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TENSIONS BUBBLE TO THE SURFACE IN CHINA-VIETNAM SPAT

BY MURRAY HIEBERT AND GREGORY POLING | JUNE 28, 2017
AMTI UPDATE, CHINA, VIETNAM

https://amti.csis.org/tensions-bubble-china-vietnam/

Fan Changlong, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, was scheduled to make a two-day official visit to Hanoi on June 18-19 before joining Vietnam’s defense minister Ngo Xuan Lich for a series of joint military patrols along the Sino-Vietnam land border from June 20 to 22. But something went very wrong because General Fan unexpectedly left Hanoi on June 18 after meetings with Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, President Tran Dai Quang, and Defense Minister Lich.

China’s Defense Ministry announced the cancellation of the border exchanges two days later, blaming “reasons related to working arrangements.” The real story seems to be that simmering tensions between Beijing and Hanoi, which has been far more skeptical of Beijing’s recent charm offensive than Manila, erupted due to disagreements over oil and gas exploration.

Unidentified sources told Jane’s on June 20 that Fan left after Vietnamese officials rejected a demand to halt all oil and gas exploration within the nine-dash line. Wu Shicun, president of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, speculated that the meetings broke down because “Beijing sees Vietnam as breaking its promises about not exploiting oil in disputed areas in the South China Sea.” Two areas—Blocks 118 and 136—appear to be at the center of the disagreement.

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Activity in two oil and gas blocks off the Vietnam coast, block 118 and block 136, may be a cause for recently heightened tensions between Vietnam and China.
In January ExxonMobil announced plans to tap natural gas reserves off the coast of central Vietnam. The so-called “Blue Whale” project will take place in Block 118, a small portion of which overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. Beijing seems to claim “historic rights” over all oil and gas within the line, despite a ruling from an international tribunal last July rejecting such rights. The site of Exxon’s planned drilling operation lies near the nine-dash line—perhaps as close as 10 nautical miles—but remains outside it.

Of course, gas reserves don’t recognize boundaries, and Exxon’s drilling could be seen by Beijing as draining a basin that straddles the line—the same basin, in fact, that the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HY981) deep-water drilling rig was exploring in 2014 when it sparked a months-long crisis between China and Vietnam. It is important to note that, while Block 118 overlaps the nine-dash line, it is firmly on Vietnam’s side of any future continental shelf delimitation.

Exxon’s work in Block 118 is likely an irritant for Beijing, but a more immediate trigger for the current spat is Vietnam’s plan to proceed with exploration of oil and gas reserves in Block 136, much farther south. That block sits on Vanguard Bank, an underwater feature that has been a bone of contention between Hanoi and Beijing for almost 30 years. The bank is believed to hold commercially viable hydrocarbon reserves. It is far from any disputed rocks or reefs, but Beijing continues to claim rights to it based on the nine-dash line. In 1992, China sold rights to the small U.S.-based Crestone Energy to explore for oil and gas in a huge block that included Vanguard Bank. That long-stalled contract overlaps with Vietnam’s own Block 136, which is currently held by Spain’s Repsol Exploration.

Since acquiring the block two years ago as part of a takeover of Australia’s Talisman Energy, Repsol has surveyed the area in preparation for exploration. Hanoi is rumored to have approved a plan for the company to soon undertake exploratory drilling despite objections from Beijing. Coincidentally (or not), Vice Chairman Fan and his delegation visited Spain immediately before their travel to Vietnam.

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An unidentified Vietnamese ship has been operating in block 136 in a manner that suggests a patrol or a survey since June 19, the day after General Fan abruptly departed from Hanoi.
Neither Repsol nor Hanoi have made any officials announcements, but an unidentified Vietnamese ship appears to have been dispatched to patrol Block 136 immediately after Fan’s departure from Hanoi. According to data from Windward, a maritime data and risk analytics firm, the vessel arrived in the area on the morning of June 19 (local time) and has been operating in a pattern consistent with a survey or patrol.

These tensions are also playing out in the context of Vietnam’s steps to deepen security ties with the United States and Japan, no doubt irritating China further. Prime Minister Phuc visited the White House in late May, days after Washington had transferred a decommissioned U.S. Hamilton-class cutter to Vietnam’s Coast Guard. At the end of his visit, the two countries released a joint communiqué that announced that Vietnam would welcome the first visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Cam Ranh Bay, the deep-water seaport expanded by the Americans during the war that ended in 1975.

