USAF Bomber Assessment

[salarsikander]

USAF BOMBER Assessment ​

A study by Centre for strategic & International Studies.


Hi,

Today we will discuss the next generation bombers Requirements.
A rough Idea was identified based on these parameters, which are Of course subject to change later on.

• The Air force's Commitment to field a new Bomber in 2018 as mandated by by the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review Report is, at best, Uncertain and that is advocacy for a new Bomber lacks conviction and credibility.
• The US ability to conduct Long-Range strike (LRS) mission throughout enemy adversary's territory, despite its Defenses, Without relying on nearby Air Bases, Its very important and supports the US Role as Global Super Power.
• The Capabitliy of Us bomber are based around three Scenarios:

1. 1. Addressing the challenge of a large, high-end competitor
   2. Providing long-duration air support missions in low-threat environments
   3. Conducting intense conventional campaigns against medium powers with
      hi-low military capabilities.

• The imperative to engage time-sensitive targets (TSTs) in all three scenarios has
  increased the value of range, persistence and payload in the nation’s air forces.
• The current need to respond immediately to on-call tasking from small ground
  units engaged in counterterrorism or counter-insurgency missions is likely to be
  an enduring need

• Providing persistence (which enables TST targeting) in highly defended areas is
  extremely challenging and is probably not achievable in technologies mature
  enough for fielding in 2018. However, it is still critically important to hold deep
  fixed targets at risk, and continuing to seek a capability of persistent surveillance
  and strike in highly defended areas is a useful cost-imposition strategy, even if all
  the capability objectives are not achieved.
• The growing likelihood that the Air Force’s plans for its future fighter force will
  be unaffordable, given competing demands and the increasing cost of the F-35
  Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), increases the value of the bomber’s range and payload,
  in part because bombers require many fewer sorties (and tanker support) to
  provide needed target coverage in many scenarios.
• A new penetrating bomber should be nuclear-capable, if the cost of doing so is
  relatively modest (no more than five percent of the total).
• Fielding a penetrating bomber by 2018 is probably not doable, because the
  technology is not mature enough, and almost certainly not affordable, because the
  cost of trying to field immature technology will lead to skyrocketing costs.
• If the still-operational force of B-52s and B-1s is not capable of conducting the
  volume of long-duration air support missions (in low-threat environments)
  needed in the 2018-timeframe, the Air Force could consider the option of fielding
  first a commercial-derivative bomber optimized for the low-end mission to fill
  this capability gap (if it emerges). But this should not divert the Air Force from
  developing and then procuring the penetrating bomber the nation needs in the
  mid-2020s when the technology is mature and the next-generation bomber is
  affordable.

 

[salarsikander]

Importance of Long-Range Strike

Most participants believed that long-range bombing “was an American thing – one of the
things we do when we fight wars.” In a less colloquial, but certainly more elaborate,
written submission after the second workshop session, one participant stated:​

The core strategic reason that the United States should give priority and adequate
resources to fielding a long-range strike system (LRSS) beyond the B-2 within the
next 10-15 years is to be able to hold at risk targets at any depth in enemy
airspace even when protected by advanced air defenses. This capability has been
one hallmark of the U.S. military ever since 8th Air force began flying missions
against occupied Europe from England in 1942. It was also the main justification
for creating an independent USAF in 1947. . . .Thus, my view is that moving
ahead and fielding a new LRSS in the foreseeable future (no later than the early
2020s) is a critical indicator of American will and commitment to remaining a
global superpower.

As a thought exercise, assume you had only three variants of air power – landbased
tactical air, sea-based tactical air and bombers – and you have to give up
two of them, which would you not want to be without? In light of the basing
risks [either on land bases in the region or on increasingly vulnerable carriers], the
answer has to be bombers.
​

While not disputing the value of long range, a few participants stressed that, as one wrote
before the meeting, “First and foremost, we must start talking about ISR in the same
breath as strike. Finding things is at least as important in most cases as hitting things.”
Although others agreed that “ISR should be the primary driver,” there was no pushback
to the comment that “once you have your long-range ISR platform, you might as well put
a bomb bay in it.

Although distinctly in the minority, one participant did not take the inherent value of long
range almost as a given, but insisted (in a written answer provided before the meeting)
that it depended on likely U.S. mission needs:​

ISR, mobility, tanking and short range strike win out over long range strike. For
all forms of warfare and deterrence, ISR (defined as both tactical and national) is
required. For local warfare, mobility and tankers are essential, and short-range
assets are needed. For local punishment from a distance, the use of existing long
air assets has already been shown to be adequate. For strategic confrontations
with major powers, the current inventory of missiles and aircraft is sufficient (if
one had to prioritize). A new bomber that encounters budget constraints is likely
to end up at low priority, unless its “fit” within the architecture of systems is
clearer; evidence exists that it can be provided on the cost and schedule proposed;
and, the warfighting scenarios and peacetime competitions are reasonable
examples of the challenges the U.S. may face.​

@salarsikander - what's your assessment? The conceptual designs are being tested currently (this doesn't mean an aircraft is flying, but don't discount that either), but very little is known about the over-all capabilities, save for the publicly stated list of desired that are put out during an RFP. This article is nice, but a bit dated as the NGB has been pushed back into the 2020s, with testing be completed in the 2010s.

The B-1 will be fine going forwards, it's supposed to be in service far past 2018 - I didn't really understand that part of the article, and is being upgraded with new targeting equipment and avionics, its arsenal is also being augmented with the LRASM being integrated into its package.

This is the B-1b's new cockpit post 2014 upgrade
View attachment 184132

The Aviationist » This is the cockpit of the upgraded B-1B “Bone” bomber

The B-1B is also more economical from a fuel perspective due to its being able to use "alternative fuels."

B-1B achieves first supersonic flight using synthetic fuel

The B-52 might not have the speed or stealth of the B-1 or B-2 (yes, the B-1 has stealth features), but what makes the B-52 continually relevant is its lower cost per maintenance hour, its high payload and its ever-being-upgraded electronic warfare package - which is among the best found in the USAF fleet.

Its electronic warfare capabilities are massive and include stand-off jamming.

B-52H Stratofortress Long-Range Multirole Bomber - Airforce Technology

It's also likely that this, the NGB, will be a manned project, augmenting armed drones such as the Navy's UCLASS, but still retaining the human element as these systems need a human redundancy as they will be responsible for carrying nuclear weapons. Given the susceptibility of UAVs to electronic attack, even if it's harder then commonly perceived, you need a human who can assume control of the system and get it to safety. UAVs just don't offer that capability, especially if an enemy can find a way to assume control of them.

Finally, on the commercial-derivative... it's interesting but not going to happen. Yes, the military once thought of doing so with the 747 cruise missile carrier project, but civilian airliners don't make for good bombers since they aren't designed for the high-loads these systems face. Like the p-8 or p-3, civilian aircraft can be turned into military system, but bombers require higher payloads then most civilian airliners are able to offer. This plan offers the advantage of an economy of scale, but it's still not the way the military is going to go especially as the NGB is currently in its testing phase.

View attachment 184135

So here's my question to you @salarsikander - what direction do you think the USAF should be going and what specifications/capabilities should the NGB have?

Hi,
Its certainly is encouraging and an an honour to be quoted my experts here, thansk for following.
As of now I am engaged in reading the articles from IISS and other Institute, I will surely get back to you with their reference. Right now its too late here to post anything

Cheers mate