5-0.)

Detect
4-45.Based on what the targeting working group identified as high-payoff targets during the decide step, collection assets are then deployed to detect them. The intelligence enterprise pairs assets to targets based on the collection plan and the current threat situation. When conducting electronic attack operations in support of command and control warfare, ISR units perform EW support tasks linked to and working closely with the electronic attack missions. Electronic warfare support units (with support from the target assessment and signals intelligence staff elements) provide the data—location, signal strength, and frequency of the target—to focus electronic attack assets on the intended target. These assets also identify the command and control system vulnerabilities open to attack by electronic attack assets.

Deliver
4-46.Once friendly force capabilities identify, locate, and track the high-payoff targets, the next step in the process is to deliver fires against those targets. Electronic attack assets must satisfy the attack guidance developed during the decide step. Close coordination between those conducting EW support and electronic attack is critical during the engagement. The EW officer facilitates this coordination and ensures electronic attack fires are fully synchronized and deconflicted with other fires. The EW officer remains aware of the potential for unintended effects between adjacent units when conducting electronic attack. The EW officer continually coordinates with adjacent unit EW officers to mitigate and deconflict these effects during cross-boundary operations. Normally, the G-3, S-3, or fire support coordinator provides requirements and guidance for this coordination and synchronization in the attack guidance matrix, intelligence synchronization matrix, spectrum management plan, and the EW input to the operation plan or operation order annexes and appendixes.

Assess
4-47.Once the target as been engaged, the next step is to assess the engagement’s effectiveness. This is done through combat assessment, which involves determining the effectiveness of force employment during military operations. It consists of three elements:

z Munitions effects assessment. z Battle damage assessment. z Re-attack recommendations.

4-48.The first two elements, munitions effects assessment and battle damage assessment, are used to inform the commander on the effects achieved against targets and target sets. From this information, the G2 or S-2 continues to analyze the threat’s ability to further conduct and sustain combat operations (sometimes articulated in terms of the effects achieved against the threat’s centers of gravity). The last element involves the assessment and recommendation whether or not to re-attack the targets.

4-49.The assessment of a jamming mission used against an enemy’s command and control system is unlike fires that can be observed visually. The signals intelligence staff element and units executing the electronic attack mission coordinate continuously to assess mission effectiveness. Close coordination between sensor and shooter allows instant feedback on the success or failure of the intended jamming effects. It also can quickly provide the necessary adjustments to produce desired effects.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION
4-50.Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization is the task that accomplishes the following: analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets internal and external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets controlled by the organization to collect on the commander’s critical information requirements; and submits requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support(FM 3-0). ISR synchronization considers all assets—both internal and external to the organization. It identifies information gaps and the most appropriate assets for collecting information to fill them.

4-51.Planning for ISR operations begins during mission analysis. Although led by the G-3 or S-3, it is supported by the entire staff, subordinate units, and external partners. ISR operations collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information from a multitude of collection sources. The staff thoroughly understands, integrates, and synchronizes the ISR plan across all echelons.

4-52.The EW officer ensures the ISR plan supports the EW-related information requirements determined during the planning process. The EW officer coordinates these requirements with the signals intelligence staff element through the G-2 or S-2.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
4-53.EW has specific ground-based, airborne, and functional (electronic attack, electronic warfare support, or electronic protection) employment considerations. The EW officer ensures EW-related employment considerations are properly articulated early in the operations process. Each capability employed has certain advantages and disadvantages. The staff plans for all of these before executing EW operations.

GROUND-BASED ELECTRONIC WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS
4-54.Ground-based EW capabilities support the commander’s scheme of maneuver. Ground-based EW equipment can be employed by a dismounted Soldier or on highly mobile platforms. Due to the short-range nature of tactical signals direction finding, electronic attack assets are normally located in the forward areas of the battlefield, with or near forward units.

4-55.Ground-based EW capabilities have certain advantages. They provide direct support to maneuver units (for example, through counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device EW and communications or sensor jamming). Ground-based EW capabilities support continuous operations and respond quickly to EW requirements of the ground commander. However, to maximize the effectiveness of ground-based EW capabilities, maneuver units must protect EW assets from enemy ground and aviation threats. EW equipment should be as survivable and mobile as the force it supports. Maneuver units must logistically support the EW assets, and supported commanders must clearly identify EW requirements.

4-56.Ground-based EW capabilities have certain limitations. They are vulnerable to enemy attack and can be masked by terrain. They are vulnerable to enemy electromagnetic deceptive measures and electronic protection actions. In addition, they have distance or propagation limitations against enemy electronic systems.

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS
4-57.While ground-based and airborne EW planning and execution are similar, they significantly differ in their EW employment time. Airborne EW operations are conducted at much higher speeds and generally have a shorter duration than ground-based operations. Therefore, the timing of airborne EW support requires detailed planning. 4-58.Airborne EW requires the following: zA clear understanding of the supported commander’s EW objectives. zDetailed planning and integration. zGround support facilities.

z Liaisons between the aircrews of the aircraft providing the EW support and the aircrews or ground forces being supported.

z Protection from enemy aircraft and air defense systems.

4-59. Airborne EW capabilities have certain advantages. They can provide direct support to other tactical aviation missions such as suppression of enemy air defenses, destruction of enemy air defenses, and employment of high-speed anti-radiation missiles. They can provide extended range over ground-based assets. Airborne EW capabilities can provide greater mobility and flexibility than ground-based assets. In addition, they can support ground-based units in beyond line-of-sight operations.

4-60. The limitations associated with airborne EW capabilities are time-on-station considerations, vulnerability to enemy electronic protection actions, electromagnetic deception techniques, and limited assets (support from nonorganic EW platforms need to be requested).

