Through Indian Eyes

[muse]

September 6, 2010 23:36 IST | Updated: September 6, 2010 23:43 IST September 6, 2010
Growing complexity of Afghan riddle
M. K. Bhadrakumar

AP Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai's latest decision to form a high council to negotiate with the Taliban reflects his entire approach to a political settlement. File photo


The myriad hopes held out at the conference in London, the Loya Jirga, and the Foreign Ministers' conference in Kabul are withering away.

The recent visits to New Delhi by Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasul and National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta are of great significance from three perspectives. Primarily, these high-level exchanges can be viewed against the backdrop of the situation in Afghanistan. Second, emanating out of the above, the Afghan-Indian consultations at this juncture are most timely and useful. And, third, of course, sections of the Indian strategic community harboured a misperception regarding Hamid Karzai that he was in an unseemly hurry to patch up with the Taliban since the United States is raring to cut loose and get out of the Hindu Kush. The Afghan officials could explain what is really going on.

To say that the situation is fragile and uncertain may sound clichéd but that is unfortunately the only possible way to begin a narrative on the politico-military situation in Afghanistan. The myriad hopes held out at the conference in January in London, the Loya Jirga held in June in Kabul and the Foreign Ministers' conference in Kabul in July are withering away. These conclaves helped evolve a consensus international opinion that a process of “reintegration” of the reconcilable Taliban fighters must commence alongside the U.S-led military operations, which would pave the way for a political settlement. Besides, the international community agreed on the “Afghanisation” of the war. Furthermore, there was wide acceptance that it was the Afghan government led by Mr. Karzai that was best placed to pilot the national reconciliation processes and it should, therefore, be strengthened.

The Loya Jirga in Kabul proclaimed that a reconciliation with the Taliban was also the collective wish of the Afghan people. At the conferences in London and Kabul, the international community pledged the financial resources needed for the Afghan government to advance the “reintegration” process. In retrospect, the U.S. principally drew up the road map and largely got a sceptical international community to endorse it. Coinciding with the London conference, the United Nations Security Council removed from its terrorism “watchlist,” for the first time, a handful of former Taliban officials, underscoring that the U.S.' AfPak officials were indeed the patron saints of the idea of the “reintegration” of the Taliban.

What since followed, therefore, is absolutely stunning and exposes the U.S. doublespeak. In the interregnum between the London conference and the Loya Jirga, the U.S. and Pakistan virtually sabotaged Mr. Karzai's “reintegration” plan when in a joint operation by the ISI and the CIA in Karachi, the number 2 in the Taliban's Quetta Shura, Mullah Baradar, was detained. The bizarre operation was undertaken despite the CIA and the ISI being aware that in Mr. Baradar (who is credited with moderate views), Mr. Karzai had a key interlocutor and the two were at an advanced stage of negotiations regarding the Taliban's participation in the upcoming Loya Jirga in April, which, of course, would have become a defining moment of the war. The ISI's detention of Mr. Baradar can only be seen as a move to ensure that Mr. Karzai did not have any top-level interlocutor among the Taliban leadership and to drive home the message that any dealings between the Taliban and Kabul should be conducted through the “proper channels,” namely, Rawalpindi and Washington.

Effectively, Mr. Karzai has been left with the virtually impossible choice of negotiating with the Taliban through the Pakistani military leadership and under American watch. The Pakistani army chief, Pervez Kayani, swiftly got into the act and began plunging into a direct role by visiting Kabul twice and opening negotiations with Mr. Karzai. He lost no time proposing that a serious reconciliation process should involve the Haqqani group within the Taliban leadership, which the ISI regards as the one sure bet within the Quetta Shura insofar as its virulent hostility toward Indians precludes any scope of the Indian intelligence ever flirting with it. In short, Gen. Kayani's calculation was that India's influence in Kabul would be exorcised once and for all if only the Haqqanis (who are implicated in the ISI operations against the Indian embassy in Kabul) are inducted into the power structure.

The bottom line in the ISI strategy is that a settlement may lead to seemingly broad-based power structures coming up in Afghanistan but this will be a transitional stage and given that the Taliban is the best-organised group in Afghanistan and has the institutional backing of the Pakistani military, it is a matter of time before other elements in the power structures, including Mr. Karzai or the erstwhile Northern Alliance (NA) leaders, could be marginalised, overthrown or even physically eliminated. It believes the western powers, wearied of wars, would willy-nilly accept the fait accompli.

