BanglaBhoot
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The US-Arab Alliance to Contain Iran
Rekha Chakravarthi and Srinjoy Bose
Research Officers,
IPCS - August 14, 2007
On 30 June 2007, the Bush administration announced an arms package of US$63 billion to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States along with Israel, aimed at containing Iran's growing influence. The deal was justified by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, at a conference in the Gulf when she said: "There isn't a doubt that Iran constitutes the single most important single-country strategic challenge to the United States and to the kind of Middle East we want to see". The arms package involves US$20 billion for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, US$13 billion for Egypt, US$30 billion for Israel, including warships for the Saudis' eastern fleet that faces the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf.
As can be inferred from the above statement, the US is increasingly concerned with Iran's growing political influence, not least interference, in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. American (as well as Israel's) suspicion of Iranian motives stems from a number of factors. To begin with, the US views Iran's nuclear gambit with extreme caution, firm in its belief that the latter is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. The second most pressing concern for the US is Iran's alleged provocative role in fueling the insurgency in Iraq by buttressing Shia militants (whether militarily or financially), thereby undermining American efforts to stabilize the nation. Finally, Iran's support for anti-Israeli militant organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, widely considered to be Iranian proxies.
Many Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, fear sectarian violence (if unchecked) may spill over into neighbouring states, thereby threatening their Arab identity (vis-à-vis Sunni dominance). Subsequently, Saudi Arabia, has bolstered Sunni insurgents against Shia militias. The US, for the first time, voiced its contempt recently against the weapons, finances and personnel flowing into Iraq from many Arab states in support of Sunni insurgents, arguing it undermines stabilization efforts. In essence, the deal may be considered a quid pro quo for Saudi restraint. Top US officials have in fact stressed the deal is an attempt to reassure their Arab allies by insuring them against a possible fallout of the ongoing sectarian war. It may also be viewed as a contingency against retaliatory attacks from Iran, should there be a US or US-Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities or the Revolutionary Guard Units aiding Shia insurgents in Iraq. Finally, the deal also provides a security-blanket to Israel should the new arms supplied to the Arab States be turned against the former. Most importantly, the deal is an indication that the United States intends to keep a presence in the region in case of an eventual withdrawal from Iraq.
Many analysts, however, have criticized this deal and see it as a last resort in anticipation of failure of Washington's policies with regard to Iraq and Iran. An emerging American-led alliance comprising of so-called 'moderate' Arab regimes can be likened to a Middle Eastern version of NATO. This strategy to counter Iran appears to have drawn inspiration from the Cold War text. Washington is simultaneously aiming to contain Iran and compel it to squander money on an arms race, thereby further jeopardizing Tehran's economy. The Washington-Tehran antagonism may run parallel to the Moscow-Washington fiasco, however, the US is overlooking certain imperatives. Iran's increasing clout in the region is not because of its military muscle but the manner in which it has wielded power by way of supporting militias throughout the region, thereby challenging the Israeli and American command. Moreover, Iran is the only state in the region apart from the US, bolstering a Shia government in Iraq. A Time magazine story in August 2005 reported that the Iranian assistance to Shiite insurgents was "dwarfed by the amount of money and material flowing in from Iraq's Arab neighbours to Sunni insurgents". Therefore, arming Iran's Sunni-Arab neighbours does nothing to resolve the conundrum, especially when there have been reports that most of the suicide bombers in Iraq are Saudi citizens.
If the US finalizes the deal, the weapons sales will undoubtedly encourage Iran to hurry in developing its arms technology. Iran may also seek weapons from Russia and China more aggressively. Consequently the American dream of promoting democracy in the region will witness a premature death. A US-Iran confrontation is likely to unleash greater upheaval in the region and accelerate the course of sectarian aggression in Iraq. The US would do well by realizing that this deal will provide more breeding space for radical Sunni groups vehemently opposed to American, Iranian and Shiite influence. Moreover, given the manner in which arms have been previously proliferated across borders in the region, the probability of their being stashed by militant groups remain high. It is time Washington appreciates that massive military equipment induction is not the road to peace in the region. Instead it should work in cooperation with all of Iraq's neighbours, including Iran and Syria, to counter the consequences of withdrawing from Iraq.
