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US military news, discussions and history

Link? PACOM isn't reporting anything, their last news update is about the CARAT 14 drills, from 10 November. Given the importance of the Pacific region to the US military, relative to other regions, and a lack of money problems at the moment, even the sequester and its auto budget cuts are likely to be roled back by republicans, I couldn't fathom the veracity of this report.


"TOKYO -- Security policymakers in Japan and the U.S. are privately voicing concern about the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers from East Asian waters for four months next year.

Budget restrictions in the U.S. and turmoil in the Middle East is putting pressure on the fleet's capability and will mean not a single aircraft carrier is deployed in East Asia.

Japanese and U.S. officials fear having no U.S. carriers in the region could provide China and North Korea with an opportunity to take military action.

The USS George Washington, the only U.S. aircraft carrier with an overseas homeport, is to leave its base in Japan for refueling and extensive maintenance. Until the USS Ronald Reagan arrives at the Japanese port of Yokosuka to replace the ship, there will be no American carrier in East Asia for about four months, according to U.S. and Japanese officials.

The U.S. Navy has not disclosed details about the replacement, but it is expected sometime between spring and autumn next year."




Japan frets over coming absence of US aircraft carriers- Nikkei Asian Review
 
Link? PACOM isn't reporting anything, their last news update is about the CARAT 14 drills, from 10 November. Given the importance of the Pacific region to the US military, relative to other regions, and a lack of money problems at the moment, even the sequester and its auto budget cuts are likely to be roled back by republicans, I couldn't fathom the veracity of this report.

Lastly, this is worrisome for us. There are already growing trends and voices in Japanese defense forums calling for Japan to strip self-imposed bans on offensive platforms. This includes the ban on the building and deploying of Aircraft carriers. I think that this will be necessitated. Given the threat of North Korea's missiles other asymmetrical factors.
 
"TOKYO -- Security policymakers in Japan and the U.S. are privately voicing concern about the absence of U.S. aircraft carriers from East Asian waters for four months next year.

Budget restrictions in the U.S. and turmoil in the Middle East is putting pressure on the fleet's capability and will mean not a single aircraft carrier is deployed in East Asia.

Japanese and U.S. officials fear having no U.S. carriers in the region could provide China and North Korea with an opportunity to take military action.

The USS George Washington, the only U.S. aircraft carrier with an overseas homeport, is to leave its base in Japan for refueling and extensive maintenance. Until the USS Ronald Reagan arrives at the Japanese port of Yokosuka to replace the ship, there will be no American carrier in East Asia for about four months, according to U.S. and Japanese officials.

The U.S. Navy has not disclosed details about the replacement, but it is expected sometime between spring and autumn next year."




Japan frets over coming absence of US aircraft carriers- Nikkei Asian Review

Fear, but nothing concrete. That's a relief for me. No disclosure about a replacement might be available, but one will be found. Even with the problems the Middle East has, the Asia-Pacific is the most important region to the US.

I'll keep an eye out for updates, and post any I find, but right now there is no news coming from Navy sources.
 
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Fear, but nothing concrete. That's a relief for me. No disclosure about a replacement might be available, but one will be found. Even without the problems the Middle East has, the Asia-Pacific is the most important region to the US.

I'll keep an eye out for updates, and post any I find, but right now there is no news coming from Navy sources.

Thanks, buddy. I hope that they can deploy another carrier into the region. 4 months is too long of a time span.
 
Pentagon Wants to Build Aircraft Carriers in the Sky

The Pentagon’s main research arm wants to find out what a flying “aircraft carrier” carrying a fleet of small aerial drones might look like and how much it would cost the military.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency announced Sunday it would open a competition for proposals to build a large aircraft — similar to a C-130 — that could carry and distribute aerial drones across a large area. DARPA officials said they wanted to see proposals for a system that could both launch the drones, but also recover them mid-flight.

Flying conventional airstrikes with large manned aircraft is both expensive and risky for the human pilot, DARPA officials explained. Therefore, the Pentagon wants to consider a “blended approach” that would lengthen the range of small drones by carrying them to combat aboard a manned aircraft.

“We want to find ways to make smaller aircraft more effective, and one promising idea is enabling existing large aircraft, with minimal modification, to become ‘aircraft carriers in the sky’,” said Dan Patt, DARPA program manager.

DARPA wants the proposals to allow for a flight demonstration of the aircraft and the drones within four years. Officials expect to use the proposals to build an official DARPA program for the system.

Leaders emphasized in the announcement that DARPA wants the drones to be small and cheap. Military commanders want cost effective options to execute airstrikes and this program should provide it.

From Pentagon Wants to Build Aircraft Carriers in the Sky | Defense Tech
 
Declining F-35 Prices Bode Well For Lockheed's Future
Declining F-35 Prices Bode Well For Lockheed's Future - Forbes

Lockheed Martin recently announced that it has reached an agreement in principle with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for the eighth production lot of F-35s. Importantly, the average unit price of F-35 in this lot 8 will be around 4% lower than that in lot 7.Exact cost details will be announced once a definite agreement is reached between the company and DoD. However, in our view, the lower unit price of F-35 is a positive trend for Lockheed as it will help generate more orders from both the U.S. government and international partners of the F-35 program.

From the point of view of Lockheed, what is important is that the company must be able to generate its initially targeted 3,100 orders for the F-35. If the company is able to generate these many orders, then its upfront investment in research and development of the F-35 will provide a healthy return. But for the company to be able to achieve 3,100 orders – roughly 2,400 from the U.S. defense forces and the remaining from other countries – F-35′s unit price will have to come further down. In the previous production lot 7, F-35′s unit price came below $100 million. This was a significant improvement from initial production lots in which F-35′s unit price was well above $100 million.

In our opinion, this steady decline in F-35′s price indicates growing program maturity. And, as the F-35 program shifts from low-rate initial production to full rate production over the next 3-4 years, we figure additional cost savings from improved manufacturing efficiencies will likely further lower F-35′s unit price.

Lower F-35 Prices Will Help Generate More Orders

The F-35 program constitutes about 18% of Lockheed’s revenue. So, success in this program is crucial for growth in the company’s overall results. And in our opinion, lower F-35 price is the single most important factor which will determine success of the F-35 program.

Production under Lockheed’s previous fighter jet program – F-22 Raptor – was terminated after just 195 production units due to high price of F-22 – about $150 million a unit – among other factors.Although F-35 program is different from the F-22 program as F-35 has many international orders while the U.S. government banned exports of F-22, we figure further declines in F-35′s price are essential for this fighter jet’s success. And it seems Lockheed is on the right track on the cost front. In July, the company announced its blueprint for affordability agreement with the DoD under which the company would bring down the price of F-35 to under $80 million a unit by 2019.We figure this is a huge boost for international buyers who will likely find it easier to make their purchase decisions with this improved foresight on prices.

