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“There was nothing inherently wrong in Partition”

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“There was nothing inherently wrong in Partition”

Hasan Suroor

Yasmin Khan, a British historian of India-Pakistan descent, questions some conventional assumptions about Partition in her bookThe Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan(Yale University Press £19.99) and, controversially, argues that the Muslim demand for Pakistan was “legitimate” given the community’s fears at the time about its political and economic status in a Hindu majority India. Here she explains why, and elaborates some of the other issues raised in the book. Ms. Khan teaches politics and international relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. Excerpts from an interview:

Your book is a grim reminder of the horrors of Partition which you rightly describe as one of the 20th century’s “darkest moments.” Yet one gets the sense that you don’t believe that the Partition itself was a bad idea. Is it right? And isn’t there a contradiction here?

The problem in my view is that imperialism is by its nature bloody, messy, and coercive. It is very difficult, therefore, for a departing imperial power to extricate itself without creating immense difficulties. There could have been civil war or even greater state collapse in 1946-47. So, yes, I guess you could say that there was nothing inherently wrong in Partition as one of many possible solutions to the problems that India faced during those months. There was a strong demand for Pakistan after all. And there had been terrible violence prior to August 1947 which some people believed the Partition would halt. The problem as I see it was in the manner of its implementation, which was absolutely appalling: there was a chronic shortage of information, it was enacted too quickly, there was almost no consideration of the rights of minorities and citizenship questions, and very little consensus about what exactly was being created: was it a permanent settlement? How were the princely states to be incorporated?

You savage the British for the way they handled the so-called “transfer of power” to India arguing that too exhausted after the Second World War to sustain the empire, they were in a hurry to leave and made no attempt to ensure an orderly transition. But you seem to let Indian political leaders off the hook rather lightly. Didn’t they bear any responsibility for losing the plot?

Of course Indian and Pakistani political leaders do bear some of the responsibility. There was ultimately a great stubborness and real failure to compromise between the Congress and the Muslim League and the reasons for this are still argued about to this day. I wanted, in this book, though, to try and move away from this blame-game and to reflect how the Indian and Pakistani politicians themselves were confused and badly informed in the conditions of 1947 and did not necessarily realise what the results of their actions would be. There was so much uncertainty in the rush to hand over power. Few people could guess what ideologies the future states would represent, where each state would be created, what the relations would be with the princely states, how the army would be split and so on. It took a few years for conditions to stabilise. Nowadays we are used to a world of nation-states but this was one of the first acts of decolonisation. Few even considered passports or border guards.

But, surely, Congress and Muslim League leaders could have done more to control the chaos which preceded Partition?

I think there is a distinction to be made. In 1946 and the first half of 1947 there were some very grave events in Bengal, Bihar, U.P., and Punjab in which there was direct complicity between politicians and so-called rioters particularly in the middle and lower tiers. Some of the language being used by politicians was inflammatory and extremely provocative. Police and civil servants were allowed to become partisan. Nationalist and volunteer groups had access to arms. There was a prominent political dimension to the violence and perpetrators may have also acted in the belief that they were doing the bidding of nationalist leaders. By August 1947 I think fear of what had been unleashed had set in among the politicians and they started to try and act in a more conciliatory manner; in August and September 1947 Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan (who was to become Pakistan’s first Prime Minister) were pulling out all the stops to try and halt the violence. The tragedy was that by this time it was too late.

You end the book saying that Partition “deserves renewed consideration and closer attention” suggesting that not enough work has been done. Why do you think that a political and human tragedy of such proportions — nearly one million people killed and 12 million displaced — has not been examined more extensively either in India or Pakistan?

There has been a brilliant outpouring of work about Partition in the past ten years by historians, anthropologists, and others. The older stories of the high politics of 1947 have been roundly challenged by a more fragmentary picture, which places the experiences of violence, dislocation, and refugee resettlement at the heart of the story where it belongs. I am thinking of the work of Mushirul Hasan, Urvashi Butalia, Ayesha Jalal, Joya Chatterji, and Gyanendra Pandey in particular. So there is certainly more work being done on the subject than ever before. There was a long delay before Partition was tackled as a ‘proper’ historical subject though after Independence: partly this was because of the unspoken traumas and shock of the events themselves and partly because nationalism and the glorification of the moment of Independence took primacy. This has shifted nowadays. It is still surprising that violence of such magnitude is not always fully understood outside South Asia: British narratives still often centre around Gandhi, Jinnah, Mountbatten, and the other key players. There is still plenty more to be said about experiences of Partition beyond Punjab, especially in Bengal which tends to get sidelined in histories of the time.

Although you were born and brought up in Britain, your father was a Pakistani and in that sense you have a Pakistani identity. How much of that has shaped your perceptions of creation of Pakistan and India-Pakistan relations?

I would not choose to describe myself through my nationality; if anything, my identity of choice would be as a Londoner! I have relatives and close friends in both India and Pakistan. My father was born in India and moved to Pakistan as a child. He later took British citizenship. My mother is white British. Having a mixed background has been a practical advantage as a historian.

It has meant that I’ve been able to spend time in both India and Pakistan; the shortage of visas is a real hindrance for historians who wish to do cross-border research. In my view Pakistan is a place of much more cultural and intellectual richness than it is usually credited for.

There is no way that the two countries can come to a solid and lasting peace without more people-to-people contact and real experience of life in the two countries; otherwise stereotypes and simplistic ideas of the ‘other’ get a hold on peoples imaginations.

http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/06/stories/2007080656071100.htm
 

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