What's new

The Road to War (Part III: The Balance of Power in a Multi-Polar World)

LeveragedBuyout

SENIOR MEMBER
Joined
May 16, 2014
Messages
1,958
Reaction score
60
Country
United States
Location
United States
This is part 3 in a continuing series. While Part I: Trade deals with the pressures of globalization, and the dangers inherent in turning away from globalized trade, and Part II: the Thucydides Trap deals with the specific possibility of a transition from Pax Americana to a Chinese-dominated world order, Part III: The Balance of Power in a Multi-Polar World will explore how shifting and unstable alliances can precipitate conflict that may involuntarily draw in the Great Powers. With the members of the "Free World" coalition no longer agreeing on their common purpose, and abstentions and defections occurring with increasing frequency, we are beginning to see the re-emergence of a multi-polar world after an exceptional period of several decades. Will this increase the likelihood of conflict, as history has shown, or will it bring about stability, as so many here predict?

The Road to War (Part I: Trade)
The Road to War (Part II: The Thucydides Trap)
The Road to War (Part III: The Balance of Power in a Multi-Polar World) - This thread

---

The Congress of Vienna Revisited by Dominique Moisi - Project Syndicate

017b89ae971b3f827c1bf2da81c12ad5.png
POLITICS
1a7218d9b2891ddcabbea39ad55d5d9d.png

DOMINIQUE MOISI
Dominique Moisi is Senior Adviser at The French Institute for International Affairs (IFRI) and a professor at L'Institut d’études politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). He is the author of The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World.

SEP 25, 2014
The Congress of Vienna Revisited
PARIS – Two hundred years ago, on September 25, 1814, Russia’s Czar Alexander I and Friedrich Wilhelm III, the King of Prussia, were greeted at the gates of Vienna by Austria’s Emperor Franz I. The start of the Congress of Vienna ushered in the longest period of peace Europe had known for centuries. So why has its anniversary all but been ignored?

True, the Congress of Vienna is mostly viewed as marking the victory of Europe’s reactionary forces after the defeat of Napoleon. Yet, given today’s growing global confusion, if not chaos, something like “Proustian” nostalgia for the Congress may not be out of order. Here, after all, was a meeting that, through tough but successful negotiations, reestablished international order after the upheavals caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Can we apply any of its lessons today?

To answer that question, we should consider not just the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, but also the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, each of which in its own way brought to an end a bloody chapter in European history.

The treaties signed in 1648 concluded nearly a century of religious warfare by enshrining the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (“whose realm, his religion”). The Congress of Vienna reinstated the principle of the balance of power, based on the belief that all parties shared a common interest transcending their respective ambitions, and re-established the Concert of Nations, which for two generations stopped territorial and ideological revisionism of the type seen from 1789 to 1815. By contrast, the Treaty of Versailles, too harsh to be honored and too weak to be enforced, paved the way for World War II.

Of the three treaties, the one produced by the Congress of Vienna offers a sort of mirror image to help us understand the specificity of our current conditions. In Vienna, the European powers were among themselves. Their feeling of belonging to a great and unified family was reinforced by the common aristocratic origins of their diplomats. The cultural “other” was not an issue.

Of course, the ambition today cannot be to recreate that world (or to reestablish an anachronistic Westphalian order of religious separation), but rather to devise a new order predicated on different assumptions. Indeed, one of the keys to our current global disorder is that, in contrast to the Congress of Vienna – or, for that matter, the parties of 1648 – the international system’s main actors are not united by a common will to defend the status quo.

The main actors fall into three categories: open revisionists, like Russia and the Islamic State; those ready to fight to protect a minimum of order, such as the United States, France, and Great Britain; and ambivalent states – including key regional players in the Middle East, such as Turkey and Iran – whose actions fail to match their rhetoric.

In such a divided context, the alliance of “moderates” created by US President Barack Obama to defeat the Islamic State – a group that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – is weak at best. A multicultural coalition is probably a requirement of legitimate military action in the Middle East; the dilemma is that unless Obama’s regional coalition broadens considerably, his current allies’ enthusiasm for US military intervention is likely to diminish quickly.

Or perhaps something like the “bipolar hegemony” of Great Britain and Russia after 1815 (though other players like Austria, Prussia, and France mattered) could be reconstituted, with the US and China substituting for Great Britain and Russia. This seems to be Henry Kissinger’s ultimate dream – a dream that one can glimpse in his latest book, Germanically entitled World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History.

But can we depend on that dream’s realization? At a time when we are confronted by Russian expansionism and the extremism of messianic thugs, the lessons from the Congress of Vienna may seem distant and irrelevant. Yet one is obvious: States possess common interests that should trump national priorities.

China, India, and Brazil are stakeholders in the world system, which means that they, too, need a minimum of order. But that implies that they also contribute to maintaining it. China’s interests, for example, would be best served not by playing Russia against the US, but by choosing the party of order over the party of disorder.

A gathering of the modern equivalents of Metternich, Castlereagh, Alexander I, and Talleyrand is also a dream: there are none. But, in confronting today’s growing disorder and escalating violence, the leaders we have would do well to draw some inspiration from their forebears, who 200 years ago this week opened the way to nearly a century of peace.

The Congress of Vienna Revisited by Dominique Moisi - Project Syndicate


Read more at The Congress of Vienna Revisited by Dominique Moisi - Project Syndicate
 
There will be no single country dominating the world. The UN will be a valid and trustworthy world government.

There is no anti-christ coming or in existence today. Rather, each generation of humanity (especally after 2012, the year of planetary alignments) hides many minor satan-sent antichritst and many more "incarnated angels" (that's an honorary title!) keeping these anti-christs in check.

And while Mohammed The Prophet was the last Prophet sent to Earth by God, who works under many names as Satan does, Mohammed will NOT be the VERY LAST Prophet sent by God.

The time that Prophets were killed by humanity has also passed out of existence. Post 2012 is the time of enlightenment, and this could last a LOT longer than 1000 years..

I do not claim to be a prophet. I do not want to be a Prophet, and I sure won't be writing a bible or pieces of text that can be compiled into a bible by the corrupt after I leave this current body of mine towards the heaven of my Christian God.
 
Ramshackle Army at Odds with Berlin's Global Aspirations - SPIEGEL ONLINE


ddae052920878d40250901d4c1a4ec50._.gif
nm_trck.gif

09/30/2014 04:59 PM
Germany's Disarmed Forces
Ramshackle Military at Odds with Global Aspirations
By SPIEGEL Staff

Germany wants to strengthen its role in international affairs. But recent reports suggest the country's weapons systems are in such disrepair that Berlin actually has very little to offer its partners.

Last week, a single person pushed Germany's air force to the very limits of its capacities: Ursula von der Leyen, the country's defense minister. Von der Leyen requested that two Transall military transport aircraft with missile defense systems be transferred to Amman, the Jordanian capital. The defense minister and a pool of reporters then flew for eight hours on Thursday morning in one of the aircraft to Erbil in Iraq's Kurdish region. Back in Germany, the military had but a single additional Transall at its disposal.

After her arrival in Erbil, von der Leyen proceeded to the palace of the Kurdish regional government's president. Her visit was to be concurrent with the delivery of German weapons, intended to aid the Kurds in their fight against Islamic State jihadists. Unfortunately, the machine guns and bazookas got stuck in Germany and the trainers in Bulgaria because of a dearth of available aircraft. One had been grounded because of a massive fuel leak. What could have been a shining moment for the minister instead turned into an embarrassing failure underscoring the miserable state of many of the Bundeswehr's most important weapons systems.

No other member of the government has been pushing as hard for Germany to increase its role abroad since taking office last year than von der Leyen. From the very start of her term, she has sought to distance herself from the "military reserve" preached by conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel and by former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. It is an approach which most notoriously manifested itself in Germany's abstention during the UN vote to conduct air strikes against Libya in 2011. At the Munich Security Conference in January, von der Leyen even proclaimed that "indifference is not an option for a country like Germany."

In recent weeks, von der Leyen has made it clear that Germany also has an obligation to intervene militarily if the threat of genocide exists somewhere. "Germany is even damned to take accept greater responsibility," she said, alluding to the country's difficult history. Von der Leyen wants to transform the Bundeswehr, the country's armed forces, into an intervention army capable of mastering deployments like those in Kosovo or Afghanistan. But the idea of deterrence based on powerful combat units and heavy weapons has also gained currency as a result of the crisis in Ukraine.

Little to Offer in Berlin

Against that backdrop and pressure from the international community, the ramshackle state of the Bundeswehr is no laughing matter in Berlin. At the moment, if Germany's allies were to ask it to step up its participation in deployments in the Baltic states or Iraq, for example, Chancellor Merkel would likely have to politely pass, creating a highly embarrassing situation for the country. For the moment, though, most pressure related to the Bundeswehr's ailments has been directed at von der Leyen. Her critics argue that she has pursued a foreign and security policy vision that goes beyond the Bundeswehr's actual capabilities. Now she faces additional criticism that she tried to play down the military's problems to members of parliament even though senior officials in her ministry were well aware of major shortcomings in the armed forces.

