F-22Raptor
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If China invades Taiwan, it must win quickly—or risk losing.
If the invasion drags out more than a few days, U.S. forces could intervene. And if that happens, the Chinese military could find itself at a major disadvantage for one simple reason.
The U.S. Air Force and Navy have tankers and catapults. The Chinese air force and navy don’t.
Aerial-refueling tankers help to extend the range of American fighters, while catapults allow carrier-launched U.S. fighters to take off with full loads of weapons and fuel.
Conversely, a lack of tankers and catapults means China’s own warplanes can fly only so far and fight only so long with only so many weapons.
Beijing is making efforts to remedy these shortfalls. But the efforts are piecemeal.
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan likely would target accessible beaches on the island country’s southwestern plain.
The first major obstacle for the Chinese is Taiwan’s garrison on the island of Penghu, halfway between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. If a Chinese fleet goes around Penghu, the Taiwanese troops could lob missiles at the fleet’s flank.
If Beijing commits to seizing Penghu before striking Taiwan’s main island, the fight for Penghu could delay the overall invasion long enough for the U.S. Air Force to reinforce and spin up its air wing at Kadena on Japan’s southernmost prefecture Okinawa. Meanwhile two or three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, sailing from Japan and San Diego, could steam into the China Seas.
American reinforcements could alter the rhythm of the battle. Chinese forces might find themselves on the defensive. And Chinese fighters—flying from land bases along China’s coast as well as from the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s two ski-jump aircraft carriers—would suffer range and endurance constraints compared to their American rivals.
The map below illustrates the problem. USAF F-15s flying from Kadena, in particular could range as far north as Beijing and as far south as Vietnam with meaningful weapons-loads thanks to the Air Force’s hundreds of KC-135 tankers. Air Force F-22s and F-35s could patrol the East China Sea and the fringes of the South China and Yellow Seas.
Chinese fighters, by contrast, would struggle to fly farther east than Luzon, the northernmost island of the Philippines. Beijing’s island outposts could help extend the range of the few planes those outposts could support, but the main force of fighters, flying from land, would have essentially no aerial-refueling support. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force possesses just three Il-78 tankers.
Three tankers. For an air force with more than a thousand fighters. The U.S. Air Force by contrast has 1,900 fighters and 500 tankers.
America’s tankers give it options. Deploying tankers just behind the line of battle would allow fighters to fly slightly farther than normal and remain in the fight longer. A chain of tankers could project a small force of fighters potentially 2,000 miles.
China doesn’t have the same options. Its land-based fighters are locked into fairly predictable deployment patterns, operating no farther than a thousand miles or so from the Chinese coast.
The disparity is even greater at sea. The U.S. Navy’s supercarriers with their steam catapults can launch F/A-18 fighters with full loads of weapons and fuel, allowing the fighters to patrol as far away as 600 miles. A boost from the carrier air wings’ own recovery tankers or the Air Force’s KC-135s could add hundreds of miles to that range.
The Chinese navy’s two carriers don’t have catapults. Their J-15 fighters launch by way of an elevated ramp. That low-energy launch-method limits how much weight the J-15s can carry. Some estimates put a lightly-armed J-15’s combat radius at just 375 miles. And there are almost no Chinese air force tankers to help out.
The upshot is that American air power in the Western Pacific can range father and deploy in more unpredictable ways than Chinese air power can do.
There are things Beijing can do to mitigate its aerial disadvantage. It can bombard Kadena with ballistic missiles. It can target the Americans’ carriers.
But those countermeasures consume resources and invite counter-countermeasures. Lob ballistic missiles at USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Theodore Roosevelt’s battle group is likely to toss a few cruise missile back your way.
China seems to realize it suffers a profound mobility disadvantage during an offensive campaign. It’s not for no reason that the Chinese fleet is installing catapults on its third aircraft carrier, currently under construction in Shanghai.
Likewise, there are rumors the Chinese air force might develop a tanker version of its new Y-20 airlifter.
But Beijing is playing catch-up—and maybe losing. By the time the PLAN has a catapult-equipped carrier, the U.S. Navy will have tanker drones aboard its own carriers.
Absent a profound and sudden political or technological shift, Chinese leaders still face an unhappy dilemma as they continue to demand “reunification” of China and Taiwan. If they force the issue, they must do so very fast.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...iwan-the-chinese-can-send-three/#752bf7e120dd
If the invasion drags out more than a few days, U.S. forces could intervene. And if that happens, the Chinese military could find itself at a major disadvantage for one simple reason.
