Vietnam Defence Forum

[Viet]

Good: the giant 10,000 ton chinese bully ship has withdrawn from the scene. Some smaller ships remain though. So the risk remains high that we see clashes again like the previous encounter.

 

[Viet]

“Two steps from Hell”

Great music!

A remembrance of the 10 day and night air battle over Hanoi at Christmas 1972

The US air assault began on 18 December with 129 B-52s approaching Hanoi. Hundreds of fighter aircraft taken off from 6 US aircraft carriers joined the attack. Good tactic: B52 bombers flew in formation, in successive waves made up three bombers.

The aftermath of the attack marked the end of US involvement in Vietnam.

 

[Viva_Viet]

“Two steps from Hell”

Great music!

A remembrance of the 10 day and night air battle over Hanoi at Christmas 1972

The US air assault began on 18 December with 129 B-52s approaching Hanoi. Hundreds of fighter aircraft taken off from 6 US aircraft carriers joined the attack. Good tactic: B52 bombers flew in formation, in successive waves made up three bombers.

The aftermath of the attack marked the end of US involvement in Vietnam.

Thats the last effort of US in VN and they tried everything they could.

Btw, u can read from my link to know more abt electronic warfare in VN, so next time when Cnese like Han-patriot brag that CN"super jamming decive" can jam VN missile, then u can give him a hard slap to wake him up

---------

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam 1965-1973


by Bernard C. Nalty

US Air Force F-105D Thunderchief is trying to evade V-750V SAM launched from a SA-75 Dvina, North Vietnam (US Air Force image).
_________

Linebacker II: The First Two Nights

By the time the B-52's launched Linebacker II, in December 1972, Fan Song operators had polished their skill in combating the bombers. As early as 9 April, near Dong Ha in South Vietnam, a SAM damaged an attacking B-52, the first missile hit suffered by a Stratofortress in seven years of Southeast Asia operation. On that day the first warning came when an electronic warfare officer on board one of the bombers in the three-plane cell detected a guidance signal. After the second B-52 in the cell had dropped its bombs and begun turning away, at least three missiles bored toward it. One of these exploded just 50 feet from the plane's left wing tip, puncturing the external fuel tank on that side and tearing into the fuselage. Despite the damage, Capt. Kenneth J. Curry landed safely at Da Nang. The absence of a Fan Song signal prior to launch indicated that the enemy had tracked the jamming source. [50]

When the Stratofortresses went North, SAM defenses were ready. The first of these planes damaged by a missile over North Vietnam was a B-52D hit by fragments while attacking Thanh Hoa on 23 April. Not until 22 November, however, did one of the SAM's destroy a B-52, a Thailand-based plane bombing a target 24 nautical miles northwest of Vinh. The pilot, Capt. Norbert J. Ostrozny, tried to fly the crippled aircraft to Nakon Phanom but lost control about 12 nautical miles from that base. The entire crew parachuted and was rescued within a few hours. [51]

In shooting down Ostrozny's B-52D, North.. Vietnamese radar had provided accurate guidance despite electronic jamming by the victim, the other two bombers in the cell, and three EB-66's orbiting some distance away. As he approached the target, Captain Ostrozny had received additional protection from a chaff corridor created by four F-4's and from two Iron Hand F-105G'3. Throughout the approach, when the countermeasures were most effective, the radar operator had contented himself with passive tracking, simply following the jamming source across his scope. He allowed the B-52 to soar unchallenged to the release point. Then, as the plane turned sharply away after dropping its bombs, the wings formed an angle of roughly 45 degrees with the horizon, and the strongest part of the jamming cone passed ineffectually beyond the SAM site. At this instant, the Fan Song transmitted just long enough to pinpoint its target before the missile battery launched the two SAM's that exploded beneath the B-52. [52]

SAM controllers thus demonstrated that they had learned to take advantage of certain technical and tactical characteristics of the B-52. When Linebacker II began, the enemy already knew that the plane's jamming transmitters were least effective during sharp turns, that each Stratofortress habitually made just such a turn after dropping its bombs, and that formations usually attacked from about 35,000 feet. Armed with this information, the Fan Song operator passively tracked the jamming signal to determine azimuth and elevation, used the normal operating altitude to establish the range, then verified the range by transmitting for a couple of seconds as the three-plane cell was making its post-target turn.