However, Mr. Karzai could anticipate the ISI game plan. At any rate, he began shoring up his own position during the past two years or so by weaving a complex political tapestry of alliances involving the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. His half-brother Wali Karzai who is ensconced in power in Kandahar has been actively networking with the Pashtuns (including Taliban leaders like Mr. Baradar).

Unsurprisingly, the U.S. has been sniping at Wali Karzai almost relentlessly for the last two years, judging that without him, the Afghan President will be a greatly weakened man. The hard reality is that the U.S. does not want a strong Afghan leader in Kabul with an independent power base. It seems to resent the “Afghan-ness” in Mr. Karzai's political personality — his sense of dignity and independence and his growing proclivity towards viewing the U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations through the prism of Afghan national interests. The U.S.' AfPak viceroys did all they could to replace him in the last presidential election in October but Mr. Karzai had the last laugh. He tenaciously outwitted the U.S.' famously-manipulative AfPak viceroys by forging an Afghan network of his own with NA stalwarts Mohammed Fahim, Karim Khalili and Rashid Dostum.

Clearly, the U.S. was on overdrive to tear apart Mr. Karzai's alliance with the NA groups what with the parliamentary elections due on September 18. The main sticking point at the moment is that a newly-elected parliament (unlike the previous one which was susceptible to the influence of the American embassy in Kabul) that works in harmony with the President will crystallise a national consensus regarding the conduct of the war and the imperatives of national reconciliation. Thus began the whispering campaign that Mr. Karzai was trying to “appease” the Taliban. It aimed at exploiting the visceral fears of the NA groups regarding a possible Taliban takeover in Kabul. A misperception grew even in India that Mr. Karzai was “appeasing” the Taliban and “cozying up” to Pakistan.

Whereas Mr.Karzai's approach has, in reality, been to work for a genuine reconciliation with the insurgents with a sense of fairness that accommodates the Taliban but within Afghanistan's democratic life and on the basis that the “reintegrated” Taliban will cohabitate with all elements of the plural Afghan society. His latest decision to form a high council to negotiate with the Taliban reflects his entire approach to a political settlement.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has also mounted a political campaign regarding “corruption,” which is in actuality a proxy war against Mr. Karzai. One agenda behind the U.S.' “anti-corruption” campaign is to seek the removal of Wali Karzai, since no Afghan President can be lethally wounded as long as he controls Kandahar (which is also symbolic as the birthplace of the Taliban). The supreme irony is that it is the U.S. which spawned corruption and war profiteering in Afghanistan on an unprecedented scale. The Pentagon engaged war contractors and the Afghan private militia — a matter of Congressional investigation at the moment — and the CIA has been extensively bribing Afghan officials, politicians and civil society. According to the U.N.'s estimation, only around 20 per cent of foreign aid is actually routed through the Kabul government.

The U.S. strategy will be to keep up the pressure on Mr. Karzai in the coming period even as the mother of all questions concerning the U.S. military presence is yet to be addressed. The Afghans will oppose a permanent U.S. military presence, while the Pentagon is bent on getting a status of forces agreement with the powers that be in Kabul so as to retain long-term access, which is needed to effectively pursue the containment strategy toward China. The Pentagon is beefing up the massive military bases in Bagram and Kandahar and has notified to Congress its plans to build new military bases in Mazar-i-Sharif, Shindand and Camp Dwyer, costing hundreds of millions of dollars.

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan is once again lingering in the shade, lost in thoughts, pending the clarity that is lacking regarding the nature of the peace settlement that can follow. No doubt, Mr. Karzai is reaching out to the neighbouring capitals — Tehran, Moscow, New Delhi — for sustenance. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to accentuate the contradictions in the geopolitics of the region — Kashmir, Pakistan, India, China, etc. — so that a regional consensus doesn't emerge regarding the “neutralisation” of Afghanistan.

(The writer is a former diplomat.)

 

[SekrutYakhni]

I am a bit confused here. It is a fact that we supported certain Afghan elements in the past..As mentioned in the article, Haqqani group should be included in the talks! So, are we going to NW to eliminate Haqqani group and if yes than how will we be the part of the talks after Haqqani group is eliminated? AM suggested that we have suffered a lot by supporting certain elements in Afghanistan and now is the time to move forward. Furthermore, he also suggested that economic help will deepen our relation with Afghanis which I agreed to.

