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Turkey's F-35 Decision Driven by Technology Transfer Concerns
By Francesco F. Milan | 23 Feb 2012
On Jan. 5, Turkeys Defense Industry Executive Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, authorized the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries to open negotiations with Lockheed Martin for the purchase of two F-35 multi-role combat fighters by 2015. Though Turkey's defense minister today clarified that Turkey still intends to follow through with its intention to acquire 100 F-35s, the small initial purchase represents yet another setback for the troubled program.* It was followed by Britains declaration in February that it will postpone making any formal commitment to the F-35 until 2015. Australia, too, is currently reconsidering plans to buy 12 F-35s, and the F-35s structural problems, which emerged during recent flight tests, led the U.S. Department of Defense to issue a technical report in December 2011 that recommended slowing down U.S. acquisitions as well.
But Ankaras decision to move slowly on its F-35 purchase is not just driven by the projects technical problems.* It also has to do with the United States uneasiness in sharing technology with Turkey, a problem dating back to the 1980s, when Turkey purchased its first F-16s. Turkeys main interest is in acquiring software source codes for weapon systems, which the U.S. Congress has so far refused to share. In particular, Turkey wants control over the aircrafts identification friend or foe (IFF) system in order to offer more flexibility with regard to how its fleet identifies foreign air force jets. The default setting of the original U.S. software for Turkeys F-16 fleet, for instance, identified Israeli air force jets as exclusively friendly. To overcome the problem, ASELSAN, one of Turkeys leading defense companies, developed a new IFF system, which was finalized in September 2011 and is now operational on Turkeys F-16 fleet. The new system allows Turkish fighters to bypass the original software restrictions, allowing Turkish pilots to determine whether to recognize Israeli fighters as either friendly or hostile.
In other words, the F-35 decision and the broader technology-sharing issue must be seen in the context of Turkeys military credibility vis-à-vis Israel and the rest of the Middle East. Since the Gaza flotilla incident in 2010, the diplomatic distance between Israel and Turkey has grown exponentially, and relations have not shown any sign of improving. In December 2011, the Israeli government vetoed a deal that Israeli defense firm Elbit Systems signed with Turkey for the provision of reconnaissance and radar systems. That decision came just a few months after Erdogan had declared that he wanted all military and defense ties with Israel suspended. Tensions have grown even more since January, when Israel signed an agreement on defense cooperation with Cyprus -- much to Turkeys displeasure, given ongoing friction over the exploitation of offshore gas reserves in disputed territorial waters.
Turkey now seems determined to contest Israeli participation in any of Ankaras formal alliance and diplomatic networks, as demonstrated last week when it opposed NATOs proposal to involve an Israeli warship in patrol duties on the Mediterranean Sea. Given both sides hardening positions, the U.S. Congress decision to keep the F-35s source codes out of Turkeys hands responds to a clear logic, not only of safeguarding U.S. military technology, but also of avoiding further escalation of tensions between two key U.S. allies in the Middle East.
But the U.S. is not Turkeys only option for multi-role combat fighters. Over the past decade, Turkey has been in contact with several defense firms to determine which multi-role aircraft will be acquired for the modernization of the Turkish air force. The upgrades are part of a 20-year, $160 billion military modernization program that Turkey announced in 1998. Turkeys current fighting and bombing capabilities consist of 213 Lockheed Martin F-16s and 127 McDonnell Douglas F-4s. The jet fighters are a critical asset for Turkeys armed forces, as both F-4s and F-16s are routinely employed in sorties over northern Iraq to target the safe havens of terrorist group Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK).
The main alternative to the F-35 is the Eurofighter Typhoon, produced by a consortium of three European companies -- Italys Alenia Aeronautica, the U.K.s BAE Systems and the multinational EADS. Other competing projects are currently at different stages of development, including the Russian-made Sukhoi T-50, which should be in service by 2016.
The F-35s limited coercive utility against Israel seems to have prompted Turkey to look elsewhere, and members of the Eurofighter consortium have been quick in trying to come up with an alternative offer. In early February, the Italian ambassador to Turkey presented a proposal for the design of a Turkish fighter based on Eurofighter technology, which, according to the ambassador, would be fully shared with Turkey. Details of the proposal were not made public, but the upcoming visit of Italys defense minister to Turkey, due in late February, should clarify the outlines of any potential deal.
The Typhoon could be a good match, given the Eurofighter consortiums eagerness to find new potential buyers and Turkeys desire for a viable alternative to the F-35, if only to use as leverage in any subsequent contract negotiations.* Whichever fighter Turkey ultimately opts for, the decision will in all likelihood be driven by the growing importance that Ankara is placing on safeguarding its military credibility as an increasingly pivotal country in the Middle East.* Clearly technology transfers, which have become a priority for emerging powers such as Brazil and India, figure prominently in Turkeys plans in this regard as well.
*Editor's note: The original version of this article incorrectly stated that Turkey had reduced the number of F-35s it planned to purchase. Although Turkey has authorized the opening of contract negotiations for just two F-35s, it still intends to purchase 100 in total, according to a clarification issued by the Turkish defense minister that appeared after this story was published.
Francesco F. Milan is a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant at the Department of War Studies, King's College London.
Photo: An F-35B Lightning II makes the first vertical landing on a flight deck at sea aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, Oct. 3, 2011. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Natasha R. Chalk).
