The US wants to reform Pakistan’s spy agency: so do I

[BanglaBhoot]

Shaukat Qadir

Throughout the summer, the United States has been increasing the pressure on the Pakistan government to do something about the ISI – the Inter Services Intelligence agency – the country’s premier intelligence gathering and analysis organisation. US officials shuttling between Washington and Islamabad all privately stressed the need for reform, and two weeks ago, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Richard Boucher, openly addressed the subject. “As long as you have organisations [by which he meant the ISI], or pieces of organisations, that work in different directions, then it’s harder for the government to accomplish the goal” of defeating terrorists, he is reported to have said.

For once, the White House is right. Even though, in my opinion, the siege of the Red Mosque last year was deliberately permitted to get out of control by the then president Pervez Musharaf – in an attempt to prove his indispensability – and the attack on the Marriott hotel last month was a security failure, that does not imply that the ISI does not need restructuring.

Like all countries round the world, each of the three military services have their own intelligence services, but the ISI is at the top of the tree. Its task could be worded as “assessing threats to the nation and carrying out such intelligence and counter intelligence operations as sanctioned by the government”. Its intelligence gathering role is not confined to military and security matters; it also covers economic, industrial and diplomatic areas, and includes considering the long-term outcomes of different policies.

With such a wide remit, I would argue that the first thing that needs to be changed is its name. Its function is far more than mere inter services intelligence, so give it a name that corresponds to its duties, such as the Bureau of National Intelligence.

At the moment, because the name implies a reliance on and responsibility to the services, it is primarily staffed by service personnel, frequently with no worthwhile intelligence background. In fact, very few career officers – those going places – used to be posted to intelligence assignments (although that has been altering). This, too, needs to change.

The next aspect to consider is the key job of Director General. Traditionally, the DG has been a serving two- or three-star officer, often with no intelligence background, who does a couple of years before moving on. Intelligence is a specialised business; it needs someone with a flair for the devious intricacies of such a shadowy world, and he needs a sufficiently long term to make policies and see them implemented. By comparison, the director of the CIA serves at the discretion of the President, and the head of Mossad, eight years. I would suggest that it would be appropriate for the reformed agency to be headed by an individual – civilian or military – serving for not less than five years and not exceeding eight.

Currently, when we have a serving three-star general (a Lt-Gen) as the DG, subordinate departments are headed by two-star officers (Maj-Gens) – these too are career officers who will do their couple of years before moving on. I strongly suggest that these should be civilians, selected for their flair for intelligence work, contracted for at least 10 years.

In fact, I believe that the “civilianisation” of the reformed agency should be extended until it is essentially no longer a military-manned body. In all probability there would be a number of service personnel who might like to stay on. This should be encouraged if they are suitably qualified, but on the understanding that they will lose their military affiliation.

All national intelligence organisations all over the world employ military personnel, specialists in their field in advisory capacities; so should Pakistan’s. Some of them even have regular troops placed at their disposal for special operations; the two prominent examples being the CIA and Mossad. Both bodies enjoy special authority to undertake operations on their own, which would more normally be undertaken by the military. The needs of Pakistan – and most other countries – are more modest, and have no real need for special forces need to be placed at their disposal.

If the restructuring recommended here is undertaken, the ISI, under whatever title is chosen for it, will be pruned and converted into an efficient national intelligence agency, manned and led by specialists, instead of the current ad hoc arrangements.

Moreover, having been de-linked from the military, particularly the army, there will be no possibility of it undertaking “rogue operations”. And there will be a second, more theoretical advantage: the army will lose one major support to its perceived political clout in the country, possibly diminishing the prospects of another military takeover.

This may not be the restructuring that the Americans were thinking of when they made their demands, since they are perpetually seeking a “quick fix”, but it is the restructuring that Pakistan needs.

An immediate beginning could be made by finding qualified civilians to fill the posts held presently by serving two- and three-star officers. President Asif Ali Zardari might think he can counter-balance the popularity of Gen Ashfaq Kyani, the Chief of the Army Staff, by appointing his own man – Lt-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha – as the Director General of the ISI, but he fails to appreciate that there are career officers serving under him who still have their first loyalty to the army and the COAS. This restructuring is in the president’s long term interest as well.

Brig-Gen Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistan army officer

The US wants to reform Pakistan’s spy agency: so do I - The National Newspaper