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The volcano an Iran war would become
Icelands volcano Eyjafjallajokull recently created air travel chaos across Europe. Millions were affected and financial losses mounted during a time of global recession. This was a subtle reminder of the potential for bedlam in the event of a very different matter, namely conflict with Iran over its nuclear program.
Such a conflict would negatively affect commercial aviation around the Gulf littoral, leading to a loss of revenue; it would push civilians to attempt to escape a war zone in droves; and there is a remote possibility that it might bring about a nuclear escalation.
Past experiences are important to recall what might happen in the event of a new war. The 1991 Gulf war provides an example of the confusion and damage that can result from the sudden increase in smoke. Retreating Iraqi forces intentionally caused the release of crude petroleum from field production facilities and ignited more than 700 Kuwaiti oil fields to slow advancing Coalition forces. For fliers, the ensuing smoke imposed abrupt transitions from clear skies to instrument flying conditions. The weather also added to the problem, with oil-laden rain clogging engines of military equipment.
An Israeli or American or some form of combined attack against Iran would likely be concentrated on three locations: Isfahan, where Iran produces uranium hexafluoride gas; Natanz, where the gas is enriched in approximately half of the 8,000 centrifuges located there; and Arak, where a heavy-water research reactor, scheduled to come on line in 2012, would be ideal to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
It is possible that other sites, such as the Qom site, or centrifuge fabrication sites, the location or locations of which have not yet been identified, would also be targeted. The latter would be high-value targets since their destruction would hobble Irans ability to reconstitute its nuclear program. Plume analysis from a possible attack on these and other sites suggest that air and sea corridors around the Gulf would be severely affected. The length of time of the attack sequence and aftermath may also have lingering effects.
A military operation against Iran means that smoke and dust will have an impact on the Gulf Cooperation Council states just as much as Iran. Smoke in the field of operations, which can be used to cause confusion and impair vision, would disrupt civilian and military air operations. Water supplies in these areas of operations would be vulnerable to both intentional and accidental contamination.
The threat from chemical-laden smoke is greatest for commercial and military aircraft where prevailing winds are north-northwesterly most of the year, with the average wind speed of 5 meters per second.
The primary impact of this smoke would be on Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the waters of the Gulf and the air above. Since most operations in a war with Iran would be through air and sea, this means that commercial air and sea traffic in the Arabian Gulf would be severely affected, and most ports and airports in the region would possibly be forced to close down.
There is always the small possibility of war escalating to such a level that involved parties could resort to non-conventional weapons. Iran is believed to possess chemical and biological weapons and many Western states accuse it of developing nuclear capabilities. The new US nuclear doctrine holds that countries not adhering to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Iran, could be targeted with nuclear weapons in case of military conflict. Nuclear blasts would throw huge quantities of smoke and nuclear dust in the air forming nuclear clouds that would endanger lives and the environment.
The implications of a military confrontation with Iran for the GCC states means that planning now is necessary for determining how air routes and air space would be affected by warfare, including alternative air routes and the costs associated with them. This entails starting negotiations with other countries and airlines.
There is also a need to prepare a future public relations campaign that advertises that Emirates, Etihad, Qatar Air, Gulf Air, Oman Air and other airlines will run their operations as usual in order to avoid leaving a vacuum. Embassies must be prepared for an onslaught of nationals who may seek to leave the region and must ready plans for refugee support. Roads may become congested and traffic might bring land transportation to a standstill. Foods, water, and medicines need to be adequately stockpiled and kept refrigerated when needed.
Alternative sources for fruits, meats, and fish must be identified before an outbreak of hostilities, as a back-up plan to support the GCCs populations (the UAE is now implementing a plan to allow a three-month food supply in times of crises, which needs to be reproduced elsewhere). Many critical drugs, including insulin and a number of vaccines, are not made locally in the region and must be flown into the Gulf in special refrigerated containers.
Finally, anti-radiation measures must be prepared in the event, again a remote one, that a nuclear exchange occurs. Civil defense officials will need to plan extensively for decontamination procedures.
Overall, the emerging lessons-learned from Icelands Eyjafjallajokull volcano is a wake-up call for the likely impact of a regional conflict with Iran and the level of crisis management it would entail.