ELECTRONIC ATTACK CONSIDERATIONS
4-61.Electronic attack includes both offensive and defensive activities. (Chapter 1 provides a full definition of electronic attack). These activities differ in their purpose. Defensive electronic attack protects friendly personnel and equipment or platforms. Offensive electronic attack denies, disrupts, or destroys enemy capability. In either case, certain considerations are involved in planning for employing electronic attack: zFriendly communications. zIntelligence collection.

zOther effects. zNonhostile local electromagnetic spectrum use. z Hostile intelligence collection. z Persistency of effect.

4-62.The EW officer, the G-2 or S-2, the G-3 or S-3, the G-6 or S-6, the spectrum manager, and the G-7 or S-7 coordinate closely to avoid friendly communications interference that can occur when using EW systems on the battlefield. Coordination ensures that electronic attack systems frequencies are properly deconflicted with friendly communications and intelligence systems or that ground maneuver and friendly information tasks are modified accordingly.

4-63.The number of information systems, EW systems, and sensors operating simultaneously on the battlefield makes deconfliction with communications systems a challenge. The EW officer, the G-2 or S-2, the G-6 or S-6, and the spectrum manager plan and rehearse deconfliction procedures to quickly adjust their use of EW or communications systems.

4-64.Electronic attack operations depend on EW support and signals intelligence to provide targeting information and battle damage assessment. However, EW officers must keep in mind that not all intelligence collection is focused on supporting EW. If not properly coordinated with the G-2 or S-2 staff, electronic attack operations may impact intelligence collection by jamming or inadvertently interfering with a particular frequency being used to collect data on the threat, or by jamming a given enemy frequency or system that deprives friendly forces of that means of collecting data. Either can significantly deter intelligence collection efforts and their ability to answer critical information requirements. Coordination between the EW officer, the fire support coordinator, and the G-2 or S-2 is prevents this interference. In situations where a known conflict between the intelligence collection effort and the use of electronic attack exists, the EW working group brings the problem to the G-3 or S-3 for resolution.

4-65.Other forms of effects rely on electromagnetic spectrum. For example, psychological operations may plan to use a given set of frequencies to broadcast messages, or a military deception plan may include the broadcast of friendly force communications. In both examples, the use of electronic attack could unintentionally interfere or disrupt such broadcasts if not properly coordinated. To ensure electronic attack does not negatively impact planned operations, the EW officer coordinates between fires, network operations, and other functional or integrating cells as required.

4-66.Like any other form of electromagnetic radiation, electronic attack can adversely affect local media and communications systems and infrastructure. EW planners consider unintended consequences of EW operations and deconflict these operations with the various functional or integrating cells. For example, friendly jamming could potentially deny the functioning of essential services such as ambulance or fire fighters to a local population. EW officers routinely synchronize electronic attack with the other functional or integrating cells responsible for the information tasks. In this way, they ensure that electronic attack efforts do not cause fratricide or unacceptable collateral damage to their intended effects.

4-67.The potential for hostile intelligence collection also affects electronic attack. A well-equipped enemy can detect friendly EW capabilities and thus gain intelligence on friendly force intentions. For example, the frequencies Army forces jam could indicate where they believe the enemy’s capabilities lie. The EW officer and the G-2 or S-2 develop an understanding of the enemy’s collection capability. Along with the red team(if available), they determine what the enemy might gain from friendly force use of electronic attack. (A red team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. [JP 2-0])

4-68.The effects of jamming only persist as long as the jammer itself is emitting and is in range to affect the target. Normally this time frame is a matter of seconds or minutes, which makes the timing of such missions critical. This is particularly true when jamming is used in direct support of aviation platforms. For example, in a mission that supports suppression of enemy air defense, the time on target and duration of the jamming must account for the speed of attack of the aviation platform. They must also account for the potential reaction time of enemy air defensive countermeasures. The development of directed-energy weapons may change this dynamic in the future. However, at present (aside from anti-radiation missiles), the effects of jamming are less persistent than effects achieved by other means.

ELECTRONIC PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS
4-69.Electronic protection is achieved through physical security, communications security measures, system technical capabilities (such as frequency hopping and shielding of electronics), spectrum management, and emission control procedures. The EW officer and EW working group members must consider the following key functions when planning for electronic protection operations:

z Vulnerability analysis and assessment. z Monitoring and feedback. z Electronic protection measures and how they affect friendly capabilities.

Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment
4-70.Vulnerability analysis and assessment forms the basis for formulating electronic protection plans. The Defense Information Systems Agency operates the Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Program, which specifically focuses on automated information systems and can be very useful in this effort.

Monitoring and Feedback
4-71.The National Security Agency monitors communications security. Their programs focus on telecommunications systems using wire and electronic communications. Their programs can support and remediate the command’s communications security procedures when required.