These tactics minimized or entirely avoided exposure to anti-radiation missiles, and they enabled the enemy to catch the B-52 when it was most vulnerable to radar-controlled weapons. For the defenders, however, waiting for the post-target turn had an obvious failing-it permitted the bomber to reach the release point opposed only by barrage fire. [53]

The 207 B-52's in Southeast Asia carried an impressive array of countermeasures equipment that included the ALT-22 jamming transmitter, used against the Fan Song track-while-scan beacon, and the ALT-28, which could either reinforce the ALT-22 or engage in down-link jamming. By mid-December, all B-52's serving in this area mounted four ALT-28's and three ALT-22's, except for 41 of the 98 G models on Guam that carried older, less powerful ALT-6B's instead of the ALT-22's. Electronic warfare officers in the bombers usually directed two ALT-28's and two ALT-22's or ALT-6's against Fan Song and used the other pair of ALT-28's to jam the SAM guidance beacon. With the remaining ALT-22 or ALT-6, he usually attacked height-finder radars. [54]

Plans for Linebacker II B-52 strikes drew upon the experience gained during the spring of 1972. Out of respect for North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns, which had proved so deadly against Rolling Thunder fighter-bombers, the B-52's flew beyond reach of even the 85-mm weapon. At these altitudes, SAM's were their most dangerous, but the bombers maintained the three-plane cells which thus far had provided adequate countermeasures protection. To avoid mid-air collision, the cells kept 2 minutes apart.

During the first three nights, the Stratofortresses sought to minimize exposure to the SAM's by getting out of missile range as rapidly as possible, even though steeply banked turns of 113 to 160 degrees were required. The officers who approved these tactics realized that ;uch a turn was "a characteristically vulnerable position" because the "effects of both TWS and beacon jamming were minimized. " [55] They believed, however, that the greater speed in leaving the target area would more than offset the loss of jamming coverage. [56]

Linebacker II began on 18 December with 121 B-52's in three waves attacking seven targets near Hanoi. Supporting the first wave were 19 countermeasures aircraft: three EB-66's for standoff jamming, eight chaff-dispensing F-4's, and eight Wild Weasels for radar suppression. The second wave received the same countermeasures support, but as the third wave arrived, four Navy A-7's replaced the eight Wild Weasels, and five EA-3B's joined the EB-66's, their Air Force counterparts, in long-range jamming. [57] ^

Everything went well as the waves approached their targets. Capt. D. D. McCrabbe, an electronic warfare officer on board one of the bombers, felt that the SAM crews were "a little confused" at first, but the confusion ended as soon as the raiders had dropped their bombs. "We started doing our post- target turn and just all hell broke loose," the captain related. "They just started throwing everything at us." The enemy fired 164 missiles that night, downing three aircraft and damaging two others. All the hits occurred as the B-52's were turning' into wind of at least 71 knots and struggling to get out of SAM range. [58]

Pending completion of a detailed evaluation by the Security Service and the Air Staff, planners made minor adjustments in countermeasures support. For radar suppression, the first wave on the 19th could count on eight F-105G's, the second had ten and the third had four Navy A-7's. Eight F-4's laid chaff corridors for the first wave, two Phantoms sowed additional chaff for the second, and eight Phantoms preceded the final wave. Once again, five Navy EA-3B's joined three EB-66's already in covering the third wave.
^
The three B-52's lost the first night had been flying at 34, 000 feet, 38, 000 feet, and 38, 500 feet, and indication that the lowest and highest aircraft in the bomber streams had not received adequate chaff protection. As a result, base altitudes of 34, 500 and 35, 000 feet were established for the bomber cells, keeping all the aircraft closer to the center of a corridor sown from 36, 000 feet. And, in order to give the B-52's room to avoid approaching SAM's, the interval between cells was doubled to 4 minutes. This increased interval allowed the enemy more time for passive radar tracking, but the increased chaff coverage, plus the jamming barrage from the bomber cells, were expected to offset this advantage. [60]