Eventually, Lockheed expects to bring down the price of F-35 to the equivalent of today’s fourth-generation fighter jets. The company plans to achieve this price reduction through improved manufacturing efficiencies driven by higher production volume. Currently, F-35s are being produced under low-rate initial production, however, once testing and development is fully complete by around 2018, then the program will shift to full rate production improving manufacturing efficiencies. Another factor that will likely help reduce F-35′s price is declining employee costs for Lockheed. During the initial development years of F-35, Lockheed had raised a huge workforce of scientists, engineers and IT professionals. However, with significant development work over and complete development work expected to be over by around 2018, the company will likely reduce its development workforce. At the same time, the decline in development workforce is not expected to be fully offset by increase in the company’s production workforce. So, Lockheed will achieve cost savings from a reduced overall employee headcount as the F-35 program transitions from development phase to production phase in coming years.

Effectively, declining F-35 prices will propel international buyers and the U.S. government to place more orders for this fifth-generation fighter jet. It will also help address concerns of international buyers who in the past have expressed disappointment with F-35′s high procurement cost. Till now, ten countries apart from the U.S. have placed orders/commitments for the F-35. These countries include the U.K., Norway, Netherlands, Italy, Israel, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Japan and South Korea. From the point of view of U.S., more international orders will help save money for the government. This is so because with a larger production volume, overall development and fixed production costs will get spread over a larger number of fighter jets, lowering F-35′s unit price. Lower unit price in turn will help lower the government’s total procurement cost.

In all, if Lockheed is able to reduce F-35′s price to match that of today’s fourth generation fighter jets, then we figure the company should be able to generate its initially targeted 3,100 orders. This large production volume in turn will likely drive the company’s results through the next decade. So, declining F-35 prices bode well for Lockheed’s future.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Eventually, Lockheed expects to bring down the price of F-35 to the equivalent of today’s fourth-generation fighter jets"

Incredible. Export outlook seem bright.

Thoughts?
@SvenSvensonov @Nihonjin1051
 
Declining F-35 Prices Bode Well For Lockheed's Future
Declining F-35 Prices Bode Well For Lockheed's Future - Forbes

Lockheed Martin recently announced that it has reached an agreement in principle with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for the eighth production lot of F-35s. Importantly, the average unit price of F-35 in this lot 8 will be around 4% lower than that in lot 7.Exact cost details will be announced once a definite agreement is reached between the company and DoD. However, in our view, the lower unit price of F-35 is a positive trend for Lockheed as it will help generate more orders from both the U.S. government and international partners of the F-35 program.

From the point of view of Lockheed, what is important is that the company must be able to generate its initially targeted 3,100 orders for the F-35. If the company is able to generate these many orders, then its upfront investment in research and development of the F-35 will provide a healthy return. But for the company to be able to achieve 3,100 orders – roughly 2,400 from the U.S. defense forces and the remaining from other countries – F-35′s unit price will have to come further down. In the previous production lot 7, F-35′s unit price came below $100 million. This was a significant improvement from initial production lots in which F-35′s unit price was well above $100 million.

In our opinion, this steady decline in F-35′s price indicates growing program maturity. And, as the F-35 program shifts from low-rate initial production to full rate production over the next 3-4 years, we figure additional cost savings from improved manufacturing efficiencies will likely further lower F-35′s unit price.

Lower F-35 Prices Will Help Generate More Orders

The F-35 program constitutes about 18% of Lockheed’s revenue. So, success in this program is crucial for growth in the company’s overall results. And in our opinion, lower F-35 price is the single most important factor which will determine success of the F-35 program.

Production under Lockheed’s previous fighter jet program – F-22 Raptor – was terminated after just 195 production units due to high price of F-22 – about $150 million a unit – among other factors.Although F-35 program is different from the F-22 program as F-35 has many international orders while the U.S. government banned exports of F-22, we figure further declines in F-35′s price are essential for this fighter jet’s success. And it seems Lockheed is on the right track on the cost front. In July, the company announced its blueprint for affordability agreement with the DoD under which the company would bring down the price of F-35 to under $80 million a unit by 2019.We figure this is a huge boost for international buyers who will likely find it easier to make their purchase decisions with this improved foresight on prices.

Eventually, Lockheed expects to bring down the price of F-35 to the equivalent of today’s fourth-generation fighter jets. The company plans to achieve this price reduction through improved manufacturing efficiencies driven by higher production volume. Currently, F-35s are being produced under low-rate initial production, however, once testing and development is fully complete by around 2018, then the program will shift to full rate production improving manufacturing efficiencies. Another factor that will likely help reduce F-35′s price is declining employee costs for Lockheed. During the initial development years of F-35, Lockheed had raised a huge workforce of scientists, engineers and IT professionals. However, with significant development work over and complete development work expected to be over by around 2018, the company will likely reduce its development workforce. At the same time, the decline in development workforce is not expected to be fully offset by increase in the company’s production workforce. So, Lockheed will achieve cost savings from a reduced overall employee headcount as the F-35 program transitions from development phase to production phase in coming years.

Effectively, declining F-35 prices will propel international buyers and the U.S. government to place more orders for this fifth-generation fighter jet. It will also help address concerns of international buyers who in the past have expressed disappointment with F-35′s high procurement cost. Till now, ten countries apart from the U.S. have placed orders/commitments for the F-35. These countries include the U.K., Norway, Netherlands, Italy, Israel, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Japan and South Korea. From the point of view of U.S., more international orders will help save money for the government. This is so because with a larger production volume, overall development and fixed production costs will get spread over a larger number of fighter jets, lowering F-35′s unit price. Lower unit price in turn will help lower the government’s total procurement cost.

In all, if Lockheed is able to reduce F-35′s price to match that of today’s fourth generation fighter jets, then we figure the company should be able to generate its initially targeted 3,100 orders. This large production volume in turn will likely drive the company’s results through the next decade. So, declining F-35 prices bode well for Lockheed’s future.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Eventually, Lockheed expects to bring down the price of F-35 to the equivalent of today’s fourth-generation fighter jets"

Incredible. Export outlook seem bright.

Thoughts?
@SvenSvensonov @Nihonjin1051

Thank's for the share!!! My thoughts are the same as they have always been for any US military program. People complain about the cost, but rarely the capabilities, and once the cost drops people stop complaining and move on. The F-35 is a great aircraft with fantastic systems, and like the F/A-18, F-16, B-1 and all other US military projects before it, it has some problems that are slowly being sorted out. Sure, it's a bit overdue, but the main sticking point that people have is becoming less and less relevant as each day goes by. The cost is dropping, new orders are being placed and the F-35's future is looking very, very bright.
 
