Pakistan labors under a heavy defense budget that consumes close to five percent of GDP and the lion's share of government spending. This prevents the nation from undertaking serious poverty reduction and education spending programs. The use of conscription while falling into disfavor globally offers unique opportunities in the Pakistan context. First and foremost it would allow for a reduction in defense spending, in Pakistan's case this would result in a decrease in efficiency distorting taxes. Taxation due to its generally progressive nature results in inefficiencies whereas conscription is akin to a lump-sum tax which does not suffer from the same weakness. Secondly the use of conscription would further Pakistan's strategic posturing vis-a-vis India. Pakistan due to its lack of depth can in times of conflict mobilize far more quickly that India in bringing force to bear in the border regions. This is a decisive factor in modern state based wars which due to international pressure tend to be short in duration. However, even with these factors Pakistan may find itself consigned to a war of attrition albeit short in duration with India. In such a conflict Pakistan is severely disadvantaged facing a standing army close to twice its own size. In such a case Pakistan would be forced to rely on nuclear brinksmanship with mutually devastating consequences in case of miscalculation on India's part.
Conscription while not reversing the balance can to some degree help mitigate the lack of critical mass on Pakistan's part. An added advantage would be in reducing reliance on complex foreign military platforms (such as fighter jets, advanced tanks and so forth) to the degree that there is some scope for substitutability between these and (conscripted) infantry.
The general criticisms of conscription revolve around the inefficiencies in composition in the specific sense that the military would not be solely composed of individuals who have the least opportunity cost of serving. This can be mitigated to some degree by instituting exceptions for those pursuing higher education (who are assumed to have highest opportunity cost of serving). In Pakistan's case however due to the extremely high level of defense spending, the inefficiencies generated to sustain requisite level of taxes would invariably exceed the inefficiency in fielding a force which is not cost minimizing.
Another criticism of conscription is that it results in a reduced fighting ability. This mode of thought is applicable to nations that have peaceful borders (Western European nations) in addition to those which are dominant militarily in relation to their neighbors. For western Europe where the military serves foreign policy objectives, a small professional force achieves this at a minimum cost (especially so where casualties would be politically sensitive and where conscription is deficient). For militarily dominant nations, conscription is relatively ineffective because in most of such cases these are also nations with larger economies where defense spending is not so burdensome. Therefore professional forces allow for minimum casualties in conflict especially in light of the fact that the militarily dominant side in a conflict attempts to take the initiative in terms of territory. Large expansive maneuver of forces are well suited to professional forces wherein level of training and experience is more homogenous. In Pakistan's case the professional force would remain largely as is and would maintain the aggressive offensive-defense posture consistent with existing doctrine. The large body of force resulting from conscription would primarily serve in defensive posture within Pakistan proper. They would serve as a buffer in the case of a catastrophic defeat of the professional force and prevent deep incursion and occupation of Pakistani territory. Therefore while suited to Pakistan, conscription may not be as suited to nations such as U.S.A, Western Europe, India, Russia or China.
Conscription while not reversing the balance can to some degree help mitigate the lack of critical mass on Pakistan's part. An added advantage would be in reducing reliance on complex foreign military platforms (such as fighter jets, advanced tanks and so forth) to the degree that there is some scope for substitutability between these and (conscripted) infantry.
The general criticisms of conscription revolve around the inefficiencies in composition in the specific sense that the military would not be solely composed of individuals who have the least opportunity cost of serving. This can be mitigated to some degree by instituting exceptions for those pursuing higher education (who are assumed to have highest opportunity cost of serving). In Pakistan's case however due to the extremely high level of defense spending, the inefficiencies generated to sustain requisite level of taxes would invariably exceed the inefficiency in fielding a force which is not cost minimizing.
Another criticism of conscription is that it results in a reduced fighting ability. This mode of thought is applicable to nations that have peaceful borders (Western European nations) in addition to those which are dominant militarily in relation to their neighbors. For western Europe where the military serves foreign policy objectives, a small professional force achieves this at a minimum cost (especially so where casualties would be politically sensitive and where conscription is deficient). For militarily dominant nations, conscription is relatively ineffective because in most of such cases these are also nations with larger economies where defense spending is not so burdensome. Therefore professional forces allow for minimum casualties in conflict especially in light of the fact that the militarily dominant side in a conflict attempts to take the initiative in terms of territory. Large expansive maneuver of forces are well suited to professional forces wherein level of training and experience is more homogenous. In Pakistan's case the professional force would remain largely as is and would maintain the aggressive offensive-defense posture consistent with existing doctrine. The large body of force resulting from conscription would primarily serve in defensive posture within Pakistan proper. They would serve as a buffer in the case of a catastrophic defeat of the professional force and prevent deep incursion and occupation of Pakistani territory. Therefore while suited to Pakistan, conscription may not be as suited to nations such as U.S.A, Western Europe, India, Russia or China.