Electronic Protection Measures and Their Effect on Friendly Capabilities
4-72.Electronic protection measures include any measure taken to protect the force from hostile electronic attack actions. However, these measures can also limit friendly capabilities or operations. For example, denying frequency usage to counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device EW systems on a given frequency to preserve it for a critical friendly information system could leave friendly forces vulnerable to certain radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. The EW officer and the G-6 or S-6 carefully consider these second-order effects when advising the G-3 or S-3 regarding electronic protection measures.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
4-73.The distinction between whether a given asset is performing a signals intelligence or EW support mission is determined by who tasks and controls the assets, what they are tasked to provide, and the purpose for which they are tasked. Operational commanders task assets to conduct EW support for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning the conduct of future operations, and other tactical actions (such as threat avoidance and homing). The EW officer coordinates with the G-2 or S-2 to ensure all EW support needed for planned EW operations is identified and submitted to the G-3 or S-3 for approval by the commander. This ensures that the required collection assets are properly tasked to provide the EW support. In cases where planned electronic attack actions may conflict with the G-2 or S-2 intelligence collection efforts, the G-3, S-3, or commander decides which has priority. The EW officer and the G-2 or S-2 develop a structured process within each echelon for conducting this intelligence gain-loss calculus during mission rehearsal exercises and pre-deployment work-ups.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE REPROGRAMMING CONSIDERATIONS
4-74.Electronic warfare reprogramming refers to modifying friendly EW or target sensing systems in response to validated changes in enemy equipment and tactics or the electromagnetic environment. (See paragraph 1-40 for the complete definition.) Reprogramming EW and target sensing system equipment falls under the responsibility of each Service or organization through its respective EW reprogramming support programs. It includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems, and intelligence collection systems. During joint operations, swift identification and reprogramming efforts are critical in a rapidly evolving hostile situation. The key consideration for EW reprogramming is joint coordination. Joint coordination of Service reprogramming efforts ensures reprogramming requirements are identified, processed, and implemented consistently by all friendly forces. During joint operations, EW reprogramming coordination and monitoring is the responsibility of the joint force commander’s EW staff. (For more information on EW reprogramming, see FM 3-13.10).

SECTION II — ELECTRONIC WARFARE PREPARATION
4-75.Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement (FM 3-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels.

4-76.During preparation, the EW officer and members of the EW working group focus their actions on the following activities:

z Revising and refining the EW estimate, EW tasks supporting command and control warfare, and EW support to the overall plan.

z Rehearsing the synchronization of EW support to the plan (including integration into the targeting process, request procedures for joint assets, deconfliction procedures, and asset determination and refinement).

z Synchronizing the collection plan and intelligence synchronization matrix with the attack guidance matrix and EW input to the operation plan or order annexes and appendixes.

z Assessing the planned task organization developed to support EW operations, including liaison officers and organic and nonorganic capabilities required by echelon.

z Coordinating procedures with ISR operational elements (such as signals intelligence staff elements).

z Training the supporting staff members of the EW working group during mission rehearsal exercises.

z Completing precombat checks and inspections of EW assets. z Completing sustainment preparations for EW assets. z Coordinate with the G-4 or S-4 to develop EW equipment reporting formats. zCompleting briefbacks by subordinate EW working groups on planned EW operations.

z Refining content and format for the EW officer’s portion of the battle update assessment and brief.

SECTION III — ELECTRONIC WARFARE EXECUTION
4-77.Execution is putting the plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 3-0). Commanders focus their subordinates on executing the concept of operations by issuing their intent and mission orders.

4-78.During execution, the EW officer and EW working group members— zServe as the EW expert for the commander. z Maintain the running estimate for EW operations.

z Monitor EW operations and recommend adjustments during execution.

z Recommend adjustments to the commander’s critical information requirements based on the situation.

z Recommend adjustments to EW-related control measures and procedures.

z Maintain direct liaison with the fires and network operations cells and the command and control warfare working group (if formed) to ensure integration and deconfliction of EW operations.

z Coordinate and manage EW taskings to subordinate units or assets. z Coordinate requests for nonorganic EW support.

z Continue to assist the targeting working group in target development and recommend targets for attack by electronic attack assets.

z Receive, process, and coordinate subordinate requests for EW support during operations.

z Receive and process immediate support requests for suppression of enemy air defense or EW from joint or multinational forces; coordinate through fire support officer and fire support coordinator with the battlefield coordination detachment and joint or multinational liaisons for support request. zCoordinate with airspace control section on all suppression of enemy air defense or EW missions.

z Provide input to the overall assessment regarding effectiveness of electronic attack missions. z Maintain, update, and distribute the status of EW assets. z Validate and disseminate cease-jamming requests.

z Coordinate and expedite electromagnetic interference reports with the analysis and control element for targeting and the spectrum manager for potential deconfliction.

z Perform jamming control authority function for ground-based EW within the assigned area of operations (when designated by the jamming control authority).

SECTION IV — ELECTRONIC WARFARE ASSESSMENT
4-79.Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation (FM 3-0). Commanders, assisted by their staffs, continuously assess the current situation and progress of the operation and compare it with the concept of operations, mission, and commander’s intent. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments, ensuring that the operation remains focused on the mission and commander’s intent.

4-80.As depicted in figure 4-5 (page 4-10), assessment occurs throughout every operations process activity and includes three major tasks:

z Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.

z Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation towards the commander’s desired end state.

z Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

4-81. The EW officer and supporting members of the EW working group make assessments throughout the operations process. During planning and preparation activities, assessments of EW are made during the MDMP, IPB, targeting, ISR synchronization, and composite risk management integration.

4-82. The EW officer, in conjunction with the G-5 or S-5, helps develop the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for evaluating EW operations during execution. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). In the context of EW, an example of a measure of performance is the percentage of known enemy command and control nodes targeted and attacked by electronic attack means (action) versus the number of enemy command and control nodes that were actually destroyed or rendered inoperable for the desired duration (task accomplishment). Measures of effectiveness are used to determine the degree to which an EW action achieved the desired result. This is normally measured through analysis of data collected by both active and passive means. For example, effectiveness is measured by using radar or visual systems to detect changes in enemy weapons flight and trajectory profiles.

4-83. During execution, the EW officer and members of the EW working group participate in combat assessments within the fires cell to determine the effectiveness of electronic attack employment in support of operations. Combat assessment consists of three elements: munitions effects assessment, battle damage assessment, and re-attack recommendations. (Paragraphs 4-47 to 4-49 discuss combat assessment.)

SUMMARY
4-84.The EW officer and staff members supporting the EW working group ensure the successful integration of EW capabilities into operations. The EW officer leads the EW integration effort throughout the operations process. The EW officer must be familiar with and participate in the applicable integrating processes and continuing activities discussed within this chapter.
 