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MILESTONES: 1899–1913

The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902

After its defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain ceded its longstanding colony of the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. On February 4, 1899, just two days before the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, fighting broke out between American forces and Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo who sought independence rather than a change in colonial rulers. The ensuing Philippine-American War lasted three years and resulted in the death of over 4,200 American and over 20,000 Filipino combatants. As many as 200,000 Filipino civilians died from violence, famine, and disease.

philippines[1].jpg

“Battle of Manila Bay”

The decision by U.S. policymakers to annex the Philippines was not without domestic controversy. Americans who advocated annexation evinced a variety of motivations: desire for commercial opportunities in Asia, concern that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule, and fear that if the United States did not take control of the islands, another power (such as Germany or Japan) might do so. Meanwhile, American opposition to U.S. colonial rule of the Philippines came in many forms, ranging from those who thought it morally wrong for the United States to be engaged in colonialism, to those who feared that annexation might eventually permit the non-white Filipinos to have a role in American national government. Others were wholly unconcerned about the moral or racial implications of imperialism and sought only to oppose the policies of President William McKinley’s administration.

After the Spanish-American War, while the American public and politicians debated the annexation question, Filipino revolutionaries under Aguinaldo seized control of most of the Philippines’ main island of Luzon and proclaimed the establishment of the independent Philippine Republic. When it became clear that U.S. forces were intent on imposing American colonial control over the islands, the early clashes between the two sides in 1899 swelled into an all-out war. Americans tended to refer to the ensuing conflict as an “insurrection” rather than acknowledge the Filipinos’ contention that they were fighting to ward off a foreign invader.

aguinaldo[1].jpg

Emilio Aguinaldo

There were two phases to the Philippine-American War. The first phase, from February to November of 1899, was dominated by Aguinaldo’s ill-fated attempts to fight a conventional war against the better-trained and equipped American troops. The second phase was marked by the Filipinos’ shift to guerrilla-style warfare. It began in November of 1899, lasted through the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901 and into the spring of 1902, by which time most organized Filipino resistance had dissipated. President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed a general amnesty and declared the conflict over on July 4, 1902, although minor uprisings and insurrections against American rule periodically occurred in the years that followed.

The United States entered the conflict with undeniable military advantages that included a trained fighting force, a steady supply of military equipment, and control of the archipelago’s waterways. Meanwhile, the Filipino forces were hampered by their inability to gain any kind of outside support for their cause, chronic shortages of weapons and ammunition, and complications produced by the Philippines’ geographic complexity. Under these conditions, Aguinaldo’s attempt to fight a conventional war in the first few months of the conflict proved to be a fatal mistake; the Filipino army suffered severe losses in men and material before switching to the guerrilla tactics that might have been more effective if employed from the beginning of the conflict.


roosevelt-t[1].jpg

President Theodore Roosevelt


The war was brutal on both sides. U.S. forces at times burned villages, implemented civilian reconcentration policies, and employed torture on suspected guerrillas, while Filipino fighters also tortured captured soldiers and terrorized civilians who cooperated with American forces. Many civilians died during the conflict as a result of the fighting, cholera and malaria epidemics, and food shortages caused by several agricultural catastrophes.

Even as the fighting went on, the colonial government that the United States established in the Philippines in 1900 under future President William Howard Taft launched a pacification campaign that became known as the “policy of attraction.” Designed to win over key elites and other Filipinos who did not embrace Aguinaldo’s plans for the Philippines, this policy permitted a significant degree of self-government, introduced social reforms, and implemented plans for economic development. Over time, this program gained important Filipino adherents and undermined the revolutionaries’ popular appeal, which significantly aided the United States’ military effort to win the war.

In 1907, the Philippines convened its first elected assembly, and in 1916, the Jones Act promised the nation eventual independence. The archipelago became an autonomous commonwealth in 1935, and the U.S. granted independence in 1946.
 
View attachment 151078

MILESTONES: 1899–1913

The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902

After its defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain ceded its longstanding colony of the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. On February 4, 1899, just two days before the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, fighting broke out between American forces and Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo who sought independence rather than a change in colonial rulers. The ensuing Philippine-American War lasted three years and resulted in the death of over 4,200 American and over 20,000 Filipino combatants. As many as 200,000 Filipino civilians died from violence, famine, and disease.

View attachment 151079
“Battle of Manila Bay”

The decision by U.S. policymakers to annex the Philippines was not without domestic controversy. Americans who advocated annexation evinced a variety of motivations: desire for commercial opportunities in Asia, concern that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule, and fear that if the United States did not take control of the islands, another power (such as Germany or Japan) might do so. Meanwhile, American opposition to U.S. colonial rule of the Philippines came in many forms, ranging from those who thought it morally wrong for the United States to be engaged in colonialism, to those who feared that annexation might eventually permit the non-white Filipinos to have a role in American national government. Others were wholly unconcerned about the moral or racial implications of imperialism and sought only to oppose the policies of President William McKinley’s administration.

After the Spanish-American War, while the American public and politicians debated the annexation question, Filipino revolutionaries under Aguinaldo seized control of most of the Philippines’ main island of Luzon and proclaimed the establishment of the independent Philippine Republic. When it became clear that U.S. forces were intent on imposing American colonial control over the islands, the early clashes between the two sides in 1899 swelled into an all-out war. Americans tended to refer to the ensuing conflict as an “insurrection” rather than acknowledge the Filipinos’ contention that they were fighting to ward off a foreign invader.

View attachment 151080
Emilio Aguinaldo

There were two phases to the Philippine-American War. The first phase, from February to November of 1899, was dominated by Aguinaldo’s ill-fated attempts to fight a conventional war against the better-trained and equipped American troops. The second phase was marked by the Filipinos’ shift to guerrilla-style warfare. It began in November of 1899, lasted through the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901 and into the spring of 1902, by which time most organized Filipino resistance had dissipated. President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed a general amnesty and declared the conflict over on July 4, 1902, although minor uprisings and insurrections against American rule periodically occurred in the years that followed.

The United States entered the conflict with undeniable military advantages that included a trained fighting force, a steady supply of military equipment, and control of the archipelago’s waterways. Meanwhile, the Filipino forces were hampered by their inability to gain any kind of outside support for their cause, chronic shortages of weapons and ammunition, and complications produced by the Philippines’ geographic complexity. Under these conditions, Aguinaldo’s attempt to fight a conventional war in the first few months of the conflict proved to be a fatal mistake; the Filipino army suffered severe losses in men and material before switching to the guerrilla tactics that might have been more effective if employed from the beginning of the conflict.


