What Ails Pakistan
By: Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
The expanded role of the military has reduced the space for autonomous civilian activities, causing a crisis of confidence in civilian institutions. This adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Further, given its expanded non-professional interests, the military can no longer afford to leave policy-making to civilian government in case the latter threatens its expanded interests
Pakistan's official circles project it as a democratic state with an elected parliament and a civilian government that guarantees the citizens' civil and political rights. They highlight Pakistan's economic recovery, claiming that the country has become a model of rapid economic development.
The opposition and other non-official circles challenge these claims, questioning the democratic credentials of the Musharraf government and the claims of an economic boom. They argue that governance has deteriorated and the economy serves the military-bureaucratic elite and others who have joined hands with the rulers in Islamabad. Some argue that the government's flawed policies have intensified political alienation in the smaller provinces.
General Pervez Musharraf brought an end to direct military rule in November 2002 by inducting an elected civilian government under the modified constitution. One can argue that Pakistan has an elected constitutional political order. The media enjoys a large measure of freedom, although the government and its intelligence agencies subtly pressure selective targets in the media. The government can claim that the 17th constitutional amendment, approved by the parliament in December 2003 endorsed the major constitutional and legal changes initiated by the military government of General Pervez Musharraf. The parliament also allowed him to concurrently hold on to the presidency and the command of the army.
However, despite Pervez Musharraf's effective hold over power, the long-term endurance of his political and economic order is doubtful. Pakistan's political and economic arrangements suffer from four major problems that hinder the evolution of a mature, stable and viable political system.
These problems are: the poor quality of democracy; militarisation of the Pakistani state and society; increased poverty and underdevelopment; and the increase in economic disparities and a failure to check inequities of opportunities, income, assets which have geographic and ethnic dimensions.
Pakistan's democracy is strong in rhetoric but weak in substance. The president exercises far more powers than he is allowed constitutionally, overshadowing the prime minister, his cabinet and the parliament. The latter have not been able to carve out an autonomous and assertive role in the political system. Power is concentrated in the presidency, the army and intelligence affiliates and some serving and retired bureaucrats. The ruling Pakistani Muslim League (PML) and the civilian cabinet help create a semblance of civilian and parliamentary order.
Three features of the present political order prove that there is a democracy deficit. First, President Musharraf continues holding on to the army chief's post, although his initial appointment to this position in October 1998 was for three years. Regardless of how the official circles argue in favour of this arrangement, an army chief cum president is an anathema to democratic theory and practice. This also shows that President Musharraf does not believe that civilian arrangements can guarantee his stay in power. He needs the army's support to hold on.
Second, democracy emphasises constitutionalism which means that constitutional principles and conventions regulate the rulers' conduct and power management. In Pakistan, military rulers have either tailored the constitution or changed it to sustain their commanding position in the political system. General Pervez Musharraf is no exception. The 1973 constitution was amended several times to suit his needs. He ignored some constitutional conventions. As long as constitutional supremacy is not rehabilitated in theory and practice, Pakistan's democracy will continue to suffer from the credibility crisis.
Third, Pervez Musharraf has used the state apparatus to curtail the two leading mainstream political parties, relying instead on smaller, local, ethnic and Islamist parties. This has narrowed the support base of the political system. He does not appear to be in a mood to change this strategy and create a broad-based consensus by enabling the mainstream political parties to freely join the political process. Such a political system cannot endure.
The second major threat to political stability and continuity is the militarisation of the state and the society. In addition to the regular induction of military personnel to central superior services, retired and serving senior military officers now hold a large number of lucrative jobs in government as well as in semi-government institutions and corporations. Until 2005, the Planning Commission was immune from military induction. Now, it cannot claim that distinction. Military men head even public sector universities.
Civil service training institutions are being given a unified structure to be looked after by a retired senior army officer who will be assisted by his colleagues from the military. Recently, the Punjab government made a retired brigadier the project direct for its Bab-i-Pakistan project - a memorial for the 1947 refugees.
