U.S. India Track II

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U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation in South Asia: A Track II Dialogue

New Delhi, September 24-25, 2008

by Dr. Zachary S. Davis and Ms. Colleen E. Garcia

Introduction
The U.S.-India Track II Dialogue brought together American and Indian national security experts and scholars to discuss future bilateral strategic cooperation between the two countries. Building on previous collaboration between the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) and Indian institutions, the meeting was jointly hosted by the CCC and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Leading American and Indian experts convened for two days of private, closed-door sessions under Chatham House rules to exchange candid views on the U.S.-India strategic partnership, regional security, and nuclear issues.

The CCC delegation also met with members of key policy-shaping think tanks in New Delhi for candid discussions on high priority issues for U.S.-India strategic cooperation. The CCC held meetings at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, the Delhi Policy Group, the Centre for Policy Research, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and Jawaharlal Nehru University. The delegation briefed the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on the strategic dialogue and provided a read-out to the Defense Attaché at the United States Embassy. Following the conference, Dr. Zachary Davis of the CCC and officials from DTRA provided briefings to officials at the United States Pacific Command headquarters.

Throughout the conference, India’s growing global influence provided a backdrop for discussion of the U.S.-India strategic partnership, regional issues, and nuclear concerns.

The U.S.-India Strategic Partnership
The U.S.-India strategic partnership is stronger now than it has ever been. A respected scholar and former U.S. government official noted that, “we are at the end of an eight-year presidential term which is unprecedented in quantity and depth of engagement.” He observed that the partnership has come a long way since 2001, but that it remains fragile with many critical issues to address.

Looking to the future of the U.S.-India bilateral partnership, discussants from both countries expressed uncertainty about the future of the partnership, the handling of disagreements, and attitudes toward growing security threats. This uncertainty, a former Indian Ambassador to the United States noted, will need to be confronted by a common agenda after new leaders are elected in both countries. He asserted that this agenda should be global in scope, and should comprise areas of little cooperation up to this point in the U.S.-India relationship. It is unclear, however, which objectives should be included in this new common vision.

Indian conference participants expressed a desire for the partnership to include greater information sharing, more high technology transfers, and relaxed export controls. A representative of Indian defense companies asked how deep India’s security relationship with the United States can be without major technology transfers. American speakers addressed these concerns and agreed that a greater level of sharing is needed. It was made clear, though, that there will always be limits to what the United States can share with other countries, limits that every country including India sets.

In confronting security threats, there was a push from the Indian side for the United States government to lead on nuclear initiatives, counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts, and regional security matters. Speaking to American participants, an Indian Ambassador stated, “ India has strategic ambiguity. India is an in-between state in transition. You have to empower India.” U.S. participants suggested instead that there be a shared effort on the nuclear regime, as well as on counterterrorism and counterproliferation. On shaping the nonproliferation regime, an American professor commented, “It is not enough to say that America and Russia need to take the lead; India needs to come up with interesting solutions in order to move forward. Moving forward will not happen if the U.S. acts alone.” American scholars also asserted the need for India’s government to take the lead on regional matters that threaten Indian security. In areas like the Gulf, for example, a representative from an American think tank emphasized that India has its own interests it can pursue. He further stated that the United States could perhaps take on an assistance role, but that India is already in a position to act. Discussants raised Indian participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as an opportunity for independent and collaborative efforts. Taking action on regional issues, the Americans argued, would increase India’s global standing and role as a leader.

There were several areas of disagreement between the American and Indian participants: the perceived restrictiveness of U.S. export controls; the usefulness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; U.S. relations with Pakistan; utility of India’s Cold Start doctrine; the lack of space cooperation; and the Chinese threat to Indian security. However, there was consensus on both sides to work through disagreements in order to foster and build upon the wider strategic partnership. An Indian participant observed, “There is a bright future for India and the United States, but maturity will be needed in the future on disagreements.” A former U.S. official and South Asia expert agreed, arguing, “It is important that disagreements between our two countries do not de-rail relations.” Programs such as PSI provide the opportunity for India and the United States to move forward with their strategic cooperation in a multilateral context. Joint initiatives like PSI can set the foundation for a stronger bilateral relationship.

Regional Issues
Several panels focused on South Asian regional issues and their significance for expanding U.S.-India relations. The group identified areas of convergence that may be ripe for increased U.S.-India cooperation, as well as areas of divergence that may require careful management to avoid misunderstandings.