View attachment 151081
President Theodore Roosevelt


The war was brutal on both sides. U.S. forces at times burned villages, implemented civilian reconcentration policies, and employed torture on suspected guerrillas, while Filipino fighters also tortured captured soldiers and terrorized civilians who cooperated with American forces. Many civilians died during the conflict as a result of the fighting, cholera and malaria epidemics, and food shortages caused by several agricultural catastrophes.

Even as the fighting went on, the colonial government that the United States established in the Philippines in 1900 under future President William Howard Taft launched a pacification campaign that became known as the “policy of attraction.” Designed to win over key elites and other Filipinos who did not embrace Aguinaldo’s plans for the Philippines, this policy permitted a significant degree of self-government, introduced social reforms, and implemented plans for economic development. Over time, this program gained important Filipino adherents and undermined the revolutionaries’ popular appeal, which significantly aided the United States’ military effort to win the war.

In 1907, the Philippines convened its first elected assembly, and in 1916, the Jones Act promised the nation eventual independence. The archipelago became an autonomous commonwealth in 1935, and the U.S. granted independence in 1946.


My honest opinion: the United States should have incorporated the Islands as it did with Hawaii and Puerto Rico.
 
A History of the US Marine Corp

On November 10, 1775, the Continental Congress passed a resolution stating that "two battalions of Marines be raised" for service as landing forces with the fleet. This established the Continental Marines and marked the birth of the United States Marine Corps. Serving on land and at sea, early Marines distinguished themselves in a number of important operations, including their first amphibious raid on foreign soil in the Bahamas in March 1776, under the command of the Corps' first commandant, Capt. Samuel Nicholas. The 1783 Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War and as the last of the Navy's ships were sold, the Continental Navy and Marines disbanded.

Following the formal re-establishment of the Marine Corps on July 11, 1798, Marines fought in conflicts with France, landed in Santo Domingo and conducted operations against the Barbary pirates along the "Shores of Tripoli."

Marines participated in numerous operations during the War of 1812, including the defense of Washington at Bladensburg, Md. They also fought alongside Andrew Jackson in the defeat of the British at New Orleans. Following the War of 1812, Marines protected American interests around the world in areas like the Caribbean, the Falkland Islands, Sumatra and off the coast of West Africa, and close to home in operations against the Seminole Indians in Florida.

During the Mexican War, Marines seized enemy seaports on both the Gulf and Pacific coasts. While landing parties of Marines and Sailors were seizing enemy ports, a battalion of Marines joined General Winfield Scott's army at Pueblo and marched and fought all the way to the "Halls of Montezuma," Mexico City.

Although most Marine Corps service during the Civil War was with the Navy, a battalion fought at Bull Run, and other units saw action with blockading squadrons at Cape Hatteras, New Orleans, Charleston and Fort Fisher. During the last third of the 19th century, Marines made numerous landings around the world, especially in the orient and the Caribbean.

Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, Marines fought during the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Rebellion in China, in Nicaragua, Panama, The Dominican Republic, Cuba, Mexico and Haiti.

In World War I, Marines distinguished themselves on the battlefields of France, as the 4th Marine Brigade earned the title of "Devil Dogs" for actions at Belleau Wood, Soissons, St. Michiel, Blanc Mont and the final Muesse-Argonne offensive. Marine aviation, which began in 1912, was used for the first time in a close-air support role during WWI. More than 309,000 Marines served in France and more than a third were killed or wounded in six months of intense fighting.

During the two decades before World War II, the Marine Corps began to more completely develop its doctrine and organization for amphibious warfare. The success of this effort was proven at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Tarawa, New Britain, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. By the war's end in 1945, the Corps had grown to include six divisions, five air wings and supporting troops, about 485,000 Marines. Nearly 87,000 Marines were killed or wounded during WWII and 82 earned the Medal of Honor.

As the Marine Corps attempted to modify the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) for operations in the nuclear age, the Corps began a decade long struggle to save the FMF and, in affect, its own existence. The Marine Corps had peaked in strength in 1945 at nearly half a million men in six divisions and five aircraft wings. The postwar Corps shrank to fit federal budgets rather than adjust realistically to fit the contingency needs of the Cold War era. Available manpower fell to 83,000 men in 1948 and dropped to just over 74,000 by the spring of 1950. About 50,000 men were assigned to the operating forces, but the FMF had only about 30,000 men in the two skeltal divisions and aircraft wings. Fewer than 12,000 Marines comprised FMFPac which included the 1st Division at Camp Pendleton and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) at El Toro, California. On the East Coast, the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and the 2d MAW at Cherry Point, making up FMFLant, numbered just under 16,000 Marines. At the outbreak of the Korean War, no Marine unit of any size was based or deployed in the Far East.

The Corps' supporting establishment was so small and its tasks for maintaining Marine Corps bases so extensive that many FMF troops spent more time housekeeping than training. The Marine Corps share of the federal budget was simply not enough to buy adequate manpower, training, or new equipment. The main threat to the nation was seen in inflation and unbalanced budgets rather than in the Soviet armed forces. On the eve of the Korean War, the FMF seemed doomed to fall to six battalion landing teams and twelve squadrons in 1950.

While Marine units were taking part in the post-war occupation of Japan and North China, studies at Quantico, Va., concentrated on attaining a "vertical envelopment" capability for the Corps through the use of helicopters. Landing at Inchon, Korea, in September 1950, Marines proved that the doctrine of amphibious assault was still viable and necessary. After the recapture of Seoul, the Marines advanced to the Chosin Reservoir only to see the Chinese Communists enter the war. In March, 1955, after five years of hard fighting, the last Marine ground forces were withdrawn. More than 25,000 Marines were killed or wounded during the Korean War.

The realities of the Korean War brought major changes in the basing and deployment of Marine Corps forces. The Corps strength ballooned to 192,000 men in June 1951, to 232,000 a year later and nearly 250,000 by June 1953. More than half the troops actually served in the operating forces, and the 1st Marine Division and 1st MAW, operationally employed in Korea, were kept up to strength. In the meantime, the 2d Marine Division and 2d MAW reached full strength for their European contingencies. In June 1951 Headquarters activated the 3d Marine Brigade, built around the 3d Marines at Camp Pendleton. In 1952 the brigade expanded to become the 3d Marine Division, and the same year the 3d MAW formed and occupied a new base in Miami. In another important reorganization, Headquarters in 1951 formed an organization known as Force Troops in order to provide the heavy artillery and other combat support and combat service support units necessary to sustain a Marine division in a land war.

The three-division/three-wing force structure decreed by the June 1952 passage of the Douglas-Mansfield Act, gave legislative support to the stated roles and missions of the Corps. The defense assumptions and programs of the Eisenhower Administration, however, left the Marine Corps role, and the corresponding basing and deployment strategy, less clearly defined. The emphasis on strategic forces over conventional forces, coupled with domestic economic implications of high defense costs and unbalanced federal budgets, challenged Marine Corps leaders of this period.