@SvenSvensonov

134 Page PDF on ECM/ESM systems. Another useful document to read after reading Sven nice detailed explanations.

capture1-png.13089



ABSTRACT

This thesis gives an overview of electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems. The objective is to give the intended reader, students of the EW curriculum new to the subject, an introduction to several different electronic warfare systems. The thesis consists of seven chapters discussing different areas of EW.

The first two chapters introduce the reader to the definitions of EW and the threat which
EW equipment is designed to counter. The following two chapters are a presentation of typical ESM and ECM systems. The final three chapters cover the integration of ESM and ECM systems as well as two subjects, suppression of enemy air defense and directed
energy weapons, which differ from the typical ECM systems Included with each chapter describing systems is a conclusion section which discusses possible future developments for the group of systems.

http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/26584/illustratedoverv00pett.pdf?sequence=1
 
Last edited:
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZING FOR JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE
II-1
“Generally, management of the many is the same as management of the few. It
is a matter of organization.”
Sun Tzu

1. Introduction
How joint forces are organized to plan and execute EW is a prerogative of the JFC. The size of
the commander’s staff, the mission or missions which the joint force is tasked to accomplish, and the
time allocated to accomplish the mission or missions are just some of the factors which affect the
organization of the staff. This chapter discusses nominal organizations and staff functions to plan and
execute EW in joint operations. It also summarizes EMS management functions and the joint level
organization of intelligence support to EW. A brief introduction to how each of the four Services is
organized to plan and execute EW is provided in order to give an understanding of how joint staff
EW functions interact with Service components.

2. Joint Electronic Warfare Responsibility
As with other combat, combat support, and combat service support functions, EW planning and
operations are divided among multiple directorates of a joint staff based on long, mid, and near term
functionality. Long-range planning of EW normally occurs under the plans directorate of a joint staff
(J-5), while more immediate planning and the supervision of execution of EW normally falls within
the purview of the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). All aspects of joint EW normally must be
coordinated closely with joint force components and deconflicted with the communications system
directorate of the joint staff (J-6) and the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2). The joint restricted
frequency list (JRFL) is prepared and promulgated by the J-6 with approval by the J-3. EA, ES, and
EP functions significantly affect, and conversely are affected by activities within the J-2, J-3 and J-
6. Examples include ES support to collection, management, and dissemination as well as all
source analysis of intelligence information (J-2), overall EW operations to include OPSEC planning
and integration within the IO division (J-3), as well as day-to-day operations of the information
GIG, JRFL planning and integration, and EP considerations (J-6).
a. J-3. Authority for planning and supervising joint EW is normally delegated by the JFC to the
J-3. When so authorized, the J-3 will have primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating,
integrating, and ensuring execution of joint force EW operations. The J-3 may delegate staff
responsibility for EW as appropriate for the size of the staff and scope of J-3 responsibilities.
b. The IO officer is the principal IO advisor to the J-3 and acts as the J-3, IO division lead
planner for the integration, coordination and execution of IO when conducting campaigns across
the range of military operations. The IO officer identifies and prioritizes IO requirements on behalf
of the JFC and ensures full spectrum IO is integrated into appropriate security cooperation plans.
II-2
Chapter II
JP 3-13.1
JP 3-13, “Information Operations,” provides details about the organization and procedures of
the IO cell.
c. Command Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO). Normally, the command EWO is the
principal EW planner on a joint staff. The scope and nature of the command EWO’s responsibilities
are dependent on the size of the staff, the operational area of the JFC that the staff supports, and the type
of mission or operation that the staff must plan. The command EWO is part of the J-3 staff and
coordinates with the command’s IO cell.
3. Joint Electronic Warfare Organization
a. Joint Force Commander’s EW Staff. The JCEWS is headed by the command EWO, who
is designated as the JCEWS Chief. The JCEWS develops operation plans (OPLANs) and concept
plans (CONPLANs), plans and monitors routine EW operations and activities, and coordinates joint
EW training and exercises. It also focuses its efforts on potential contingency areas within the operational
area and develops the information and knowledge necessary to support contingency planning (e.g.,
JRFL development). The JCEWS maintains habitual relationships with key individuals (e.g., component
liaison officers) and enabling organizations such as Service and multinational EWCCs, the
USSTRATCOM Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC), E-Space portal, and the
Joint Spectrum Center (JSC). These relationships are established during joint training and exercise
events and are maintained via a network of collaboration throughout the planning process.
(1) Organization of the JCEWS. The JCEWS should be a standing joint planning group with
multi-directorate membership. The JCEWS does not require additional billets, but rather, networks
existing command billets to focus on joint EW planning and execution. At a minimum the JCEWS
should consist of core membership from the combatant command/subordinate unified command
headquarters’ J-2, J-3, and J-6. The J-6 deconflicts all EW activity that affects the GIG with JTF-GNO
through the theater NETOPS centers and theater NETOPS control centers (TNCCs). The JCEWS
should also network with representatives from joint force components (Service and/or functional) and
other supporting organizations or agencies. JCEWS membership should be a long-term assignment
and members should be designated spokespersons for their respective organizations. Nominal JCEWS
membership may include:
(a) JCEWS chief (command EWO)
(b) Standing joint force headquarters EW planner (may be dual-hatted as the deputy
command EWO when assigned)
(c) JFMO/J-6 representative
(d) J-2 SIGINT collection manager
(e) J-2 cryptologic support group (CSG) representative
(f) Special technical operations (STO) planner
II-3

Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare
(2) Nominal JCEWS networked representation may include:
(a) EW planners from Service/functional components (e.g., joint force air component
commander (JFACC), joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), and
commander, Navy forces, distributed common ground system).
(b) EW asset liaison officers (LNOs) (e.g., EA-6B, EC-130H, US Marine Corps
radio battalion, RC-135, distributed common ground system)
b. Joint Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell. The decision to form a joint EWCC depends
on the anticipated role of EW in the operation. When EW is expected to play a significant role in the
JFC’s mission, a component EWCC may be designated as the joint EWCC to handle the EW aspects
of the operation. The joint EWCC may either be part of the JFC’s staff, assigned to the J-3 directorate,
or may remain within the designated component commander’s structure. The joint EWCC will plan
operational level EW for the JFC.