No really drastic revision of B-52 tactics seemed necessary. As one of the aircraft commanders later pointed out, there really was no reason to change tactics at this point." The Stratofortresses, after all, had used the same basic procedures over Haiphong on 15 April and suffered no losses. "Sure," he admitted, "we lost some aircraft on the first day [of Linebacker II], but the area we flew in was better defended." On the second night, 19 December, no B-52's were lost, though two suffered damage, which seemed to confirm these views. [61]

Hard Lessons are Learned

The tactics that worked on the second night failed on the third, as the sky came alive with 221 SAM's, 39 more than had been fired on the 19th. "Just watching all the SAM's, " said Capt. Bruce Kordenbrock, "was like watching a show until you realized they were starting to shoot at you." To Capt. D. W. Jameison, the enemy seemed to be "just salvoing off like six SAM's at a time, " of which "maybe one or two would be tracking." Other B-52 crewmen, such as Maj. L. M. Sweet, reported hectic radar activity on the night of the 20th, with as many as three Fan Song radars simultaneously tracking a single plane. A tail gunner saw three missiles, obviously guided from the ground, pursue his bomber through a hard left turn and explode within 750 feet of him. [62]

Below the bomber stream, Captain Kordenbrock saw a stratum of antiaircraft shells bursting so close together that "you could get out and walk on it." The scene reminded him of "all the war movies you've ever heard about. TSgt C. M. O'Quinn, the tail gunner whose B-52 had been chased by three missiles, believed "they were sending up triple A [antiaircraft artillery] and SAM's together. . . , hoping we'd dive to avoid the SAM's and fly through the flak. " Although the B-52's remained above 34, 500 feet and escaped flak damage, missiles downed six bombers and damaged a seventh. [63]

Until the Security Service could evaluate the role of countermeasures on the night of the 20th, three interim actions were taken to reduce SAM effectiveness during the strikes planned for the 21st. First, electronic warfare officers shifted one jammer from the Fan Song track-while - scan beam to reinforce the downlink jamming barrage. Second, planners decided to compress the bomber stream, stacking the cells from 33, 500 to 38, 000 feet and timing their arrival over the targets at intervals between 90 and 120 seconds. This decision reversed the 19 December policy of extending the bomber streams to keep the aircraft close to the center of the chaff corridor. Finally, plans for the night of 21 December called for two of the bomber streams, 24 of the 30 attacking aircraft, to avoid sharp turns, relying on their speed, boosted by the prevailing wind, to approach from the west and to depart eastward over the Tonkin Gulf. [64]

The countermeasures evaluation for the first night, which became available on the 23d, confirmed that the three bombers lost to SAM's on 18 December had received fatal hits during post-target turns, when their jamming was least effective. More significant was the disclosure that all three had belonged to "the cells in which no jamming was committed to the beacon (downlink) frequency." [65] The shift of emphasis from Fan Song to downlink jamming therefore appeared wise.