During the years 1953 to 1955, significant changes in the basing and deployment of Marine forces were realized. The 3d Marine Division deployed from Camp Pendleton to the Far East in the summer of 1953. Based in Japan, the Division followed regimental landings in Japan and Okinawa with a full-dress division landing exercise on Iwo Jima in March 1954. Significantly, the division began redeploying from Japan to Okinawa in 1955 and by February 1956 the Headquarters of the 3d Marine Division was moved to Okinawa where its remains today. Teamed with the 3d Division, the bulk of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, in Japan with headquarters at Atsugi, provided the air portion of a ready U.S. expeditionary force in the Far East.

The 1st Marine Division, meanwhile, which had been in Korea since the summer of 1950, was returned to Camp Pendleton in 1955. The 3d MAW during the same period moved from the East to the West Coast to support Pacific deployments.

In 1954, the 1st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force, built around a reinforced infantry regiment and a reinforced air group, was established at Hawaii in response to strategic requirements in the Pacific Theater. One reinforced regiment of the 3d Marine Division, together with elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were shifted from the Far East to Oahu to build the task force, later called the 1st Marine Brigade, to desired strength.

On the other side of the world, the commitment of a Marine battalion landing team to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, which began in 1948, continued except for brief periods in 1950-51 and 1955. During the Korean War, this practice was briefly interrupted due to wartime needs and during 1955 a reduction in amphibious shipping forced the termination of the rotating assignment for nearly a year. The deployment to the Sixth Fleet was designed to give the fleet commander a ready landing force in an area left unstable in the aftermath of World War II.

Events in the Far East from 1955 on likewise pointed out the need for a ready battalion of Marines afloat with the fleet, and from 1960 on, the 3d Marine Division maintained such a floating battalion under Commander Seventh Fleet.

In July 1958, a brigade-size force landed in Lebanon to restore order. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, a large amphibious force was assembled, but not landed. In April 1965, a brigade of Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to protect Americans and evacuate those who wished to leave.

The period from 1956-1960 witnessed the Corps' continuing development of a permanent base structure to support its force in readiness mission as well as the procurement of supplies and equipment for a wide range of contingencies. Bases were developed stateside for cold-weather training at Pickel Meadows, and for desert warfare and supporting arms training at Twentynine Palms, both in California. Budget cuts and resulting reduced end strengths, however, became formidable obstacles to meeting desired manning levels for FMF units. The reductions resulted in all three divisions being placed on reduced manning levels in 1957 and total Marine Corps strength fell below 200,000. Commandant of the Marine Corps Annual Reports for the years 1957 through 1960 reflect the reduced manning levels throughout the FMF, stating of the Divisions and Wings, "their capability for sustained combat has been seriously diminished." Reserve training also suffered during this period due to lack of funding.

By 1960, Marine Corps strength had fallen to 170,000 - down 30,000 in just three years. Over the same period the Marine Corps "green dollar" budget dropped from an already austere $942 million in FY1958 to $902 million in FY1961. Certain elements of the FMF had to be placed in cadre status. Perhaps just as damaging to the Corps' readiness posture was the low priority given in the "blue dollar" budget to the construction of amphibious shipping and particularly helicopter-carrying ships, which threatened the development of the vertical assault mission.

To improve readiness in the Pacific, a system was implemented to rotate infantry battalions between the 3d and 1st Divisions. Beginning in 1959, the "transplacement" program had battalions forming and training in the 1st Division, then deploying to Okinawa for fifteen months' service as a cohesive unit. The 2d Division began a similar program in 1960 which aided personnel stability and continuity, but as in the Pacific, it meant that several battalions could not be easily deployed in a crisis.

Nevertheless, in 1960 the Marine Corps began a five-year surge in its readiness that brought it to its highest level of peacetime effectiveness by the eve of the Vietnam War. The results of the Presidential election of 1960, coupled with internal redirection in the Corps, combined to form the highly favorable conditions for the Marine Corps to consolidate its amphibious force in readiness mission. The "Flexible Response" strategy of the new administration was ideally suited to the Marine Corps -- stressing conventional force improvements in manpower, equipment modernization, and strategic mobility. Marine Corps budgets grew, as did the strength ceilings, and just as significantly, improvements were realized in obtaining amphibious shipping. During this period, as well, Headquarters enhanced the readiness of the Reserve with the formation of the 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing in the Marine Corps Organized Reserve.

The combination of increased amphibious exercises and contingency deployments kept the tactical units of the FMF busy during the early 1960s. The size of the possible Marine role in Europe grew as Headquarters aimed at a larger role in NATO. In 1964 II MEF conducted Operation Steel Pike I, an amphibious exercise in Spanish waters that exceeded all earlier exercises in both the size of the Marine force deployed and the distance covered. An amphibious force of 60 ships carried 22,000 Marines and over 5,000 vehicles to the amphibious objective area.

While FMF Atlantic forces were being exercized in Europe, the Caribbean, and Africa, FMF Pacific units trained throughout the Far East, Hawaii, and California. In 1964 there were 45 landing exercises worldwide, and by the beginning of the major U.S. involvement in Vietnam, in 1965, the FMF, both regular and Reserve, was as effective a force as the Corps had ever fielded in peacetime.

The landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang in 1965 marked the beginning of a large-scale Marine involvement in Vietnam. By the summer of 1968, after the enemy's Tet Offensive, Marine Corps strength in Vietnam rose to about 85,000. The Marine withdrawal began in 1969 as the South Vietnamese began to assume a larger role in the fighting. The last ground forces left Vietnam by June 1971. The Vietnam War, the longest in the history of the Marine Corps, exacted a high cost, with more than 13,000 Marines killed and 88,000 wounded.

The Vietnam War proved to be the ultimate test of the Corps' basing and deployment decisions of the 1950s and early 1960s. From the March 1965 landing of Marine ground troops as Da Nang until the departure of the last large Marine units in June 1971, the war impacted drastically on all Marine forces within and outside the III Marine Amphibious Force. Peak Marine strength in Vietnam was reached in 1968 when more than 85,000 Marines were in Vietnam out of a Marine Corps numbering just over 300,000.

By 1972 the Marine Corps was once again down to 200,000 men and post-Vietnam redeployments had returned the Corps to the same basing and deployment patterns that had been in effect from 1960 to 1965. The 3d Marine Division was back on Okinawa and the 1st Marine Brigade had been reconstituted in Hawaii. The 1st Marine Division was back in Camp Pendleton and the 3d MAW remained at El Toro. On the East Coast, the 2d Marine Division and 2d MAW remained in North Carolina.

In July 1974, Marines evacuated U.S. citizens and foreign nationals during the unrest in Cyprus.