(1) Nominal members of the joint EWCC may include:
(a) EWCC chief
(b) Deputy EWCC chief
(c) EW operations chief
(d) EW plans chief
(e) EW duty officer(s)
(f) EW planner(s)
(g) Operations analyst(s)
(h) SIGINT and/or ELINT analyst(s)
(i) STO planner
(j) Spectrum manager
(k) EW asset LNOs
(l) JFC JFMO representative
(2) Nominal joint EWCC networked representation should include:

a) JFC JFMO
(b) J-6 representative
(c) JFC J-2 SIGINT collection manager
(d) JFC J-2 CSG representative
(e) Service/functional components LNOs
(f) Other government agency representatives
(g) Coalition partner representatives
c. JCEWS and joint EWCC responsibilities:
(1) Specific functions and responsibilities of a JCEWS:
(a) Be familiar with EW support to current theater OPLANs and CONPLANs
(b) Prepare EW portion of estimates and tabs to joint force OPLANs
(c) Formulate and recommend EW targets to support the JFC OPLAN
(d) Implement EW policies
(2) Functions and responsibilities common to JCEWS and joint EWCC (When a JCEWS
and joint EWCC exist at the same level, the owning commander must decide command and coordination
relationships between the two organizations).
(a) Provide EW planning and coordination expertise to the JFC. Develop a daily EW
battle-rhythm that supports EW planning and operations requirements
(b) Prepare the EW portion of estimates and tabs for operation orders (OPORDs) and
identify authorities necessary to implement the OPORD
(c) Identify requirements for intelligence support to joint EW operations, including
assistance to the J-2 in planning the collection and dissemination of ES information
(d) Define and develop intelligence requirements to support EW operations
(e) Coordinate with ISR assets and national agencies in assessing hostile EW capabilities
and limitations
II-5

Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare
(f) Coordinate with ISR and national resources to weigh intelligence gain/loss of EA or
the physical destruction of targets, and if necessary, coordinate the resolution of these conflicts. Resolution
of intelligence gain/loss conflicts resides with the JFC.
(g) Plan, coordinate, and assess defensive EA requirements
(h) Maintain current assessment of the EW resources available to the JFC (to include
number, type, and status of EW assets) and analyze what resources are necessary to accomplish the
JFC’s objective
(i) Assist JFC by recommending the level of EW support required of the component
commanders
(j) Prioritize EW targets based on the JFC’s objectives, EW plan and available assets
(k) Represent EW within the IO cell to formulate and recommend to the joint targeting
coordination board EW targets to support the JFC’s plan
(l) Predict effects of friendly and enemy EW activity on joint and multinational operations
using applicable modeling and simulation tools
(m) Plan, coordinate, and assess EP (e.g., EW deconfliction, EMCON, EW
reprogramming)
(n) Assist JFMO in conjunction with JFC J-2, J-3, J-6, other government agencies,
joint special operations center, components, and allies in resolving spectrum conflicts that JFMO or
JCEWS are unable to resolve
(o) Carry out responsibilities of the jamming control authority (JCA)
(p) Coordinate and monitor joint coordination EW reprogramming (JCEWR) by
identifying where EW reprogramming decisions and reprogramming actions affect joint force tactical
operations and disseminating theater-wide EW plans as required
(q) Recommend and promulgate EW special instructions and rules of engagement (ROE)
(r) Plan, coordinate, integrate, and deconflict EW in current and future operations taking
in consideration nontraditional capabilities (e.g., IO, space, special operations, and STO) within the
operational area
(s) Compile and coordinate EW support requests from all components according to the
priorities set by the JFC
(t) Coordinate through the chain of command to resolve any component/multinational
EW requests that cannot be solved at the JCEWS or joint EWCC level
II-6
Chapter II
JP 3-13.1
(u) Monitor and adapt execution of EW plans in current operations and exercises
(v) Archive EW planning and execution data and document EW lessons learned in
accordance with the joint lessons learned program
(3) Joint EWCC Support Requirements. When activated, the EWCC should be located in
or have access to a special compartmented information facility to permit thorough accomplishment of its
coordinating functions. Optimal joint EWCC staffing will dictate the inclusion of STO cleared personnel
in order to coordinate and deconflict STO issues. The joint EWCC will also have requirements for
administrative, intelligence, logistics, legal and communications support.
(a) Administrative. Administrative support will include, but not be limited to, clerical
assistance, classified material control, publications management, update, maintenance and display of
operational SIGINT data, and the provision of general administrative materials.
(b) Intelligence. The joint EWCC will require all-source intelligence information to maintain
full knowledge of an opposing force’s intentions and capabilities. Intelligence support will include specific
and detailed combat information, intelligence, and ES information for example: opposing force electronic
systems; scheme of maneuver; communications system capabilities and deployment; electronic-dependent
weapon systems capabilities and deployment; as well as EW activities, and SIGINT collection plans of
friendly units. The J-2 will coordinate with theater EW units to ensure mission reports are received in a
timely manner and disseminated to the staff and other agencies as required.
(c) Logistics. Logistic support for the joint EWCC includes, but is not limited to:
storage containers for classified material; desks; maps; information display facilities; messing and billeting
of assigned personnel.
(d) Communications. The Joint EWCC should advise J-6 of the staff’s communication
requirements. These requirements depend directly on the level of EW activities involved in joint task
force (JTF) operations. Provisions must be made for secure, reliable, and timely communications
support. The joint EWCC should be able to communicate with both component EW authorities/
agencies and appropriate external authorities concerning coordination of EW activities. The joint EWCC
must also be able to communicate with coalition partners within releasability restraints.
(e) Legal. Support for the joint EWCC includes legal support to review and obtain the
necessary authorities and to review the plan for compliance with ROE and applicable domestic and
international law, including law of armed conflict (LOAC).
4. Joint Frequency Management Organization
Each geographic combatant commander (CCDR) is specifically tasked by joint EMS use policy
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction [CJCSI] 3320.01B, “Electromagnetic Spectrum Use
in Joint Military Operations”) to establish a frequency management structure that includes a JFMO and
to establish procedures to support planned and ongoing operations. The supported CCDR authorizes
II-7