Iraq
In talking about Iraq, Indian scholars emphasized that they view this as primarily a “ U.S. problem.” A Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research articulated this view by stressing the need for America to fix its own “botched up policies” in Iraq, because India’s interests would not be served by associating with the United States there. The Indians uniformly expressed no desire to play any role in Iraq, preferring instead to discuss possible involvement in other regional concerns.

Iran
Iran was another area of divergence for the American and Indian participants. Indian scholars expressed a strong inclination to maintain good relations with Iran, despite obvious U.S. concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and Tehran’s negative influences throughout the Middle East. An Indian diplomat, who had recently served in Iran, asserted that it is important to understand the role of Islam in India, because India has the second largest Muslim population, and an enormous Shia population. This is a concern the United States doesn’t share. India is also worried about Iran because, as Singh pointed out, it is a problem that won’t go away and India gets the spillover. An Indian Ambassador then brought up the possibility of energy cooperation between India and Iran. So, while the United States government seeks to isolate Iran, the Indian government wants greater communication and ties there for its own reasons. The discussion on Iran highlighted the primacy of India’s own interests and represented a significant disagreement between the United States and Indian participants. Nevertheless, participants expressed interest in the possibility of an India-Iran Track II dialogue, the outcomes of which would be of interest to India’s U.S. partners.

Afghanistan
Afghanistan, on the other hand, represented an important area of possible convergence at the conference. Here, there proved to be further room for discussion, and perhaps, an opportunity for cooperation. Indian scholars and officials expressed a willingness to increase their role in Afghanistan, while American scholars are looking for more partners to help bring stability to the country. However, there was uncertainty about who should lead on the subject of India’s involvement in Afghanistan, and some disagreement on the possible negative response by Pakistanis to increased Indian presence on Pakistan’s western border. Indian participants, while expressing a desire to be seen as a global leader, preferred that the United States government provide justification for Indian assistance. The American participants, on the other hand, encouraged Indians to articulate their own justification on such regional issues if they want to be seen as a global player. An American participant suggested that the Indian government use its good relationship with Iran to promote peace and stability for Afghanistan. A National Defense University representative noted that India could talk directly to Pakistan about Afghanistan, rather than going through the United States. A former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan briefed on the status of India-Pakistan direct talks and assured the group that India is willing and able to work with any Pakistan government. He expressed optimism about bilateral relations with Pakistan. Several Indian participants stressed the importance of the reemergence of democracy in Pakistan, although there were questions about the relationship between the new civilian leaders and the Pakistan Army and intelligence services. There was general agreement on the utility of a clear strategy with concrete objectives to tackle the conflict in Afghanistan.

China
India is preoccupied by the rise of China’s military power and fearful because China’s intentions are unknown. An Indian Ambassador stated, “ China is considered a threat by our community, but you won’t catch anyone in the government saying that.” Regarding India’s intentions, an Indian participant argued that, “The trouble for India is an opaque China.” An Indian military official commented in his presentation that, “It would be advantageous for India to enter into nuclear talks with its two nuclear neighbors.” A former Indian Ambassador followed up by saying, “We [ India] need to start talking with the Chinese about nuclear issues if we are going to ultimately develop some CBMs.” An Indian government representative brought in the United States, asking, “What kind of role does the U.S. want to play, or what kind of advice do they want to give on Indo-China relations?” In discussions at the Center for Land War Studies, Indian military analysts went much further in asserting China’s aggressive intentions vis a vis India, including deployments of nuclear missiles in Tibet and on Chinese submarines. Several participants stressed the importance of deploying Agni 3 IRBMs capable of reaching Beijing as a means to deter Chinese aggression. U.S. participants inquired about the underlying analysis of China’s nuclear posture, but were not provided with detailed responses. In every discussion, Indian participants conveyed their desire to be considered equal to China in global affairs and regional issues.

Pakistan
Indian participants reiterated their desire for “de-hyphenation” with Pakistan. This theme, while not new, remains a major issue for the Indian government. They do not want to be defined by their relationship with Pakistan. For this reason, Indian scholars repeatedly downplayed India’s nuclear relationship with Pakistan. In response, the American panelists emphasized that despite India’s desire for de-hyphenation with Pakistan, India cannot escape its relationship with Pakistan. The threat of another war and the risk of nuclear escalation cannot be, and should not be, ignored. An American scholar said, “When you have interests in both countries who are at the brink of going to war frequently, it may not be hyphenation, but it’s something.” India’s own interests, regional security, and global concerns about the risk of nuclear war require serious efforts from Indian experts and a willingness to discuss those efforts with partners such as the United States. Ignoring or downplaying the nuclear issue would be detrimental to India’s interests. The American scholar further noted, “Your inability to cooperate with Pakistan in an area where you might have interest is in a sense your problem.” It is a problem that the United States cannot solve for India.