The question here is--

If we are going after Haqqani group in NW than how will we influence the peace talks? As we will not have any political say after the operation..

 

[Urbanized Greyhound]

The U.S. strategy will be to keep up the pressure on Mr. Karzai in the coming period even as the mother of all questions concerning the U.S. military presence is yet to be addressed. The Afghans will oppose a permanent U.S. military presence, while the Pentagon is bent on getting a status of forces agreement with the powers that be in Kabul so as to retain long-term access, which is needed to effectively pursue the containment strategy toward China.

there seems to be no broad consensus in the Karzai administration or the U.S ......even among regional players like India , Pakistan....about confrontation or reconciliation with the taliban........

 

[SekrutYakhni]

I don't think that Karzai will last longer than anticipated. He is virtually incompetent from economic reforms to solving social issues. Karzai is like Zardari of our side--

 

[Urbanized Greyhound]

I don't think that Karzai will last longer than anticipated. He is virtually incompetent from economic reforms to solving social issues. Karzai is like Zardari of our side--

karzai appears to be considerably smarter....he understands the Afghan situation well and seems to be quite able to balance different power factions in the polity.....but the bold part is quite true ....till date he has done nothing as far as economic reforms are concerned.....

 

[SekrutYakhni]

karzai appears to be considerably smarter....he understands the Afghan situation well and seems to be quite able to balance different power factions in the polity.....but the bold part is quite true ....till date he has done nothing as far as economic reforms are concerned.....

He might run here and there to remain in the power; however, social and economic reforms are impossible under his leadership due to several reasons. In my opinion, Afghanistan should get rid of conservative leadership sooner than later but there are too many stakes present which will not help Afghanis at all. Someone said it right and I think Pakistan also fits in it because it is our moral responsibility to help Afghanis grow on their own feet--

Soviets can accept a neutral Afghanistan but they cannot accept an anti Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan can accept a neutral Afghanistan but not an anti Pakistan, Afghanistan.

I think that the foreign stakes should be neutralized and let Afghanis decide their fate. HOWEVER, it is completely justifiable if Pakistan looks for a pro Afghanistan considering the foreign stakes.

Pakistan is not the sole bad animal in the jungle. I am against any foreign influence in Afghanistan. As long as foreign interests are present in Afghanistan, Pakistan has the right to push her interests forward.

 

[muse]

So if you are asking how to make sense of the piece, I'll give you my understanding of it :

1. India, Iran and Russia according to the ambassador are making a claim on Karzai (who were the backers of the Northern Alliance? India, Russia and Iran)

2. US and Pakistan are spoilers.

3. Karzai has outwitted the US and his cabal think that they can maintain the US at arms length with the assistance of India, Russia and Iran.

4. The ambassador does not mention the role of UK and Saudi Arabia, the Saudis brought the Talib to the table, at the behest of the English, not the US.

5. While the Ambassador does not mention this, Karzai has used local govt institutions to seed his nominees through out (look to see if a replay of the vote fraud will happen again - be sensitive to particular areas - and especially how the American will choose to play it)

So, is the ambassador making sense? well, it's about persepective, sure, but we can be objective about quite a few things -- Articles comparing the Karzai brothers (there is a even more important one than Wali and the banker) to Diem of south vietnam have appeared in the last year, as well as articles comparing how the brother used institutions for their own enrichment and that of their clique. In a sense the US is now victim of it's owm IO campaign, it tell the world that it opposes Pakistana nd it tells Pakikstan that it is in agreement with it's strategic outlook, it calls India it's strategic ally and opposes it in Afghanistan, relagating it to a "humanitarian and development role" while it turns a blind eye to the activities of it's external intelligence agency and considers it's options for making war on the Iranian and the role of Afghanistan in such an eventuality, it tells the Afghan that it's there to safeguard the Afghan and the world from terror and Al-Qaida and finds itself battling ordinary Pashtuns for the most part, and now finds that the "puppet" seems to not respond to the strings the masters pull --- basically, they are in a very tough spot because they have been lying to all sides and all sides now know this and worse still, the US is unclear about what it really wants there.

