atatwolf
BANNED
- Joined
- Jul 15, 2012
- Messages
- 6,965
- Reaction score
- -19
- Country
- Location
Stratfor has long discussed Turkey as an integral part of U.S. strategy in Eurasia. Straddling two continents, Turkey has influence spanning the Black Sea region and the Middle East, meaning it is a highly strategic ally in both counterbalancing Russia and managing the conflicts consuming the Islamic world. We view Turkey as the southern anchor of the Intermarium, a network of allies including Lithuania, Poland and Romania that occupy Russia's European rim and have a collective interest in working with a Western hegemon to keep Russia at bay.
But the map only tells part of the story. The Turkey of today is not the Turkey of the 1950s. Back then, a vulnerable Turkey was ready to duck under a U.S. security umbrella stamped with the Truman Doctrine while embracing the Rousseauian mindset of keeping religion separate from statecraft. Today, Turkey understands it has a role to play in the region, but it lacks the consensus and coherence to deploy its power in a meaningful way. Compounding the situation are the results of Turkey's June 7 election, which stripped the ruling Justice and Development Party of its majority in a highly polarized electorate.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Turkey will slide into a familiar and dangerous period of political instability reminiscent of the 1970s, when inconclusive elections and stalemated coalitions characterized the country's politics. Political violence of various stripes developed amid weak economic conditions, culminating in a military coup in 1980. Already, left-wing radical movements like the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front have re-emerged in Turkey's charged political atmosphere, and a series of attacks punctuated the days leading up to the election. As the Kurdish peace process stalls, the state will also need to cope with the threat of Kurdish separatist attacks while trying to prevent jihadist activity from spilling across the border. As for the ruling party itself, the perception that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a growing liability will cause splits in the party, leading to an impasse from the center as Erdogan alternatives, including former Turkish President Abdullah Gul, are reassessed.
Domestic issues that consume Turkey's attention will naturally curb the country's ability to project its power abroad. Turkey has displayed its displeasure with Russia's actions in Ukraine and takes part in Black Sea exercises every now and then. But Ankara is also keeping some distance from the leaders of the Intermarium and NATO to avoid a more serious confrontation with Moscow. Turkey is trying to exhibit its neutrality and benefit from its position as a transit state to host pipeline proposals like Turkish Stream, which is sourced by Russia, and Southern Corridor routes, which are designed to exclude Russia. As Turkey's internal vulnerabilities grow, its cautious approach toward Russia will likely endure.
The Middle East is a much messier problem for Turkey. The prospects for Turkey's Justice and Development Party to make real headway in the Kurdish peace process and keep a lid on the insurgency are extremely low. And with active insurgencies in both Syria and Iraq, Kurdish militant traffic in the region will remain high. A return to a more nationalist stance on the Kurdish problem would translate into more military action in Kurdish areas with the potential to spill over Turkey's borders.
During the past year, Turkey has also become more proactive in backing Islamist rebel fighters in northern Syria who have made strides in their fight for Aleppo. Sustaining that fight fits the ruling party's ideological goal of toppling the Syrian government and bringing a friendly Islamist government to power. Without having to maintain a contradictory strategy of negotiating peace with Kurds in Turkey while dealing with Kurds militarily abroad, Turkey's military focus in the Syrian and Iraqi borderland could sharpen and allow for more cross-border activity and intelligence support for select rebel groups. That said, the level of political distraction the government deals with at home will define Turkey's military reach abroad.
A Turkey subsumed by its own political divisions, too wary of confronting Russia and more interested in backing Islamists to replace the Syrian government instead of containing the Islamic State, is obviously not an ideal ally for the United States. The U.S.-Turkish partnership is already noticeably strained, and that stress will only increase as Turkey descends into a more unstable state and searches for a hidden foreign hand to blame for its troubles. As the prominent American journalist Walter Lippmann noted, "An alliance is like a chain. It is not made stronger by adding weak links to it." For now, Turkey is a weak link in the U.S. alliance for Eurasia. But that does not mean that the United States can afford to leave Turkey off the chain, either.