The United States and Vietnam also agreed to step up intelligence sharing. “We won’t be sharing intel on Islamic State in the Middle East,” a Vietnamese official joked, hinting at the fact that the information shared would be about maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea. Vietnam also expressed interest in acquiring more defense equipment from the United States, something made possible after Washington lifted its ban on lethal weapons sales a year ago. Vietnam defense minister Lich is also slated to make his maiden trip to Washington to meet Defense Secretary James Mattis in the coming months, possibly in August.

Phuc’s trip to Washington was quickly followed with a visit to Japan. According to a joint statement, Vietnam and Japan agreed on a “broad strategic partnership” and to increase their defense and security cooperation. Tokyo committed over $900 million in aid to Vietnam for various projects, including coast guard activities and the provision of six patrol boats. Shortly after the visit, Japan and Vietnam launched a joint exercise between their two coast guards that focused on combating illegal fishing, which likely prompted some heartburn in China.

From Hanoi’s point of view, Beijing’s objections to exploration in Blocks 118 and 136 are not only unfounded, but offensive. The areas are not in dispute because of overlapping continental shelves, only by virtue of the nine-dash line, which Hanoi and the international community at large do not recognize.

Meanwhile, China continues to explore for oil and gas around the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin and the disputed Paracel Islands. On June 16, just before Fan arrived in Hanoi, China’s HY981 rig arrived just south of Hainan. According to an announcement by the China Maritime Safety Administration, it will operate in the area until September 15. The rig is on the Chinese side of the median line between the two nation’s coasts and, while the area in question is technically still disputed pending delimitation, it is almost certainly China’s. Blocks 118 and 136 are even more clearly Vietnam’s, and yet it is being told to stand down. That double standard is particularly galling to Hanoi’s leaders.

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About Murray Hiebert
Murray Hiebert serves as senior fellow and deputy director of the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS in Washington, DC. He earlier worked as a journalist in Asia for the Wall Street Journal and the Far Eastern Economic Review.

gpoling-96x96.jpg

About Gregory Poling
Gregory B. Poling is director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and a fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS. He oversees research on U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, with a particular focus on the maritime domain and the countries of Southeast Asia. His research interests include the South China Sea disputes, democratization in Southeast Asia, and Asian multilateralism.
 
Together, stronger, bro.

Let's kick the US out of our region and install peace.

It was never about countries, race, or even religion. Its about the people struggling against an elite class that keeps the people divided. Specifically, the BIS bank in switzerland, central banks all over the world and the pedophiles who own all of us.
 
@Viet

The whole Kh-35E is being produced in Vietnam, including radar of it? If so then you basicaĺy just import the engine and radar to be placed inside shell your people are producing to get UE.

Since you are Vietnamese then submit this suggestion to your military.

Order as much turbofan engines used in Kh-35UE from both Russians and North Koreans to be replace turbojet of Kh-35E, Russians won't be able deliver as much radars as they could turbofan engines while North Korean variant of the radar is incompatible.

Turbojet used for Kh-35 could be used for a domestic target drone and UAV/UCAV.
You have humor because I am Vietnamese I can submit suggestions. Ha ha ha. You are foreigner but can do the same my friend regardless.

Well North Korea is a textbook example for students where a country has acquired nuclear and missile technology in a short time span if a certain threshold is reached. Yes true we can learn from them. And I am pretty sure, we will copy them. No right now we can't make everything. Although little is disclosed as usual following tradition of Vietnamese Army, we can be certain except turbofan and missile guidance computer, which will be imported from Russia, VN makes the rest including launching tubes and fire control radar 3Ts-25E Garpun-B. We have the backing of a military superpower. The Russians will provide components to enable their Vietnamese comrades to produce 3,000 kh35 cruise missiles. You can understand the logic of the number: Vietnam calculates with the worst case, with a war of attrition, with missile saturation attacks on enemy destroyers.

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thanks for sharing us the pictures. Very nice ones.