Riad Kahwaji is the CEO and Theodore Karasik is the director of research and development at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) in Beirut, Lebanon and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. They wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
Icelands volcano Eyjafjallajokull recently created air travel chaos across Europe. Millions were affected and financial losses mounted during a time of global recession. This was a subtle reminder of the potential for bedlam in the event of a very different matter, namely conflict with Iran over its nuclear program.
Such a conflict would negatively affect commercial aviation around the Gulf littoral, leading to a loss of revenue; it would push civilians to attempt to escape a war zone in droves; and there is a remote possibility that it might bring about a nuclear escalation.
Past experiences are important to recall what might happen in the event of a new war. The 1991 Gulf war provides an example of the confusion and damage that can result from the sudden increase in smoke. Retreating Iraqi forces intentionally caused the release of crude petroleum from field production facilities and ignited more than 700 Kuwaiti oil fields to slow advancing Coalition forces. For fliers, the ensuing smoke imposed abrupt transitions from clear skies to instrument flying conditions. The weather also added to the problem, with oil-laden rain clogging engines of military equipment.
An Israeli or American or some form of combined attack against Iran would likely be concentrated on three locations: Isfahan, where Iran produces uranium hexafluoride gas; Natanz, where the gas is enriched in approximately half of the 8,000 centrifuges located there; and Arak, where a heavy-water research reactor, scheduled to come on line in 2012, would be ideal to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
It is possible that other sites, such as the Qom site, or centrifuge fabrication sites, the location or locations of which have not yet been identified, would also be targeted. The latter would be high-value targets since their destruction would hobble Irans ability to reconstitute its nuclear program. Plume analysis from a possible attack on these and other sites suggest that air and sea corridors around the Gulf would be severely affected. The length of time of the attack sequence and aftermath may also have lingering effects.
A military operation against Iran means that smoke and dust will have an impact on the Gulf Cooperation Council states just as much as Iran. Smoke in the field of operations, which can be used to cause confusion and impair vision, would disrupt civilian and military air operations. Water supplies in these areas of operations would be vulnerable to both intentional and accidental contamination.
The threat from chemical-laden smoke is greatest for commercial and military aircraft where prevailing winds are north-northwesterly most of the year, with the average wind speed of 5 meters per second.
The primary impact of this smoke would be on Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the waters of the Gulf and the air above. Since most operations in a war with Iran would be through air and sea, this means that commercial air and sea traffic in the Arabian Gulf would be severely affected, and most ports and airports in the region would possibly be forced to close down.
There is always the small possibility of war escalating to such a level that involved parties could resort to non-conventional weapons. Iran is believed to possess chemical and biological weapons and many Western states accuse it of developing nuclear capabilities. The new US nuclear doctrine holds that countries not adhering to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Iran, could be targeted with nuclear weapons in case of military conflict. Nuclear blasts would throw huge quantities of smoke and nuclear dust in the air forming nuclear clouds that would endanger lives and the environment.
The implications of a military confrontation with Iran for the GCC states means that planning now is necessary for determining how air routes and air space would be affected by warfare, including alternative air routes and the costs associated with them. This entails starting negotiations with other countries and airlines.
There is also a need to prepare a future public relations campaign that advertises that Emirates, Etihad, Qatar Air, Gulf Air, Oman Air and other airlines will run their operations as usual in order to avoid leaving a vacuum. Embassies must be prepared for an onslaught of nationals who may seek to leave the region and must ready plans for refugee support. Roads may become congested and traffic might bring land transportation to a standstill. Foods, water, and medicines need to be adequately stockpiled and kept refrigerated when needed.
Alternative sources for fruits, meats, and fish must be identified before an outbreak of hostilities, as a back-up plan to support the GCCs populations (the UAE is now implementing a plan to allow a three-month food supply in times of crises, which needs to be reproduced elsewhere). Many critical drugs, including insulin and a number of vaccines, are not made locally in the region and must be flown into the Gulf in special refrigerated containers.
Finally, anti-radiation measures must be prepared in the event, again a remote one, that a nuclear exchange occurs. Civil defense officials will need to plan extensively for decontamination procedures.
Overall, the emerging lessons-learned from Icelands Eyjafjallajokull volcano is a wake-up call for the likely impact of a regional conflict with Iran and the level of crisis management it would entail.
Riad Kahwaji is the CEO and Theodore Karasik is the director of research and development at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) in Beirut, Lebanon and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. They wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