"Contrary to her own list of needed equipment, she created the impression in parliament that anything that could drive, fly or float was capable of full deployment," said Rainer Arnold, the defense policy spokesman for the center-left Social Democrats (SPD). "But we members of parliament will not be taken for idiots."

The defense minister hasn't exactly been blind-sided by the criticism either -- she's known about the problems since before entering office almost a year ago. On Friday, she summoned the heads of the German army, navy and air force as well as the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr to her office for five hours of questioning, much of it centering on events in parliament last Wednesday.

Major Deficiencies

In a hearing of the defense committee, the Bundeswehr General Inspector and other senior representatives of the military and the defense ministry presented the state of affairs to members of parliament. The committee had sought additional information after SPIEGEL reported in August about major deficiencies in the operational capability of important German weapons systems. On Wednesday, members of the committee reviewed a paper that provided a color-coded green, yellow and red classifications based on an assessment of the operational capability of the 22 main weapons systems used by the army, navy and air force.

It appears that the paper included a considerable amount of misleading information and that the military might even be in worse shape than that presented by the officials.

High-ranking military officials involved had the option of giving a seemingly arbitrary green, yellow or red classification for systems for which their unit had responsibility. Germany's lone deployable submarine (of four) received a yellow rating. Seventy of the country's 180 Boxer armored combat vehicles were deemed unfit for deployment. Defense Ministry sources also told SPIEGEL that Bundeswehr General Inspector Volker Wieker even made last-minute changes to the color codes on some of the systems. Meanwhile, air force chief Karl Müllner made clear in remarks to members of the committee that, despite green dots signifying equipment was working, his forces were only capable of conducting current missions and did not have the capacity for any new ones. Officials at the ministry stated that the "classification system used is based on a combination of availability for deployment and training as well as consideration for the ability to fulfill the mission."

But some of the criteria seemed arbitrary, with no apparent rules on the time frames used for measuring the weapons systems' operational readiness. A good example is the NH90 helicopter. The report measured the operational capability for these aircraft during the months of April, May and June, a time when most were still flying. A current list from sources close to the manufacturer indicate that all but two of 33 helicopters have since been grounded.

The situation is similar with the navy's Sealynx helicopter, of which only four can apparently fly. In order to improve the aircraft's ranking in the overview, the period used for the averaging was October 2013 through September 2014. However, by the end of June, all of the aircraft had been grounded because of construction defects.

Bundeswehr - Operational Capability of Select Weapons Systems
Weapons SystemTotal NumberAvailableDeployable
Tiger helicopter31*1010
NH90 helicopter33*88
Sea King helicopter21153
Sea Lynx helicopter22184
CH53 helicopter834316
Eurofighter fighter jet1097442
Tornado fighter jet896638
K130 corvette522
U212 submarine411
Frigates1187
Marder tank406280280
Boxer tank1807070
Total stock = all procured units
Available = in operation, including systems currently out of service because of maintenance or repair
Deployable = can be used immediately for missions, exercises or training

*includes pre-production models
Source: Bundeswehr German Armed Forces


The ministry also didn't distinguish between "full" or "conditional" operational capability. But this is an important distinction, because when the German federal parliament votes on whether the Bundeswehr can engage in a foreign deployment, it only allows equipment to be sent that is fully operational. And that's where the deficiencies start to stack up. For example, on the list given to the parliamentarians, 16 CH53 transport helicopters are listed, but a previous air force internal report distributed to the Defense Ministry in August stated that only 7 were "fully" operational. With the Eurofighter fighter jet, Wednesday's official list for parliament stated that 42 aircraft were ready for deployment, but the August air force report stated that only eight were "fully" capable of operation. Despite these discrepancies, the Defense Ministry is still standing behind its official list, with officials claiming it provides a "meaningful overview of the situation."

It's an assessment not shared by parliamentarians. "We called on the ministry to tell us how this list came to be and the criteria used to produce it," said Tobias Lindner, a fiscal policy expert with the Green Party.

Under the Gun

The minister herself is also reported to be upset about the report, sentiment she shared with the generals reporting to her last Friday. The inspectors were forced to report directly to von der Leyen about their weapons systems and will now be required to appear before the defense minister once every two weeks. She is also demanding that they explain how they reached their conclusions about the operational capability of the weapons systems in question.

The Bundeswehr's general inspector showed von der Leyen the report for parliament before last Wednesday's hearing, but the condition of weapons systems shouldn't have come as a surprise to senior Defense Ministry officials. Heads of the ministry had been alerted to the many problems in a memo dating August 12 that also included a copy of the internal air force report. Ultimately, those figures were not used in the report given to parliament, and critics argue the Defense Ministry should have provided more differentiated information to the elected officials.

In that August letter, officials in the Defense Ministry blamed the bottlenecks on repair times that had been delayed despite commitments to complete them and on the inability to find replacement parts for outdated weapons systems. One inspector even admitted to parliament's defense committee that he assumed the situation would continue for another "two or three years".



Mishaps Mar German Military Operations

Meanwhile, the series of mishaps continues. SPIEGEL has learned that a Tiger combat helicopter lost a weapons rack over a training area in Germany because its lock came undone on Sept. 8. Fortunately, no weapons had been mounted on it and the damage was limited.
In addition, the Bundeswehr unit currently operating the Patriot missile defense system in Turkey is literally eating into its own inventory. Because certain replacement parts are unavailable, the military is being forced to cannibalize equipment based in Germany in order to keep the Turkey-based Patriots in operation. The Patriots are being used to defend Turkey from possible cross-border attacks in the Syrian civil war. "A priority is given to making sure they get replacement parts, but that also influences the readiness of the Bundeswehr's other Patriots," Bundeswehr officials conceded in response to a query from a Green Party official.

It's not just old systems that plague the Bundeswehr -- there are also problems with new equipment. The Bundeswehr has waited for years for delivery of the Airbus A400M transport aircraft, which is intended to replace the aging Transall fleet, aircraft that began operations in the 1960s. The first planes may arrive later this year, but the Bundeswehr doesn't have a maintenance contract for it yet or a sufficient number of mechanics trained on the aircraft. The A400M could be back on the ground soon again not long after it first takes off.

Von der Leyen, it seems, has faced one setback after another in her aim to kick off a greater role for Germany in the international community. It's ironic, too, given the amount of face time she is getting these days with Chancellor Merkel to discuss the Bundeswehr's 17 current deployments around the world.

'Disarmament Through Wear and Tear'

Already, the defense minister has been forced to concede that Germany will not reach its 2014 NATO Defense Planning Process targets for its airborne systems. In the event of an Article 5 attack on a NATO member state -- in the Baltics, for example -- the Bundeswehr has pledged to make 60 Eurofighters available, but it is currently incapable of supplying them. If the allies come knocking at Germany's door for greater engagement in northern Iraq or Africa, the Bundeswehr won't be able to deliver there either. Indeed, it's possible that the world's fourth largest industrial nation and global leader in exports wouldn't even be able to provide six fighter jets to a US-led coalition in northern Iraq.

These days, a lot of scoffing can be heard about the military in Berlin political circles. One line goes, "We're practicing disarmament through wear and tear."

It's unlikely the overall state of the Bundeswehr will change anytime soon. In recent years, Germany eliminated its mandatory conscription and is now struggling to attract enough recruits. The Bundeswehr seeks to recruit 60,000 people each year, but the task is proving difficult, with a booming economy making modestly paid military service unattractive for many.

The Bundeswehr also lacks funding, to the chagrin of other NATO members. This year, the federal government has reduced the budget for the armed forces by €400 million ($504 million) to €32.8 billion. With Merkel insisting on a balanced federal budget by 2015, spending on the military is expected to drop to €32.1 billion next year.

A recent NATO ranking showed that Germany's military spending is 1.29 percent of GDP, far short of the 2 percent spent by Britain and 14th overall in a ranking of alliance member states. Other member states had sought a commitment from all in NATO to spend 2 percent of GDP, but it was downgraded to a "pledge" even before the summit and it is unlikely Germany will shift course anytime soon. Merkel, after all, wants to enter the next election campaign with the positive news of a balanced budget.

URL:
 
Analyst: China’s Encirclement Could Spark War | The Diplomat

Analyst: China’s Encirclement Could Spark War
Griffith University’s Christian Wirth on the ongoing dangers associated with East Asia’s maritime disputes.

2874f5072fd0eff03d0ee353a3599fef.jpg

By Anthony Fensom
October 09, 2014

Growing tensions in the East and South China Seas have raised the risk of a “miscalculation” spilling over into a regional conflict. Amid confrontations between various Asian nations over disputed islands and territory, the power shift from West to East is seen having potentially explosive consequences.