WPR Article | Turkey's F-35 Decision Driven by Technology Transfer Concerns
---------- Post added at 07:33 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:31 PM ----------
If it means that we will Fund and Boost the TF-X Project more i'll Be happy to Drop the F35
Rather have more TF-X
By Francesco F. Milan | 23 Feb 2012
On Jan. 5, Turkeys Defense Industry Executive Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, authorized the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries to open negotiations with Lockheed Martin for the purchase of two F-35 multi-role combat fighters by 2015. Though Turkey's defense minister today clarified that Turkey still intends to follow through with its intention to acquire 100 F-35s, the small initial purchase represents yet another setback for the troubled program.* It was followed by Britains declaration in February that it will postpone making any formal commitment to the F-35 until 2015. Australia, too, is currently reconsidering plans to buy 12 F-35s, and the F-35s structural problems, which emerged during recent flight tests, led the U.S. Department of Defense to issue a technical report in December 2011 that recommended slowing down U.S. acquisitions as well.
But Ankaras decision to move slowly on its F-35 purchase is not just driven by the projects technical problems.* It also has to do with the United States uneasiness in sharing technology with Turkey, a problem dating back to the 1980s, when Turkey purchased its first F-16s. Turkeys main interest is in acquiring software source codes for weapon systems, which the U.S. Congress has so far refused to share. In particular, Turkey wants control over the aircrafts identification friend or foe (IFF) system in order to offer more flexibility with regard to how its fleet identifies foreign air force jets. The default setting of the original U.S. software for Turkeys F-16 fleet, for instance, identified Israeli air force jets as exclusively friendly. To overcome the problem, ASELSAN, one of Turkeys leading defense companies, developed a new IFF system, which was finalized in September 2011 and is now operational on Turkeys F-16 fleet. The new system allows Turkish fighters to bypass the original software restrictions, allowing Turkish pilots to determine whether to recognize Israeli fighters as either friendly or hostile.
In other words, the F-35 decision and the broader technology-sharing issue must be seen in the context of Turkeys military credibility vis-à-vis Israel and the rest of the Middle East. Since the Gaza flotilla incident in 2010, the diplomatic distance between Israel and Turkey has grown exponentially, and relations have not shown any sign of improving. In December 2011, the Israeli government vetoed a deal that Israeli defense firm Elbit Systems signed with Turkey for the provision of reconnaissance and radar systems. That decision came just a few months after Erdogan had declared that he wanted all military and defense ties with Israel suspended. Tensions have grown even more since January, when Israel signed an agreement on defense cooperation with Cyprus -- much to Turkeys displeasure, given ongoing friction over the exploitation of offshore gas reserves in disputed territorial waters.
Turkey now seems determined to contest Israeli participation in any of Ankaras formal alliance and diplomatic networks, as demonstrated last week when it opposed NATOs proposal to involve an Israeli warship in patrol duties on the Mediterranean Sea. Given both sides hardening positions, the U.S. Congress decision to keep the F-35s source codes out of Turkeys hands responds to a clear logic, not only of safeguarding U.S. military technology, but also of avoiding further escalation of tensions between two key U.S. allies in the Middle East.
But the U.S. is not Turkeys only option for multi-role combat fighters. Over the past decade, Turkey has been in contact with several defense firms to determine which multi-role aircraft will be acquired for the modernization of the Turkish air force. The upgrades are part of a 20-year, $160 billion military modernization program that Turkey announced in 1998. Turkeys current fighting and bombing capabilities consist of 213 Lockheed Martin F-16s and 127 McDonnell Douglas F-4s. The jet fighters are a critical asset for Turkeys armed forces, as both F-4s and F-16s are routinely employed in sorties over northern Iraq to target the safe havens of terrorist group Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK).
The main alternative to the F-35 is the Eurofighter Typhoon, produced by a consortium of three European companies -- Italys Alenia Aeronautica, the U.K.s BAE Systems and the multinational EADS. Other competing projects are currently at different stages of development, including the Russian-made Sukhoi T-50, which should be in service by 2016.
The F-35s limited coercive utility against Israel seems to have prompted Turkey to look elsewhere, and members of the Eurofighter consortium have been quick in trying to come up with an alternative offer. In early February, the Italian ambassador to Turkey presented a proposal for the design of a Turkish fighter based on Eurofighter technology, which, according to the ambassador, would be fully shared with Turkey. Details of the proposal were not made public, but the upcoming visit of Italys defense minister to Turkey, due in late February, should clarify the outlines of any potential deal.
The Typhoon could be a good match, given the Eurofighter consortiums eagerness to find new potential buyers and Turkeys desire for a viable alternative to the F-35, if only to use as leverage in any subsequent contract negotiations.* Whichever fighter Turkey ultimately opts for, the decision will in all likelihood be driven by the growing importance that Ankara is placing on safeguarding its military credibility as an increasingly pivotal country in the Middle East.* Clearly technology transfers, which have become a priority for emerging powers such as Brazil and India, figure prominently in Turkeys plans in this regard as well.
*Editor's note: The original version of this article incorrectly stated that Turkey had reduced the number of F-35s it planned to purchase. Although Turkey has authorized the opening of contract negotiations for just two F-35s, it still intends to purchase 100 in total, according to a clarification issued by the Turkish defense minister that appeared after this story was published.
Francesco F. Milan is a doctoral candidate and teaching assistant at the Department of War Studies, King's College London.
Photo: An F-35B Lightning II makes the first vertical landing on a flight deck at sea aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, Oct. 3, 2011. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Natasha R. Chalk).
WPR Article | Turkey's F-35 Decision Driven by Technology Transfer Concerns
---------- Post added at 07:33 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:31 PM ----------
If it means that we will Fund and Boost the TF-X Project more i'll Be happy to Drop the F35
Rather have more TF-X