Initial comments on chaff effectiveness on the night of 18 December implied that the corridors had been satisfactory despite winds that varied from predictions by as much as 10 degrees in direction and 14 knots in velocity. Subsequent reports stated, however, that the three Stratofortresses shot down that night had been on the fringe of a ragged corridor. The difference between the predicted winds and the air currents actually encountered had disrupted the planned chaff coverage. [66]

When the Security Service analysis of the 20 December strikes arrived, it disclosed that chaff protection had been nonexistent that night. Plans had called for 27 of the 33 attacking cells to be protected by chaff corridors while within range of SAM sites. Although "many cells flew through some portion of the corridor" during the night's operation, "only four cells were actually in chaff at their respective bomb release lines and post target turns. " The six B-52's that fell victim to SAM's were from 5 to 10 nautical miles from the chaff concentrations when hit. The wind had again blown gaps in the coverage, forcing planners to think in terms of widespread blankets rather than comparatively narrow corridors. A shortage of chaff, however, caused postponement of this modification of counter- measures tactics. [67]

The evaluation of the third night's countermeasures effectiveness also sustained the decision, made in time for the 21 December operation, to substitute speed for steeply banked turns in getting out of SAM range. The Security Service reported that the missile batteries had again concentrated their fire upon B-52's in the post-target turn. In one case, the intended victim foiled the enemy by quickly leveling off and "re-injecting the protection noise jamming element during the terminal phase of the intercept." [68]

Study of the first three nights also led to a prohibition against using certain B-52 models over Hanoi-Haiphong. One of the three B-52's shot down on the 18th, and four of the six destroyed on the 20th were B-52G's carrying ALT-6 jamming transmitters instead of the newer ALT-22. For the rest of Linebacker II, therefore, bombers mounting the ALT-6 were restricted to less heavily defended targets. [69]

As the struggle against the SAM continued additional Navy aircraft joined the support force, with EA-6B's in engaging in stand-off jamming and A-7E's flying SAM suppression. Effective 24 December, chaff blankets replaced the corridors, and the bombers began releasing chaff in self defense. The B-52 electronic warfare officers received instructions to drop the radar reflectors whenever they detected Fan Song tracking signals during any turn sharper than 45 degrees and with a bank angle of 30 degrees or more. Although designed to confuse airborne radar, the chaff would also provide some extra protection during the dangerous post-target turn. [70]

Throughout Linebacker II, countermeasure tactics underwent analysis and revision. Tests at Eglin AFB indicated that the B-52 antenna radiation pattern was ill suited for downlink jamming. In addition, the enemy seemed to be using a modified SAM, fitted with a more powerful guidance beacon that was less susceptible to a modulated noise barrage. As a result, the B-52's that attacked North Vietnam on 26 December employed only two ALT-28's against the downlink. All other transmitters jammed the track-while-scan beam, except for one ALT-22 or ALT-6 directed against height finder radars and the I-band T-8209 signal.

When the electronic warfare officer detected the T-8209, he was to switch on his ALR-18 jamming transmitter. Although designed for the airborne radar carried by MIG interceptors, this device also had some value against the T-8209. [71]

The attacks of 26 December incorporated all the counter- measures lessons learned since the 18th. Plans for the operation combined precise timing with countermeasures protection, sending 120 bombers to attack 10 targets within 15 minutes. Careful selection of approach and departure routes brought the B-52's over seven targets almost simultaneously. Also, altitudes and interval varied to confuse the defenders, with some cells climbing or descending during the shallow post-target turn. Counter-measures support required 62 Air Force and Navy planes for stand-off jamming, SAM suppression, and chaff dispensing. [72]

The 24 F-4's laying chaff on 26 December put down two blankets, one west of Hanoi and the other over Haiphong. The six B-52 cells attacking Thai Nguyen, some 30 nautical miles north of Hanoi, had no chaff cloud to protect them, but certain of the bombers released chaff during the post-target turn, whether or not a Fan Song signal was detected. [73]

Despite the resourcefulness of those who planned the raid, SAM's claimed two B-52D's on the night of 26 December, scoring both hits in the vicinity of Hanoi. One aircraft received the fatal damage before releasing its bombs, but the other went down during its post-turn. The countermeasures plan was not at fault, however, for in both cases, one aircraft in the cell had turned back, depriving the remaining pair of vital jamming power. [

https://www.allworldwars.com/Tactics-and-Techniques-of-Electronic-Warfare-by-Bernard-Nalty.html

 

[Aqsuperman]

Strap something old on another old thing and we have somthing new-ish :b

The Ural truck chassis seem resilient enough to handle a bunch of artillery including the 85mm D-44 above

 

[Viet]

A Vietnamese tank (R) competes against a tank from Tajikistan at the International Army Games 2019 in Moscow, Russia, August 11, 2019. Photo courtesy of Vietnam People's Army.