Turkey: The Weak Link in the Intermarium
Looks like AKP screwed up big time with betting on the sincerity of the PKK Kurds. They got all the goodies from AKP and then didn't vote on AKP but on HDP. They screwed Erdogan really hard to the point that he is remarkably silent for the last couple of days which is very funny for a loud guy like him.
But the map only tells part of the story. The Turkey of today is not the Turkey of the 1950s. Back then, a vulnerable Turkey was ready to duck under a U.S. security umbrella stamped with the Truman Doctrine while embracing the Rousseauian mindset of keeping religion separate from statecraft. Today, Turkey understands it has a role to play in the region, but it lacks the consensus and coherence to deploy its power in a meaningful way. Compounding the situation are the results of Turkey's June 7 election, which stripped the ruling Justice and Development Party of its majority in a highly polarized electorate.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Turkey will slide into a familiar and dangerous period of political instability reminiscent of the 1970s, when inconclusive elections and stalemated coalitions characterized the country's politics. Political violence of various stripes developed amid weak economic conditions, culminating in a military coup in 1980. Already, left-wing radical movements like the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front have re-emerged in Turkey's charged political atmosphere, and a series of attacks punctuated the days leading up to the election. As the Kurdish peace process stalls, the state will also need to cope with the threat of Kurdish separatist attacks while trying to prevent jihadist activity from spilling across the border. As for the ruling party itself, the perception that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a growing liability will cause splits in the party, leading to an impasse from the center as Erdogan alternatives, including former Turkish President Abdullah Gul, are reassessed.
Domestic issues that consume Turkey's attention will naturally curb the country's ability to project its power abroad. Turkey has displayed its displeasure with Russia's actions in Ukraine and takes part in Black Sea exercises every now and then. But Ankara is also keeping some distance from the leaders of the Intermarium and NATO to avoid a more serious confrontation with Moscow. Turkey is trying to exhibit its neutrality and benefit from its position as a transit state to host pipeline proposals like Turkish Stream, which is sourced by Russia, and Southern Corridor routes, which are designed to exclude Russia. As Turkey's internal vulnerabilities grow, its cautious approach toward Russia will likely endure.
The Middle East is a much messier problem for Turkey. The prospects for Turkey's Justice and Development Party to make real headway in the Kurdish peace process and keep a lid on the insurgency are extremely low. And with active insurgencies in both Syria and Iraq, Kurdish militant traffic in the region will remain high. A return to a more nationalist stance on the Kurdish problem would translate into more military action in Kurdish areas with the potential to spill over Turkey's borders.
During the past year, Turkey has also become more proactive in backing Islamist rebel fighters in northern Syria who have made strides in their fight for Aleppo. Sustaining that fight fits the ruling party's ideological goal of toppling the Syrian government and bringing a friendly Islamist government to power. Without having to maintain a contradictory strategy of negotiating peace with Kurds in Turkey while dealing with Kurds militarily abroad, Turkey's military focus in the Syrian and Iraqi borderland could sharpen and allow for more cross-border activity and intelligence support for select rebel groups. That said, the level of political distraction the government deals with at home will define Turkey's military reach abroad.
A Turkey subsumed by its own political divisions, too wary of confronting Russia and more interested in backing Islamists to replace the Syrian government instead of containing the Islamic State, is obviously not an ideal ally for the United States. The U.S.-Turkish partnership is already noticeably strained, and that stress will only increase as Turkey descends into a more unstable state and searches for a hidden foreign hand to blame for its troubles. As the prominent American journalist Walter Lippmann noted, "An alliance is like a chain. It is not made stronger by adding weak links to it." For now, Turkey is a weak link in the U.S. alliance for Eurasia. But that does not mean that the United States can afford to leave Turkey off the chain, either.
Turkey: The Weak Link in the Intermarium
Looks like AKP screwed up big time with betting on the sincerity of the PKK Kurds. They got all the goodies from AKP and then didn't vote on AKP but on HDP. They screwed Erdogan really hard to the point that he is remarkably silent for the last couple of days which is very funny for a loud guy like him.
