Justin Joseph
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ISLAMABAD: Two leading international news groups on Saturday launched what appears like a well-coordinated campaign against the Pakistan Army, especially General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.
(MOD EDIT)
“(President) Obama should make a few things clear to the general: that America knows the extent of the ISI’s backing for the Taliban; that Pakistan Army will not keep getting money and weapons from Washington if it goes on backing groups that kill American soldiers,” the Boston Globe said in an editorial.
In an ominous warning it said: “If Pakistan does not end all support for its Taliban proxies, the US will seek India’s assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan.”
The Globe editorial was timed with influential London magazine Economist’s highly focused article on Pakistan Army. “Most of the blame should be laid at the door of the army, which claims, more than any other institution, to embody nationhood,” the magazine said.
The Boston Globe editorial said: “The US and the Nato cannot endure an open-ended military commitment in Afghanistan. But they know - or should know - that there can be no hope of ending the war unless Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency stops arming, funding and training Afghan insurgent groups.
“President Obama must recognize the necessity of persuading Pakistan’s military leaders, who control the ISI, to stop playing a double game with America. This can be done. Washington has valuable carrots to offer and credible threats to make. To succeed, however, Obama must be willing to play hardball.
“There is no point applying pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government. Whatever its flaws, the government of President Asif Ali Zardari is aligned with the United States on fighting Islamist extremists. Zardari’s wife, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated by Pakistani extremists. Rather, it is the Army Chief of Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, himself a former head of the ISI, who has the power to end the agency’s backing for the Taliban.
“Pakistan originally sponsored the Taliban in the mid-90s as a proxy force that could ensure Afghanistan would be friendly to Pakistan and not be absorbed into an Indian sphere of influence. Anxiety about India’s role in Afghanistan remains the driving force behind the ISI’s support for the Taliban.
“Recent attacks on India’s embassy and Indian nationals in Afghanistan point to the Pakistani military’s continuing obsession with Indian designs on Afghanistan. And when Kayani held high-level meetings in Washington this March, he reportedly objected to a plan for India to train Afghan soldiers under the Nato auspices, offering instead to have Pakistan train them.
“Obama’s leverage over Kayani is this same fixation on India. Obama should make a few things clear to the general: that America knows the extent of the ISI’s backing for the Taliban; that Pakistan Army will not keep getting money and weapons from Washington if it goes on backing groups that kill American soldiers; and that if Pakistan does not end all support for its Taliban proxies, the US will seek India’s assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan.
“Then, if Kayani makes the right choice, Obama can use America’s growing influence with India to help reduce tensions with Pakistan. This is the key to a stable future for that part of Asia. To extract American troops from Afghanistan without leaving behind a crucible for new calamities, Obama will have to master the craft of balancing power.
The Economist under the title: “Land of the impure: Don’t blame the army for all Pakistan’s problems. Just most of them” said:
“Three score years and a bit after its founding, Pakistan-which means land of the pure-still struggles to look like a nation.
Economically backward, politically stunted and terrorised by religious extremists, it would be enough to make anyone nervous, even if it did not have nuclear weapons. For these shortcomings, most of the blame should be laid at the door of the army, which claims, more than any other institution, to embody nationhood.
Grossly unfair? If the Army stood before one of its own tribunals, the charge sheet would surely run as follows:
One, a taste for military adventurism on its “eastern front” against giant India, which has undermined security, not enhanced it. No adventure was more disastrous than the one in 1971, which hastened the loss of East Pakistan, present-day Bangladesh. More recently, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, then army chief, sent troops into Indian-controlled Kashmir without deigning to inform the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. Mr Musharraf thus forced a confrontation between two nuclear states. It was an international public-relations debacle for Pakistan. Today the army remains wedded to the “India threat”. India, meanwhile, for all its gross abuses in Kashmir, is more concerned about economic development than invading Pakistan.
Two, endangering the state’s existence by making common cause with jihadism. This policy started with General Zia ul-Haq’s “Islamisation” policies in the late 1970s. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan (along with the CIA) financed the Afghan mujahideen opposition. The policy turned into support for the Taliban when the movement swept into power in the mid-1990s. Taliban support continues today, even though Pakistan is America’s supposed ally in Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban counterinsurgency. A new report by the London School of Economics claims that not only does Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency finance the Afghan Taliban, but also the ISI is even represented on the Taliban’s leadership council. The claims have been loudly rejected, but in private Pakistani military men admit that corners of the army do indeed help the Taliban.
For years both Islamist and liberal generals have also backed jihadists fighting for a Muslim Kashmir. Though vastly outnumbered, the militants have managed to tie down a dozen Indian army divisions. Mr Musharraf and an aide once joked about having such jihadists by their tooti-ie, literally, “taps”, by which he meant their private parts.