Rekha Chakravarthi and Srinjoy Bose
Research Officers,
IPCS - August 14, 2007
On 30 June 2007, the Bush administration announced an arms package of US$63 billion to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States along with Israel, aimed at containing Iran's growing influence. The deal was justified by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, at a conference in the Gulf when she said: "There isn't a doubt that Iran constitutes the single most important single-country strategic challenge to the United States and to the kind of Middle East we want to see". The arms package involves US$20 billion for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, US$13 billion for Egypt, US$30 billion for Israel, including warships for the Saudis' eastern fleet that faces the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf.
As can be inferred from the above statement, the US is increasingly concerned with Iran's growing political influence, not least interference, in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. American (as well as Israel's) suspicion of Iranian motives stems from a number of factors. To begin with, the US views Iran's nuclear gambit with extreme caution, firm in its belief that the latter is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. The second most pressing concern for the US is Iran's alleged provocative role in fueling the insurgency in Iraq by buttressing Shia militants (whether militarily or financially), thereby undermining American efforts to stabilize the nation. Finally, Iran's support for anti-Israeli militant organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, widely considered to be Iranian proxies.
Many Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, fear sectarian violence (if unchecked) may spill over into neighbouring states, thereby threatening their Arab identity (vis-à-vis Sunni dominance). Subsequently, Saudi Arabia, has bolstered Sunni insurgents against Shia militias. The US, for the first time, voiced its contempt recently against the weapons, finances and personnel flowing into Iraq from many Arab states in support of Sunni insurgents, arguing it undermines stabilization efforts. In essence, the deal may be considered a quid pro quo for Saudi restraint. Top US officials have in fact stressed the deal is an attempt to reassure their Arab allies by insuring them against a possible fallout of the ongoing sectarian war. It may also be viewed as a contingency against retaliatory attacks from Iran, should there be a US or US-Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities or the Revolutionary Guard Units aiding Shia insurgents in Iraq. Finally, the deal also provides a security-blanket to Israel should the new arms supplied to the Arab States be turned against the former. Most importantly, the deal is an indication that the United States intends to keep a presence in the region in case of an eventual withdrawal from Iraq.
Many analysts, however, have criticized this deal and see it as a last resort in anticipation of failure of Washington's policies with regard to Iraq and Iran. An emerging American-led alliance comprising of so-called 'moderate' Arab regimes can be likened to a Middle Eastern version of NATO. This strategy to counter Iran appears to have drawn inspiration from the Cold War text. Washington is simultaneously aiming to contain Iran and compel it to squander money on an arms race, thereby further jeopardizing Tehran's economy. The Washington-Tehran antagonism may run parallel to the Moscow-Washington fiasco, however, the US is overlooking certain imperatives. Iran's increasing clout in the region is not because of its military muscle but the manner in which it has wielded power by way of supporting militias throughout the region, thereby challenging the Israeli and American command. Moreover, Iran is the only state in the region apart from the US, bolstering a Shia government in Iraq. A Time magazine story in August 2005 reported that the Iranian assistance to Shiite insurgents was "dwarfed by the amount of money and material flowing in from Iraq's Arab neighbours to Sunni insurgents". Therefore, arming Iran's Sunni-Arab neighbours does nothing to resolve the conundrum, especially when there have been reports that most of the suicide bombers in Iraq are Saudi citizens.
If the US finalizes the deal, the weapons sales will undoubtedly encourage Iran to hurry in developing its arms technology. Iran may also seek weapons from Russia and China more aggressively. Consequently the American dream of promoting democracy in the region will witness a premature death. A US-Iran confrontation is likely to unleash greater upheaval in the region and accelerate the course of sectarian aggression in Iraq. The US would do well by realizing that this deal will provide more breeding space for radical Sunni groups vehemently opposed to American, Iranian and Shiite influence. Moreover, given the manner in which arms have been previously proliferated across borders in the region, the probability of their being stashed by militant groups remain high. It is time Washington appreciates that massive military equipment induction is not the road to peace in the region. Instead it should work in cooperation with all of Iraq's neighbours, including Iran and Syria, to counter the consequences of withdrawing from Iraq.
i mean he really thinks he can take the U.s. on. i say fine continue enrichment if u want, ya it is ur right and we dunno if u really want nuclear weapons anyway the same way we did'nt knw about iraq but don't make comments about blowing israel off the map wen all the foreign nations wanna screw ur country. Just think about national interest and try to win the world rather than scaring other ppl into believing that u will do sumthin u can't or won't! 