Here are some nice pictures from China side. Just yesterday (June 28th), China launched the first unit of 055 destroyer in the JNCX shipyard in my hometown Shanghai. That's really a proud moment to me.

Given the high completion rate of the newly-launched 055 ship, we can expect it to be part of the PLAN CVBG in South China Sea in about 18~24 months.

See the huge Chinese flag in the first picture? Know what is behind it? It's another unit of 055 ship, which will be launched soon. Oh, forget to mention, Dalian Shipyard is building 2x 055 ships too. All the rest three ones are to be launched in the next 12 months.

For the 2nd picture, see the grey ship at the background? I mean the grey one at another side of the pool (left side). That's a 052D destroyer under building. It's just one of the five 052D ships that are under construction in JNCX shipyard.

Oh, forget to mention, two days before the 055 launch, i.e. June 26th, Dalian Shipyard launched a new unit of 052D ship. Dalian is currently building three 052D ships in parallel.

Another wonderful news to share, Ma Weiming, the god father to PLAN Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMAL) system, he just confirmed that PLAN's 3rd carrier will be equipped with EMAL system that Ma developed. And the building of the 3rd carrier will be started soon. So we can expect the new carrier with EMAL system sailing in South China Sea in about six years from now.

Hope our Vietnam comrades could feel happy for the small progress made by their Chinese comrades.
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impressive but honestly I must disappoint you. even you can build 1,000 warships as seen during the heyday of the Ming, China led by Xi Jinping and his comrades, supported by cheer leading folks, united in nationalistic policy will miss the target of bringing the imperial glorious days back to China. there is something you are missing, and obviously you will never learn.
 
impressive but honestly I must disappoint you. even you can build 1,000 warships as seen during the heyday of the Ming, China led by Xi Jinping and his comrades, supported by cheer leading folks, united in nationalistic policy will miss the target of bringing the imperial glorious days back to China. there is something you are missing, and obviously you will never learn.
You have obviously reply to the wrong person, US arm forces exist in almost every hot zone on this world as we speak, so the title "Imperial" should be honorably given to them.:usflag:
 
impressive but honestly I must disappoint you. even you can build 1,000 warships as seen during the heyday of the Ming, China led by Xi Jinping and his comrades, supported by cheer leading folks, united in nationalistic policy will miss the target of bringing the imperial glorious days back to China. there is something you are missing, and obviously you will never learn.
The so-called imperial glorious is not what we are seeking for. All that we want is nothing but to make China fully modernized, no matter economy-wise, technology-wise, or military-wise. And of course, during that process, we also hope to achieve some minor targets, e.g. to take back the islands that stolen by our neighbors when China was in her weak era.

Of course that's not an easy task. We are fully aware of the difficulties and challenges behind. But we have patience. Be patient please, you and me are both young enough.
 
The so-called imperial glorious is not what we are seeking for. All that we want is nothing but to make China fully modernized, no matter economy-wise, technology-wise, or military-wise. And of course, during that process, we also hope to achieve some minor targets, e.g. to take back the islands that stolen by our neighbors when China was in her weak era.

Of course that's not an easy task. We are fully aware of the difficulties and challenges behind. But we have patience. Be patient please, you and me are both young enough.
Your islands were stolen when you were weak, and you want to take back once your 5th carriers and 20th destroyers hit the waters? Ha ha ...your assessment is wrong. What you describe is not weakness but incompetence. People can understand weakness but never forgive incompetence. After you have built 10 carriers and 50 destroyers? .

You have obviously reply to the wrong person, US arm forces exist in almost every hot zone on this world as we speak, so the title "Imperial" should be honorably given to them.:usflag:
Look, we don't care a penny if you take over the world and enslave all people of different skin colors including the White there. However we are allergic if you want to rape Vietnam, destroy our lands and kill our people.

Get it!
 
Your islands were stolen when you were weak, and you want to take back once your 5th carriers and 20th destroyers hit the waters? Ha ha ...your assessment is wrong. What you bescribe is not weakness but incompetence. People can understand weakness but never forgive incompetence. When will you be able to take over Taiwan? After you have built 10 carriers and 50 destroyers? We could take Taiwan tomorrow if we just had a half of your strength today.
hysteria won't be any helpful to you or make your country any better. Only hard work can.