The Vietnamese chemical troop at the Safe Environment competition of International Army Games 2019 in China, August 13, 2019. Photo by Vietnam People's Army newspaper

 

[Viet]

As China Looms, Vietnam Aims to Develop a More Modern, Skilled Navy
By Ralph Jennings
August 12, 2019 09:26 AM


FILE - Vietnam Navy ships barely visible inside Cam Ranh Bay (D. Schearf/VOA).

TAIPEI - A Vietnamese military official advocates developing a more modern, better skilled navy that can hold off complex threats, mainly what experts believe to be increasing pressure from China.

A rear admiral and political commissar in Hanoi told the official Viet Nam News August 6 that the navy could not be “taken by surprise at any development.

“In this complicated situation that poses many threats to the country’s defense and security, given the Navy’s role as the key defender of the country’s sovereignty, the Viet Nam People’s Navy must do more to build a strong, developed, skilled and modern naval force that can fulfill all assigned missions,” said the commissar, Phạm Văn Vững.

The commissar’s words follow the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel in March — Vietnam says at the hands of China.

More recently, Chinese coast guard boats have approached a Vietnamese undersea energy exploration site near Vanguard Bank in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam vie for sovereignty over tracts of the sea where these two incidents have occurred. These two upsets are just the latest between the territorial rivals dating back centuries.


South China Sea territorial claims

Naval improvements would help Vietnam deter China, analysts believe, though Vietnamese naval firepower is unlikely to come near equaling that of China.

“I think all they can think of doing is being a bit of a deterrent,” said Murray Hiebert, deputy director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Neither Vietnam nor China wants somebody to fire the first shot. That would be pretty serious. So, Vietnam sends in vessels to sort of block China.”

Navy, present and future

Today’s Vietnamese navy has 65 vessels including six submarines and six frigates, according to research database GlobalFirePower.com. It needs a “mastery of modern weapons” and “careful planning” of logistics issues, the commissar said earlier this month via Viet Nam News.


FILE - A nuclear-powered Type 094A Jin-class ballistic missile submarine of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's navy is seen during a military display in the South China Sea, April 12, 2018.

China today has one of the world’s most powerful navies at 714 vessels including 76 submarines, 33 destroyer and an aircraft carrier, GlobalFirePower.com says.

China claims about 90 percent of the disputed sea, overlapping Vietnam’s smaller claim as well as tracts that four other governments call their own. The other claimants are Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan.

Chinese maritime activity alarms particularly Vietnam because China controls the full Paracel archipelago, a South China Sea tract vehemently claimed by Hanoi. Much of Vietnam’s population resents China over the maritime dispute.


FILE - A ship (top) of Chinese Coast Guard is seen near a ship of Vietnam Marine Guard in the South China Sea, about 210 km (130 miles) off shore of Vietnam, May 14, 2014.

“Vietnam realized that they had to modernize their navy to cope with the harassment from the Chinese coast guard,” said Trung Nguyen, international relations dean at Ho Chi Minh University of Social Sciences and Humanities.

Foreign help

The Vietnamese navy should work with foreign governments, the commissar was quoted saying. It “must effectively coordinate with other military forces and civilian forces to build a whole-nation defense and people-based defense, while at the same time, maintaining diplomatic efforts, especially in terms of exchanges with naval forces from other countries,” he said.

The Southeast Asian country acquired six U.S. patrol boats this year. It normally taps Russia for weaponry, such as missile stealth frigates, Hiebert said.

Washington may eventually push to send its aircraft carriers to Vietnam once a year, Thayer said. The U.S. government has been massing allies in Asia over the past two years to help contain China’s maritime expansion.