Despite this need to remove the mental link between India and Pakistan, however, the Indian panelists were eager to discuss Pakistan’s problems, including the possibility of Pakistan as a failed state. There was much discussion about the “eastward movement of India’s border with the Taliban,” and Pakistan’s inability to stop the spread of militant Islam from the Pak-Afghan border areas. There was also discussion about potential consequences for nuclear security if Pakistan became a failed state. Several participants noted the risk of a fracture within the Pakistani military ranks and the possibility of a loss of control over nuclear assets. A highly decorated Indian police officer expressed the view that terrorists are seeking access to Pakistan’s nuclear assets and asked the United States for advice and support in preparing for such a contingency. A former Commander of India’s Border Security Force similarly articulated strong interest in meeting with U.S. government officials to discuss border protection and incident response issues. Several Indian analysts reiterated a familiar request for information about any U.S. plans to secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets in a crisis. U.S. participants dismissed the notion. Nevertheless, Indian participants were especially interested in hearing American ideas for solutions in Pakistan. The U.S. participants responded that Indian innovation is needed as well. Acknowledging the need for solutions in Pakistan, a retired Indian Ambassador asked if there were positive forces at work in Pakistan that could at least be assisted in some way by the United States, India or anyone else. There was general agreement that support for the new democratic government provided the best opportunity to promote the development of civil institutions in Pakistan. Overall, there was growing recognition that it is in India’s interest for Pakistan to succeed.


Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons
The India Track II dialogue took place during the final passage of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Deal. These events, and first-hand involvement of some of the nuclear deal participants in the Track II dialogue, led to lively discussions about the significance and future implementation of the agreement and its impact on the global nuclear regime.

Beyond the powerful symbolism of the U.S.-India agreement, there remained much uncertainty about India’s status as a global nuclear power. A primary architect of the deal highlighted India’s need to decide what it wanted as a nuclear country. He stated that India has yet to tackle the difficult questions of deterrence and nonproliferation. Indian participants expressed continuing commitment to disarmament, yet all the while they maintained a desire to be respected as a serious nuclear player. Indian scholars want to expand India’s nuclear forces to deter China, yet still profess adherence to a minimum nuclear capability. They call for transparency, but maintain opacity for their own program. This inherent contradiction led a former Indian Ambassador to refer to India as a “vegetarian nuclear power.” He commented, “We have nuclear weapons, but we’re not comfortable with it. We need to learn how to deal with our new place and power.”

By contrast, in our discussions at the Center for Land War Studies (CLAWS), Indian experts revealed new steps underway to train Indian army and air force officers in nuclear issues, including frequent collaborations and personnel exchanges with the Bhabba Atomic Research Center, the home base for key aspects of India’s nuclear weapon program. A CLAWS representative asserted that the expanding training involves the safety and security of nuclear weapons and the command and control over the weapons.

While India is still sorting out its deterrence posture and remains committed to developing a “nuclear triad,” Indian participants continued to place the burden of disarmament on Russia and the United States. However, the Indian government must be consulted on any plan to reduce global nuclear arsenals. An Indian government representative, for example, argued that, “Any discussion on the zero option needs to involve the principal players of nuclear power.” He went on to say that “How India will be treated will determine in large part India’s involvement in these discussions.” A special dinner in honor of India’s most highly respected strategic thinker, K. Subrahmanyam, provided an opportunity to revisit the many reasons for U.S.-India antagonism over nuclear policy. Two American participants recalled their duties on U.S. delegations delivering sanctions to their stony-faced Indian counterparts over the years.

Regarding nonproliferation, the Indian scholars and experts stressed that the current regime was an inadequate foundational basis for the future nuclear world order. In particular, Indian panelists criticized the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Talking about the CTBT, Ambassador Ghose noted that the treaty is impossible to sign unless the United States and China ratify it first. In response, an American scholar commented that, “ India has had the luxury of not getting its thinking in order because ratification [of the CTBT] hasn’t happened.” However, he thought that ether presidential candidate would likely ratify the CTBT, so the Indian government needed to start thinking seriously about the treaty.