Have half of China's strength and you can do better? That's very cheap words like if I'm given have half of Elon Musk's wealth and I can make a more competitive company to beat Tesla the next day.
 
hysteria won't be any helpful to you or make your country any better. Only hard work can.

Have half of China's strength and you can do better? That's very cheap words like if I'm given have half of Elon Musk's wealth and I can make a more competitive company to beat Tesla the next day.
Not hysterical at all. Look, when are you able to take back Manchuria from the Russians? Will we both see it happening in our life time? Expecting we sit still while you prepare to attack is avery optimistic assumption. Even you successfully take an island from Vietnam, we take two in return. I could expect you have learned a bit from previous encounters.
 
Not hysterical at all. Look, when are you able to take back Manchuria from the Russians? Will we both see it happening in our life time? Expecting we sit still while you prepare to attack is avery optimistic assumption. Even you successfully take an island from Vietnam, we take two in return. I could expect you have learned a bit from previous encounters.
be patient my friend, we two are both young enough to witness the changes in the coming decades.
 
be patient my friend, we two are both young enough to witness the changes in the coming decades.
perfect, you go your way, while we go ours. hopefully our ways don't cross.
 
seems he share the same concern with me

thediplomat.com-1200px-puckapunyal-type-59-mbt-1-386x226.jpg

A Type 59 tank, in use during the Vietnam War.
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ Bukvoed
The Weak Points in Vietnam's Miliary
Despite significant defense investments, some neglected portions of Vietnam’s military are vulnerable to Chinese attack.

By Shang-su Wu
June 27, 2017


In the last two decades, Hanoi has concentrated its limited resource to strengthen some of its aerial and maritime capabilities, but the rest of Vietnam’s military equipment is moving toward obsolescence due to lack of renewal. Despite lack of a universal definition, military obsolescence can be seen from two perspectives: absolute and relative. The former refers to operational readiness, and the latter signifies a comparison of capabilities between a state and its potential enemy. In Vietnam’s case, the relative perspective is more salient because of China’s comprehensive military modernization. While Hanoi’s new fighters, submarines, and frigates are not inferior to their Chinese counterparts, other Vietnamese capabilities would be vulnerabilities available for Beijing to exploit. Minesweeping, armored vehicles, and artillery are three major examples.

Minesweeping

The Vietnam People’s Army Navy (VPAN) possesses four kinds of minesweeping vessels, Project 266, Project 1258, Project 1265, and Project T-361; all are Soviet legacies from the Cold War with old countermine technology, small capacity, and short durability. Vietnam’s long coastline and large maritime territory puts a heavy burden on those minesweepers. Given that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is prepared to create a blockade by laying sea mines, the VPAN may not be able to keep its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open with its limited minesweeping capacity.

Aside from the six submarines, Hanoi lacks effective means to retaliate with the same tactic to disrupt China’s SLOCs. Of course, the VAPN can attack the PLAN’s surface vessels and aircraft while laying sea mines offshore, but countering sea mines laid by submarines is a different challenge thanks to Hanoi’s limited anti-submarine capability. When options for denial and punishment are unavailable, Vietnam has to make a difficult decision between enduring the impact, submitting, or escalating he conflict; all are unpleasant.

Armored Vehicles

Back in the Cold War era, Vietnam received a lot of land systems from the Soviet Union in considerable quality and quantity. But more than a quarter of century since the end of the military aid, those assets have gradually become outdated in the face of China’s continuous military modernization.

Currently, the Vietnamese main battle tanks (MBTs) are all legacies from the front part of the Cold War, T-54/55s, T-62s, and Type 59s. In contrast, the PLA has modernized its MBT units with Type 88, Type 96, and Type 99, one or more generations ahead of the VPA’s, reflecting greater firepower, mobility, and protection. Although Hanoi introduced Israeli technologies to upgrade its T-55 MBTs, the generation gap was not fully overcome. In other words, an armor battle between China and Vietnam would favor the former.

Since MBTs are usually the spearhead for offense, this technological gap would determine the strategic situation on the Sino-Vietnamese borders. Although anti-tank missiles have demonstrated promise in various cases, the VPA’s missiles — the 9M14M and 9M111 — are also Cold War legacies, meaning their damage to the Chinese MBTs’ new armor could be uncertain. Besides, the VPA have both self-propelled and towed anti-tank guns, mainly designs from World War II, and thee should not be high expectations for their performance.