When it comes to India, what they want to avloid is seeing a radical Wahabist regime there, you would have thought Pakistan and India would be on the same page in this regard - but because it's to Chu--- boxes like Pakistan and India, they have to be on opposing sides - the Russian and the Iranians want the same thing, the ejection of the Wahabist.

Will Karzai succeed? the Ambassador is mistaken with regard to the American, he is a fanatic, a true believer, his ejection from Afghanistan when it does come will come with a great deal of blood and pain. And while this karzai may not survive, there is that other brother, the fixer, the planner, the brains of the outfit if you will.

Will Pakistan go after the Haqqani group ?? NO, it won't, not until it has good reason to and thus far it does not.

 

[SekrutYakhni]

So if you are asking how to make sense of the piece, I'll give you my understanding of it :

1. India, Iran and Russia according to the ambassador are making a claim on Karzai (who were the backers of the Northern Alliance? India, Russia and Iran)

2. US and Pakistan are spoilers.

3. Karzai has outwitted the US and his cabal think that they can maintain the US at arms length with the assistance of India, Russia and Iran.

4. The ambassador does not mention the role of UK and Saudi Arabia, the Saudis brought the Talib to the table, at the behest of the English, not the US.

5. While the Ambassador does not mention this, Karzai has used local govt institutions to seed his nominees through out (look to see if a replay of the vote fraud will happen again - be sensitive to particular areas - and especially how the American will choose to play it)

So, is the ambassador making sense? well, it's about persepective, sure, but we can be objective about quite a few things -- Articles comparing the Karzai brothers (there is a even more important one than Wali and the banker) to Diem of south vietnam have appeared in the last year, as well as articles comparing how the brother used institutions for their own enrichment and that of their clique. In a sense the US is now victim of it's owm IO campaign, it tell the world that it opposes Pakistana nd it tells Pakikstan that it is in agreement with it's strategic outlook, it calls India it's strategic ally and opposes it in Afghanistan, relagating it to a "humanitarian and development role" while it turns a blind eye to the activities of it's external intelligence agency and considers it's options for making war on the Iranian and the role of Afghanistan in such an eventuality, it tells the Afghan that it's there to safeguard the Afghan and the world from terror and Al-Qaida and finds itself battling ordinary Pashtuns for the most part, and now finds that the "puppet" seems to not respond to the strings the masters pull --- basically, they are in a very tough spot because they have been lying to all sides and all sides now know this and worse still, the US is unclear about what it really wants there.

When it comes to India, what they want to avloid is seeing a radical Wahabist regime there, you would have thought Pakistan and India would be on the same page in this regard - but because it's to Chu--- boxes like Pakistan and India, they have to be on opposing sides - the Russian and the Iranians want the same thing, the ejection of the Wahabist.

Will Karzai succeed? the Ambassador is mistaken with regard to the American, he is a fanatic, a true believer, his ejection from Afghanistan when it does come will come with a great deal of blood and pain. And while this karzai may not survive, there is that other brother, the fixer, the planner, the brains of the outfit if you will.

Will Pakistan go after the Haqqani group ?? NO, it won't, not until it has good reason to and thus far it does not.

"Will Pakistan go after the Haqqani group ?? NO, it won't, not until it has good reason to and thus far it does not."

That sums up the answer.

Pakistan and India are not on the same page with regards to Afghanistan and it will be quite absurd to think that they are on the same page... Russia and Iran are on the same page. As we know, Iran is having issues with the Western world, Pakistan can actually benefit from this situation. Pakistan and Iran should help each other to safeguard their interests in Afghanistan. Given that, Russia, Pakistan and Iran will be on the same page. India will be an uncle Charlie in the issue if Pakistan and Iran somehow come on the same page. However, we cannot do that openly considering the U.S pressure--And if we are successful to persuade Iranians or vice versa, it will be a great boost for us.

Pakistan and Iran can change their fate by helping each other, no?


It is beyond my imagination that crooks sitting in Pentagon and DC do not know what they want....It is possible but...

KSA is a game changer considering the influence they have on Afghanis. It will be clear in year or two that who wins to retain her strong foothold in Afghanistan. Strategically speaking, Pakistan and Iran can help each other and it is a perfect time for that.

There must be something which Pakistan and Iran shares in Afghanistan.

