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Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
It was almost to the day a year ago that the then chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen called the Haqqani terrorist network the ISIs veritable arm and that Pakistan was exporting violence to Afghanistan. Mullen drew flak from the softies in the US administration for his blunt remarks and the Pakistanis too were up in arms. Speaking to the NPR, he later clarified his comment, saying, Im not asserting that the Pak military or the ISI has complete control over the Haqqanis. But the Haqqanis run that safe haven. Theyre also a home to al Qaeda in that safe haven. And I am losing American soldiers. The Haqqanis are killing American soldiers. And from that perspective, I think its got to be addressed, which is the reason I spoke to it. But he insisted that he would not change a word of the testimony he gave to the US Senate Armed Services Committee and maintained that he phrased it the way I wanted it to be phrased.
And now on September 7, 2012, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released a press statement that stated: Today, I have sent a report to Congress saying that the Haqqani Network meets the statutory criteria of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO)...The consequences of these designations include a prohibition against knowingly providing material support or resources to, or engaging in other transactions with, the Haqqani Network, and the freezing of all property and interests in property of the organisation that are in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of US persons.
While there might be no immediate implications of the Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani terrorist network being declared an FTO for the US Pak-Afghan policy and for Pakistan, it could have extremely serious consequences for the latter as there is a lot of history between these terrorists and Pakistan. So far, the Pakistani response has been restrained or even subdued. Pakistan tried to appear cool to the decision by terming it an internal US matter, ostensibly because the Haqqanis are not Pakistani nationals. There are also reports that despite some behind-the-scenes resistance to this anticipated US sanction, the Pakistanis, who were intimated in advance, opted to keep their public reaction low key. Some others speculate that the Pakistani security establishment had indicated that it would finally go after the Haqqanis headquartered in Miram Shah, North Waziristan Agency (NWA) a stones throw away from the Pakistani military positions.
The problem may be that Sirajuddin Haqqani does not exactly have his savings account at the Bank of Americas Main Street, USA branch, the ailing Jalaluddin is not drawing a social security payment from the US exchequer and Badruddin Haqqanis mortal remains were not repatriated to Hometown, USA. The Haqqani network and its leaders very much remain an internal Pakistani venture, with a large portion of their financial and terror transactions originating in that country. A recent report by Peter Gretchen for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point states that besides receiving largesse from donors, the Haqqanis and their front men run illicit as well as legitimate business enterprises, including transport, real estate and construction in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East.
While the US had initially been soft, and even derelict in dealing with the Haqqani network, the Pakistanis have always considered it as their preeminent asset for whom they wanted a military victory and a prized political position in the post-USA Afghanistan. Indeed, when the talk of an operation against the Haqqanis started back in 2010, a Pakistani official had noted: If you cant beat your enemy, befriend him, and then added that the cornerstone of security policy here (in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) is to attack militants close to al Qaeda, but spare armed syndicates that protect Pakistans flanks. It was this thought process and ambition vis-à-vis Afghanistan that led to the Pakistanis actually protecting the Haqqanis flank at multiple levels. Over two years, if not more, in the making, the purported NWA operation is probably going to be the most well-planned and delayed military action in the history of modern warfare. That is if it is ever executed.
Many in Pakistan believe that the FTO designation has to do with the upcoming US presidential elections. Nothing can be further from the truth. Perhaps 99 percent of the US electorate has no clue who the Haqqanis are. However, the designation does end the longstanding tug of war between various branches of the US government. The much-overrated late Richard Holbrooke had collected peaceniks by the dozen who kept on dragging their feet on how to take on the Haqqanis and their backers. The Holbrooke relics kept dreaming against all objective realities that they can somehow have Pakistan bring the Haqqanis to the peace talks. With realists like Secretary Defence Leon Panetta and CIA head David Petraeus, who have consistently called a spade a spade, finally prevailing with full support of the US Congress, a definite clarity has emerged in the US approach to tackle the Haqqani menace. The FTO designation gives the much needed coherence to a fractured US strategy against the terrorists that have not just unleashed havoc in the heart of Kabul umpteen times but are effectively the centre-piece that holds together the northeastern and southeastern prongs of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.
Many observers have noted that several members and enforcers of the Haqqani network roam free in Pakistan. Despite what many in Pakistan and some at the State Department say, under the new designation, such business will now be considered anything but usual. In an ideal case scenario, Pakistan now has the option to make a clean break with the terrorist albatross it has been hell bent on keeping around its neck.
With a Congress-backed new consensus emerging within the US against the Haqqani network, the FTO designation might not just be a symbolic twisting of the ISIs veritable arm. Much more can follow if Pakistan does not move to dissociate itself from the killers holed up in NWA. What is being construed as a benign move by several Pakistanis can set the stage for their country being sanctioned as a state sponsor of terror, if more of the so-called spectacular attacks on the US and Afghan interests originate from North Waziristan.