Artillery

Having benefited from later designs and technologies, Chinese artillery systems, especially self-propelled guns and multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS), have superior ranges to their Vietnamese counterparts. Longer ranges not only provide the PLA artillery more flexibility than the VPA, but also reduce the latter’s opportunity to retaliate. Although Hanoi has artillery rockets and missiles with longer ranges, such as the Israeli EXTRA and Russian R-17 (Scud), to apply them would invite stronger retaliation from Beijing’s larger arsenals of standoff munitions. If the VPA’s artillery is suppressed by that of the PLA, the former’s frontline units, including MBTs, would be in an even worse operational condition.

The demarcation of land borders through bilateral treaties between Hanoi and Beijing in the 1990s removed a common cause of armed conflict: territorial disputes. China would not want to create a negative impression through a land invasion. However, the VPA’s inferior military capability on land defense still presents an effective means for the PLA to exert strategic pressure. Exercises, forward deployments, and even exchanges of fire on a small scale would send additional messages from China. Despite higher political costs for Beijing, Hanoi is not remote from the border. The mountainous terrain between the Red River Delta and the borders would help the VPA to resist a northward invasion, but does nothing to deter artillery rockets and missiles, not to mention air raids. China thus has a spectrum of operation options on land to use against Vietnam.

These capabilities can be improved a lot with sufficient investment, but the allocation of the defense budget would be a dilemma for Hanoi. On the one hand, even with the current emphasis on air defense and sea denial, these capabilities have not reached an equivalent stage vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts. Shifting resources to other areas may disrupt the existing projects. On the other hand, the strategic vulnerabilities mentioned above will be worse for aging, given no considerable investment.

Raising the budget may solve the dilemma but it is likely to create a larger problem in balancing between defense and other needs. Building allies to cover up the insufficiencies in Hanoi’s military capabilities would be another option, but it would work against Vietnam’s current foreign policy. Hostility toward China may be too strong to retain Hanoi’s hedging policy toward Beijing. Also, even an alliance might not give Vietnam the support it needs. As there is no easy solution, Vietnamese defense planners will be obsessed with the challenges originating from military obsolescence in the foreseeable future.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow in the Military Studies Program of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
 
Vietnam/Russia Summit (Jun 28 - July 1)

Not too bad: both countries sign 20 joint investment programs worth $10 billion. In addition, Vietnam and Russia
establish an investment fund ($500 mln).

More:
http://tass.com/economy/953976



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@jhungary @Carlosa

seems he share the same concern with me

thediplomat.com-1200px-puckapunyal-type-59-mbt-1-386x226.jpg

A Type 59 tank, in use during the Vietnam War.
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ Bukvoed
The Weak Points in Vietnam's Miliary
Despite significant defense investments, some neglected portions of Vietnam’s military are vulnerable to Chinese attack.

By Shang-su Wu
June 27, 2017


In the last two decades, Hanoi has concentrated its limited resource to strengthen some of its aerial and maritime capabilities, but the rest of Vietnam’s military equipment is moving toward obsolescence due to lack of renewal. Despite lack of a universal definition, military obsolescence can be seen from two perspectives: absolute and relative. The former refers to operational readiness, and the latter signifies a comparison of capabilities between a state and its potential enemy. In Vietnam’s case, the relative perspective is more salient because of China’s comprehensive military modernization. While Hanoi’s new fighters, submarines, and frigates are not inferior to their Chinese counterparts, other Vietnamese capabilities would be vulnerabilities available for Beijing to exploit. Minesweeping, armored vehicles, and artillery are three major examples.

Minesweeping

The Vietnam People’s Army Navy (VPAN) possesses four kinds of minesweeping vessels, Project 266, Project 1258, Project 1265, and Project T-361; all are Soviet legacies from the Cold War with old countermine technology, small capacity, and short durability. Vietnam’s long coastline and large maritime territory puts a heavy burden on those minesweepers. Given that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is prepared to create a blockade by laying sea mines, the VPAN may not be able to keep its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open with its limited minesweeping capacity.