 

[muse]

Pakistan and India are not on the same page with regards to Afghanistan and it will be quite absurd to think that way

Doesn't have to be -- neither Pakistan nor India want a Wahabist regime in Afghanistan, neither do the Iranian nor do the Russian -- What India is contesting is the notion that Afghanistan is Pakistan's backyard - it's a useless, pointless contest - Indian signing and dancing and movies, all good and welcome but do Afghans actually think that India as a power player in Afghanistan? No, they don't - don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting that trade and culture with India are unimportant, they are very important - but allow me to use an example to provide the contrast - from one end of Afghanistan to the other, East to West and North to South, the medium of exchange is the Pakistani rupee - get a haircut and the barber will complain about Pakistan and ISI and what not, but the chair you are sitting in is made in Sialkot, the clippers as well, and the complaining is done in fluent urdu and the barber was born in Pakistan -- it's just a very different kind of thing, I don't think people, especially the US types, realize the depth of relationship, I mean ordinary peolpe come and go, buy and sell and live one season here one season there, nobody is harassing them for a visa or a passport which they don 't have, even a Afghan ID letter they don't have, but will ask if you can help them get a Pakistani Shenahkti card.

So, for indians it's a contest which is not one they can win, because the premise of the contest is mistaken - see Durand, whether you like it or not, connects the two, out in the middle of nowhere, you'll find kohat cement - now, I think botht he US and the Indian shoudl have used this Pak-Afghan connection -when I say the Us type is a fanatic, this is what I was referring to, instead of using this and creating win win, he choose to caste it as a negative, spread poison for 9 years through his radio liberty and now finds himself isolated - the same with the Indian.

The Iranian has no such problem, he too shares a border and people come and go, as do goods - Iranian goods and more and more currency are dominating the western border region. They have the Shi'ah and the Hazara

The Russian, while not a fanatic, doesnot want any Wahabi govt in Afghanistan, it's the one thing everybody agrees to but cannot see to make it work to their mutual advantage. They think they have the Uzbek, but the Uzbek is looking for a better deal.

Then there is the briothers Karzai and that whole idiot Kandahar game of who is more legitimate ($$) and there is the Northern Alliance and jamiaat - hostile to Pakistan as if it was mothers milk, because, well, they want to claim a Iranian connection as farsi speakers, but find their Sunni-ness gets in the way, but if it rattles the Pakistanis cages, they are up for it. They for sure don't want any Wahabi regime.

Into all of this mess, enter the US - Intl declaration of human rights and women's rights, and "democracy" and the NGOs - behind it all, a fanatical ethic against Islam and Muslims and a cold calulation of strategic imperative - - out of Afghanistan, where in Asia will they go?? There's new troubles created in Kyrgyzstan, then that place will implode - See, this is why I created that thread, new wars for Asia - US has no other option but to muscle into business and to position it's military to "protect it's interests" -- it's crude, but increasingly it does not work.

It is beyond my imaginations that crooks sitting in Pentagon and DC do not know what they want

Why? You think they are 10 feet tall? Have all the answers? -- If theyh knew what they wanted, what's taken them 10 years to not get it??

If you know what they are doing there please tell the rest of us.

 

[muse]

Look at the piece below, see if you can discern the main theme, is the Taliban defector scheme working? Why not? Who controls what makes the scheme workable?


September 6, 2010
Lacking Money and Leadership, Push for Taliban Defectors Stalls
By ROD NORDLAND

KABUL, Afghanistan — A $250 million program to lure low-level Taliban fighters away from the insurgency has stalled, with Afghans bickering over who should run it, and international donors slow to put up the money they had promised.

Six months after Afghanistan’s foreign backers agreed to generous funding for a reintegration effort, only $200,000 has been spent so far by the United States and little or nothing by other donors.

During the same period, the flow of Taliban fighters seeking to reintegrate has slowed to a trickle — by the most optimistic estimates, a few hundred in the last six months. It is not clear whether that is because of the lack of a program that would provide them with jobs, security guarantees and other incentives, or because most Taliban no longer see the insurgency as a losing proposition.

In the past five years, a poorly funded Afghan reintegration effort, the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, recorded 9,000 Taliban who sought to join the government side — compared with 100 since April, officials said.