The Diplomat’s Anthony Fensom spoke to Christian Wirth, a research fellow at Australia’s Griffith University Asia Institute, on the region’s maritime disputes involving China, Japan, South Korea and other nations and how they might be contained.

The East, South China and Yellow Seas are seeing a number of confrontations currently, sparking fears of a new “Cold War” in Asia. Is this an accurate description and how real is the threat of war?

We associate the Cold War with a confrontation between two economically and socially isolated blocs, while now we have a huge country, China on the one side, and a de facto U.S.-led grouping on the other. But both are economically deeply interdependent. So if we’re talking about the conflict escalating beyond the crisis we’ve seen between Vietnam and China, or China and the Philippines for example, we would be talking about some involvement of the U.S. and its armed forces.

This could either be a clash such as during the 2001 Hainan Island incident, when a Chinese fighter jet hit a U.S. plane, or an instance where a U.S. ally gets into trouble with China and is seen as in need of being backed up, something which Washington is not really keen on getting involved in. But there might be some circumstances where Washington, for the sake of maintaining its reputation as a reliable ally and its power position in the Western Pacific, might not be able to stay out of such struggles.

The danger is that tensions are being ratcheted up, step by step. By having this overall tension heightened, there’s an increased likelihood of a small spark in one of the existing disputes igniting a bigger crisis. I’m not alarmist on certain clashes or the rise of China itself, but what we should be more concerned about is a general ignorance of increasing levels of fear. There seems to be a belief on all sides that as long as you keep up and increase deterrence, everything will be stable and safe, but that’s a risky calculation. To think that deterrence will decrease the likelihood of miscalculation and that nothing will happen, to me that is wishful thinking.

Given the economic importance of the region’s shipping lanes, how could tensions be reduced?

It is the very essence of great power status that the more powerful an actor is, the more it can influence the overall situation and keep tensions down. So the biggest responsibilities lie with the U.S., followed by China and Japan, which need to take action to improve the situation. I think apart from being aware of the subjective insecurities that the other side feels, it would be helpful, for instance, if the U.S. would refrain from stoking additional Chinese fears through military surveillance around Hainan and the South China Sea, not the least because the ensuing unhealthy dynamic inevitably empowers hardliners in Beijing.

In terms of the law of the sea, yes, it might be true that the U.S. stance is justified and the U.S. Navy has the right to navigate the seas; however, what is at stake is not just the interpretation of legal principles, but an overall political atmosphere, which allows those governments involved in stand-offs over maritime territories to move toward cooperation and compromise. It would, for instance, increase the basic level of tension even more if the Chinese started to conduct the same military surveillance that the U.S. does in the South China Sea around Hawaii and naval bases on the U.S. West Coast.

On the Chinese side, what’s concerning is in the general stance on the South China Sea. The Chinese government should work toward putting its sweeping, unclear territorial claim into the terms of the existing law of the seas in order to make it manageable and amenable to negotiations. The way it stands now, it’s an unclear claim, so it’s very difficult to get a handle on it and this causes more insecurity on the part of the weaker claimants.

At the same time, in Northeast Asia, the tensions between China and Japan are the responsibility of both sides, too. The Chinese side could help to improve the situation by not just keeping up its top-down level of engagement but also by making sure that non-governmental communication can continue even during diplomatic crises. Due to the Chinese system, we have seen a near-complete breakdown of governmental andnon-governmental communication and exchange during the 2010 and 2012 controversies. Even Chinese academics were discouraged from traveling to Japan. In times of crisis, in particular, you should have academics continue talking to each other, and have student friendship exchanges proceed.

On the Japanese side, leaders could help the Chinese government to keep nationalism at bay by not provoking anti-Japanese sentiments among people in China (and South Korea) through controversial statements on wartime history. The current government in particular, could do a much better job in this respect. It would also be helpful for the Japanese side to acknowledge that there exists a maritime territorial dispute between China and Japan – that would certainly alleviate the worst of the tensions we’re seeing at the moment.

You have suggested the United States, China and Japan should work together to resolve these issues?

Yes, but there’s a conundrum here, as you have these deep historical animosities between China and Japan. The three governments need to have this situation be stable, but the question is what stability really means. Certainly, part of this stability is provided by the presence of the United States, which has shaped international relations throughout the postwar period. But that U.S. presence, if it remains unchanged, also freezes the current situation.

So, on the one hand, you have the U.S. military presence potentially preventing armed conflict, but on the other, by freezing the status quo, also complicating a resolution of conflicts through reconciliation. And that’s a troublesome issue.

We’re talking about very small steps: when you have, for instance, Japanese initiatives for improving regional cooperation, these regularly cause considerable anxiety, not just in Washington but also among conservative circles in Tokyo. Fears that the U.S.-Japan alliance might be in danger, that Japan might move too close to Asia, and that an Asian or regional bloc might emerge, are always around the corner. These fears should be acknowledged and alleviated. Even if Sino-Japanese relations were to significantly improve, I don’t see Japan becoming part of an Asian bloc or ever getting close to China.

Looking at the Japan-Russia dispute over the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands, will this ever be resolved?

Unlike in 1956 when the Soviet Union and Japan were close to implementing an agreement, the U.S. is not opposed any more, if Russia and Japan were to find a compromise. But what’s still the same is that you have this East-West dividing line that cuts across the disputed islands. Whereas it was the Cold War split that inhibited a resolution in the past, negotiations are now complicated by the fact that Japan has to make a strong stance against Russia with regard to Ukraine, but that’s not everything.

In Japan, the conviction that ultimately all islands should be returned seems to persist. You could see that in the 2000-01 negotiations. Then, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered the Japanese side the two smaller islands Shikotan and Habomai. The Japanese side, however, has consistently tried to come to an agreement where it gets more than two islands – eventually all four. You’ve also had over recent years Japanese leaders like Taro Aso suggest there could be a compromise where Japan gets three islands. But such proposals, even when made by powerful rightwing politicians like Aso, caused a considerable backlash and had to be abandoned.

That’s why I’m pessimistic about any significant change as there seems to be reluctance on the part of Japan to compromise. What will be necessary is to acknowledge that Japan lost the war and that, therefore, it can’t claim all four islands back. That seems to be really difficult to do.

How about the dispute between Japan and South Korea over the island of Takeshima/Dokdo?

I don’t see that being resolved anytime soon either. The only way to handle the dispute is to keep it low profile. While the Koreans will never give the islets up, Takeshima did not mean that much for Japan until 2005. Until rather recently, most people were not even aware that the dispute existed. It would be wisest for the Japanese side to shelve it and keep it away from the public sphere.

How might the current disputes impact on important economic ties?

The dispute between South Korea and Japan is quite unlikely to escalate that much. But during the crises of 2010 and 2012 between Japan and China, there were implications – we had anti-Japan riots and boycotts in China. Even though these were contained and/or co-opted by the Chinese government, there would be far greater negative consequences for economic ties if tensions were to increase. When nationalist currents and emotions run high, there’s not much space left for rational calculations about economic costs and benefits.

China and Japan are Australia’s top two trading partners, making any dispute between them a lose-lose situation for Australia. How might the Australian government approach such disputes?

To safeguard Australia’s economic and political interests, it would be very wise for Canberra to proceed on a path similar to the one pursued in the 90s, when Australia was leading in the creation of APEC and other regional bodies…having this enmeshment of not just China but all the regional powers, that’s one way to create stability and it would be quite a good way for Australia to play a leadership role.

There’s nothing to be lost by doing that, as opposed to Australia joining one side of a deepening rift or conflict, which would potentially be costly on the economic side and defense side. You might know where you belong to and have your allies, but in a confrontation among great powers, these allies don’t really provide you with sustainable economic growth and real stability.

All of China’s rivals deny having a “containment” policy toward China. How do you see the situation?

Containment as it happened during the Cold War was different to what we’re seeing now – there’s no real or de facto containment, but that doesn’t really matter. What matters is the Chinese view on the current security environment. When leading think tank experts tell you: “Look there’s fires all around us, what are we supposed to do?”, then, that is not a good sign.

I think that’s the real danger – when you have the leadership of a country feeling encircled, isolated, that’s where rationality calculations change. You will see more assertiveness, aggressiveness even. Leaders will be prone to miscalculations because they can’t see the overall situation.

One example is the 1969 conflict between China and the Soviet Union where the Chinese leadership was extremely concerned and thought a nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R. was imminent and left Beijing for the bunkers. Of course that’s an extreme case during the Cold War, of a China not really connected to the outside world. But that’s the danger of what I would call “ideational isolation,” and that’s what we should try to prevent.

How do you see the outlook for these maritime disputes over the next five to 10 years?

I’m rather pessimistic – I think these maritime disputes will continue to be big issues. I don’t think it’s possible to really shelve them, especially not in the East China and South China Seas. This is because the political situation has changed. The disputes are now out in the public sphere and foreign ministries are no longer in control of managing them.