More spats ahead?

China and Vietnam are used to conflicts over maritime sovereignty, and new ones come up despite diplomatic moves to solve previous ones.

They had already gotten into “confrontations” over fuel exploration near Vanguard Bank in the 1990s, said Carl Thayer, Southeast Asia-specialized emeritus professor with the University of New South Wales.

Vietnam backed away from the site last year but never agreed to stay away in the long term, Thayer said. This time, he said, Chinese vessels reached Vietnam’s continental shelf.

“So, now we have the arrival of this Chinese ship this year, and it’s operating on the Vietnamese side of the exclusive economic zone,” Thayer said.

 

[Aqsuperman]

At long last, the construction of 12 ships for Vietnam Border Guard funded by India line of credit would start at Larsen & Toubro

 

[Viet]

A T-72B3 tank used by Vietnam for the finals of the Tank Biathlon, part of the International Army Games 2019, in Russia, August 15, 2019. Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

A Vietnamese soldiers' combat engineer vehicle at the Safe Route competition in Russia's International Army Games on August 11, 2019. Photo by VnExpress/My Hanh

 

[Viet]

The B52-killer during Vietnam war, SA2 missile still plays a key part of Vietnam integrated air defense.

 

[Viet]

Su27 and Su30 Fighter jet with R27 heat-seeking Air-to-air missiles against enemy aircraft as well as R27 anti radar missile variant, max range 100km

 

[Viet]

Army Games 2019 (Russia)

female Medics

 

[Viet]

Vietnam’s Strange Ally in Its Fight With China
The Russian oil giant Rosneft is quietly backing Hanoi in its clash with Beijing.
BY BENNETT MURRAY | AUGUST 1, 2019, 12:48 PM

Russian navy warships sail during the parade of the Russian fleet as part of the Navy Day celebration in St. Petersburg on July 28. ALEXEY NIKOLSKY/AFP/GETTY IMAGES


As heavily armed Vietnamese and Chinese coast guard ships stare each other down in the South China Sea near the submerged Vanguard Bank, Hanoi appears to have found its spine despite threats from its gigantic neighbor. Unlike in the past two years, when Vietnam quietly scrapped a pair of drilling ventures with the Spanish energy firm Repsol under Chinese pressure, Vietnam is currently demanding that China withdraw its survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, and its escorts from the vicinity of the oil and gas blocks. This time, Vietnam has teamed up with an old friend and key shareholder in the drilling: the Russian government.

The facts on the ground have barely changed since the most recent standoffs in 2017 and 2018. All of them occurred within China’s “nine-dash line,” the imprecise self-defined boundary in which Beijing lays claim to almost all of the South China Sea. But the contested fields, all within the 35,000-square-mile, energy-rich Nam Con Son Basin, are also largely within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam’s coastline, the international rule of thumb for determining exclusive economic zones. China is distant—more than 600 miles away—leaving Beijing no real options under the global status quo to claim the Vanguard Bank.

Nonetheless, Vietnam called off drilling in Blocks 136/03 and 07/03, the Vietnamese-licensed drilling concessions that last came under Chinese scrutiny under murky circumstances. While the reasons for the cancellations were never publicly disclosed, reports from Hanoi and within the industry suggested that China had threatened to invade Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands, a disputed territory that the two violently fought over in the 1980s. Vietnam, attempting to salvage its security situation amid doubts over the Trump administration’s commitment to the region, went on the retreat. It also did not help that the Philippines, which until recently had been a reliable fellow opponent of the nine-dash line, suddenly expressed ambivalence following the 2016 election of President Rodrigo Duterte.