“It’s almost dead,” said Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, a top official at the nearly moribund commission in Kabul. He said employees there had not been paid in three months. “The Taliban know the government doesn’t have a single policy for peace and reconciliation.”

There has been broad American and international support for a more ambitious initiative. When Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal took command in Afghanistan last year, he argued in his initial assessment that there was a need for a program that would “offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy.”

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, testifying in favor of such a program before Congress, said, “This is really about getting the foot soldiers to decide that they don’t want to be a part of the Taliban anymore.”

Congress this year earmarked $100 million to support reintegration programs, while at the London Conference on Afghanistan in February, several countries, Britain, Germany and Japan among them, promised another $150 million to go into a Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund, to be administered jointly by the Afghan government and foreign backers. A United States official said that as of August, only $200,000 of the American money had been spent on reintegration.

So far, Britain has put in about $2.6 million, although officials said the nation was committed to about $7.5 million. Money has yet to come from Germany, which pledged $64 million, and Japan, which pledged $50 million — although officials said both countries were expected to contribute this month.

Only Estonia has put in its full contribution: $64,000.

There is little pressure on the donors to meet their pledges more quickly, however, since the Afghans have yet to form an agency to spend the money. As one American official said, “There isn’t any there there yet.”

At a peace assembly, or jirga, in June, delegates agreed to form a High Peace Council, which would be responsible for trying to engage Taliban leaders in talks.

“I am telling you, dear brother Talib-jan, this is your country, come and have a peaceful life in the country,” President Hamid Karzai said, using a suffix that Afghans often attach to friends’ names.

Subsequently, at a Kabul conference in July, more international money was pledged for the reintegration trust fund, and delegates agreed that the High Peace Council would run the program financed by that fund.

Since then, a “force reintegration cell” at the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF, has been working with Afghan officials on how such a program would be structured, but the program has yet to start because of bickering among Afghan officials over who would head the council.

“There’s a lot of political resistance to this from a lot of people,” said an American official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the subject.

Gary Younger, an ISAF spokesman, said: “Because the Afghan government has the structure in place, hopefully it’ll move ahead quickly” once the council is formed. “We are seeing interest out there.”

Mr. Karzai’s office said in a statement on Saturday that the council’s members had been decided upon and that their names would be announced after the Id al-Fitr holiday, which begins Thursday.

Nonetheless, there is some doubt about how effective the council will be once it starts its work. “There are several parties from the government who don’t want the Taliban to come in,” Mr. Akram said.

Muhammad Dawood Kalakani, an ethnic Tajik member of Parliament, expressed a view commonly held among non-Pashtun minority groups: “We don’t want peace at the cost of losing the achievements of the last nine years in terms of human and women’s rights, civil society, media and governance.”

Insurgents who have changed sides in the past have been bitterly disappointed, Mr. Akram said.

Ghulam Yahya Akbari, an insurgent commander in Herat Province, was killed last October and 200 of his fighters surrendered to the Afghan government. To date, Mr. Akram said, none of them have received benefits other than emergency food rations, and they cannot return to their homes for fear of reprisals from the Taliban.

“Nobody finds them shelter, nobody gets them jobs, nobody opens a place for them in society,” he said.

More recently, small numbers of Taliban have turned themselves in to provincial officials in Baghlan Province and elsewhere, where local officials have run ad hoc programs to try to resettle them. In all, the American official said, estimates are that “several hundred” have turned themselves over in recent months, though he added that there was no way to verify the number.

NATO late last year estimated Taliban strength at 25,000 fighters, an increase of 25 percent over the previous year.


Sangar Rahimi contributed reporting.

 

[SekrutYakhni]

Doesn't have to be -- neither Pakistan nor India want a Wahabist regime in Afghanistan, neither do the Iranian nor do the Russian -- What India is contesting is the notion that Afghanistan is Pakistan's backyard - it's a useless, pointless contest - Indian signing and dancing and movies, all good and welcome but do Afghans actually think that India as a power player in Afghanistan? No, they don't - don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting that trade and culture with India are unimportant, they are very important - but allow me to use an example to provide the contrast - from one end of Afghanistan to the other, East to West and North to South, the medium of exchange is the Pakistani rupee - get a haircut and the barber will complain about Pakistan and ISI and what not, but the chair you are sitting in is made in Sialkot, the clippers as well, and the complaining is done in fluent urdu and the barber was born in Pakistan -- it's just a very different kind of thing, I don't think people, especially the US types, realize the depth of relationship, I mean ordinary peolpe come and go, buy and sell and live one season here one season there, nobody is harassing them for a visa or a passport which they don 't have, even a Afghan ID letter they don't have, but will ask if you can help them get a Pakistani Shenahkti card.