Organizing for Joint Electronic Warfare
and controls use of the spectrum resources by the military forces under his or her command. Each
supported CCDR establishes a command policy on how the spectrum is used in there area of responsibility
(AOR), obtains clearance (or approval) from host nations for use of the spectrum (through existing
coordination procedures), and ensures that assigned military forces are authorized sufficient use of the
spectrum to execute their designated missions. To accomplish these tasks, each supported CCDR
establishes a JFMO, typically under the cognizance of the J-6, to support joint planning, coordination,
and control of the spectrum for assigned forces. At the JTF level a joint spectrum management
element (JSME) may be established. The combatant command JFMO or the JSME within a JTF may
be assigned from the J-6 staff, from a component’s staff, or from an external command such as the JSC
(see Appendix C, “Joint Spectrum Center Support to Joint Electronic Warfare”). In any event, the
combatant command JFMO or the JSME within a JTF must be staffed with trained spectrum managers,
preferably with experience in joint spectrum use and knowledge of the spectrum requirements of the
combatant command component forces. Figure III-1 diagrams the spectrum management process
followed by the combatant command JFMO or JSME within a JTF. The basic process the combatant
command JFMO or the JSME within a JTF uses to carry out its primary responsibilities is discussed
further in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Electronic Warfare,” and Chapter IV, “Coordinating
Joint Electronic Warfare.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3320.01B,
“Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace,” provides additional information about
the JFMO and its functions and processes.
5. Organization of Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare
The intelligence community is organized into four levels to provide intelligence support to joint
military operations (see Figure II-1). Each of these levels is closely and continuously involved in providing
support for EW.
a. National-Level Intelligence Organizations. At the national level, organizations and agencies
such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) are constantly seeking to identify, catalog, and update the electronic order of
battle (EOB) of identified or potential adversaries. Other intelligence agencies, such as the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), support the maintenance of the EOB. National-level
organizations such as the National Air & Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), the National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC), and the National Maritime Intelligence Center, not only define EW target
parameters and associated system performance, but also analyze and provide intelligence on adversary
EW doctrine and tactics. National-level collection efforts also provide much of the intelligence that is
gathered about adversary electronic infrastructures. The DIA defense collection coordination center
(DCCC) is the focal point for tasking national assets to collect intelligence in response to EW intelligence
requirements. EW intelligence requirements that cannot be met by lower-level intelligence assets are
forwarded to DCCC or other national-level organizations according to established procedures for
prioritization and tasking to national assets.
JP 2-01, “Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” provides more detailed
discussion on the organization of national level intelligence support.
 
@Bratva - thanks for the PDF, have already read it:lol: - Just like to let you know that the link doesn't work though

@salarsikander - a good document, but a different "JP" than I will reference. JP isn't a reference to anything in particular (though I have a specific reference in mind), it's military short-hand for joint publication (meaning anything written by two or more US military branches). I also recommend cleaning up the formatting so it's easier to read. Apart from that it's a good contribution, though it will be difficult to cross-reference the data I provide with that document, given they aren't relating directly to one another.

This is section 5.XX of document FM. This is the end of document FM.

SvenSvensonov


Coordination, Deconfliction, and Synchronization
Once the commander approves an operation plan or order and preparations are complete, the electronic warfare officer and supporting staff turn to coordinating, deconflicting, and synchronizing the electronic warfare efforts. They ensure electronic warfare actions are carried out as planned or are modified in response to current operations. This chapter discusses major areas and activities that require continuous coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization by the electronic warfare officer and supporting staff of the electronic warfare working groups.

COORDINATION AND DECONFLICTION
5-1.A certain amount of coordination is part of the planning process. However, once a plan is approved and an operation begins, the electronic warfare (EW) staff effort shifts to the coordination and deconfliction necessary to ensure units carry out EW actions as planned or modify actions to respond to the dynamics of the operation.

5-2.The EW officer and members of the EW working group continuously monitor several key areas. These include EW coordination across organizations (higher, lower, and adjacent units), support request coordination, electromagnetic spectrum management, EW asset management, functional coordination between EW subdivisions, EW reprogramming, and EW deconfliction. Normally, EW personnel on watch in the operations center monitor and coordinate activities of these key areas. They alert the EW officer or other EW support personnel to address the required actions.

COORDINATION ACROSS ORGANIZATIONS
5-3.At the joint level, the information operations division of the J-3 performs EW coordination. The EW section of the information operations staff engages in all EW functions. This section performs peacetime contingency planning, completes day-to-day planning and monitoring of routine theater EW activities, and crisis action planning for contingencies as part of emergent joint operations. The EW section coordinates closely with other appropriate staff sections and other larger joint planning groups as required. (JP 3-13.1 discusses joint EW coordination.)