Yet ex-mujahideen and their affiliates-known loosely as the Pakistani Taliban-have turned on their hosts. The armed forces have struck against them near the border with Afghanistan. Other militant groups, which the army thought it “owned” have either joined the Pakistani Taliban or, like them, have turned against their former protectors. The army itself, even the ISI, has been a target of attacks. While officers draw increasingly nice distinctions between different jihadists, the militant groups are bleeding into one another. Now attacks are spreading into tolerant, prosperous Punjab, far from the troubled marches. No doubt now about who holds whom by the tooti.
Three, the armed forces have undermined democratic institutions. Since 1947, the longest period of civilian rule the army has tolerated is just six years. And when Mr Musharraf instigated a coup after being sacked by Mr Sharif after the Kashmir debacle, there followed more than eight disastrous years of military rule, heavily backed, as with previous such rules, by the Americans. Like General Zia before him, Mr Musharraf often found Islamist political parties more congenial than secular ones.
Admittedly, Pakistan’s governing institutions were weak from the outset, but the army’s meddling has made them even weaker.
Under Mr Musharraf it has left the civil service and judiciary corrupt and demoralised. (A tenth of civil-service appointments must still go to officers.) The armed forces have a $20 billion business empire and are probably the country’s biggest land developer, as officers’ loyalty is bought with grants of land.
The leaders of the main parties are mainly to blame for their corrupt, feudal styles and for not practising the democracy they espouse even in their own parties. Yet the army also shares some of the blame for political backwardness. It has permitted only a handful of elections. Democracy might have been much more mature by now had elections been allowed to run their course.
The costs go beyond any democratic deficit. Pakistan’s economic and social developments have also been stunted, as the army has sucked up resources and thwarted growth. In economic terms, educated Pakistanis think their country should be a Turkey or a Malaysia by now. Instead, it lies below Yemen in the UNDP’s ranking of human-development indicators, at 151st in the world. School enrolment ranks below Sudan. The government spends twice as much on the armed forces as on education. Some say Pakistan has turned a corner. The army went back to barracks in 2008, pushed partly by the return and assassination of the populist leader, Benazir Bhutto. This year political parties reached consensus on constitutional changes that shift power towards the Parliament and away from the president, currently Asif Zardari, Miss Bhutto’s widower and heir to her political dynasty.
Optimists say this sets Pakistan on a path to more effective and accountable government. Perhaps. But the pessimist in Banyan counters that the army retains its huge say on national security. What’s more, civilian politics remains frequently corrupt, and personality trumps policy. What looks like a system of checks and balances today could look like gridlock tomorrow. The sort of combination, in other words, that tempts the army to poke its head out of the barracks again.”
The News, Pakistan
‘Pak armed forces have $20b business empire’
(MOD EDIT)
“(President) Obama should make a few things clear to the general: that America knows the extent of the ISI’s backing for the Taliban; that Pakistan Army will not keep getting money and weapons from Washington if it goes on backing groups that kill American soldiers,” the Boston Globe said in an editorial.
In an ominous warning it said: “If Pakistan does not end all support for its Taliban proxies, the US will seek India’s assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan.”
The Globe editorial was timed with influential London magazine Economist’s highly focused article on Pakistan Army. “Most of the blame should be laid at the door of the army, which claims, more than any other institution, to embody nationhood,” the magazine said.
The Boston Globe editorial said: “The US and the Nato cannot endure an open-ended military commitment in Afghanistan. But they know - or should know - that there can be no hope of ending the war unless Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency stops arming, funding and training Afghan insurgent groups.
“President Obama must recognize the necessity of persuading Pakistan’s military leaders, who control the ISI, to stop playing a double game with America. This can be done. Washington has valuable carrots to offer and credible threats to make. To succeed, however, Obama must be willing to play hardball.
“There is no point applying pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government. Whatever its flaws, the government of President Asif Ali Zardari is aligned with the United States on fighting Islamist extremists. Zardari’s wife, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated by Pakistani extremists. Rather, it is the Army Chief of Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, himself a former head of the ISI, who has the power to end the agency’s backing for the Taliban.
“Pakistan originally sponsored the Taliban in the mid-90s as a proxy force that could ensure Afghanistan would be friendly to Pakistan and not be absorbed into an Indian sphere of influence. Anxiety about India’s role in Afghanistan remains the driving force behind the ISI’s support for the Taliban.
“Recent attacks on India’s embassy and Indian nationals in Afghanistan point to the Pakistani military’s continuing obsession with Indian designs on Afghanistan. And when Kayani held high-level meetings in Washington this March, he reportedly objected to a plan for India to train Afghan soldiers under the Nato auspices, offering instead to have Pakistan train them.
“Obama’s leverage over Kayani is this same fixation on India. Obama should make a few things clear to the general: that America knows the extent of the ISI’s backing for the Taliban; that Pakistan Army will not keep getting money and weapons from Washington if it goes on backing groups that kill American soldiers; and that if Pakistan does not end all support for its Taliban proxies, the US will seek India’s assistance in stabilizing Afghanistan.