During the 1970s, the Marine Corps assumed an increasingly significant role in defending NATO's northern flank as amphibious units of the 2nd Marine Division participated in exercises throughout northern Europe.

As it moved into the 1970s, the Marine Corps once again faced close scrutiny of its missions, force structure, and personnel policies. The Marine Corps continued to emphasize global strategic flexibility and reemphasized the Corps' amphibious mission, developing the concept of "sea-basing," which aimed at greatly increasing sea-borne logistic support. At the same time, FMF Atlantic launched its first time NATO exercise outside the Mediterranean when a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) conducted maneuvers in Norway and northern Germany in 1975. These exercises, which became annual and expanded to brigade size, and their underlying mission of preparing to assist in the defense of NATO's Northern flank, represented the Marine Corps single most significant change in deployment patterns until the end of the decade.

The revolution in Iran, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and hostages there, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 gave impetus to a Department of Defense plan to improve U.S. non-NATO military capability. The Rapid Deployment Force was created in response to the realization of the range of contingencies short of general war that faced the United States. In particular, the CONUS-based joint task force, with designated forces from all four services, was created with responsibility for operational planning, training, and exercises for designated rapid deployment forces worldwide with the initial focus on Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean. The new force widened the FMF's force in readiness role without compromising its amphibious mission.

The Corps played a key role in the development of the Rapid Deployment Force, a multi-service organization created to ensure a flexible, timely military response around the world. The Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS) Program was instituted in late 1979 with the goal of providing three Marine amphibious brigades ready for airlift to potential crisis areas where they would unite previously positioned ships carrying their equipment and supplies. The MPS concept gave the Marine Corps and the U.S. a significant new dimension in mobility, sustainability, and the global response.

An increasing number of terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies around the world took place in the 1980s. In August 1982, Marines landed at Beirut, Lebanon, as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. For the next 19 months these units faced the hazards of their mission with courage and professionalism. In October 1983, Marines took part in the highly successful, short-notice intervention in Grenada.

In December 1989, Marines responded to instability in Central America during Operation Just Cause in Panama to protect American lives and restore democracy.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to the largest movement of Marine forces since World War II. Between August 1990 and January 1991, 24 infantry battalions, 40 squadrons (more than 92,000 Marines) deployed to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield. The air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began Jan. 16, 1991, followed by the main overland attack Feb. 24 when the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions breached the Iraqi defense lines and stormed into occupied Kuwait. Meanwhile, the threat from the sea in the form of Marine Expeditionary Brigades held 50,000 Iraqis in check along the Kuwait coast. By the morning of Feb. 28, 100 hours after the ground war began, the Iraqi army was no longer a threat.

In December 1992, Marines landed in Somalia marking the beginning of a two-year humanitarian relief operation there. In another part of the world, land-and carrier-based Marine Corps fighter-attack squadrons and electronic warfare aircraft supported Operation Deny Flight in the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. During April 1994, Marines once again demonstrated their ability to protect American citizens in remote parts of the world when a Marine task force evacuated 142 U.S. citizens from Rwanda in response to civil unrest in that country.

Closer to home, Marines went ashore in September 1994 at Cape Haitian, Haiti, as part of the U.S. force participating in the restoration of democracy in that country. At the same time, Marines were actively engaged in providing assistance to America's counter-drug effort, battling wildfires in the western United States, and aiding in flood and hurricane relief operations.

The Marine Corps continued its tradition of innovation to meet the challenges of a new century. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory was created in 1995 to evaluate change, assess the impact of new technologies on warfighting, and expedite the introduction of new capabilities into the operating forces of the Marine Corps. Exercises such as “Hunter Warrior,” and “Urban Warrior” were designed to explore future tactical concepts, and to examine facets of military operations in urban environments.

During the late 1990's, Marine Corps units deployed to several African nations, including Liberia, the Central African Republic, Zaire, and Eritrea, in order to provide security and assist in the evacuation of American citizens during periods of political and civil instability in those nations.

Humanitarian and disaster relief operations were also conducted by Marines during 1998 in Kenya, and in the Central American nations of Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In 1999, Marine units deployed to Kosovo in support of Operation Allied Force. Soon after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., Marine units deployed to the Arabian Sea and in November set up a forward operating base in southern Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

In 2002, the Marine Corps continued to play a key role in the Global War on Terrorism. Marines operated in diverse locations, from Afghanistan, to the Arabian Gulf, to the Horn of Africa and the Philippines. Early 2003 saw the largest deployment of Marine forces since the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 when 76,000 Marines deployed to the Central Command area for combat operations against Iraq.

The I Marine Expeditionary Force, including Task Force Tarawa and the United Kingdom’s 1st Armored Division, were the first conventional ground units to enter Iraq in late March as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft from the 3d Marine Air Wing provided continuous close air and assault support to Marine and coalition units as they drove deeper into Iraq. On the ground, Marines from I MEF moved nearly 400 miles from the Kuwait border to Baghdad and Tikrit, Iraq, and eliminated the last organized resistance by Iraqi military forces. Although I MEF would transition to stabilization and security operations and then redeploy to the U.S. by late September, I MEF began preparing for a return to Iraq in early 2004. The adaptability and reliability of Marine forces continued to be highlighted around the world from the Horn of Africa to Haiti and to the Philippines.

Across the U.S., Marine units from both coasts fought and contained wildfires, and also supported hurricane relief efforts in various parts of the country. In December, 2004, a tsunami struck numerous nations in the Indian Ocean region killing more than 150,000 and causing enormous devastation. Marine units from III MEF were immediately deployed to Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka to assist in disaster relief operations.

In early 2005, the II Marine Expeditionary Force replaced I MEF in Iraq as the primary focus began to shift to partnership operations with the Iraqi Security Forces. Marine units continued to provide air and ground support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Closer to home, the flexibility and responsiveness of the Navy/Marine team was exhibited during September and October when nearly 3000 Marines and sailors conducted search and rescue, humanitarian relief, and disaster recovery operations in Louisiana and Mississippi in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Iraqi security forces assumed responsibility for security of Al Anbar Province on o1 September 2008. The Marine Corps main area of operation, Al Anbar was the 11th of Iraq’s 18 provinces to come under provincial Iraqi control. Marines remained deployed to the area to provide support and training to the Iraqi security forces. The last of the 3,000 Marines stationed in Fallujah, Iraq, were pulled out of the city center on 14 November 2008 as part of the U.S. plan to hand security operations for the city over to Iraqi security forces. On 03 December 2008 Marines with RCT-5 finalized the demilitarization of the Haditha Dam located along the Euphrates River in Iraq. Security for the area was turned over to the Iraqi government.