5-4.In the early stages of contingencies, the joint force commander’s EW staff assesses the staffing requirements for planning and execution. This staff also coordinates EW planning and course of action development with the joint force commander’s components. Services begin component EW planning and activate their EW working groups per combatant command or Service guidelines. When the scope of a contingency becomes clearer, the command EW officer may request that the joint force commander establish a joint EW coordination cell. If a joint EW coordination cell is formed, it normally requires additional augmentation from the Service or functional components. Depending on the size of the force, EW personnel from the division, corps, or theater are expected to augment the joint EW coordination cell to form a representative EW planning and execution organization. The senior Army organization’s staff EW officer anticipates this requirement and prepares to support the augmentation if requested.

5-5.Coordination occurs through established EW working groups from theater level to battalion level. Within Army organizations, the coordination of EW activities occurs both horizontally and vertically. At every level, the staff EW officer ensures the necessary coordination. Normally, coordination of EW activities between the Army and joint force air component commander flows through the battlefield

coordination detachment at the joint air operations center. EW staffs at higher echelons monitor EWrelated activities and resolve conflicts when necessary.

5-6.Normally the senior Army headquarters (ARFOR) G-3 or S-3 coordinates with external EW organizations, unless direct liaison is authorized at lower echelons. Other components requesting Army EW support coordinate their support requirements with the EW officer located at the ARFOR headquarters or tactical operations center. Often, a liaison from the requesting organization completes these requests. If other Service or functional components have an immediate need for Army EW support, they send the request to the operational fires directorate or fires cell and the senior headquarters EW working group (sometimes referred to as an EW coordination cell) via the Global Command and Control System or Global Command and Control System-Army. In support of external EW coordination, the staff EW officer within the J-3, G-3, or S-3— zProvides an assessment of EW capabilities to other component operation centers.

z Coordinates preplanned EW operations with other Service components (within prescribed time lines).

z Updates preplanned EW operations in coordination with other components as required.

SUPPORT REQUEST COORDINATION
5-7.Units requesting electronic attack support forward requests to the appropriate EW working group. (See appendix D for the electronic attack request format.) Each EW working group prioritizes the requests and forwards them to the higher headquarters. The commander who owns the capability when the requested support is needed approves the requests. The technical data required to support the execution of the request is passed through EW channels at the appropriate level of classification.

5-8.Electronic warfare support requests are prioritized and passed from the EW working groups through G-2 or S-2 channels and are approved by the commander who owns the capability. New EW support requests are integrated into the intelligence synchronization process. If they are approved, they appear in the intelligence synchronization plan and the unit intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan. See FMI 2-01 for details on the intelligence synchronization process. The technical data required to support EW support requests passes via signals intelligence channels within the G-2 or S-2 by classified means.

ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
5-9.The electromagnetic spectrum is a finite resource. Once apportioned, this resource must be managed efficiently to maximize the limited spectrum allocated to support military operations. Electromagnetic spectrum operations aim to enable electronic systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or experiencing unacceptable interference. Electromagnetic spectrum operations deconflict all military, national, and host-nation systems being used in the area of operations, including electronic protection systems, communications systems, sensors, and weapon systems.

5-10.Spectrum management involves planning, coordinating, and managing use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. Primarily, it involves determining what specific activities will occur in each part of the available spectrum. For example, some frequencies are assigned to the counter radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device EW systems operating in the area of operations. These frequencies then are deconflicted with ground tactical communications. The spectrum manager ensures all necessary functions that require use of the electromagnetic spectrum have sufficient allocation of that spectrum to accomplish their purpose. Where a conflict (two or more functions require the same portion of the spectrum) exists, the spectrum manager resolves the conflict through direct coordination.


5-11.The spectrum manager is a member of the G-6 or S-6 section that has staff responsibility for spectrum management in the unit. The spectrum manager is a member of the unit’s EW working group. Conflicts regarding spectrum use and allocation that cannot be resolved through direct coordination by the spectrum manager are referred to the G-3 or S-3 for resolution.

JAMMING CONTROL AUTHORITY
5-12.Depending on the operational situation, an Army headquarters may be designated as the jamming control authority. This authority serves as the senior jamming control authority in the area of operations. It establishes guidance for jamming on behalf of the joint force commander. If designated as the jamming control authority, the senior staff EW officer normally is tasked with the following responsibilities:

z Participating in development of and ensuring compliance with the joint restricted frequency list. z Validating and approving or denying cease-jamming requests.

z Maintaining situational awareness of all jamming-capable systems in the area of operations. zActing as the joint force commander’s executive agent for developing EW intelligence gain-orloss recommendations when electronic attack or electronic warfare support conflicts occur. zCoordinating jamming requirements with joint force components. zInvestigating unauthorized jamming events and implementing corrective measures.

See JP 3-13.1 for further information on jamming control authority.

ASSET MANAGEMENT
5-13.Regardless of echelon, the EW officer monitors and tracks the organization’s EW assets and their status. The EW officer makes recommendations to the G-3 or S-3 concerning EW asset allocation and reallocation when required. The EW officer monitors and tracks EW asset status within the EW working group and reports this information to higher echelons via the Army battle command system.


OTHER COORDINATING ACTIONS
5-14.In addition to the functional considerations listed in chapter 4, several coordinating actions must also take place between the EW working groups (at all echelons) and the other planning and execution cells within the headquarters. These actions include— zDetailed coordination between the EW activities and the intelligence activities supporting an operation.

z Coordination of EW systems reprogramming.

z Coordination with the working groups or cells coordinating the command and control warfare and information protection tasks.