“Then, if Kayani makes the right choice, Obama can use America’s growing influence with India to help reduce tensions with Pakistan. This is the key to a stable future for that part of Asia. To extract American troops from Afghanistan without leaving behind a crucible for new calamities, Obama will have to master the craft of balancing power.
The Economist under the title: “Land of the impure: Don’t blame the army for all Pakistan’s problems. Just most of them” said:
“Three score years and a bit after its founding, Pakistan-which means land of the pure-still struggles to look like a nation.
Economically backward, politically stunted and terrorised by religious extremists, it would be enough to make anyone nervous, even if it did not have nuclear weapons. For these shortcomings, most of the blame should be laid at the door of the army, which claims, more than any other institution, to embody nationhood.
Grossly unfair? If the Army stood before one of its own tribunals, the charge sheet would surely run as follows:
One, a taste for military adventurism on its “eastern front” against giant India, which has undermined security, not enhanced it. No adventure was more disastrous than the one in 1971, which hastened the loss of East Pakistan, present-day Bangladesh. More recently, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, then army chief, sent troops into Indian-controlled Kashmir without deigning to inform the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. Mr Musharraf thus forced a confrontation between two nuclear states. It was an international public-relations debacle for Pakistan. Today the army remains wedded to the “India threat”. India, meanwhile, for all its gross abuses in Kashmir, is more concerned about economic development than invading Pakistan.
Two, endangering the state’s existence by making common cause with jihadism. This policy started with General Zia ul-Haq’s “Islamisation” policies in the late 1970s. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan (along with the CIA) financed the Afghan mujahideen opposition. The policy turned into support for the Taliban when the movement swept into power in the mid-1990s. Taliban support continues today, even though Pakistan is America’s supposed ally in Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban counterinsurgency. A new report by the London School of Economics claims that not only does Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency finance the Afghan Taliban, but also the ISI is even represented on the Taliban’s leadership council. The claims have been loudly rejected, but in private Pakistani military men admit that corners of the army do indeed help the Taliban.
For years both Islamist and liberal generals have also backed jihadists fighting for a Muslim Kashmir. Though vastly outnumbered, the militants have managed to tie down a dozen Indian army divisions. Mr Musharraf and an aide once joked about having such jihadists by their tooti-ie, literally, “taps”, by which he meant their private parts.
Yet ex-mujahideen and their affiliates-known loosely as the Pakistani Taliban-have turned on their hosts. The armed forces have struck against them near the border with Afghanistan. Other militant groups, which the army thought it “owned” have either joined the Pakistani Taliban or, like them, have turned against their former protectors. The army itself, even the ISI, has been a target of attacks. While officers draw increasingly nice distinctions between different jihadists, the militant groups are bleeding into one another. Now attacks are spreading into tolerant, prosperous Punjab, far from the troubled marches. No doubt now about who holds whom by the tooti.
Three, the armed forces have undermined democratic institutions. Since 1947, the longest period of civilian rule the army has tolerated is just six years. And when Mr Musharraf instigated a coup after being sacked by Mr Sharif after the Kashmir debacle, there followed more than eight disastrous years of military rule, heavily backed, as with previous such rules, by the Americans. Like General Zia before him, Mr Musharraf often found Islamist political parties more congenial than secular ones.
Admittedly, Pakistan’s governing institutions were weak from the outset, but the army’s meddling has made them even weaker.
Under Mr Musharraf it has left the civil service and judiciary corrupt and demoralised. (A tenth of civil-service appointments must still go to officers.) The armed forces have a $20 billion business empire and are probably the country’s biggest land developer, as officers’ loyalty is bought with grants of land.
The leaders of the main parties are mainly to blame for their corrupt, feudal styles and for not practising the democracy they espouse even in their own parties. Yet the army also shares some of the blame for political backwardness. It has permitted only a handful of elections. Democracy might have been much more mature by now had elections been allowed to run their course.
The costs go beyond any democratic deficit. Pakistan’s economic and social developments have also been stunted, as the army has sucked up resources and thwarted growth. In economic terms, educated Pakistanis think their country should be a Turkey or a Malaysia by now. Instead, it lies below Yemen in the UNDP’s ranking of human-development indicators, at 151st in the world. School enrolment ranks below Sudan. The government spends twice as much on the armed forces as on education. Some say Pakistan has turned a corner. The army went back to barracks in 2008, pushed partly by the return and assassination of the populist leader, Benazir Bhutto. This year political parties reached consensus on constitutional changes that shift power towards the Parliament and away from the president, currently Asif Zardari, Miss Bhutto’s widower and heir to her political dynasty.
Optimists say this sets Pakistan on a path to more effective and accountable government. Perhaps. But the pessimist in Banyan counters that the army retains its huge say on national security. What’s more, civilian politics remains frequently corrupt, and personality trumps policy. What looks like a system of checks and balances today could look like gridlock tomorrow. The sort of combination, in other words, that tempts the army to poke its head out of the barracks again.”
The News, Pakistan
‘Pak armed forces have $20b business empire’
