Conditions define the level of required support/assistance. It's reasonable to assume that we define our need (or lack therein) by the conditions imposed.
Evidently, we don't need the services at the risk of being unable to account for these "reimbursements". If audits of billed services is onerous and/or overtly insulting, the services should be denied to America. It is then to America to ameliorate the requirements and beg foregiveness or accept the absence of this support. It's clear that audits indicate we question the services actually rendered and are prepared to do without if need be.
We would be fine with it. Audit it but the turn around would be something that both sides would want to fix. As a taxpayer, you should be concerned about where your money goes and we should be concerned if this money is worth it for Pakistan to do what its being asked to do. That would be a fair arrangement for both sides.
blain2, MastanKhan's derisive comments aside, infantry platoons of the U.S. Army are living daily with pashtus in the mountains along the border. That's how they're posted. You might be surprised how well we understand the tribal networks in the area, the taliban, and A.Q. (including the Uzbeks). I frankly doubt that your troops live remotely like ours-with the villagers. We understand tribal considerations of the pashtu.
You might think that your living with Pashtuns daily gives you a better insight than most (and it does), but not more than Pakistani formations operating in the areas. A vast number of Pakistani troops and even officers come from these same areas. Even the Mehsud tribe has considerable number of troops and officers in the Army. So while its good that you are operating in the area and living amongst Pashtuns of the area (we actually were the first ones to introduce the US Special Forces to this area starting off in 1954-1964), its still not the same as being one of them. Its like me suggesting that I live in Texas so I understand Texans. I may never. The reason this fight is so difficult for the Pakistani troops is for the above reasons. There are family, tribal and blood linkages between the Pakistani operators and the tribals. Thus Pakistani government prefers diplomacy over military operations. As I have said before, unlike the US and ISAF detachments in the area, Pakistan has to live with these tribals for eternity. We can't burn all of our bridges because some in the US believe that all these folks need to be sorted out.
We also understand that Pakistani citizens reflect the interest of their gov't in two critical ways. Support of pan-pashtu tribal sentiment is a concern of the Pakistani government-taliban or no taliban. Pakistan has always felt comfortable deflecting these pan-pashtu aspirations westward into Afghanistan. Second, this deflection coupled with covert assistance by the ISI created the latest incarnation of this manifest goal- the taliban.
S2, the interests of Pakistan and the US converged during the time of Taliban's inception. You may want to read "Taliban" by Ahmed Rashid to understand what it was that both Pakistan and US were trying to do with the Taliban in Afghanistan. To lay the blame on ISI's door for the creation of Taliban is in turn a misunderstanding of yours and of most outsiders.
What's clear to me on this board is the following-
blain2, you're a lucid and reasonable person-most of the time however this comment by you reveals much. Karzai, of course, is pashtu and President. Numero uno. From what I can determine here, he's simply not the RIGHT pashtu president. Is this correct? It seems that the pristine standards of leadership ascribed to by the members of this board have found Karzai's tribal lineage tainted by hints of opium.
Imagine that! Yup. None of that elsewhere among the Pashtus, I'm sure. Let's face it. Removing the taliban from Afghanistan's government has caused much gnashing of teeth among members here. Perhaps you too. There's no way, then, that any present leader of Afghanistan would have the support of many Pakistani citizens.
S2, its not support for Taliban. Pakistan would do well without such obscurantist mindsets. I shiver at the thought of these semi-literate people coming to me and telling me how to mind my business. Nobody in Pakistan wants this. However the issue is that Karzai has a very limited Pashtun base in the Afghan government. This does not represent Afghanistan's Pashtun demographics and this sidelining of Pashtuns in Afghanistan poses problems for Pakistan's own Pashtun population (concerns somewhat similar to how Turkey, Syria and Iraqis have about Kurds). You ignore the Pashtuns for long and pretty soon they will start asking for a country of their own (which is not in the interest of either Pakistan or Afghanistan).
The Brits are clumsy fools. Their actions recently in both Kandahar and Musa Qala are both pathetic and laughable. The taliban "governor" of Musa Qala couldn't deliver any of his "forces" on the ascribed day of liberation/battle. Nope. He stayed back with twenty or so guys and awaited the all-clear. I'm not impressed.