We need to do more than just engage in crisis diplomacy. There might be instances where some of the claimants might reach agreements on joint development, but overall I think maritime disputes will be of great concern. The question then is what else do we have – is there going to be anything to balance these negative dynamics with?

Then, there are two wildcards. One is China’s economic situation. If that changes, what’s going to happen to the “power shift” and how would a bigger economic crisis, such as commonly occur, affect China’s political stability and foreign policy?

The other is North Korea, because we’re not sure how stable that regime really is and what the new leadership might do next. We can, for instance, see negotiations between Japan and North Korea on the abduction issue, which is quite interesting.

All of the relationships among Northeast Asian governments, if they change, might alter the dynamic at least in the sub-region. While that makes the future of East Asia more uncertain, it also offers great opportunities if handled pragmatically.
 
America’s Militarization of Trade | The Diplomat

America's Militarization of Trade
In South Korea and elsewhere, the U.S. has offered security for trade.

5496305c8598a369f00fcd2e86f5255c.jpg

By Steven Denney
October 10, 2014

CNN’s national security analyst Peter Bergen recentlypublished an op-ed on the significance of the Afghan national unity government’s decision to allow a continued U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan after the end of this year. Bergen clearly sees this as a good thing. In fact, he sees it as a great thing, because a U.S. security guarantee is a sufficient condition for economic growth. The analogy? South Korea.

The line in question reads: “At the end of the Korean war in 1953 South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world; now, under an American security umbrella, it is on of the richest.” Never mind Korean economic planning, Japanese loans, the Economic Planning Bureau, or other equally if not more important factors. It’s a fanciful statement that lays bare a U.S.-centric understanding of the world prominent among many influential Americans — like Bergen. In his defense, the line isn’t much more than a throwaway nestled at the end of a short op-ed. So, rather than throw it out, let’s indulge it. With the publication of the CRS report on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, now is as good a time as ever to think about U.S.-South Korea relations and the U.S. role in East Asia.

The U.S. has had a huge security and economic presence on the Korean peninsula and in the broader region for more than fifty years. After World War II, the U.S. established a network of bilateral alliances with strategically located countries in the Asia Pacific, including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The hub and spokes-like alliance architecture built by the U.S. is commonly referred to as the “San Francisco System.” Victor Cha, in his article “Powerplay: The Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in East Asia,” argues that the U.S. pursued a network of asymmetric bilateral alliances that would give it power to control the actions of its (smaller) allies and prevent “rogue allies” (e.g., Chiang Kai-shek) from starting a unwanted war. But there was more to it than just security commitments. As Kent Calder argues, the postwar security architecture was underwritten by U.S. economic strength. In exchange for security cooperation with the U.S., the “spokes” had an export market.

The economic footing of this system has shifted; in the era of America’s (relative) decline and China’s rise, it was inevitable that the structures of foreign trade for the export-oriented countries of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea would change. Regardless, much of the logic that drove postwar policy still mainly drives policymaking today.

Take, for instance, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). As scholars Sohn Yul and Min Gyo-koo argue, the KORUS FTA “clearly shows how countries simultaneously pursue economic benefits and strategic interests in trade negotiations.” KORUS FTA negotiations made clear the security implications of the free trade agreement, what Sohn and Min describe as “joint efforts… to re-securitize” the U.S.-Korea bilateral relationship. In short, the U.S. continues to use trade as a means to advance broader strategic goals. The most recent Congressional Research Service report on the KORUS FTA, released last month, reinforces this point. The authors of the report write:

“President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and other U.S. officials have said that the KORUS FTA, along with the TPP, are key parts of their move to ‘rebalance’ U.S. strategic orientation toward the Asia-Pacific, in that they are designed to help shape the economic rules that will govern the region’s economic activity in the coming decades.”

The notable difference in the logic is that a multilateral strategy is now seen as viable; this isn’t at all surpiring given the shifting geopolitical landscape and a more connected global economy.

While we can see that the U.S. still uses a logic of securitized trade, we ought not to forget that South Korea, too, has a strategy of its own: securing free trade agreements with its largest economic trading partners, China included. Going forward, it will be interesting to watch how South Korea plays to its strengths and navigates the space in between the world’s two largest economies while the U.S. continues to use economic ties and trade for strategic ends.
 
The EU and Russia: China’s Balancing Act | The Diplomat

The EU and Russia: China's Balancing Act
In the EU, China finds an economic partner; in Russia, a strategic ally. How does Beijing balance the two?

4da4355c302dc55a77b9e82b57457032.png

By Shannon Tiezzi
October 15, 2014

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang is in Europe this week on a three-country tour that will take him to Germany, Russia, and Italy. The visit to Europe by China’s top economic leader gives insight into China’s balancing act when it comes to the European continent – how to maintain and expand economic relations with powerhouses like Germany while deepening political ties to Russia. Tensions between the EU and Russia have made this two-pronged diplomacy more difficult, but each side offers something China cannot do without.

When it comes to the EU, China is most interested in economic opportunities. The travel schedule of Li himself attests to this. As premier, Li is nominally responsible for overseeing China’s economy (although Xi Jinping has taken a more hands-on approach to help push through difficult economic reforms). Li’s foreign travels, then, represent a sort of economic roadmap (or even wish-list) for China. It’s no coincidence that Li’s first tour abroadtook him to Germany and Switzerland. He’s been back to Europe several times since, stopping in Romania and Eastern Europe in November 2013 and visiting the U.K. in June 2014. Now Li has once again scheduled EU member states for a trip abroad, further reinforcing the emphasis Beijing places on trade with European partners.

This was especially apparent during Li’s time in Germany. A Foreign Ministry briefing held before Li’s departure emphasized Germany’s outsized role in China’s European trade. Trade with Germany alone accounts for close to 30 percent of China’s total trade with the EU member states; the total value of China-Germany bilateral trade in 2013 was $160 billion. As such, Germany provides something of an economic window into the greater EU for China.

Accordingly, the Hamburg Summit, held concurrently with Li’s visit, provided a blueprint for further development of China-Europe economic relations, including the possibility of an investment treaty. Both sides have serious concerns when it comes to the trade relationship. The EU complains of restricted market access, particularly in the service sector (including financial services). Meanwhile, China argues that EU “anti-dumping” cases against Chinese industries are merely protectionism in disguise. Still, both sides recognize the importance of their economic relationship and have vowed to boost cooperation (with a particular focus on foreign direct investment). Mark Schulz, the president of the European Parliament, promised that “China will be at the top of my foreign policy agenda throughout my mandate.”

When it comes to Russia, however, China’s focus is not economic but political. This is evidenced by Li’s own travel schedule – this month’s visit marked his first trip to Russia since assuming power, while Xi Jinping chose Russia as the destination of his first presidential visit abroad. Xi visited Russia again to meet with Putin and celebrate the opening of the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Just as Li’s numerous trips to Europe signal China’s economic interests there, Xi’s (and not Li’s) corresponding focus on Russia indicates a strategic rather than economic interest.

In the Foreign Ministry briefing on Li’s trip, the same focus was clear. Rather than highlighting economic and trade relations, Vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping stressed that China and Russia “are each other’s most important strategic partners of coordination.” Thus, Li’s first priority in going to Russia was not to boost trade but to “consolidate mutual support on issues concerning each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and other core interests.”

That’s not to say that China has no interest in deepening economic cooperation with Russia. Cheng said that the bilateral economic relationship has “huge cooperative potential” – potential that is only slowly unfolding. During his visit, Li and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev did sign a number of economic cooperation deals on finance, investment, energy (including nuclear power), and high-speed railways.

But Beijing clearly values its strategic relationship with Russia more highly than economic ties. Both China and Russia portray their relationship as having bilateral and multilateral facets. On a bilateral level, Beijing and Moscow back each other’s core interests, from Russian control of Crimea to China’s approach to Xinjiang security. On a multilateral level, both countries see their cooperation as helping to advance multi-polar world with truly “democratized” international relations – a quest which will reduce U.S. and EU influence in the current international system.

It’s here that the difficulty of China’s balancing act becomes clear. On one hand, it seeks political and strategic partnership with Russia to lessen the global influence of Western countries, including many EU members. But at the same time, China seeks greater economic ties with both the EU as a whole and its individual members, especially Germany. Strategic partnership with Russia cannot bring the increased trade and investment China wants; economic partnership with the EU will not bring the political backing Beijing wants. To achieve both goals, China must balance the two sides of the equation.
 
To Rule Asia, China Needs Allies | The Diplomat

To Rule Asia, China Needs Allies
China needs to build more alliances to challenge the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific.

By Asyura Salleh
October 16, 2014

China’s rapid industrialization as an emerging power has prompted much discussion of a power transition, in which a rising China displaces a declining America with potentially dire consequences in the process. Internal capabilities, particularly domestic industrialization, are an essential ingredient in national power. China has been industrializing rapidly, and could within the foreseeable future reach a rough parity in national power with the U.S., signaling the start of a power transition.