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Aside from the six submarines, Hanoi lacks effective means to retaliate with the same tactic to disrupt China’s SLOCs. Of course, the VAPN can attack the PLAN’s surface vessels and aircraft while laying sea mines offshore, but countering sea mines laid by submarines is a different challenge thanks to Hanoi’s limited anti-submarine capability. When options for denial and punishment are unavailable, Vietnam has to make a difficult decision between enduring the impact, submitting, or escalating he conflict; all are unpleasant.

Armored Vehicles

Back in the Cold War era, Vietnam received a lot of land systems from the Soviet Union in considerable quality and quantity. But more than a quarter of century since the end of the military aid, those assets have gradually become outdated in the face of China’s continuous military modernization.

Currently, the Vietnamese main battle tanks (MBTs) are all legacies from the front part of the Cold War, T-54/55s, T-62s, and Type 59s. In contrast, the PLA has modernized its MBT units with Type 88, Type 96, and Type 99, one or more generations ahead of the VPA’s, reflecting greater firepower, mobility, and protection. Although Hanoi introduced Israeli technologies to upgrade its T-55 MBTs, the generation gap was not fully overcome. In other words, an armor battle between China and Vietnam would favor the former.

Since MBTs are usually the spearhead for offense, this technological gap would determine the strategic situation on the Sino-Vietnamese borders. Although anti-tank missiles have demonstrated promise in various cases, the VPA’s missiles — the 9M14M and 9M111 — are also Cold War legacies, meaning their damage to the Chinese MBTs’ new armor could be uncertain. Besides, the VPA have both self-propelled and towed anti-tank guns, mainly designs from World War II, and thee should not be high expectations for their performance.

Artillery

Having benefited from later designs and technologies, Chinese artillery systems, especially self-propelled guns and multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS), have superior ranges to their Vietnamese counterparts. Longer ranges not only provide the PLA artillery more flexibility than the VPA, but also reduce the latter’s opportunity to retaliate. Although Hanoi has artillery rockets and missiles with longer ranges, such as the Israeli EXTRA and Russian R-17 (Scud), to apply them would invite stronger retaliation from Beijing’s larger arsenals of standoff munitions. If the VPA’s artillery is suppressed by that of the PLA, the former’s frontline units, including MBTs, would be in an even worse operational condition.

The demarcation of land borders through bilateral treaties between Hanoi and Beijing in the 1990s removed a common cause of armed conflict: territorial disputes. China would not want to create a negative impression through a land invasion. However, the VPA’s inferior military capability on land defense still presents an effective means for the PLA to exert strategic pressure. Exercises, forward deployments, and even exchanges of fire on a small scale would send additional messages from China. Despite higher political costs for Beijing, Hanoi is not remote from the border. The mountainous terrain between the Red River Delta and the borders would help the VPA to resist a northward invasion, but does nothing to deter artillery rockets and missiles, not to mention air raids. China thus has a spectrum of operation options on land to use against Vietnam.

These capabilities can be improved a lot with sufficient investment, but the allocation of the defense budget would be a dilemma for Hanoi. On the one hand, even with the current emphasis on air defense and sea denial, these capabilities have not reached an equivalent stage vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts. Shifting resources to other areas may disrupt the existing projects. On the other hand, the strategic vulnerabilities mentioned above will be worse for aging, given no considerable investment.

Raising the budget may solve the dilemma but it is likely to create a larger problem in balancing between defense and other needs. Building allies to cover up the insufficiencies in Hanoi’s military capabilities would be another option, but it would work against Vietnam’s current foreign policy. Hostility toward China may be too strong to retain Hanoi’s hedging policy toward Beijing. Also, even an alliance might not give Vietnam the support it needs. As there is no easy solution, Vietnamese defense planners will be obsessed with the challenges originating from military obsolescence in the foreseeable future.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow in the Military Studies Program of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
Forget that VN can enrich uranium in our soil while JP are not allowed, it means we can make nuke warhead ?? And we already possed nuke capable missile Shaddock, range 550km.

Full scale Land attack to VN will face wt nuclear war and CN will.not like that.
 
Moscow June 29. Meeting with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev

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