The expanded non-professional activities of the military have also led to militarisation. This includes business, commercial, industrial activities, partly carried out by the military directly and partly through the five welfare foundations set up by different services. They engage in all sorts of non-professional activities including education, banking, share market business and insurance, transportation, construction business, real estate development, and industry.
The Defence Housing Authorities in Lahore and Karachi have established an elaborate system of educational institutions and intend to launch universities. These activities have expanded so much that they cannot be covered in a short article.
The expanded role of the military has reduced the space for autonomous civilian activities, causing a crisis of confidence in civilian institutions. This adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Further, given its expanded non-professional interests, the military can no longer afford to leave policy-making to civilian government in case the latter threatens its expanded interests.
The third major threat to the present day political order is the growing poverty. Despite the tall claims of the government, most independent observers maintain that poverty has not declined in Pakistan. The proportion of the poor to the total population has increased. Those above the poverty line have also been badly hit by the price hike over the last year. The prices of utilities, petrol and kitchen items, including food stuff, have gone up so much that middle and lower middle class people are finding it difficult to cope.
Fourth, Pakistan's economic policies in the post-September 2001 period have improved Pakistan's overall economy but these policies have increased inequalities by creating wealth in a small section of the population. Economic growth has not benefited the middle and lower strata of the society. The government appears to have abdicated its responsibilities towards the disadvantaged sections of the population with the exception of offering them some international aid. If the poor are left at the mercy of free market forces and the state does not check the rapidly increasing disparities, ethnic and regional issues will get out of hand. This will also strengthen hardline Islamists and extremist forces.
These problems pose a serious challenge to the long-term endurance of the Musharraf-led political order. General Pervez Musharraf's problems are going to multiply if he does not move towards an inclusive and equal-opportunity democracy, fails to recognise the urgency of protecting the civilian institutions and processes from being overwhelmed by the military, and does not immediately address the problem of poverty, price hike and socio-economic inequity.
(Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst)
By: Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
The expanded role of the military has reduced the space for autonomous civilian activities, causing a crisis of confidence in civilian institutions. This adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Further, given its expanded non-professional interests, the military can no longer afford to leave policy-making to civilian government in case the latter threatens its expanded interests
Pakistan's official circles project it as a democratic state with an elected parliament and a civilian government that guarantees the citizens' civil and political rights. They highlight Pakistan's economic recovery, claiming that the country has become a model of rapid economic development.
The opposition and other non-official circles challenge these claims, questioning the democratic credentials of the Musharraf government and the claims of an economic boom. They argue that governance has deteriorated and the economy serves the military-bureaucratic elite and others who have joined hands with the rulers in Islamabad. Some argue that the government's flawed policies have intensified political alienation in the smaller provinces.
General Pervez Musharraf brought an end to direct military rule in November 2002 by inducting an elected civilian government under the modified constitution. One can argue that Pakistan has an elected constitutional political order. The media enjoys a large measure of freedom, although the government and its intelligence agencies subtly pressure selective targets in the media. The government can claim that the 17th constitutional amendment, approved by the parliament in December 2003 endorsed the major constitutional and legal changes initiated by the military government of General Pervez Musharraf. The parliament also allowed him to concurrently hold on to the presidency and the command of the army.
However, despite Pervez Musharraf's effective hold over power, the long-term endurance of his political and economic order is doubtful. Pakistan's political and economic arrangements suffer from four major problems that hinder the evolution of a mature, stable and viable political system.
These problems are: the poor quality of democracy; militarisation of the Pakistani state and society; increased poverty and underdevelopment; and the increase in economic disparities and a failure to check inequities of opportunities, income, assets which have geographic and ethnic dimensions.