The U.S. Air Force and Navy have tankers and catapults. The Chinese air force and navy don’t.
Aerial-refueling tankers help to extend the range of American fighters, while catapults allow carrier-launched U.S. fighters to take off with full loads of weapons and fuel.
Conversely, a lack of tankers and catapults means China’s own warplanes can fly only so far and fight only so long with only so many weapons.
Beijing is making efforts to remedy these shortfalls. But the efforts are piecemeal.
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan likely would target accessible beaches on the island country’s southwestern plain.
The first major obstacle for the Chinese is Taiwan’s garrison on the island of Penghu, halfway between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. If a Chinese fleet goes around Penghu, the Taiwanese troops could lob missiles at the fleet’s flank.
If Beijing commits to seizing Penghu before striking Taiwan’s main island, the fight for Penghu could delay the overall invasion long enough for the U.S. Air Force to reinforce and spin up its air wing at Kadena on Japan’s southernmost prefecture Okinawa. Meanwhile two or three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, sailing from Japan and San Diego, could steam into the China Seas.
American reinforcements could alter the rhythm of the battle. Chinese forces might find themselves on the defensive. And Chinese fighters—flying from land bases along China’s coast as well as from the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s two ski-jump aircraft carriers—would suffer range and endurance constraints compared to their American rivals.
The map below illustrates the problem. USAF F-15s flying from Kadena, in particular could range as far north as Beijing and as far south as Vietnam with meaningful weapons-loads thanks to the Air Force’s hundreds of KC-135 tankers. Air Force F-22s and F-35s could patrol the East China Sea and the fringes of the South China and Yellow Seas.
Chinese fighters, by contrast, would struggle to fly farther east than Luzon, the northernmost island of the Philippines. Beijing’s island outposts could help extend the range of the few planes those outposts could support, but the main force of fighters, flying from land, would have essentially no aerial-refueling support. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force possesses just three Il-78 tankers.
Three tankers. For an air force with more than a thousand fighters. The U.S. Air Force by contrast has 1,900 fighters and 500 tankers.
America’s tankers give it options. Deploying tankers just behind the line of battle would allow fighters to fly slightly farther than normal and remain in the fight longer. A chain of tankers could project a small force of fighters potentially 2,000 miles.
China doesn’t have the same options. Its land-based fighters are locked into fairly predictable deployment patterns, operating no farther than a thousand miles or so from the Chinese coast.
The disparity is even greater at sea. The U.S. Navy’s supercarriers with their steam catapults can launch F/A-18 fighters with full loads of weapons and fuel, allowing the fighters to patrol as far away as 600 miles. A boost from the carrier air wings’ own recovery tankers or the Air Force’s KC-135s could add hundreds of miles to that range.
The Chinese navy’s two carriers don’t have catapults. Their J-15 fighters launch by way of an elevated ramp. That low-energy launch-method limits how much weight the J-15s can carry. Some estimates put a lightly-armed J-15’s combat radius at just 375 miles. And there are almost no Chinese air force tankers to help out.
The upshot is that American air power in the Western Pacific can range father and deploy in more unpredictable ways than Chinese air power can do.
There are things Beijing can do to mitigate its aerial disadvantage. It can bombard Kadena with ballistic missiles. It can target the Americans’ carriers.
But those countermeasures consume resources and invite counter-countermeasures. Lob ballistic missiles at USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Theodore Roosevelt’s battle group is likely to toss a few cruise missile back your way.
China seems to realize it suffers a profound mobility disadvantage during an offensive campaign. It’s not for no reason that the Chinese fleet is installing catapults on its third aircraft carrier, currently under construction in Shanghai.
Likewise, there are rumors the Chinese air force might develop a tanker version of its new Y-20 airlifter.
But Beijing is playing catch-up—and maybe losing. By the time the PLAN has a catapult-equipped carrier, the U.S. Navy will have tanker drones aboard its own carriers.
Absent a profound and sudden political or technological shift, Chinese leaders still face an unhappy dilemma as they continue to demand “reunification” of China and Taiwan. If they force the issue, they must do so very fast.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...iwan-the-chinese-can-send-three/#752bf7e120dd
