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VIEW: The do more mantra Imtiaz Alam
Every army and every secret agency has its own security obsessions and loves to keep its assets and edge over possible adversaries, cover its flanks and expand its depths of reserves and resilience
Not only the war on terror led by the US/NATO in Afghanistan, but also Pakistans security establishments role is under fire with the most damaging exposure by the whistleblower site WikiLeaks. Efforts are afoot to cover up the embarrassment for the US military and a flawed US military strategy that has provided fuel to the Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan, which the Obama-driven surge is expected to tame with the most critical backup by the Pakistan Army and a redoubtable ISI from Pakistans northwest. Hence the blame is being shifted to the underdogs for still not doing enough. What are the strategic implications of the do more mantra?
Coming under greater pressure from the media, congressmen and the strategic community, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has said on July 30 in the company of Secretary of Defence Robert Gates: They (the Pakistan Army and the ISI) are strategically shifting. That does not mean that they are through that shift at all, and they are still focused on rebuilding that trust as well, and it is not yet rebuilt. Admiral Mullen termed as unacceptable the alleged links between the elements of the ISI and extremist organisations while asking the ISI to strategically shift its focus. Almost similar views were expressed by him in more concrete terms when at a press briefing in Islamabad last week he openly demanded action against the Haqqani group, accused of launching attacks against US troops in southern Afghanistan from its sanctuary in North Waziristan, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, whom he termed a threat to regional and international peace. Similar views have been expressed by the British Prime Minister David Cameron in New Delhi, which has irked even those Pakistanis who support the war on terror.
While President Obama is taking refuge behind the excuse that the Afghan war leaks pertain to the period prior to his review, he has said that these documents do not reveal any issue that has not already informed our public debate on Afghanistan. As a gesture of reassurance, Robert Gates has observed that in the last 18 months or so there has been a dramatic change, in my view, in Pakistans willingness to take on insurgents and terrorists, their willingness to put their own military at risk and take casualties in going after this. Our cooperation has been steadily expanding. If so, then why this public campaign and to what end?
Given President Obamas planned troop surge (95,000 troops), which is attracting greater scepticism, failure to secure Marjah-Helmand in the last six months, difficulties in initiating an offensive in Kandahar and the US casualties soaring to record highs (coalitions 89, including 66 US in July), the US administration is panicking and exerting much greater pressure on Pakistan to stop the insurgents based in North Waziristan from attacking US troops in eastern Afghanistan. The Obama administration is also highly perturbed about a possible replay of a Mumbai-like terrorist attack that can shift Pakistans strategic focus to the eastern front instead of doing the needful on its western one. The Obama strategy of starting a withdrawal in July 2011 and handing over security to the Afghan Army in 2014 however flawed it may be by giving the date for beginning of the drawdown and ambitious in terms of such a short time to build Afghan state institutions, which is not a strategic priority is critically dependent on Pakistans extraordinary counter-insurgency effort, even if it is beyond its means at the moment.
The failure of the US/NATO/ISAF military campaign in Afghanistan, especially in Helmand and Kandahar, forces the US generals to shift the blame to their Pakistani counterparts as the Afghan leadership and the US allies want an early political settlement. There is a limit to what the Pakistan Army and the ISI could do and that too according to President Obamas timeframe. Pakistan has deployed over 140,000 troops in the frontier regions to fight the insurgents while sacrificing over 3,000 soldiers higher than the US/NATO troops besides over 6,000 civilian deaths and 21,000 injured. It is officially estimated that the impact of the war on terror on Pakistans economy since 2001 has been to the tune of $ 43 billion. As compared to Afghanistan, the US and the international community have offered Pakistan much less than it actually needed to keep its economy going and run a full-fledged unconventional war with great destabilising consequences. The terrorists have retaliated against all kinds of civilian and military targets, including shrines, mosques, market places, schools and hospitals. Successful operations have been conducted in Malakand division, South Waziristan and other agencies. Yet the do more mantra goes on and on without finding synergies and compatibilities between the legitimate national security interests of Pakistan and the strategic designs of the US and jointly calibrating immediate, mid-term and long-term goals and objectives of the two sides, even if the civil and military officials of the Obama administration remain sharply divided.
Undoubtedly, the Pakistani security apparatuses have been deeply involved with the former mujahideen and the current insurgents since 1973, and even more after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The human, military, financial, strategic and other linkages established over three decades cannot be reversed in a short time, even if they pose a most serious existential threat to Pakistans own survival as a modern democratic nation-state. By attacking those who can deliver the Pakistan Army and the ISI you do not get what you wish for and that too thanklessly. Every army and every secret agency has its own security obsessions and loves to keep its assets and edge over possible adversaries, cover its flanks and expand its depths of reserves and resilience. It is true about the US army, the CIA, the Indian army, RAW and the Pakistan Army and the ISI are no exception.