Pakistan's democracy is strong in rhetoric but weak in substance. The president exercises far more powers than he is allowed constitutionally, overshadowing the prime minister, his cabinet and the parliament. The latter have not been able to carve out an autonomous and assertive role in the political system. Power is concentrated in the presidency, the army and intelligence affiliates and some serving and retired bureaucrats. The ruling Pakistani Muslim League (PML) and the civilian cabinet help create a semblance of civilian and parliamentary order.
Three features of the present political order prove that there is a democracy deficit. First, President Musharraf continues holding on to the army chief's post, although his initial appointment to this position in October 1998 was for three years. Regardless of how the official circles argue in favour of this arrangement, an army chief cum president is an anathema to democratic theory and practice. This also shows that President Musharraf does not believe that civilian arrangements can guarantee his stay in power. He needs the army's support to hold on.
Second, democracy emphasises constitutionalism which means that constitutional principles and conventions regulate the rulers' conduct and power management. In Pakistan, military rulers have either tailored the constitution or changed it to sustain their commanding position in the political system. General Pervez Musharraf is no exception. The 1973 constitution was amended several times to suit his needs. He ignored some constitutional conventions. As long as constitutional supremacy is not rehabilitated in theory and practice, Pakistan's democracy will continue to suffer from the credibility crisis.
Third, Pervez Musharraf has used the state apparatus to curtail the two leading mainstream political parties, relying instead on smaller, local, ethnic and Islamist parties. This has narrowed the support base of the political system. He does not appear to be in a mood to change this strategy and create a broad-based consensus by enabling the mainstream political parties to freely join the political process. Such a political system cannot endure.
The second major threat to political stability and continuity is the militarisation of the state and the society. In addition to the regular induction of military personnel to central superior services, retired and serving senior military officers now hold a large number of lucrative jobs in government as well as in semi-government institutions and corporations. Until 2005, the Planning Commission was immune from military induction. Now, it cannot claim that distinction. Military men head even public sector universities.
Civil service training institutions are being given a unified structure to be looked after by a retired senior army officer who will be assisted by his colleagues from the military. Recently, the Punjab government made a retired brigadier the project direct for its Bab-i-Pakistan project - a memorial for the 1947 refugees.
The expanded non-professional activities of the military have also led to militarisation. This includes business, commercial, industrial activities, partly carried out by the military directly and partly through the five welfare foundations set up by different services. They engage in all sorts of non-professional activities including education, banking, share market business and insurance, transportation, construction business, real estate development, and industry.
The Defence Housing Authorities in Lahore and Karachi have established an elaborate system of educational institutions and intend to launch universities. These activities have expanded so much that they cannot be covered in a short article.
The expanded role of the military has reduced the space for autonomous civilian activities, causing a crisis of confidence in civilian institutions. This adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Further, given its expanded non-professional interests, the military can no longer afford to leave policy-making to civilian government in case the latter threatens its expanded interests.
The third major threat to the present day political order is the growing poverty. Despite the tall claims of the government, most independent observers maintain that poverty has not declined in Pakistan. The proportion of the poor to the total population has increased. Those above the poverty line have also been badly hit by the price hike over the last year. The prices of utilities, petrol and kitchen items, including food stuff, have gone up so much that middle and lower middle class people are finding it difficult to cope.
Fourth, Pakistan's economic policies in the post-September 2001 period have improved Pakistan's overall economy but these policies have increased inequalities by creating wealth in a small section of the population. Economic growth has not benefited the middle and lower strata of the society. The government appears to have abdicated its responsibilities towards the disadvantaged sections of the population with the exception of offering them some international aid. If the poor are left at the mercy of free market forces and the state does not check the rapidly increasing disparities, ethnic and regional issues will get out of hand. This will also strengthen hardline Islamists and extremist forces.
These problems pose a serious challenge to the long-term endurance of the Musharraf-led political order. General Pervez Musharraf's problems are going to multiply if he does not move towards an inclusive and equal-opportunity democracy, fails to recognise the urgency of protecting the civilian institutions and processes from being overwhelmed by the military, and does not immediately address the problem of poverty, price hike and socio-economic inequity.
(Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst)