But last time, the Madrid-based Repsol risked being cut off from its hundreds of millions of dollars in investments and potential revenue. This time, a much tougher partner is involved: Rosneft, whose primary shareholder is the Russian government. Gazprom also operates nearby, as does Zarubezhneft, a wholly Russian state-owned firm founded in 1967 whose local Vietsovpetro joint venture with PetroVietnam is all that is left of the Soviet Union’s once mighty overseas fossil fuel ventures. Where Repsol, a private firm from a minor world power, held little geopolitical clout, Russia can be expected to play old-fashioned great-power politics to defend cash flows to the state.

The Kremlin’s policy on the South China Sea dispute has never been straightforward. Officially neutral, Moscow usually provides tacit diplomatic cover to Beijing by publicly insisting that nonclaimant countries ought to stay away from the dispute. Attempts to portray the conflict as a problem of global significance, it argues, are cynical misrepresentations to justify American power grabs.

Moscow also shares Beijing’s distrust for the institutions standing in China’s way—President Vladimir Putin said Russia was “solidarizing with and supporting China’s stance” after the latter refused to recognize the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling against the nine-dash line. The Russian approach to the South China Sea is not unlike China’s toward the 2014 annexation of Crimea: ostensibly neutral but deferential to the local great power while steadfastly opposed to the matter being settled in Western institutions.

But while the Kremlin’s rhetoric may be useful for China, its actions at sea have been less so. Although Russia may not officially take Vietnam’s side in the dispute, its companies are the only ones currently producing at the country’s behest within the nine-dash line. This is no minor transgression—at a time when Chinese maritime militias ruthlessly attack foreign fishermen and its military positions itself to strong-arm Vietnam out of its oil and gas fields, Russia’s cooperation with Vietnamese resource extraction is a serious (albeit low-key) affront, even if the Kremlin carefully avoids calling attention to it.

While no one expects Russia to deploy an armada from Vladivostok to challenge the People’s Liberation Army Navy, China has plenty to lose if it plays its hand too strongly against Rosneft. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with its lofty plans to connect Eurasia, must carefully thread routes through what Russia considers to be its backyard. Some $7 billion of Chinese wealth has already been strategically placed in Ukraine, which remains locked in an undeclared war against Russian forces in its east. Georgia, whose ties with Russia have long been poisoned, has also flirted with the Belt and Road. China is also spreading its largesse among Russia’s friends in the Eurasian Economic Union, and an ambitious project to link Kazakhstan with Belarus is already underway.

While no one expects Russia to deploy an armada from Vladivostok to challenge the People’s Liberation Army Navy, China has plenty to lose if it plays its hand too strongly against Rosneft.

Keeping the peace between two powers requires substantial give and take and inevitable conflicts that must be addressed quietly as spheres of influence are established and reinforced. As a result, joint Russian-Vietnamese oil drilling off the southern Vietnamese coast is almost definitely on the negotiating table.

China, isolated as it is amid the U.S. trade war and a general wave of Western disengagement, is also in no mood to antagonize the only power that cuts it slack in the South China Sea. While it may not be in Russia’s interests to side with the regular U.S. denunciations of Chinese maritime expansionism, neither does the Kremlin particularly want Beijing to control the multitrillion-dollar shipping lanes linking the Indian and Pacific oceans.

For Vietnam’s part, linking its petroleum industry to great-power politics may be its best chance of hanging on to some of its drilling fields within the nine-dash line. It has brought the United States on board as well, with an ExxonMobil drilling project in the Blue Whale field, sandwiched precariously off the coast of Da Nang, between China’s proclaimed continental shelf boundary and one of the nine dashes. The downside is that the strategy’s success is no longer so dependent on Hanoi’s decision-making as greater winds blow. But Vietnam’s unilateral negotiating power, dwarfed as the country is by its enormous and increasingly powerful neighbor, has proved paper-thin in the past two years. Relying on Moscow, or Washington, as an advocate may not be ideal, but options are running out.

