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Which road do we take?
Mehreen Zahra-Malik
Friday, September 16, 2011
Ten years after it became the capital of the global jihad, the only lessons Pakistan seems to have learnt are the wrong ones.
Battered by US allegations of duplicity, collusion with Osama bin Laden, mounting criticism at home over failing to intercept an attack on a major naval base and the murder of an investigative journalist in which fingers were directed at the Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistan Army convened the 139th Corp Commanders conference on June 9. In an unusually detailed statement, the brass hit back at critics: Some quarters, because of their perceptual biases, were trying to deliberately run down the armed forces and the army in particular. This is an effort to drive a wedge between the army, different organs of the state, and more seriously, the people of Pakistan.
Ten years after worlds collided on Sept 11, 2001, it was clearer than ever before: the Pakistan Army just didnt get 9/11.
As September 11 became the prism through which all history would subsequently be refracted, the security establishment sought sanctuary in woe-is-us conspiracies, refusing to realise that the protégés it had fattened up for decades had turned rogue. Ten years later, despite attack after audacious attack on the military itself, with at least 3,000 military personnel and over 30,000 civilians killed by terrorists, those in charge still dont know introspection.
September 11 should have marked a turning point not only in Pakistans relations with other countries (not least India, Afghanistan and the US), it should have also profoundly impacted power relations within Pakistan itself. But the generals failed to understand that beyond this point they could opt for business as usual only at their own peril. What was worse: while the army failed, the political establishment never even tried.
Rethinking relations with India; embarking on economic reforms; giving up non-state actors as a policy instrument; acknowledging the Quetta Shura; dismantling the old ways of exerting influence in Afghanistan-much needed to be and could have been done post-9/11. But Pakistan chose a transactional response best exemplified by what President Musharraf explained were his reasons for signing up for Americas war on terror: because he had been threatened into acquiescence by the Bush administration; and because he wanted to be able to further Pakistans interests, including by grabbing the carrots the US was dangling. Musharraf believed what he said. Here and abroad, he was seen as Americas man. And he survived two publicly known assassination attempts.
Ironically, even as we opened supply routes for the US war machine in Afghanistan and went after Al-Qaeda, we turned a blind eye to the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and other elements that overtly challenge US and, very often, Pakistani interests. We seem to think that in worrying the world, we interest it. And if only for that reason, the world will always give us another chance.
Will things change? Possibly, if Pakistan makes some hard choices. But one cant see how Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani will make the right choices now, when he and his predecessors have declined to do so in the past. If this expectation is true, US-Pakistan relations in particular, and Pakistans internal equation in general, will remain locked into a low-level equilibrium trap at best. At both levels setting our own house in order and getting on the right side of history the generals have adopted an unfortunate pragmatism aimed at protecting the lowest common denominator of achievement.
Ten years on, we measure our successes in terms of retaking control of Swat, counting dead militants and civilians, denying complicity with drone attacks, meeting Indias military buildup. We have witnessed attacks on GHQ, PNS Mehran, in bazaars and ballrooms. We have buried Pakistans bravest woman, minorities and their leaders, a courageous and charismatic governor. Where is the success in having to relive 9/11 almost every day? How do you measure success when everyone is part of the debris?
The security of the people of Pakistan; the war being fought, and lost, in our villages, slums and shantytowns that war isnt on TV yet; that war isnt the one anyone cares about. The pain, horror, and yearning of the people of this country have not, and will not, change the minds of those who choose the paths we tread.
Some say only another cataclysmic event another 9/11 could finally impel a genuine lurch forward for Pakistan. But we can no longer afford to risk such a game-changer.
We have come to a fork in the road and are forced to ask ourselves: Which road do we take? The answer is staring us in the face if only we would look. But we wont, and in doing this, we have forfeited even the right to mourn our own tragedies.
The writer is assistant editor, The News International. Email: mehreenzahramalik@gmail. com
Mehreen Zahra-Malik
Friday, September 16, 2011
Ten years after it became the capital of the global jihad, the only lessons Pakistan seems to have learnt are the wrong ones.
Battered by US allegations of duplicity, collusion with Osama bin Laden, mounting criticism at home over failing to intercept an attack on a major naval base and the murder of an investigative journalist in which fingers were directed at the Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistan Army convened the 139th Corp Commanders conference on June 9. In an unusually detailed statement, the brass hit back at critics: Some quarters, because of their perceptual biases, were trying to deliberately run down the armed forces and the army in particular. This is an effort to drive a wedge between the army, different organs of the state, and more seriously, the people of Pakistan.
Ten years after worlds collided on Sept 11, 2001, it was clearer than ever before: the Pakistan Army just didnt get 9/11.
As September 11 became the prism through which all history would subsequently be refracted, the security establishment sought sanctuary in woe-is-us conspiracies, refusing to realise that the protégés it had fattened up for decades had turned rogue. Ten years later, despite attack after audacious attack on the military itself, with at least 3,000 military personnel and over 30,000 civilians killed by terrorists, those in charge still dont know introspection.
September 11 should have marked a turning point not only in Pakistans relations with other countries (not least India, Afghanistan and the US), it should have also profoundly impacted power relations within Pakistan itself. But the generals failed to understand that beyond this point they could opt for business as usual only at their own peril. What was worse: while the army failed, the political establishment never even tried.
Rethinking relations with India; embarking on economic reforms; giving up non-state actors as a policy instrument; acknowledging the Quetta Shura; dismantling the old ways of exerting influence in Afghanistan-much needed to be and could have been done post-9/11. But Pakistan chose a transactional response best exemplified by what President Musharraf explained were his reasons for signing up for Americas war on terror: because he had been threatened into acquiescence by the Bush administration; and because he wanted to be able to further Pakistans interests, including by grabbing the carrots the US was dangling. Musharraf believed what he said. Here and abroad, he was seen as Americas man. And he survived two publicly known assassination attempts.
Ironically, even as we opened supply routes for the US war machine in Afghanistan and went after Al-Qaeda, we turned a blind eye to the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and other elements that overtly challenge US and, very often, Pakistani interests. We seem to think that in worrying the world, we interest it. And if only for that reason, the world will always give us another chance.
Will things change? Possibly, if Pakistan makes some hard choices. But one cant see how Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani will make the right choices now, when he and his predecessors have declined to do so in the past. If this expectation is true, US-Pakistan relations in particular, and Pakistans internal equation in general, will remain locked into a low-level equilibrium trap at best. At both levels setting our own house in order and getting on the right side of history the generals have adopted an unfortunate pragmatism aimed at protecting the lowest common denominator of achievement.
Ten years on, we measure our successes in terms of retaking control of Swat, counting dead militants and civilians, denying complicity with drone attacks, meeting Indias military buildup. We have witnessed attacks on GHQ, PNS Mehran, in bazaars and ballrooms. We have buried Pakistans bravest woman, minorities and their leaders, a courageous and charismatic governor. Where is the success in having to relive 9/11 almost every day? How do you measure success when everyone is part of the debris?
The security of the people of Pakistan; the war being fought, and lost, in our villages, slums and shantytowns that war isnt on TV yet; that war isnt the one anyone cares about. The pain, horror, and yearning of the people of this country have not, and will not, change the minds of those who choose the paths we tread.
Some say only another cataclysmic event another 9/11 could finally impel a genuine lurch forward for Pakistan. But we can no longer afford to risk such a game-changer.
We have come to a fork in the road and are forced to ask ourselves: Which road do we take? The answer is staring us in the face if only we would look. But we wont, and in doing this, we have forfeited even the right to mourn our own tragedies.
The writer is assistant editor, The News International. Email: mehreenzahramalik@gmail. com