However, Woosang Kim goes beyond this internal capability argument to include external factors. He argues that alliance formation is also important in strengthening national power. In this argument, rising powers like China that seek to achieve power parity with the U.S. need to bolster their national power by pursuing both domestic industrialization and external alignment relationships. China has already made impressive strides in expanding its share of global GDP and trade. To further augment its national power, it should focus on aligning with other countries, especially with neighbors that are inside its targeted sphere of influence.

However, China’s recent behavior toward its neighbors has moved it in the opposite direction. Rather than aligning themselves with China, countries in the Asia-Pacific are turning to the U.S. How then, can China continue its pursuit of regional hegemony without inflaming regional fears? Instead of pursuing assertive actions against regional neighbors, China will need to consider an alternative approach, one that attracts potential allies, instead of repelling them. And in fact this would be possible, if China observed the alignment preferences of weaker regional neighbors such as the Philippines.

The Philippines: U.S. Over China

China’s behavior toward the Philippines provides an opportunity to display the alignment preferences of China’s weaker neighbors. Lacking a credible defense capability, the Philippines cannot rely entirely on its own military strength for national security. Military spending accounts for just 1.3 percent of the country’s GDP, and most of its naval equipment is in dire need of modernization. As a result, in the face of a perceived threat, the Philippines finds itself resorting more to external balancing strategies by aligning more closely with the U.S.

This alignment behavior was demonstrated in two recent instances of Chinese assertiveness against the Philippines. The first was when China announced the Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in 1992, which claims the disputed Spratly Islands as Chinese territory. The second was the 2011 Reed Bank Incident, in which a Chinese vessel allegedly harassed a Philippine vessel.

The Philippines’ alignment preferences in each of these instances reflect assessments of both relative power capabilities and threat perception. This echoes the alliance theories of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. Waltz’s balance of power theory is based on relative calculations of power, in which he argues that secondary states are more likely to balance against the more powerful state. This is based on the assumption that the country with the most national power is by definition the most threatening.

Meanwhile, Walt believes that alignment preferences are determined by factors beyond simple relative military capabilities. He shows that states generally balance against the country perceived as most threatening, which is determined by many factors such as relative power and geography.

Therefore, Waltz would expect the Philippines to balance against the more powerful state, which would be the U.S., by forming a coalition with other regional states. On the other hand, Walt would expect the Philippines as the weaker state to tighten its alignment with the U.S. as China is the greater threat to its territorial integrity.

The Philippines’ alignment preferences most closely reflect Walt’s predictions. In both of the cases of Chinese behavior cited above, the Philippines perceived a threat in China and responded by balancing against the source of this threat. In 1992, as chair of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the Philippines viewed China’s Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone as a threatening concern and pushed for an ASEAN Declaration to call for the peaceful resolution of sovereignty and jurisdictional issues in the South China Sea. President Benigno Aquino III echoed these concerns in 2011 when he described China’s actions in the Reed Bank as a “violation of our territorial integrity and sovereignty.”

Accordingly, the Philippines responded to the perceived threat from China by aligning more closely with the U.S. through external balancing strategies. China’s passing of the controversial law in 1992 spurred then-President Fidel Ramos to immediately secure a temporary U.S. military presence in the Philippines by granting the U.S. access to military installations. In 2011, Aquino took a different strategy: modernizing the Philippines’ military capabilities, but with American military assistance. Not long after the Reed Bank Incident, the Philippines purchased a second-hand Hamilton-class cutter from the U.S.. Interestingly enough, this same cutter, the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, was deployed against China during a later incident at the Scarborough Shoal in 2012. It appears that the more threatening China’s posture to the Philippines, the tighter the Philippines’ alignment with the U.S.

Threat Perceptions as Important as Power Calculations

Walt’s argument that weaker states will ally with a more powerful state if another state poses a greater threat is supported by the Philippines’ alignment behavior. As a weak state, the Philippines prioritizes its survival needs first and foremost, which are met under the security umbrella offered by the U.S.

Conversely, Kenneth Waltz’s argument that secondary states will form a coalition and balance against the more dominant power cannot explain the Philippines’ alignment behavior.

What explains this discrepancy? Waltz’s argument did not place sufficient emphasis on the role of perceived threats, which is critical in initiating alignment decisions in the first place. The threat perception emanating from China spurred the Philippines to make an alignment choice. Only after this was the Philippines’ alignment decision influenced by its assessment that the military capabilities of the U.S. were sufficient to provide protection to the Philippines in the face of a potential threat from China.

This behavior shows that power capabilities and threat perceptions do not necessarily have to accompany one another. Kenneth Waltz may have erred on two points. First, the stronger power does not always threaten secondary states. Second, weaker states do not always balance against the strongest power. When push comes to shove, threat perception (of which relative power is only one factor) is just as (if not more) important as raw power calculations in influencing alignment decisions.

Allies Needed for Regional Hegemony

Where does this leave China? As noted above, it is already well on its way to meeting the industrial power to achieve regional hegemony, but it must also pursue closer alignments with its regional neighbors to acquire the allied support it needs to overtake the U.S. as the dominant power in Asia. To do this, China should avoid intimidating regional neighbors, which contributes to bilateral tension, and instead focus on attracting them as potential allies. As demonstrated by the Philippines’ alignment behavior, weaker regional countries are attracted to states that are both powerful and do not pose a perceived threat. China should thus consolidate its position as a regional power by attracting allies through a powerful and benign posture.

This posture, earlier adopted under China’s “peaceful development” maxim, requires jointly developing domestic and foreign policies to contribute to a strong domestic polity that cooperates with other countries in the international system. However, China is lumbered with factors such as nationalism, a factional army, and growing external pressure from the U.S., which hinder it from pursuing peaceful development. Chinese leaders should therefore try be more prudent in developing policies and avoid being swayed too strongly by the overwhelming nationalistic calls at home for a more assertive foreign policy. Appeasing influential domestic interest groups at the expense of foreign policy will not help Beijing achieve its goal of regional hegemony.

China could also broaden its avenues in reaching out to regional neighbors. Soft power, especially economic appeal, should play a larger role in securing a powerful and benign posture. As a major trading partner with many of its regional neighbors, China has already established a strong regional economic presence that could be further utilized to entrench the Asia Pacific’s economic dependency on China. This should be accompanied with diplomacy to cultivate trust towards a Chinese military, political and economic presence. On a broader international scale, China should demonstrate its ability to become a responsible and accountable rising power in its interaction within international institutions. By introducing a responsible, benign, and powerful posture in international diplomacy, China could assuage fears amongst regional neighbors and instead make them potential allies.

Asyura Salleh is a former government political analyst and currently a Ph.D. candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. She has a specialized research interest in military alliances and patron-client state relationships in Asia Pacific.
 
Russia’s Great-Power Problem
-
Carnegie Moscow Center


Russia’s Great-Power Problem
Source: Getty
Dmitri TreninOP-ED OCTOBER 28, 2014NATIONAL INTEREST

SUMMARY
Russia has territory, resources, and a sizable nuclear arsenal, but it lacks real economic strength. Can it correct this deficiency?

Those who may have hoped to hear a conciliatory message from President Putin at the Valdai Club meeting in Sochi last week were disappointed. The speech was almost immediately dubbed Munich II—both in Russia and in the West. Putin appeared a wartime president, defying the U.S.-dominated global system, and supremely self-confident. He did talk about the need to agree on common global rules of the game and the relevant mechanisms for enforcing them, but this part of his remarks sounded like Sunday preaching. Basically, he demanded that the United States learn the art of self-limitation, make room for others in this world and mind its own business.

Trenin_medium_new.jpg

Dmitri Trenin
DIRECTOR
MOSCOW CENTER
More from this author...
@DMITRITRENIN

Emotionally, the centerpiece of Putin’s intervention was the lack of respect in the West for Russia and its interests: a recurrent theme with him for the better half of the decade. Essentially, he told the international audience of scholars and journalists: when Russia called itself the Soviet Union, was arming itself to the teeth with nuclear weapons and had leaders like Nikita Khrushchev, who famously banged his shoe at the UN General Assembly and came close to banging the United States with nuclear-tipped missiles, Moscow was respected, and its interests taken into account—if anything, out of fear. Now that Russia has shed communism, gotten off the backs of a dozen satellites, allowed its own fourteen borderlands to form independent states; embraced capitalism and begun moving toward democracy, its interests are being wholly ignored.


This diagnosis is generally correct, but the analysis needs to go deeper. Putin, a self-avowed student of history and a champion of the Westphalian tradition in international relations, certainly understands that the balance of interests—a phrase he should not have borrowed from Mikhail Gorbachev—rests on the balance of power or equivalent. This, by the way, is well understood in Beijing, where I heard—also last week—that the talk of multipolarity is just talk, for the lack, now or in the foreseeable future, of multiple poles. In reality, the world was moving toward new bipolarity, this time between the United States and China, with all other countries aligning themselves with either of the two poles. Thus, Europe and Japan would side with the United States; and Russia would go to China.