Kandahar was worse. Semple and Patterson exceeded their briefs in an amazingly naive "rogue" operation to replicate the al-Anbar "Awakening". Look. The idea is fine. Most understand that separating the pashtu from the taliban IS the name of the game. But it's not a "touchy-feely" nice-nice. Few understand al-Anbar and these diplo-fools didn't bother to ask any U.S. army expert who did. We have a few actually. H.R. McMaster kicked things off in al-Anbar at Tal Afar with his 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.
It involved a lot-of everything. Heavy-duty combat operations that whacked the snot of A.Q. groups and any/every bad-*** who raised a rifle. The HAND OF GOD descended like a fist. Once security was grabbed, it had to be held. Aid HAD to arrive like magic, be dynamic, and IMPRESS that we were serious.
Hiring locals who might have been your enemy an hour ago sounds really NICE and SENSITIVE too. But there's a quid pro quo. Retina-scans and finger-prints so if you get rounded up next week in a fire-fight, we'll know that you're playing both sides. This holds tribal leaders accountable for the men they offer as CLCs (concerned local citizens).
Sorry. I digress. Patterson and Semple did none of this. Nor did they try to position the Afghan gov't for success. I was stunned and hardly impressed by the naivete behind their attempt.
Excellent points and maybe something that needs to be replicated in FATA. The bottom line is things that you have mentiond, understanding the dynamics of the area, backing up military operations (which cannot be pushed on in isolation) with key things such as what you have stated "Aid HAD to arrive like magic, be dynamic, and IMPRESS that we were serious."
So I am not suggesting that all pressure be lifted. Military pressure as in Anbar was applied in phases. Beyond that a lot of public affairs work needs to be done.
blain2, I sadly believe that most here wish for a pashtu-dominated Afghan gov't under the thumb of Pakistan. Most here aren't seriously interested in an inclusive electoral process arising in Afghanistan. Should Pashtus attain dominance at the expense of the rest of Afghanistan, that would be a positive outcome.
Yes Pakistani security apparatus has been infatuated with the idea of a Pakistani dominated Afghanistan led by Pashtuns for the past many years and this has actually hurt us. The hope is that the new government will look at things a bit differently. The new provincial government in NWFP (as much as they hate this name) will be more open to an alternate arrangement with Afghanistan (Karzai and the ANP click really well) with ANP being on the other side of the pole than the Taliban in NWFP. So I think things actually look promising.
Oddly then, it's the Pakistanis who have little concern about taliban/pashtu separation. Where pashtu dominance of Afghanistan expressed through taliban rule as before, most here would happily accede. Why, I'm unsure. Clearly, Pakistan found that it's control of the taliban government in Afghanistan was tenuous at best once before and embarassing as an open association.
I disagree. I think after the first spell of the Taliban rule, nobody in the Pakistani mainstream wants these folks back in power. They have had a massively negative impact on Pakistan's own internal security and after spilling blood in Swat and FATA fighting the same folks, the Army would not be in any mood to push for a similar type of proxy authority as the Taliban were for Pakistan (and in turn the US initially).
Still, I suppose that's better than the N.A. I've learned since coming here that the KEY problem with them is India's patronage. That explains much to this simple westerner.
Few here wish for Pakistan to be in flames, particularly at the hands of A.Q. or Mehsud's taliban. The gap, however, of popularity ascends upward dramatically when discussing the AFGHAN taliban and Hekmatyr, Omar, Gulbuddin. Pakistanis see a favorable difference, oddly enough.
NA has to get over its own insecurities from the days of Masood (Panjsheri) with regards to Pakistan. Pakistan did make some mistakes but the other side needs to realize that their annoying of Pakistan will also yield no positive results. Eventually both the NA and Pakistan have to re-build the lost trust. That is the only way something agreeable will emerge.
Overall great points from your perspective. I think after a long time I have seen some indepth views of an outsider with regards to the situation in the tribal and Afghan areas.
Also, excuse the nasty formatting of the post. Will clean it up later.