 

[Nilgiri]

@Viet @Carlosa @xiao qi @fadine @Viva_Viet @cochine



India builds 12 high-speed patrol boats for Vietnam

https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/india-builds-12-high-speed-patrol-boats-for-vietnam-3968449.html

Work began this week near India’s Chennai City to build 12 high-speed patrol vessels for the Vietnam Border Guard.
The offshore vessels are built under a contract signed between the Vietnam Border Guard and Indian company Larsen & Toubro.

It was part of India’s $100-million line of credit extended to Vietnam during a trip to India in October 2014 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.

The ships are designed to serve the protection of maritime sovereignty, strengthen security and detect illegal activities like smuggling. They can also assist with search and rescue missions, Vietnam News Agency reported.

Made of aluminum alloy, they will be 35 meters long and able to reach a maximum speed of 35 knots. They will be armed with modern navigation, monitoring and defense equipment.

Five will be built at Larsen & Toubro’s Kattupalli shipyard in Chennai, Tamilnadu State, and the rest will be made at the Hong Ha Shipyard in Vietnam’s northern port city of Hai Phong using Larsen & Toubro knowhow and under its supervision.

The Indian firm will take full responsibility for the designs and technologies of all the 12 ships.

Vietnam and India established a strategic partnership in 2007.

At a ceremony held Wednesday to start the shipbuilding project, Major-General Hoang Dang Nhieu, Deputy Commander of the Vietnam Border Guard, said Vietnam and India were paying more attention to boosting collaboration between the two nations in different fields, and the shipbuilding project was an important part of it.

This high-speed patrol ship project will play a key role in strengthening the bilateral defense relations of Vietnam and India, officials of both sides said.

Retired Vice Admiral B Kannan, CEO of Larsen & Toubro Shipbuilding, said Vietnam and India have a long-standing friendship and are currently promoting their cooperation in many fields, including national defense.

 

[xiao qi]

@Viet @Carlosa @xiao qi @fadine @Viva_Viet @cochine



India builds 12 high-speed patrol boats for Vietnam

https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/india-builds-12-high-speed-patrol-boats-for-vietnam-3968449.html

Work began this week near India’s Chennai City to build 12 high-speed patrol vessels for the Vietnam Border Guard.
The offshore vessels are built under a contract signed between the Vietnam Border Guard and Indian company Larsen & Toubro.

It was part of India’s $100-million line of credit extended to Vietnam during a trip to India in October 2014 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.

The ships are designed to serve the protection of maritime sovereignty, strengthen security and detect illegal activities like smuggling. They can also assist with search and rescue missions, Vietnam News Agency reported.

Made of aluminum alloy, they will be 35 meters long and able to reach a maximum speed of 35 knots. They will be armed with modern navigation, monitoring and defense equipment.

Five will be built at Larsen & Toubro’s Kattupalli shipyard in Chennai, Tamilnadu State, and the rest will be made at the Hong Ha Shipyard in Vietnam’s northern port city of Hai Phong using Larsen & Toubro knowhow and under its supervision.

The Indian firm will take full responsibility for the designs and technologies of all the 12 ships.

Vietnam and India established a strategic partnership in 2007.

At a ceremony held Wednesday to start the shipbuilding project, Major-General Hoang Dang Nhieu, Deputy Commander of the Vietnam Border Guard, said Vietnam and India were paying more attention to boosting collaboration between the two nations in different fields, and the shipbuilding project was an important part of it.

This high-speed patrol ship project will play a key role in strengthening the bilateral defense relations of Vietnam and India, officials of both sides said.

Retired Vice Admiral B Kannan, CEO of Larsen & Toubro Shipbuilding, said Vietnam and India have a long-standing friendship and are currently promoting their cooperation in many fields, including national defense.

Good news, thanks a lot for your support to our country

 

[Viet]

Women power

Nguyen Hong Minh is a police officer at Jangseong County Police Department, South Jeolla Province, South Korea. Photo courtesy of Nguyen Hong Minh.

Nguyen Hong Minh, second from left, and her colleagues at Jangseong County Police Department, South Jeolla Province. Photo courtesy of Nguyen Hong Minh.