The way the Chinese see it, Russia is not an all-round “major power.” It has territory, resources and a sizable nuclear arsenal, for all that is worth today, but it lacks real economic strength. Unless it deals with this massive deficiency, Russia will not be able to play in the global top league. And, given the present circumstances, it will have nowhere to go other than to China. Exit Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok; enter Greater Asia from Shanghai to St. Petersburg.

For years, Vladimir Putin, a judo player, has been trying—not without success—to compensate for Russia’s deficit of economic strength with his own capacity of punching above his weight. This, however, can only go so far. As an individual statesman, he may well be the most powerful and most experienced leader in the present-day world, but the Russian Federation, which he leads, is way below that. Today, Russia, while a truly independent player (a rare quality, and Putin deserves credit for that), is not an equal of the world’s high and mighty, and thus can only wish for a co-equal relationship with them.

The idea is not to gain quantitative parity—say, in terms of GDP volumes—with America, China or Europe. This, of course, is impossible. Rather, Russia should work to advance in qualitative terms: labor productivity; science and technology power; and the general quality of life of its people. Here, Putin has a chance to elevate Russia and win respect for it, and the sanctions imposed by the West can be a godsend. Or he may blow that chance and let Russia slide even deeper.

Anti-American litanies and a Herculean—or Sisyphean—toil of getting one’s message across to a largely unsympathetic Western public will not help. What Russia needs today is a new national elite based on meritocracy and devotion to the country and its people, not proximity to a leader or membership in particular clans; it needs fair and transparent rules of the game inside the country, based on the rule of law and backed by independent courts and a professional law-enforcement apparatus, from which corruption is expunged; it needs de-monopolization of the Russian economy, with streamlining of profligate and inefficient state corporations and support for responsible private business at all levels; it needs a modern science/technology/education complex; and it needs a modern administrative system accountable to the public. Without any of this, Russia will squander its resources and ultimately lose its cherished independence: to China, if not to America.

The question is, will Putin—the country’s “top nationalist,” as he has just called himself—use his immense political capital to embark on the hard path of modern nation-building or will he continue enjoying the comfort of Kremlin control, which will gradually become more and more elusive as the problems mount? And then, finally: as Vyacheslav Volodin, Putin’s chief political aide, said at Valdai, while there is Putin, there is Russia; and when there is no Putin, there will be no Russia, either. A dire and timely warning. Thank you, Mr. Volodin. One should hope that your boss understands the implications.
 
The World’s Future: Bipolar Geoeconomics?
-
Carnegie Moscow Center


The World’s Future: Bipolar Geoeconomics?
Posted by: DMITRI TRENINTUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2014

At an event in Beijing last week, a leading Chinese academic said that the vision of a multipolar world so central to Beijing's foreign policy doctrine was in fact unrealistic—for the lack, now and in the foreseeable future, of multiple poles. In fact, he said, there were only two poles available: the United States and China. All other countries would need to decide with which they want or have to align. Many in the audience nodded and some even suggested that the Chinese leadership's thinking was much closer to that of the professor than to its own formal doctrine.

Dmitri Trenin
DIRECTOR
MOSCOW CENTER
More from this author...
@DMITRITRENIN

Political developments of the past nine months seem to have produced a lot of fresh evidence in support of the growing global bipolarity. The Ukraine crisis has put an end to Russia's hopes of building a Greater Europe or of a strategic partnership with Japan. The European Union has had to reduce and restrict its economic ties with Russia, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has had to abandon his idea of forging a strategic connection to Moscow. In their opposition to Russia's policies, both Europe and Japan are now more closely tied to the United States than ever before since the end of the Cold War. Faced with the Western sanctions, Russia, for its part, has had to intensify and expand its relations with China. As the Beijing academic put it, it simply has no other choice.


Several fundamental geoeconomic trends point in the same direction. As Konstantin Simonov put it in his October 21column in Vedomosti newspaper, the re-industrialization of the United States powered by cheap energy and helped by raising labor costs in Asia leads to the emergence of a pan-American economic space, from Canada to Chile, with the United States at its center. Europe, Japan and Australia are already aligning themselves with the U.S. through Transatlantic and Transpacific partnerships. In response, China is already working on expanding its own domestic consumption and consolidating its ties with neighboring countries in Asia.

President Xi Jingpin's initiatives, announced in 2013, about the Silk Road Economic Belt in continental Asia and the Maritime Silk Road point to the two main axes of China's geoeconomic expansion. Beijing eyes Central and South-East Asia as prime areas for boosting trade and investment. South Asia and Eurasia are next. If these plans are implemented, the future economic Sinosphere, which might be more politely called Greater Asia, may extend all the way to the Gulf, the Black Sea and the Baltics, and embrace countries such as India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia.

Regionalization may indeed be the future or at least the new stage of globalization. Competition among the super-regions, in this scenario, will become the essence of global geoeconomics and geopolitics. Unlike in the early stages of globalization, the main players' norms and principles, the values and ideas will be actively contested. It is not a given that this contest will always be peaceful. Geoeconomics, by itself, will not just build a new and stable world order. Again, as the developments of the past nine months have shown, geopolitics is not far behind, and can throw a wrench into the process, particularly when it is ignored. A world of roughly equal multiple poles is not in the offing. But do not bank on a Sino-American bi-hegemony, either. It is going to be messier, but also more diverse and more interesting than that.
 
Even though this is an economic article, this is a nice follow-up to the previous post. It's clear that North America and China are pulling away from the rest of the world, thus reinforcing the view that these are the new poles going forward.

---

Global Consumer Confidence Rises in Third Quarter - Real Time Economics - WSJ

  • wsj_print.gif
  • October 29, 2014, 12:05 AM ET
Global Consumer Confidence Rises in Third Quarter
ByKathleen Madigan
BN-FG156_Nielse_G_20141028124902.jpg

Consumers around the world are feeling slightly more confident about their economic situation–although pockets of distress remain, according to a global survey of individuals released Wednesday.

The global consumer confidence index edged up one point in the third quarter to 98, according to the Nielsen Global Survey of Consumer Confidence and Spending Intentions. A reading above 100 indicates optimism while a reading below 100 suggests pessimism about the economy.

Consumers in many major industrialized nations are feeling more upbeat. The U.S. index rose four points to 108, the highest reading since 2007. Japan’s index increased four points to 77 andGermany’s index increased a point to 97. China’s confidence held at a high 111.

Elsewhere, however, economic optimism remained shaky last quarter. The confidence index in Italy fell 4 points to a reading of 47, the lowest of 60 nations surveyed. South Korea’s measure slipped one point to 52. Venezuela dropped 2 points to 70.

“Outside of North America, a range of region and country-specific factors are translating into weaker and more uneven improvements,” said Louise Keely, senior vice president at Nielsen. She saidEurope is being affected by the Ukraine crisis, China is re-orienting itself to greater domestic demand and India is looking at the potential economic payoff from its new government.

Ms. Keely noted a widening split between middle-class households in the developed markets versus those in emerging economies.

“In the U.S. and Western Europe, the middle has been structurally weakened while the low-wage sector has grown,” she said. “By contrast, the middle class grew strongly in emerging markets during the previous decade, and while recently that trend has slowed, it can still be expected to continue.”

The split should have “a large impact on the overall level and patterns in discretionary spending,” she added.

In the third quarter, 52% of consumers across the globe were more optimistic about job prospects, up from 50% in the second quarter and just 31% in 2009.

BN-FG157_Nielse_G_20141028125036.jpg

But views vary across regions. About 66% of consumers in the Asia/Pacific region were upbeat about job prospects. The 55% share of consumers in North America who are upbeat was higher than the shares in Europe, 31%, or Latin America, 34%.

The Nielsen survey was established in 2005 as an online survey. The latest survey was conducted Aug. 13-Sept. 5, 2014 with responses of more than 30,000 consumers in 60 countries. The sample has quotas based on age and sex for each country based on its Internet users and is weighted to be representative of Internet consumers.
 
In the discussion of how future alliances will be configured around the US and China, let's not forget India's role.

---

The Great Game Folio - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Great Game Folio
Source: Getty
C. Raja MohanOP-ED OCTOBER 29, 2014INDIAN EXPRESS

CHINA IN LANKA
Reports that India has objected to Sri Lanka hosting a Chinese submarine last month are not surprising. In September, a submarine of the Chinese navy docked at the Colombo port just days before President Xi Jinping arrived in Sri Lanka. Last December, there were reports that a Chinese nuclear submarine had surfaced in the waters of Sri Lanka.