A majority of the Indian officials and scholars believe the NPT is broken beyond repair and should be abandoned. A former Indian government official declared, “The NPT is in trouble, whatever we see from the outside.” Others expressed the view that the NPT had “plateaued” and should no longer be viewed as the basis for world nuclear order. Several U.S. speakers countered that the civilian nuclear deal was supposed to strengthen the NPT regime, not weaken it. Any new agreements should increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. India should not undermine the NPT regime. An American participant warned, “It is in India’s interest not to have the NPT fall apart…It is in your interest not to let this treaty fall apart, and time is short. We are entering a new review process unprepared.” Indian leaders should direct their attention and energy to strengthening the regime, not tearing it down. Indian participants expressed familiar views regarding remaining export controls on some nuclear items that would not be removed even with the passage of the U.S.-India agreement for cooperation.

Terrorism
The meetings occurred in the wake of a spate of terrorist bombings in New Delhi carried out by domestic Islamic militants. A highly regarded police officer was mortally wounded in a shootout with the terrorists in downtown New Delhi. The realization that the terrorists were homegrown, and not linked to Pakistan’s intelligence service, came as somewhat of a shock to many Indian observers. The presence and growing militancy of these indigenous and essentially middle class terrorists is changing the way Indians think about Al Qaeda and its sympathizers. These events led to a spirited discussion of the threat of WMD terrorism, which the Indian government takes very seriously.

The group found much common ground in discussions of WMD terrorism. An Indian participant provided an overview of India’s assessment of Islamic militants interest in WMD, and concluded with the view that Al Qaeda and its offshoots are indeed in search of weapons and fissile material. He commented that, “There should be no doubt that if a terrorist group got hold of the bomb, they would use it.” The group was in broad agreement about the need to secure nuclear weapons and materials before they get into the hands of terrorists and flagged this area as one conducive to greater U.S.-India cooperation. An American professor observed, “The U.S. has stepped up its multilateral policies to combat the WMD problem and CT initiatives post-9/11. However, given India’s status as a rising power, she has the opportunity to be the kind of state that can generate global public goods. India has appeared to be reluctant to take an active role in such processes.” He went on to state that, “not only could India play a greater role in global discussions of CT and controlling WMD, it should also be looking to foster new forms of global cooperation and lead the way in combating the severe problems we face today.” The group agreed on the potential for increased collaboration on this topic, including border controls, incident response, first responder preparedness, and other issues of Homeland Security.

Concluding Thoughts and Opportunities for Further Discussion
The September Track II Strategic Dialogue built on several years of investment by the Center for Contemporary Conflict and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to establish strong partnerships with leading South Asian individuals and institutions. This meeting, however, was different from any previous interactions, according to key participants. The American and Indian governments have turned a corner, and have left behind many issues that restrained the realization of a true partnership. Much of the old rhetoric is gone. While the psychological leap has been made, however, much work must be done to put meat on the bones of the new strategic skeleton. Additional big-ticket deliverables are not needed and could be a distraction.

What is needed is to establish habits of cooperation on important shared objectives. Military-to-military cooperation is currently fulfilling the bulk of this task. An important next step in this regard will be for the Indian military to participate in multilateral regional military activities, such as joining PSI. Sharing best practices on Homeland Security matters could be another venue for practical cooperation. However, there seemed to be a lack of Indian interest or capability to take the lead in any important global or regional issue such as Global Warming or assisting efforts to repair the global economic system. Shared interests in nonproliferation and counterterrorism provide opportunities for expanding cooperation as well. India’s role and contributions to the global nuclear order remain uncertain, and will require further discussion to find common ground.

The U.S.-India partnership can facilitate the advancement of shared interests in selected regional issues, including perhaps the stabilization of Afghanistan and easing pressures on Pakistan. However, India’s role in Afghanistan will have to be carefully managed to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing Pakistan’s fear of encirclement. Furthermore, disagreements over Iraq and Iran will have to be controlled, and may test the strength and durability of the strategic partnership. Looking to China, Indian fears of the Chinese threat could potentially be assuaged by the transparency that further discussions could provide. Bilateral talks between Indian and China, or even trilateral talks that bring in the United States, could prove useful in fulfilling this aim. There are already efforts under way for a China Track II project that may touch upon this possibility.

The DTRA-sponsored Track II Dialogue in India provided an invaluable and timely discussion on the future of the U.S.-India strategic partnership, South Asian regional concerns, the rise of terrorism, and India’s status as a nuclear power. It is crucial to build upon these meetings with further candid India Track II dialogues in order to improve India’s relations with its regional and global partners, as well as to further policymaking through top scholars and national security experts.