So, for indians it's a contest which is not one they can win, because the premise of the contest is mistaken - see Durand, whether you like it or not, connects the two, out in the middle of nowhere, you'll find kohat cement - now, I think botht he US and the Indian shoudl have used this Pak-Afghan connection -when I say the Us type is a fanatic, this is what I was referring to, instead of using this and creating win win, he choose to caste it as a negative, spread poison for 9 years through his radio liberty and now finds himself isolated - the same with the Indian.

The Iranian has no such problem, he too shares a border and people come and go, as do goods - Iranian goods and more and more currency are dominating the western border region. They have the Shi'ah and the Hazara

The Russian, while not a fanatic, doesnot want any Wahabi govt in Afghanistan, it's the one thing everybody agrees to but cannot see to make it work to their mutual advantage. They think they have the Uzbek, but the Uzbek is looking for a better deal.

Then there is the briothers Karzai and that whole idiot Kandahar game of who is more legitimate ($$) and there is the Northern Alliance and jamiaat - hostile to Pakistan as if it was mothers milk, because, well, they want to claim a Iranian connection as farsi speakers, but find their Sunni-ness gets in the way, but if it rattles the Pakistanis cages, they are up for it. They for sure don't want any Wahabi regime.

Into all of this mess, enter the US - Intl declaration of human rights and women's rights, and "democracy" and the NGOs - behind it all, a fanatical ethic against Islam and Muslims and a cold calulation of strategic imperative - - out of Afghanistan, where in Asia will they go?? There's new troubles created in Kyrgyzstan, then that place will implode - See, this is why I created that thread, new wars for Asia - US has no other option but to muscle into business and to position it's military to "protect it's interests" -- it's crude, but increasingly it does not work.




Why? You think they are 10 feet tall? Have all the answers? -- If theyh knew what they wanted, what's taken them 10 years to not get it??

If you know what they are doing there please tell the rest of us.

The relationship we share with Afghanis is quite deep due to the demographics, religion and the same region. I think that Pakistan should benefit from this situation by taking Iran into confidence. Some right moves will minimize the Indian-Iranian relation over Afghanistan. Russia has her proxies, Iran and Pakistan have theirs. Together, they can help each other which will minimize the U.S. influence in Afghanistan if they have any. Military to military relation might be the worst but the cultural bonding we have with Afghans benefit both of us.


No, they are not ten feet tall but they sure are crooks. They are running their proxies successfully and not only countered us but created differences among us. I do not know what they are doing there but as the days pass and weeks follow, the internal differences in the US over Afghan war are of great concern.

 

[SekrutYakhni]

The article is like giving the bank keys to the robber. Militants will buy weapons, in my opinion. This particular 'scheme' will increase militancy in Afghanistan.

As long as there is ideological war, militancy will never stop.

Freedom fighters to be more precise.

 

[muse]

There is no one handed clapping -- truth be told, Pakistan is the second largest Shi'ah nation in the world, and yet it seems to be ashamed of this - - it does not assert that it stands for pluralism in Islam. This assertion is vital - VITAL, an assertion that we Muslims of all sects as Muslims - but Pakistan have a long, long way to go in exocising the demons of Wahabist ideology from their society, it's like detoxification of a entire society. Actually the same is pretty much true of Iran -- and so unfortunately we deal through proxies, BTW the Iranian are very very active in Afghanistan and their proxies among the best educated in the country and certainly more "enlightened" among the Muslims of that country.

Keep your eyes fixed on that Afghan population bomb - it is BOMB, the birth rates are astronomical and system collapse is a very real possibility - where then will the people go? to Tajikistan? And when they flow into Pakistan and Iran, they will destabilze tjhose societies in a very serious manner - they are human beings too, they have aspirations and dreams for their children, but they will also create strife if they cannot be absorbed and naturalized.