With Xi making public his determination to expand China’s defence cooperation with Sri Lanka and Colombo backing his Maritime Silk Road initiative, New Delhi can no longer downplay concerns about Beijing’s role in the waters to the south. The issue of Sri Lanka’s military ties to Beijing was apparently flagged last week by Defence Minister Arun Jaitley when he met the visiting Lankan defence secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who happens to be the brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

1-Mohan-001.jpg

C. Raja Mohan
NONRESIDENT SENIOR ASSOCIATE
SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM
More from this author...
@MOHANCRAJA

As it bowed to political pressures from Chennai, the UPA found it hard to balance India’s genuine concerns about the rights of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and Delhi’s other national security interests in the island republic. Whether it was voting on Sri Lanka’s human rights record in Geneva, training Lankan defence personnel in Tamil Nadu, or the prime minister’s travel to Colombo to attend the Commonwealth Summit, the Congress leadership simply caved in to pressures from Chennai.


The NDA government is in a much better position to cope with the competing imperatives in Sri Lanka. That Narendra Modi is less vulnerable to Chennai was reflected in his decision to invite President Rajapaksa for his swearing-in ceremony in end-May against the objections of the Tamil parties.

This, in turn, has given Modi a little more space to deal more purposefully with Lanka; but not a lot. For, Modi senses the huge opportunity to expand the BJP’s influence in Tamil Nadu. He is also conscious of the fact that Tamil concerns are very much part of India’s overall approach to Sri Lanka. Modi has begun well by expanding engagement with all the stakeholders involved in the Lanka conflict, including Chennai, Jaffna and Colombo.

THE RAJ LEGACY
India has long opposed the military presence of foreign powers in the subcontinent. This is a geopolitical legacy of the British Raj that was the paramount power in the Indian subcontinent and the guarantor of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean. The Raj ensured that no rival European power would get too close to the subcontinent on the land frontiers or establish a threatening naval presence in the Indian Ocean. As the successor state to the Raj, independent India adopted this position in its entirety. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, vigorously opposed Pakistan’s bilateral and multilateral military alliances with the United States.

While seeking to keep other powers out of the region, Nehru recognised the importance of providing security to its smaller neighbours. He signed security treaties with Bhutan and Nepal after China gained control over Tibet and offered valuable military cooperation to Burma when it faced the threat of a domestic insurgency. Nehru had also initiated defence cooperation with key countries in the extended neighbourhood, such as Egypt and Indonesia.

Yet, Nehru and his successors have found it impossible to sustain the twin security legacies of the Raj. India could neither prevent foreign military presence in the subcontinent nor offer substantive military assistance to its neighbours. And, as India’s relations with the neighbours frayed over the decades, many of them turned to outside powers to counter an India they saw as overbearing and politically insensitive to their concerns.

REGIONAL DEFENCE
Initially, India’s neighbours turned to the Anglo-American powers, much to the irritation of Delhi. Recall the 1980s, when Indira and Rajiv Gandhi told Colombo not to host American bases or facilities on its soil. Now, as a rising China becomes the most important extra-regional partner for India’s neighbours, India cannot simply wish away the Chinese influence in the subcontinent.

Drawing red lines or mounting public pressure on neighbours will not work. The only way to limit the scope and structure of China’s security profile in South Asia is to expand India’s own cooperation, including in the defence domain, with all neighbours.

The UPA had indeed sought to deepen defence ties with India’s neighbours. But it was not a strategic priority for the foreign office, the defence ministry or the armed forces. Modi must now try and make India the defence partner of choice for its smaller neighbours. This will take a while, but the policies and institutional framework to get there must be put in place now.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.
 
Asia Unbound » Not U.S. Isolationism, But a Rebalancing of Priorities and Means

Not U.S. Isolationism, But a Rebalancing of Priorities and Means
by Scott A. Snyder
October 29, 2014

shangri-la-sideline.jpg
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel (center) join hands with Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera (left) and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin during a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 12th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore on June 1, 2013 (Edgar Su/Courtesy: Reuters).
Share
1
13

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2014 survey released last month entitled “Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment” reports that over 40 percent of Americans believe that the United States should “stay out” rather than take an active part in global affairs. But the survey also shows that over four-fifths of Americans believe that the United States should continue to show strong leadership in world affairs. Possibly the strongest counter-arguments for smart American leadership versus isolationism and retrenchment are expressed in poll results regarding American attitudes toward its alliances in Asia. This is an important finding because it shows growing American understanding of the importance of Asia and growing support for the strategic value of the U.S. rebalance to Asia.

New analysis of the Chicago Council survey results on Asian issues by Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura shows that over three-fifths of Americans now express support for the U.S. rebalance to Asia and that American favorability toward its two closest American allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, have reached their highest levels since the poll was started. Sixty-two percent of Americans recognize that Japan is one of America’s top ten trading partners and 64 percent support a long-term U.S. military presence in South Korea. While 59 percent of Americans surveyed prioritize building the alliances over partnership with China, two-thirds of Americans continue to say that the United States should seek friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Over 63 percent of Americans support the Trans-Pacific Partnership and over 72 percent of Americans support free trade agreements as an effective way to pursue U.S. foreign policy goals.

Analysis of the Chicago Council poll results for Japan by Michael Green of CSIS underscores the high level of trust among Americans toward Japan, rating Japan fourth globally in favorability (at 62 out of 100) behind only Canada (79), Great Britain (74), and Germany (65). Over four-fifths of Americans think of the United States and Japan as mostly partners rather than mostly rivals, and Americans recognize that Japan is an “important global player,” just behind the United States, China, and the European Union. Green finds that Americans and Japanese mostly concur in their respective threat assessments, recognizing a need for talks with North Korea despite widespread public distrust. On China, Green finds that American and Japanese concerns overlap, but that there is a gap in the intensity of American and Japanese concern over the possibility that a territorial dispute may arise between Japan and China.

My review of the Chicago Council poll results for Korea shows a growing gap in American favorability toward South Korea (55 out of 100) versus North Korea, which at 23 out of 100 scored the lowest favorability among nations included in the poll. Despite an ongoing diplomatic stalemate between the United States and North Korea over its nuclear weapons program, 85 percent of Americans continue to favor the use of diplomacy over military options for dealing with North Korea. However, reflecting rising frustration, two-thirds of Americans would support interdiction of North Korean ships suspected of trafficking in nuclear materials and arms in line with UN Security Council resolutions passed following each of North Korea’s three nuclear tests. Although the poll results clearly show that Americans regarding use of force on the Korean peninsula as a last resort, 47 percent of Americans support sending U.S. troops to defend South Korea, the highest recorded level of support since 1974.

A final area of concern remains the fact that despite clearly increased favorability of South Korean and Japanese allies in the eyes of Americans, the relationship between Japan and South Korea remains fraught. South Korean and Japanese polls show strikingly low levels of trust toward each other, and disconcerting pluralities in both countries even see the other as a potential military threat. While the U.S. Department of State has clearly stated it will not mediate between its two allies, it would be to America’s benefit if current high levels of American public goodwill toward its two closest allies were contagious enough to influence their attitudes toward each other.
 
Russia is one of the oldest players of the Great Game, and should not be discounted.

---

Africa in Transition » Nigeria Turns to Russia, Czech Republic, and Belarus for Military Training and Materiel

Nigeria Turns to Russia, Czech Republic, and Belarus for Military Training and Materiel
by John Campbell
October 29, 2014

Russian-Special-Forces.jpg
A member of the military special forces sits on an armoured vehicle near Kramatorsk, September 4, 2014. (Gleb Garanich/Courtesy Reuters)
Share
2
13

The Vanguard, a Nigerian daily, carried a report on September 28, confirmed by the Ministry of Defense, that 1,200 Nigerian soldiers, police, and Department of State Services (DSS) are being trained by Russian special forces. The Vanguard says that Abuja has turned to Moscow following an “alleged snub or nonchalant attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom toward Nigeria in her fight against Boko Haram terrorists.”

According to the Vanguard, Russian instructors participated in the selection process of those to be trained. The training is to last four months.

A South African news portal reports that the Nigerian Army is seeking the funds to purchase at least three advanced surveillance aircraft from the Czech Republic. It also reports that Belarus has agreed to provide twelve attack helicopters for which the Nigerian government will pay in installments over the next seven years.

In September, the National Assembly approved a special allocation of one billion dollars for the struggle against the northern insurgency. Presumably those funds will be used to pay Russia, the Czech Republic, and Belarus for the training and materiel.

Abuja has refused to acknowledge and investigate repeated and credible reports of security service human rights abuses and to prosecute alleged offenders. These abuses largely preclude the United States from providing military training or other assistance to Nigeria under U.S. law, specifically the Leahy amendment.

Nigeria turning elsewhere when the United States and the United Kingdom won’t play is an old song. During the 1993-1998 brutal dictatorship of Sani Abacha, western countries imposed sanctions on Nigeria because of pervasive human rights abuses. Abacha then turned to China and India for military training and materiel.

Russian military training of Nigerian security service personnel may improve their capacity. In theory, special forces should be “force multipliers”, and could make a difference tactically. But, given Russian military behavior in Chechnya, Georgia, and the Ukraine, the training is unlikely to contribute to a badly needed change in Nigeria’s military and police culture, which largely ignores human rights, and will likely fuel support or aquiescence for Boko Haram.
 