Coordination Between EW Activites and Intelligence Activities
5-15.Most of the intelligence effort, before and during an operation, relies on collection activities targeted against various parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare support depends on the timely collection, processing, and reporting of intelligence and combat information to alert EW operators and other military activities about intelligence collected in the electromagnetic spectrum. The EW officer and G-2 or S-2 ensure EW collection priorities and EW support collection assets are integrated into a complete intelligence collection plan. This plan ensures that units maximize the use of scarce intelligence and collection assets to support the commander’s objectives.

Coordination of EW Systems Reprogramming
5-16.The EW officer and G-2, at division and corps levels, track and coordinate EW systems reprogramming input submitted by lower echelons. This input is then forwarded to the Army Service component command headquarters for submission to the Army Reprogramming Analysis Team. EW officers ensure this input is promptly submitted to ensure urgent reprogramming actions are completed for assigned systems. See FM 3-13.10 for detailed procedures for reprogramming EW and target sensing systems.

Coordination Between EW, Command and Control Warfare, and Information Tasks
5-17.EW working groups coordinate their supporting actions with the elements responsible for the Army information tasks—information engagement, command and control warfare, information protection, operations security, and military deception. Although EW plays a major role in supporting command and control warfare and information protection, it also enhances or provides direct support to other information tasks. For example, enemy radio and television broadcasts can be disrupted or replaced with friendly radio and television messages as part of larger psychological operations in support of information engagement. Electronic deception capabilities can support and enhance an overall military deception operation.

DECONFLICTION
5-18.Friendly forces depend on electromagnetic energy and the electromagnetic spectrum to sense, process, store, measure, analyze, and communicate information. This dependency creates the potential for significant interference between various friendly systems. Without proper deconfliction, interference could damage friendly capabilities or lead to operational failure. This is especially true with regard to EW systems. EW deconfliction includes— zFriendly electromagnetic spectrum use for communications and other purposes (such as navigation systems and sensors) with electronic attack activities (such as counter-radiocontrolled improvised-explosive-device EW systems).

z Electronic attack activities with electronic warfare support activities (potential electromagnetic interference of collection assets).


z Electronic attack and electronic warfare support activities with information tasks involving electromagnetic emissions (such as counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device EW systems interfering with a psychological-operations radio broadcast).

z Electronic attack activities with host-nation electromagnetic spectrum users (such as commercial broadcasters, emergency first responders, and law enforcement).

5-19.The forum for deconfliction is the unit’s EW working group. As such, the specific composition of the working group may expand to include more than the standard staff representation described in chapter 3. Regardless of echelon, to perform its critical deconfliction function, the EW working group retains knowledgeable representation from and ready access to decisionmakers. The EW working group also retains knowledge of and access to higher headquarters assistance and reachback capabilities available (See appendix F for more information).

SYNCHRONIZATION
5-20.EW, particularly in electronic attack, can produce both intended and unintended effects. Therefore, units thoroughly synchronize its use with other forms of fires and with friendly systems operating in the electromagnetic spectrum. Through synchronization, units avoid negative effects such as communications fratricide by jammers. The EW officer ensures all EW activities are integrated into the appropriate sections of plans—fires, information protection, command and control warfare, and military deception plans. This officer also synchronizes EW activities for maximum contribution to the commander’s desired effects while preventing EW from inhibiting friendly force capabilities. The primary forum for this synchronization is the unit’s EW working group. The EW officer attends the regular targeting meetings in the fires cell and may also participate (perhaps as a standing member) in other functional or integrating cells and working groups. These may include fires, information engagement, network operations, or future operations. The EW officer’s participation in these other cells and working groups helps to synchronize EW operations.

SUMMARY
5-21.EW capabilities yield many advantages for the commander. The EW working group’s sole purpose is to facilitate the integration, coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization of EW operations to ensure advantages are achieved. This effort requires constant coordination with the unit’s other functional cells and working groups. As conflicts are identified during the planning and execution of operations, the EW officer and supporting staff members coordinate solutions to those conflicts within the EW working group.

As noted in post #1, this thread was sourced through publicly available US military documents. These are them:

References

CJCSI 3320.01B Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations. 01 May 2005

CJCSI 3320.02C. Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR). 27 January 2006 (with change 1 as of 25 February 2008).

CJCSI 3320.03A Joint Communications Electronics Operation Instructions. 011 June 2005.

CJCSM 3122.03C. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance. 17 August 2007.

CJCSM 3320.01B Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace. 25 March 2006.

CJCSM 3320.02A Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Procedures. 20 January 2006.

DODI 4650.01. Policy and Procedures for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. 09 January 2009.
 
Last edited:
@SvenSvensonov

Wonderful post:D
This technology is very useful and wonderful in many cases,
For example,
Two terrorists organizations are competent and enemy of each other have planned to destroy you.
With this technology,what if you track their messages without letting them to find out or divert messages taking place b/w members of TA(TTP for instance) against TB( fazullah group) and divert it to TB without disclosing your presence. This is done so that they began to fight with each other and you get a chance to break them and to destroy them.Also to divert their attention from your army to one of their temporary ally?Is it possible?how?
@Horus @WebMaster and others..please make it featured:D
@jhungary take a look at this-
nice, i wish i can also tell you all what i did in the military...

But one part is boring and the other part i cannot tell you about....lol
 
nice, i wish i can also tell you all what i did in the military...

But one part is boring and the other part i cannot tell you about....lol
Did you attend RASP or did you attend ranger school?
 
Did you attend RASP or did you attend ranger school?

Ranger school, only, no RASP....I was going to get into SF selection after my tour in Afghanistan, probably will go ROP (What it called back in the day) if i failed SF selection.

Why Ask?

And lol, i have to kiss a lot of arses to get into Ranger school, even soldier passed RASP OR ROP Still have to wait for a spot lol
 

Back
Top Bottom