What seems to be perhaps disturbing the Pakistani leadership, the army leadership in particular, most is: a) If the US has to start the drawdown next year and, in the meanwhile, engages a section of the Taliban, how appropriate would it be to go for a huge kill in North Waziristan? b) If the US-led allies are to hand over security to the Afghan army, which seems impossible, or most probably leave in 2014, who will fill the void? c) If the US aim is to just eliminate al Qaeda and such elements within the Taliban ranks or jihadi community who are associated with the former or have an international terrorist reach and hand over Afghanistan to whoever, most probably moderated Taliban, how could Pakistan afford a resurgent Taliban-type regime that can sway not only the whole Pakhtun belt of Pakistan but also other regions infected with the epidemic of jihad? If the US or President Karzai are to talk to the Taliban, then why should they ask to eliminate the Haqqani group first? If the US leaves without finishing the job in all its ramifications, how and why would Pakistan take the burden of a dangerously destabilising mass of medieval warriors? And above all, what would Pakistan get as a quid pro quo is the moot question. Not forgetting the way the Americans left after forcing the Soviet withdrawal and leaving us at the mercy of a jihadi culture that also infected our rank and file, Pakistan wants to be doubly assured of a long-term partnership with an unreliable partner.
No doubt, our beloved Pakistan has to clean up its own house for its survival, set a clear direction towards a modern, democratic and progressive state at peace within and without. It has to shed the notions of a warrior state that requires strategic depth despite having nuclear weapons, creates the space for private militias and indulges in adventurous pursuits that undermine human security and erode our moderate social fabric. We have to decisively act and in an all-sided manner in our own interest and with our own timing and with the help of the international community to make Pakistan a safe haven for its native people, and not the outlaws who are not loyal to our nation-state but their own megalomania of an internationalist terrorist enterprise. The Americans, international community and the Indians must engage and not denigrate our national institutions that can enforce the writ of the state and not let any territory of Pakistan be used by any terrorist outfit against our people or any other state.
Imtiaz Alam is Editor of South Asian Journal. He can be reached at imtiazalampak@yahoo.com
Every army and every secret agency has its own security obsessions and loves to keep its assets and edge over possible adversaries, cover its flanks and expand its depths of reserves and resilience
Not only the war on terror led by the US/NATO in Afghanistan, but also Pakistans security establishments role is under fire with the most damaging exposure by the whistleblower site WikiLeaks. Efforts are afoot to cover up the embarrassment for the US military and a flawed US military strategy that has provided fuel to the Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan, which the Obama-driven surge is expected to tame with the most critical backup by the Pakistan Army and a redoubtable ISI from Pakistans northwest. Hence the blame is being shifted to the underdogs for still not doing enough. What are the strategic implications of the do more mantra?
Coming under greater pressure from the media, congressmen and the strategic community, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has said on July 30 in the company of Secretary of Defence Robert Gates: They (the Pakistan Army and the ISI) are strategically shifting. That does not mean that they are through that shift at all, and they are still focused on rebuilding that trust as well, and it is not yet rebuilt. Admiral Mullen termed as unacceptable the alleged links between the elements of the ISI and extremist organisations while asking the ISI to strategically shift its focus. Almost similar views were expressed by him in more concrete terms when at a press briefing in Islamabad last week he openly demanded action against the Haqqani group, accused of launching attacks against US troops in southern Afghanistan from its sanctuary in North Waziristan, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, whom he termed a threat to regional and international peace. Similar views have been expressed by the British Prime Minister David Cameron in New Delhi, which has irked even those Pakistanis who support the war on terror.
While President Obama is taking refuge behind the excuse that the Afghan war leaks pertain to the period prior to his review, he has said that these documents do not reveal any issue that has not already informed our public debate on Afghanistan. As a gesture of reassurance, Robert Gates has observed that in the last 18 months or so there has been a dramatic change, in my view, in Pakistans willingness to take on insurgents and terrorists, their willingness to put their own military at risk and take casualties in going after this. Our cooperation has been steadily expanding. If so, then why this public campaign and to what end?