It was almost to the day a year ago that the then chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen called the Haqqani terrorist network the ISIs veritable arm and that Pakistan was exporting violence to Afghanistan. Mullen drew flak from the softies in the US administration for his blunt remarks and the Pakistanis too were up in arms. Speaking to the NPR, he later clarified his comment, saying, Im not asserting that the Pak military or the ISI has complete control over the Haqqanis. But the Haqqanis run that safe haven. Theyre also a home to al Qaeda in that safe haven. And I am losing American soldiers. The Haqqanis are killing American soldiers. And from that perspective, I think its got to be addressed, which is the reason I spoke to it. But he insisted that he would not change a word of the testimony he gave to the US Senate Armed Services Committee and maintained that he phrased it the way I wanted it to be phrased.
And now on September 7, 2012, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton released a press statement that stated: Today, I have sent a report to Congress saying that the Haqqani Network meets the statutory criteria of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO)...The consequences of these designations include a prohibition against knowingly providing material support or resources to, or engaging in other transactions with, the Haqqani Network, and the freezing of all property and interests in property of the organisation that are in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of US persons.
While there might be no immediate implications of the Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani terrorist network being declared an FTO for the US Pak-Afghan policy and for Pakistan, it could have extremely serious consequences for the latter as there is a lot of history between these terrorists and Pakistan. So far, the Pakistani response has been restrained or even subdued. Pakistan tried to appear cool to the decision by terming it an internal US matter, ostensibly because the Haqqanis are not Pakistani nationals. There are also reports that despite some behind-the-scenes resistance to this anticipated US sanction, the Pakistanis, who were intimated in advance, opted to keep their public reaction low key. Some others speculate that the Pakistani security establishment had indicated that it would finally go after the Haqqanis headquartered in Miram Shah, North Waziristan Agency (NWA) a stones throw away from the Pakistani military positions.
The problem may be that Sirajuddin Haqqani does not exactly have his savings account at the Bank of Americas Main Street, USA branch, the ailing Jalaluddin is not drawing a social security payment from the US exchequer and Badruddin Haqqanis mortal remains were not repatriated to Hometown, USA. The Haqqani network and its leaders very much remain an internal Pakistani venture, with a large portion of their financial and terror transactions originating in that country. A recent report by Peter Gretchen for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point states that besides receiving largesse from donors, the Haqqanis and their front men run illicit as well as legitimate business enterprises, including transport, real estate and construction in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East.
While the US had initially been soft, and even derelict in dealing with the Haqqani network, the Pakistanis have always considered it as their preeminent asset for whom they wanted a military victory and a prized political position in the post-USA Afghanistan. Indeed, when the talk of an operation against the Haqqanis started back in 2010, a Pakistani official had noted: If you cant beat your enemy, befriend him, and then added that the cornerstone of security policy here (in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) is to attack militants close to al Qaeda, but spare armed syndicates that protect Pakistans flanks. It was this thought process and ambition vis-à-vis Afghanistan that led to the Pakistanis actually protecting the Haqqanis flank at multiple levels. Over two years, if not more, in the making, the purported NWA operation is probably going to be the most well-planned and delayed military action in the history of modern warfare. That is if it is ever executed.
Many in Pakistan believe that the FTO designation has to do with the upcoming US presidential elections. Nothing can be further from the truth. Perhaps 99 percent of the US electorate has no clue who the Haqqanis are. However, the designation does end the longstanding tug of war between various branches of the US government. The much-overrated late Richard Holbrooke had collected peaceniks by the dozen who kept on dragging their feet on how to take on the Haqqanis and their backers. The Holbrooke relics kept dreaming against all objective realities that they can somehow have Pakistan bring the Haqqanis to the peace talks. With realists like Secretary Defence Leon Panetta and CIA head David Petraeus, who have consistently called a spade a spade, finally prevailing with full support of the US Congress, a definite clarity has emerged in the US approach to tackle the Haqqani menace. The FTO designation gives the much needed coherence to a fractured US strategy against the terrorists that have not just unleashed havoc in the heart of Kabul umpteen times but are effectively the centre-piece that holds together the northeastern and southeastern prongs of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.
Many observers have noted that several members and enforcers of the Haqqani network roam free in Pakistan. Despite what many in Pakistan and some at the State Department say, under the new designation, such business will now be considered anything but usual. In an ideal case scenario, Pakistan now has the option to make a clean break with the terrorist albatross it has been hell bent on keeping around its neck.
With a Congress-backed new consensus emerging within the US against the Haqqani network, the FTO designation might not just be a symbolic twisting of the ISIs veritable arm. Much more can follow if Pakistan does not move to dissociate itself from the killers holed up in NWA. What is being construed as a benign move by several Pakistanis can set the stage for their country being sanctioned as a state sponsor of terror, if more of the so-called spectacular attacks on the US and Afghan interests originate from North Waziristan.