 

[SekrutYakhni]

There is no one handed clapping -- truth be told, Pakistan is the second largest Shi'ah nation in the world, and yet it seems to be ashamed of this - - it does not assert that it stands for pluralism in Islam. This assertion is vital - VITAL, an assertion that we Muslims of all sects as Muslims - but Pakistan have a long, long way to go in exocising the demons of Wahabist ideology from their society, it's like detoxification of a entire society. Actually the same is pretty much true of Iran -- and so unfortunately we deal through proxies, BTW the Iranian are very very active in Afghanistan and their proxies among the best educated in the country and certainly more "enlightened" among the Muslims of that country.

Keep your eyes fixed on that Afghan population bomb - it is BOMB, the birth rates are astronomical and system collapse is a very real possibility - where then will the people go? to Tajikistan? And when they flow into Pakistan and Iran, they will destabilze tjhose societies in a very serious manner - they are human beings too, they have aspirations and dreams for their children, but they will also create strife if they cannot be absorbed and naturalized.

The shortsightedness of our society has ruined our future. Coexistence is a key made of gold which we lost back in the day. However, media can play a very positive role in opening up people's mind and souls. Yes, I have heard of explosion in birth rates before which is a great concern for the neighbouring countries.

I do not think that proxies in Afghanistan will help her to prosper in the long run. One must minimize the foreign involvement! If Afghani gov is willing to work with us closely given an effective leadership in Pakistan, Afghanis will not migrate to Pakistan down the road.

 

[muse]

See below as to how the US intends to play the upcoming parliamentary elections in Afghanistan:

Editorial from NYT - Singing the same old tune, much to the dismay of Indian, Afghan, Russian and the Iranian

September 5, 2010
The Next Afghan Election

In less than two weeks, Afghanistan will elect a new parliament — a chance to show that the country is making progress. Unfortunately, the odds of success may not be much better than they were last year, when a presidential election, marred by violence and widespread fraud, left Afghans and the international community questioning the legitimacy of Hamid Karzai’s victory.

Millions of Afghans courageously voted in past elections and may do so again. There are 2,447 candidates on ballots in 34 provinces, including about 400 women (up from 328 in 2005) despite severe constraints on their political participation in this male-dominated society.

Still, there are many reasons to worry.

Security is the biggest obstacle given the worsening insurgency. Four candidates have been killed in attacks by suspected Taliban fighters even with a buildup in American forces and an escalation in allied military operations. Armed men also killed five campaign workers for a female candidate. Many candidates running for 249 parliamentary seats are too fearful to campaign, and some have told reporters that the violence, especially suicide attacks, is much worse than last time. Election officials say it is too dangerous to even open at least 938 of 6,835 polling centers — most in the south and the east.

The threat of another fraud comes close behind. When Mr. Karzai ran last year, his allies stuffed so many ballot boxes that the Electoral Complaints Commission ended up throwing out one-third of his votes. Mr. Karzai won by default after his opponent dropped out.

That disaster prompted calls for major electoral reforms. There have been some — but not nearly enough. The most significant may be Mr. Karzai’s appointment of a new chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission, which oversees election logistics. His predecessor failed to adequately prevent or punish fraud.

The new chairman, Fazel Ahmad Manawi, an Islamic scholar and former I.E.C. commissioner, is generally viewed as doing a better job. He barred 6,000 people who worked on the fraudulent November poll from administering this one, improved ballot security, and publicized polling sites weeks — rather than days — in advance.

The United Nations-backed Electoral Complaints Commission — the election’s ultimate arbiter — is reconstituted, although experts are concerned about the competence of the new members. Their big test will be whether they have the courage of their predecessors to expose fraud if found. It will be hard to pull off credible balloting. The election is hampered by a flawed voter registry, a vetting process that left far too many corrupt warlords on the ballots, and fewer independent observers. Reports of vote buying, bribery and intimidation are rife; Mr. Karzai shows no sign of discouraging this.

It would be better to postpone the election. But American and allied officials say Kabul wants to proceed, and they must respect that decision. While the allies pressed the Karzai government on reforms, they seem curiously resigned to whatever may happen.

In the remaining weeks, the allies should press Mr. Karzai and other major political leaders to urge all Afghans to vote, to speak out against fraud and corruption and to pledge that violators will be punished. No one expects Afghanistan to install a perfect system overnight. But cynical and disenchanted Afghans need to see there is a way for their voices to count.