Given President Obamas planned troop surge (95,000 troops), which is attracting greater scepticism, failure to secure Marjah-Helmand in the last six months, difficulties in initiating an offensive in Kandahar and the US casualties soaring to record highs (coalitions 89, including 66 US in July), the US administration is panicking and exerting much greater pressure on Pakistan to stop the insurgents based in North Waziristan from attacking US troops in eastern Afghanistan. The Obama administration is also highly perturbed about a possible replay of a Mumbai-like terrorist attack that can shift Pakistans strategic focus to the eastern front instead of doing the needful on its western one. The Obama strategy of starting a withdrawal in July 2011 and handing over security to the Afghan Army in 2014 however flawed it may be by giving the date for beginning of the drawdown and ambitious in terms of such a short time to build Afghan state institutions, which is not a strategic priority is critically dependent on Pakistans extraordinary counter-insurgency effort, even if it is beyond its means at the moment.
The failure of the US/NATO/ISAF military campaign in Afghanistan, especially in Helmand and Kandahar, forces the US generals to shift the blame to their Pakistani counterparts as the Afghan leadership and the US allies want an early political settlement. There is a limit to what the Pakistan Army and the ISI could do and that too according to President Obamas timeframe. Pakistan has deployed over 140,000 troops in the frontier regions to fight the insurgents while sacrificing over 3,000 soldiers higher than the US/NATO troops besides over 6,000 civilian deaths and 21,000 injured. It is officially estimated that the impact of the war on terror on Pakistans economy since 2001 has been to the tune of $ 43 billion. As compared to Afghanistan, the US and the international community have offered Pakistan much less than it actually needed to keep its economy going and run a full-fledged unconventional war with great destabilising consequences. The terrorists have retaliated against all kinds of civilian and military targets, including shrines, mosques, market places, schools and hospitals. Successful operations have been conducted in Malakand division, South Waziristan and other agencies. Yet the do more mantra goes on and on without finding synergies and compatibilities between the legitimate national security interests of Pakistan and the strategic designs of the US and jointly calibrating immediate, mid-term and long-term goals and objectives of the two sides, even if the civil and military officials of the Obama administration remain sharply divided.
Undoubtedly, the Pakistani security apparatuses have been deeply involved with the former mujahideen and the current insurgents since 1973, and even more after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The human, military, financial, strategic and other linkages established over three decades cannot be reversed in a short time, even if they pose a most serious existential threat to Pakistans own survival as a modern democratic nation-state. By attacking those who can deliver the Pakistan Army and the ISI you do not get what you wish for and that too thanklessly. Every army and every secret agency has its own security obsessions and loves to keep its assets and edge over possible adversaries, cover its flanks and expand its depths of reserves and resilience. It is true about the US army, the CIA, the Indian army, RAW and the Pakistan Army and the ISI are no exception.
What seems to be perhaps disturbing the Pakistani leadership, the army leadership in particular, most is: a) If the US has to start the drawdown next year and, in the meanwhile, engages a section of the Taliban, how appropriate would it be to go for a huge kill in North Waziristan? b) If the US-led allies are to hand over security to the Afghan army, which seems impossible, or most probably leave in 2014, who will fill the void? c) If the US aim is to just eliminate al Qaeda and such elements within the Taliban ranks or jihadi community who are associated with the former or have an international terrorist reach and hand over Afghanistan to whoever, most probably moderated Taliban, how could Pakistan afford a resurgent Taliban-type regime that can sway not only the whole Pakhtun belt of Pakistan but also other regions infected with the epidemic of jihad? If the US or President Karzai are to talk to the Taliban, then why should they ask to eliminate the Haqqani group first? If the US leaves without finishing the job in all its ramifications, how and why would Pakistan take the burden of a dangerously destabilising mass of medieval warriors? And above all, what would Pakistan get as a quid pro quo is the moot question. Not forgetting the way the Americans left after forcing the Soviet withdrawal and leaving us at the mercy of a jihadi culture that also infected our rank and file, Pakistan wants to be doubly assured of a long-term partnership with an unreliable partner.
No doubt, our beloved Pakistan has to clean up its own house for its survival, set a clear direction towards a modern, democratic and progressive state at peace within and without. It has to shed the notions of a warrior state that requires strategic depth despite having nuclear weapons, creates the space for private militias and indulges in adventurous pursuits that undermine human security and erode our moderate social fabric. We have to decisively act and in an all-sided manner in our own interest and with our own timing and with the help of the international community to make Pakistan a safe haven for its native people, and not the outlaws who are not loyal to our nation-state but their own megalomania of an internationalist terrorist enterprise. The Americans, international community and the Indians must engage and not denigrate our national institutions that can enforce the writ of the state and not let any territory of Pakistan be used by any terrorist outfit against our people or any other state.
Imtiaz Alam is Editor of South Asian Journal. He can be reached at imtiazalampak@yahoo.com