Security in Afghanistan has worsened significantly in the 3 years after 2006, impeding both U.S. and international partners' efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. The security situation, including the overall increase in insurgent attacks from 2005 to 2008, is the result of a variety of factors including a resurgence of the Taliban in the south, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a continuing and thriving illicit drug trade in the south, and the threat emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. In discussing his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2009, the President noted his goals were to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

By 2012 nearly 20,000 Marines were conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) remained the top priority. Marines reported seeing measurable progress along all lines of operation in the Helmand Province: security, reintegration, rule of law, governance, development, education and health. Over the previous year, violence and the level of collateral damage had decreased significantly. Throughout 2012, Marines in Regional Command-Southwest [RC(SW)] continued transitioning to partnership training missions as they transfered even greater security responsibility to the maturing Afghan National Security Forces; police and army forces in Helmand province have progressed in training and capability.
 
F-35C Joint Strike Fighter first at-sea test off SD a success
San Diego Source > News > F-35C Joint Strike Fighter first at-sea test off SD a success

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The F-35C Lightning II carrier variant Joint Strike Fighter conducted its first carrier-based night flight operations aboard the USS Nimitz Nov. 13. LCDR Ted "Dutch" Dyckman piloted aircraft CF-03 for the inaugural night flight, taking off at 6:01 pm. Dyckman conducted a series of planned touch and goes before making an arrested landing at 6:40 pm. Photo by U.S. Navy

Ten days into a two-week developmental test onboard the USS Nimitz off San Diego, the Navy’s new F-35 carrier variant Joint Strike Fighter jet is performing well, successfully completing its first catapult launches and arrested landings on and off the aircraft carrier.

Test pilot Lt. Cmdr. Ted “Dutch” Dyckman piloted the inaugural night flight Thursday, taking off at 6:01 p.m., conducting a series of planned touch-and-goes and making an arrested landing at 6:40 p.m. Even before the night operations were completed, testing was ahead of schedule with 95 percent of the scenarios run.

“What we have remaining is we’re just going to do a night evaluation, so night taxi as well as takeoff and landings, we have catapult launches in cross-wind conditions … and then we have some additional high wind over deck recoveries — 40-45 knot recoveries,” said Cmdr. Shawn Kern, director of test and evaluation for F-35 naval variants.

In the roughly 100 catapult launches the four test pilots and Nimitz crew have conducted in this first phase onboard a carrier — DT-II and DT-III will follow in the next two years — the JSF has successfully caught the wire 102 times, with 214 planned touch-and-go landings.

It technically has not boltered — landed past the fourth and final wire — though it would have one time, had the pilot been attempting to land instead of touch and go. The jet missed the fourth wire, although its hook wasn’t out.

“We’re out here conducting the Super Bowl of flight tests,” said Cmdr. Tony “Brick” Wilson, the Navy test pilot who landed the F-35C for the first time Nov. 3.

“We came out here with a well laid-out plan, and we’re executing that plan. The machine was mature and ready to come out here. Just like any other developmental test, we are learning things, but everything that we’re learning is extremely minor.”

Wilson wouldn’t comment on what the minor issues were.

This first phase of testing is focused on how the JSF hooks up to the catapult, launches, lands and integrates into the carrier environment in terms of taxiing around the flight deck and maneuvering to the hangar bay.

During the second test phase, expected in 2015, weapons will be added, but only within the jet’s bomb bay.

The third test phase, set for 2016, will gather data on the jet’s performance with weapons systems both in the bomb bay and under the wings. Any effect of the weapons’ added weight — which includes a 26 mm cannon, two air-to-air missiles and two 2,000-pound guided bombs — will be evaluated in later tests.

Thomas Briggs, air vehicle engineering department head at NAVAIR, said very little mission systems testing was conducted on the Nimitz, and only to gauge the interaction with the ship.

“We did a little bit of weapons testing just to load the weapons on, using the shipboard equipment in the shipboard environment,” Briggs said. “We did that; it worked fine.”


One of the bright spots in testing has been the success of the jet’s automated landing technology software within the flight control computers, called Delta Flight Path.

The software alleviates much of the multitasking pilots have to do when landing a 30,000-pound aircraft with a 35-foot wingspan in exactly the right spot to catch a wire less than 2 inches around, all on a moving ship sometimes plowing ahead at 30 knots.

“Delta Flight Path is revolutionary — it’s going to pay huge dividends for the Navy,” Wilson said. “It’s going to make landing on a boat a routine task, and right now landing on the boat is anything but a routine task. That is why the Navy invests so much money in training its pilots. … I can’t speak to whether or not we’re going to see any cost savings … but it does make landing on the boat routine. And fun.”

Landing signal officer Chris Karapostolus said he’s noticed the F-35C’s steadiness throughout the testing, even in strong and adverse wind conditions, as well as its ability to make corrections slightly faster than legacy aircraft, due to Delta Flight Path and the automation of the control laws.


One second may not sound like much, but when an entire landing occurs in just 15 to 18 seconds, it’s a big deal.

“A lot of the corrections the pilots have been able to make are something we would not typically see, or make us very uncomfortable on legacy platforms,” Karapostolus said.

“Pilots make very aggressive corrections, and the rate at which they’ll make those corrections is generally more than we’ll see out of legacy platforms. It all goes back to the control laws of how this aircraft is designed.

“If you have a Rhino aircraft, or any other legacy platform … a deviation might take you two or three seconds to get back to that center line on glide slope. This aircraft can do it a little bit quicker.”

During this testing phase, successful landings have been done manually, with Delta Flight Path, and in approach power compensator mode.

While the two Joint Strike Fighters on the Nimitz have been performing well, the program itself has come under fire almost since its inception because of its high cost. At about $400 billion, it’s the most expensive weapons system ever — and there have been problems with its engine and software.

The cost per carrier-variant bird is now down to $130 million, although Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT), which built the aircraft, projects that will drop to $87 million when in full production.

The Navy has been ordering about two F-35Cs per year, with initial operating capability expected in 2018. At that point, the first complement of F-35C’s will be 10 jets in one squadron, and one squadron per aircraft carrier. As more come online, decisions will be made about increasing either squadron size or squadrons per ship to replace FA-18C Hornets.


“It’s been very positive feedback,” Kern said of the test results. “Obviously seeing the F-35 operate successfully in and around the carrier environment tells a positive story about the level of systems maturity we’ve got in the platform right now.

“I will say also the F-35C is envisioned in the Navy’s strategy as a replacement for the FA-18C, and obviously we’ve been well positioned with the FA-18 E and F to ensure we’ve got adequate combat capability in our fleet for quite some time.

“So the need for replacement on the Navy side is just starting to come to a head, as we see overhead costs for FA-18C and service-like limits for FA-18C starting to be reached.”
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"the JSF has successfully caught the wire 102 times, with 214 planned touch-and-go landings."

