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To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t Be Stopping Soon

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Very, very positive developments. As long as the CCP can discipline itself to stop corruption, the Chinese economy should continue to do well. When these efforts stop, incompetents will bribe their way to promotions, and mal-investment in projects that only enrich the cadres will increase in frequency. So far, it looks like Xi is the real deal.

To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t Be Stopping Soon - China Real Time Report - WSJ

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  • July 21, 2014, 1:13 PM HKT
To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t Be Stopping Soon
By Russell Leigh Moses

BN-DT776_moses_G_20140721010358.jpg

Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
One major question hovering over China’s anti-corruption campaign – already the longest the country has ever seen — is when it’s going to wind down.

According to anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan, who briefed fellow officials on the campaign last week (in Chinese), it won’t be any time soon.

And the major reason for that may well be that Beijing hasn’t yet figured out how to end it.

Wang laid out the anti-corruption strategy in unusual detail during these meetings, supplying a road map that outlined where the campaign had been and where it’s now headed (in Chinese).

Beijing’s anti-graft crusade isn’t just a one-off initiative, but an extended battle which began last year, taking down, as President Xi promised, both high-ranking “tigers” and lower-level “flies.”

And it’s accelerating. According to an analysis that appeared on the website of the People’s Daily earlier this month, from January to May this year, Wang’s inspection teams disciplined 62,953 people, an increase of 34.7% over the same period the previous year (in Chinese).

In his briefing last week, Wang conceded that the campaign didn’t start all that well. Indeed, in the early stages of the campaign, Wang said, the sense among his inspection teams was that corruption was buried so deep within China’s political marrow that it couldn’t be defeated, only deterred from growing. Party officials were only too comfortable with political business as usual, where bribes and personal connections overrode considerations of actual talent when it came to selecting and promoting cadres.

“Some localities and departments, as well as some party organizations saw the pursuit of honest government as not their main responsibility,” Wang said, adding that the only option at that point was to “not allow corrupt elements to gain a foothold” in the few institutions where corruption was not already omnipresent.

The tide turned, he said, when cadres were finally given political cover by Beijing to report on their comrades engaging in corruption, especially those selling access to government officials and offering bribes for promotion. That routine had become worrisome to Beijing because unqualified and immoral officials were becoming policy-makers.

Moreover, Wang argued, by focusing on specific areas known to be rife with graft—such as land development and real estate projects, mining rights, and public welfare funds—inspectors showed skeptics and potential targets that this campaign was a serious effort to rollback misconduct.

So what’s next?

That’s the tricky part. Punishing corruption is one thing; preventing its reemergence could be a far-greater problem. As one Chinese analyst admitted despondently in the pages of the People’s Daily (in Chinese), unless the system is thoroughly reformed, there’s a good chance that “the rot will come back.”

Continuing to press hard against corruption seems to make sense if Beijing’s expanding fight against graft is finally starting to show success and developing the party’s legitimacy as a problem-solver on issues that matter to the masses. But there’s also concern about just how much longer the campaign can be maintained when, as the analysis above notes, there is “a danger of overdoing something, leaving some people in a constant state of anxiety.”

Fear is evidently freezing some officials from becoming more actively engaged in supporting Xi’s call for changes in how the government operates—a passivity that has led to complaints in the Party media (in Chinese).

And there’s a greater danger: That this effort to tear down corruption is simply dealing with the existing problems and not doing anything about building a new way of decision-making.

As a leading Chinese commentator on the current leadership’s policies put it in the same People’s Daily essay, the real need is “to create a good political environment, allowing officials to devote oneself, heart and soul, to do things, and not focus on the small circle of relationships one has with one’s superiors, doing always what one is told to do.”

That’s an attractive vision, but one that would require a major restructuring of politics in China.

The briefing Wang gave last week acknowledged the danger of a resurgence in corruption after the campaign, but said little about how Beijing planned to prevent it from happening. The inspection teams are clearly good at dealing with the criminal; but their purpose isn’t to create the new political culture that some believe is necessary for the country to eradicate graft.

The anti-corruption campaign has been exceptional, and increasingly successful. But it would be ironic if this effort, which was supposed to allow the Communist Party to stiff-arm fundamental political reform, ends up showing how much China needs it.
 
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The anti-corruption is seemingly successful. China need reform, but some government officials, management level from state companies in industries like oil, finance or electricity...these people form many groups, they have common interest, they live by leeching national interests. You are not dealing corruption with every single official, you are facing many groups, their power can reach to Politburo Standing Committee, it's hard. They are the biggest obstacles to reform, since China has made it clear the market will play a decisive role. Only President Xi can crack them down, everyday I keep hearing there is some officials are investigated, this is incredible. Xi's father was once China's PM, so he can do it, he don't fear fighting with corruption. If other leader without such background are pushed to the front line, they can't do better.
 
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Has China considered monitoring account transfers of party officials and overseas investments of party officials? Everything is electronic so it should not be that hard.
 
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Is it a good thing that Central Discipline Inspection Commission is ahead of law everywhere? Does it prove that our anti-corruption law is useless when dealing with government officials?
 
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Not yet, coz China's Corruption Crackdown is the power struggle inside CPC.

Jiang gang vs Xi & Hu
. This Xi's corruption movement just beat Jiang and his partisan members to save CPC, or CPC might collapse in next 10 years due to corruption like KMT 60years ago in mainland of China.