Seems like there is more good news about the F-35 every day
:usflag:
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Navy Upgrades Ship-Based Electronic Warfare
Navy Upgrades Ship-Based Electronic Warfare | DoD Buzz

The Navy is upgrading its suite of electronic warfare technology currently on surface ships across the fleet in order to keep pace with emerging threats, service officials said.

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AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare Suite

The Navy has configured an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, the USS Bainbridge, with what’s called Block 2 of its SLQ-32 Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program, or SEWIP – a suite of upgraded electronic warfare sensors able to detect a wider range of threat signals than the existing system.


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Block 2 SEWIP is an upgraded version of the existing AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system designed to provide early detection, signal analysis and threat warnings against anti-ship missiles and other threats, Navy officials said.


The USS Bainbridge is currently involved in operational testing as the Navy acquires its first 24 Block 2 SEWIP units. The technology is being produced by Lockheed Martin in a deal that could be worth up to $147 million, said Joe Ottaviano, SEWIP program director, Lockheed Martin.

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USS Bainbridge (DDG-96)

“SEWIP is the Navy’s continued push to keep electronic warfare excellence ahead of the threat. It is an incremental set of upgrades to the SLQ-32 which was designed in the late 70s and deployed in the 80s. It gives the Navy the ability to upgrade and outpace the threat. It provides the ability to quickly upgrade processing as new threats come online and become more complex without overhauling the antenna,” Ottaviano said.

The Block 2 SEWIP advancements include upgrades to the antenna and digital receiver, Ottaviano said. Block 2 upgrades also include the addition of new software engineered to ensure the system is equipped to recognize new, emerging threat signals.

“It provides the digital architecture so it can quickly upgrade and provide additional capability as threats increase in capability,” Ottaviano added.


The Navy plans to configure as many as 140 surface ships with Block 2 SEWIP technology, including carriers, cruisers, destroyers and amphibs, among others.

The hardware to the system consists of above and below deck components including a display screen and processing technology, he added.

The hardware may be configured differently depending upon the structure of a given ship, Ottaviano explained. For example, the EW antenna on the Navy’s new destroyer, the DDG 1000, is conformed to align with the ship’s hull.

Following SEWIP Block 2, the Navy plans to develop and acquire a Block 3 SEWIP electronic attack technology, Navy and Lockheed officials said. In addition to “listening” or passive electromagnetic detection, Block 3 will include the ability to transmit signals and potentially jam or disrupt enemy signals.

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Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP)
The US Navy -- Fact File: Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP)

Description
The AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare (EW) system, introduced in the late 1970s, performs the mission of early detection, signal analysis, threat warning and protection from anti-ship missiles. It is an integrated shipboard combat system that provides a full suite of EW capabilities that can be managed and controlled manually from a console or semi-manually/auto by the host combat management system. In 2013, there were 258 systems, in 7 variants, deployed worldwide: 147 systems on US Navy ships (CVN, DDG, CG, FFG, LCC, LHA, LHD, LPD and LSD), 17 systems on US Coast Guard Cutters, and 94 Foreign Military Sales Transfers in 12 countries. The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) is an evolutionary development block upgrade program for the AN/SLQ-32(V) EW system offering incremental enhancements in capability. There are currently three established block upgrades and a fourth is planned.

Features
SEWIP Block 1 provides enhanced EW capabilities to existing and new ship combat systems to improve anti-ship missile defense, counter targeting and counter surveillance capabilities. The upgrade addresses obsolescence mitigation through introduction of Electronic Surveillance Enhancements (ESE) and Improved Control and Display (ICAD) as well as incorporation of adjunct receivers for special signal intercept including Specific Emitter ID (SEI) and High Gain/High Sensitivity (HGHS). The SEI and HGHS capability provides improved battlefield situational awareness. The SEWIP Block 1 program is designated as an ACAT II program. Block 1A, Block 1B1, and Block 1B2 are in Full Rate Production. Block 1B3 (HGHS) is in Low Rate Initial Production.


SEWIP Block 2 will provide enhanced Electronic Support (ES) capability by means of an upgraded ES antenna, ES receiver and an open combat system interface for the AN/SLQ-32. These upgrades are necessary in order to pace the threat and improve detection and accuracy capabilities of the AN/SLQ-32. The SEWIP Block 2 program is designated as an ACAT II program. Milestone C was achieved in January 2013 with approval to begin Low Rate Initial Production.


SEWIP Block 3 will provide Electronic Attack (EA) capability improvements required for the AN/SLQ-32(V) system to keep pace with the threat. This block upgrade will provide a common EA capability to all surface combatants outfitted with the active variant of the AN/SLQ-32. SEWIP Block 3 development will leverage technology developed under the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Integrated Topside (InTop) Science and Technology (S&T) effort. The SEWIP Block 3 program is designated as an ACAT II program and is currently in the Technology Development Phase.


SEWIP Block 4 is a future planned upgrade that will provide advanced electro-optic and infrared capabilities to the AN/SLQ-32(V) system.

Background
SEWIP was established as an ACAT II program in July 2002 after cancellation of Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS). Through incremental upgrades using an evolutionary acquisition strategy, the AN/SLQ-32(V) is being modernized to mitigate obsolescence and delivery advanced ES and EA capability to the Fleet.


 
U.S. Navy sees decision soon on follow-on for LCS
U.S. Navy sees decision soon on follow-on for LCS warship| Reuters

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is expected to make a decision soon on how to make a new class of smaller warships more lethal and survivable, the Navy's top admiral said on Saturday.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert expected a quick decision based on a recommendation submitted by the Navy, but gave no details.

"The Secretary is very close to a decision," Greenert told Reuters in an interview at a defense conference at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

"It was our endeavor to provide an option which would provide a more lethal ship, one that is more survivable, with capabilities that can be backfit, and as much as feasible, not interrupt production."

He expected the decision to be announced in the near future, along with a description of the new plan.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel ordered a pause in the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and asked for a review of options before the Navy ordered the last 20 ships in the 52-ship program. At the time, he expressed concerns about the survivability and firepower of the current designs.

Lockheed Martin Corp and Australia's Austal are building two separate designs of the new warships. The companies are waiting for a decision on the new "Small Surface Combatant," which could affect funding for future ships.

Navy officials have said they expect the decision to inform their fiscal 2016 budget request and an associated five-year spending plan, which will be submitted to Congress in February.

The new class of LCS ships will expand the Navy's ability to hunt mines, submarines and conduct surface warfare closer to shore than larger destroyers.

The USS Fort Worth, the third LCS ship built and the second in the Freedom-class built by Lockheed, is leaving on a 16-month deployment to Asia on Monday.

By 2018, the Navy expects to have four of the ships in the region, operating mainly out of Singapore.



 
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