As far as i knew (rumors), Jiang and Yu YongBo r the biggest "Tigers" inside CPC and PLA, their gang members r middile "Tigers" like Xu CaiHou. The last 10years in China, Hu was not the real president of PRC, he was just a puppet of Jiang and no any power in Army, PLA also controlled by Jiang's gang. After 2013 Hu retired from the puppet chairman, both Xi & Hu r removing Jiang's members inside Zhong NanHai of CPC. Xi is the last hope of CPC, Hu is his Political Ally, those "Tigers" of Jiang's gang r destroying CPC.


Before the power and money, the Chinese Communist also abandoned faith even in PLA Army. So China's trouble is not from outside, it's always threated by Chinese their own.
 
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Not yet, coz China's Corruption Crackdown is the power struggle inside CPC.

Jiang gang vs Xi & Hu
. This Xi's corruption movement just beat Jiang and his partisan members to save CPC, or CPC might collapse in next 10 years due to corruption like KMT 60years ago in mainland of China.

As far as i knew (rumors), Jiang and Yu YongBo r the biggest "Tigers" inside CPC and PLA, their gang members r middile "Tigers" like Xu CaiHou. The last 10years in China, Hu was not the real president of PRC, he was just a puppet of Jiang and no any power in Army, PLA also controlled by Jiang's gang. After 2013 Hu retired from the puppet chairman, both Xi & Hu r removing Jiang's members inside Zhong NanHai of CPC. Xi is the last hope of CPC, Hu is his Political Ally, those "Tigers" of Jiang's gang r destroying CPC.


Before the power and money, the Chinese Communist also abandoned faith even in PLA Army. So China's trouble is not from outside, it's always threated by Chinese their own.

In other words Hu was afraid to do anything and Xi because of his father as an important CPC figure is the factor which allows him to crack down those corrupt officials?
 
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In other words Hu was afraid to do anything and Xi because of his father as an important CPC figure is the factor which allows him to crack down those corrupt officials?

I thought it was because Xi is both the General Secretary of the CPC and also the Central Military Commission Chairman that he is able to make unilateral decisions. Obviously the prestige of his lineage doesn't hurt, though.
 
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I thought it was because Xi is both the General Secretary of the CPC and also the Central Military Commission Chairman that he is able to make unilateral decisions. Obviously the prestige of his lineage doesn't hurt, though.

Hu was also Chairman of the Central Military Commission
 
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In other words Hu was afraid to do anything and Xi because of his father as an important CPC figure is the factor which allows him to crack down those corrupt officials?
1. Xi is the 2nd-gen Communist, his family have some Political Allies inside CPC.

2. Hu was no any family background there, he was selected by Deng XiaoPing from Tibet, but his teacher was the Hu YaoBang. Deng selected Hu as future CPC leader, but he's younger than Jiang, so Deng arranged Jiang as leader first then Hu.

3. U have to know, Deng never selected Jiang as his successor, Jiang was selected by Cheng Yun and there's no any better candidate in turbulent time of 1980s. Deng just had only one requirement, Jiang must support & insist of Deng's "reform and opening policies".

4. 1997 Deng gone, 2003 Jiang should peacefully transmit the chairman to Hu, but Jiang arranged & promoted many his men into Zhong NanHai of CPC and PLA. During 10 years Hu as the president of CPC just a puppet, around him most r Jiang's gang members. They were making money & corruption insde CPC and PLA.

5. Hu was the least powerful president of PRC, Jiang was behind him. Hu no any power in PLA, PLA controlled by Jiang's generals like Yu YongBo, Xu CaiHou, Guo BoXiong etc.

6. Xi tried to save CPC, what he do today is kicking Jiang's members off. Hu is Xi's friend and helper.

Today China is not that Mao's Red China, i think CPC more like KMT. Just watching Xi will do within 2014, they only have one chance.
 
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Not a good sign for the party if true
Inside CPC, there'r two party or three party, they struggle for power. This called "inner-party democracy".:angel:

Whatever CPC is still smater than KMT, it's no doubt.
 
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1. Xi is the 2nd-gen Communist, his family have some Political Allies inside CPC.

2. Hu was no any family background there, he was selected by Deng XiaoPing from Tibet, but his teacher was the Hu YaoBang. Deng selected Hu as future CPC leader, but he's younger than Jiang, so Deng arranged Jiang as leader first then Hu.

3. U have to know, Deng never selected Jiang as his successor, Jiang was selected by Cheng Yun and there's no any better candidate in turbulent time of 1980s. Deng just had only one requirement, Jiang must support & insist of Deng's "reform and opening policies".

4. 1997 Deng gone, 2003 Jiang should peacefully transmit the chairman to Hu, but Jiang arranged & promoted many his men into Zhong NanHai of CPC and PLA. During 10 years Hu as the president of CPC just a puppet, around him most r Jiang's gang members. They were making money & corruption insde CPC and PLA.

5. Hu was the least powerful president of PRC, Jiang was behind him. Hu no any power in PLA, PLA controlled by Jiang's generals like Yu YongBo, Xu CaiHou, Guo BoXiong etc.

6. Xi tried to save CPC, what he do today is kicking Jiang's members off. Hu is Xi's friend and helper.

Today China is not that Mao's Red China, i think CPC more like KMT.

Thanks for the explanation, can't blame Hu for being an average leader since Jiang is behind all these power play.
So because of Xi's family having ties with some very important figures inside CPC, Xi can purge the corrupt big tigers. But those big tigers have high positions, Xi must have very influential gangs to purge these people.
 
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Inside CPC, there'r two party or three party, they struggle for power. This called "inner-party democracy".:angel:

Whatever CPC is still smater than KMT, it's no doubt.
So CPC is democratic. Fxxk the West for saying we're commies :D
 
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