@Chinese-Dragon @Edison Chen @hans @Sanchez @Carlosa @Viet @Nihonjin1051 @SvenSvensonov

I found this to be a thorough and compelling article about the struggle over the SCS. I would be curious to hear your feedback (or pushback, if that is the case).
---

Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea | The Diplomat

Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea
Prospects for regional security hinges heavily on how these actors relate to the South China Sea issue.

By Alexander L. Vuving
November 26, 2014

Between May and July 2014, China unilaterally deployed a giant drilling rig in waters claimed by Vietnam as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The move led to a fierce confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese government vessels and saw relations between the two countries deteriorate to their lowest point since 1988. The standoff also served as a litmus test to identify who will side with whom in this conflict. While most of the world remained neutral, several states came out in support of Vietnam in one form or another. Among these supporters, the United States and Japan stood out as the most powerful and staunchest.

The fault line between Vietnam, the U.S., and Japan on one side and China on the other can be seen as one between status quo and revisionist powers. The former share the same objective of maintaining the balance of power that has kept the region in peace for the last two decades. China, with its long period of rapid economic growth in the last three decades, appears to be determined to use its newfound power to assert its sovereignty claims, which in end effect would amount to its dominance of the region. The prospects for regional security hinges heavily on how these actors relate to the South China Sea (SCS) issue.

The Stakes

The prevailing narrative portrays the SCS issue as a territorial dispute driven by conflict over natural resources between the littoral states. This provides a very truncated picture that fails to illuminate the identity and motives of the stakeholders. Besides its economic value, the SCS also has an enormous strategic value for several countries and an increasing symbolic value for some of the disputants.

China claims a vast area of the SCS that lies within a unilaterally drawn U-shape line as its own territories and waters, while Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the EEZ and continental shelf surrounding its mainland’s coasts. The SCS is believed to be rich in fish stocks, energy reserves, and mineral ores. Some estimates put the oil and gas reserves in the SCS at about 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s. With roughly ten percent of the world’s catch, the region also has one of the largest fishing stocks in the world.

The SCS constitutes one of the inner seas that lie within what China’s strategic planners and analysts term the “first island chain.” Offering easy access to the industrial centers of the country, these maritime zones are critical to the defense of the Chinese homeland against invaders coming from the seas. The SCS is even more important to the defense of Vietnam. If it is sometimes likened to China’s backyard, it is literally the front door to Vietnam.

The SCS has strategic value not only for the littoral states but also for other regional and major powers from outside. The shortest shipping routes between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean, the sea lines of communication that pass through the SCS carry nearly one-third of world trade and a half of the global oil and gas shipping. Not only the economies of Southeast Asia but also those of Northeast Asia are heavily dependent on these trading routes. About 80 percent of the oil and gas imports of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are shipped through the SCS.

While all players in the SCS issue share a large stake in its waterways, powers with hegemonic ambitions such as the United States and China have an additional interest based on the strategic value of those sea lines. Given its location as a chokepoint on the Asian lifeline and one of the global arteries, control of access to the SCS is a sine qua non for naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, which in turn is a critical pillar of regional primacy in East Asia.

Besides its economic and strategic value, the SCS also has an enormous symbolic value for China and Vietnam. Conflicts and stakes in this region have made it a strong symbol of identity for both nations. Vietnam, for example, has declared the Paracel and Spratly Islands to be its territories in the new constitution of 2013.

Vietnam’s Strategies

No single strategy can describe how Vietnam is dealing with the SCS issue. Instead, Vietnam pursues a multitude of approaches that employ a wide range of mechanisms stretching from hard to soft power. At least seven distinct strategies can be identified.

At the hard extreme of the spectrum, Vietnam tries to strengthen its presence and forces, both military and non-military, in the SCS. During the “scramble for the Spratlys” in 1988, when Beijing and Hanoi competed for foothold on the Spratly Islands, Vietnam set up permanent military garrisons on 11 land features in the archipelago, increasing its possessions here from 10 to 21 land features. From 1989 to 1991, Vietnam went out to occupy six underwater shoals on its continental shelf southwest of the Spratlys by putting up permanent high-pillar structures and manning them with garrisons. Slowly but surely, Vietnam continues to consolidate and increase its presence in these areas with more troops, facilities, equipment, and civilians. Since 2007, Vietnam started to populate the largest of its possessions in the Spratly Islands with permanent civilian habitants. Taking a leaf out of China’s playbook, Vietnam decided in 2012 to create a fisheries surveillance force as a third force, after the navy and the coast guard, to patrol its maritime waters, and in 2014, after the oil rig crisis, to lightly arm these vessels. To build a minimum deterrent force on the sea, Vietnam continued to modernize its navy and air force. A key element in this deterrent force is a submarine fleet it is building with six Kilo-class vessels.

Vietnam is well aware that it cannot rely on military force alone to deter China. One strategy to compensate for this deficit is to get powerful third parties involved. Vietnam’s application of this strategy is, however, limited to the oil and gas industry in the SCS only. But perhaps Hanoi has no other option but to give concessions in the oil blocks that lie within China’s U-shaped line to large companies from major powers, something it has done so far to ExxonMobil from the United States, ONGC from India, and Gazprom from Russia. The extent to which Vietnam has limited its pursuit of this strategy is remarkable; it has repeatedly pledged that it will not form an alliance with any other country against a third party, a coded statement to reassure China of Vietnam’s non-aligned posture.

Instead of forming alliances with powerful partners, Vietnam places more emphasis on internationalization of the issue to interlock and deter China. During most of the 1990s and 2000s, Vietnam remained largely modest in its attempt to internationalize the SCS issue. But responding to Chinese assertiveness in the region since 2008, Vietnam has become increasingly proactive and determined to bring the issue to the world’s attention and enlist the support of foreign partners. For example, international conferences on the SCS issue have become a thriving industry in Vietnam since 2009. Hanoi has also tried to include the SCS issue as an agenda item in its talks – and as a rhetorical device, in the joint statements – with most other foreign governments. Starting with the ASEAN and ARF meetings, international forums such as EAS, APEC, the UN, and ASEM have become diplomatic battlegrounds for Vietnam over the SCS dispute.

Vietnam’s effort to internationalize and multilateralize the issue does not come at the expense of its bilateral dialogues with China. Not only does Vietnam take advantage of all possible channels to talk with China, it is also proud of being able to maintain those channels. Besides the government-to-government channel, Vietnam also cultivates ties between the two Communist Parties and the two militaries to keep special access to China. The uniqueness of the party-to-party and the military-to-military relations between Vietnam and China lies in the fact that both sides emphasize their ideological bonds and, particularly for the militaries, their common interests in opposing the West. With regard to negotiation to resolve the territorial disputes, Vietnam accepts a bilateral approach to the Paracel Islands while insisting on a multilateral approach to the Spratly Islands, arguing that the multilateral nature of the dispute over the latter requires multilateral negotiation.

Toward the soft end of the spectrum, self-restraint and self-constraint to reassure China is also a key element in Vietnam’s approach to the SCS. Hanoi’s political leaders and military strategists reason that China, mindful of its superior forces, will seize the moment when Hanoi lets itself be provoked to escalate the conflict and overwhelm Vietnam. But for Hanoi, self-restraint and self-constraint are not only a tactic to avoid being provoked; they are a systematic approach based on the belief that it can convince Beijing of Hanoi’s benign intentions. Hanoi has, for instance, tried to erase public memories of Vietnam’s military conflicts with Communist China, both on the land borders and in the SCS during the 1970s and 1980s. To reassure Beijing, Hanoi has also unilaterally set tight limits on its room of action. One example is its “three no’s” policy, under which Vietnam vows not to participate in any military alliance, not to allow any foreign military bases on its soil, and not ally with any other country against a third country.

Softer than self-restraint, deference is also a principal element of Vietnam’s strategy toward China. Many Vietnamese leaders and strategists argue that combining resistance with deference is key to Vietnam’s ability to survive in China’s shadow for thousands of years. Acts of deference signaled Vietnam’s acceptance of its subordinate position to China in a hierarchy of states, and Hanoi continues to show deference to Beijing. Two recent examples include visits to China by Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh in the wake of the oilrig crisis. Minh used a trade fair in Nanning, China to go to China before traveling to the United States in September 2014. In October, Thanh led a delegation of thirteen high-ranking military officers to China, preceding the long-planned visit to Vietnam by the U.S. secretary of defense in November.

While preparing for the contingency of a military showdown with China in the SCS, Vietnam hopes that ideological bonds will prevent the worst and serve to isolate, compartmentalize, and attenuate the conflict. Predicated on solidarity between the two communist regimes, this strategy enjoys powerful support among the military leadership and Communist Party conservatives. The underlying thinking is best articulated by General Le Van Dung, then-head of the Political General Directorate of the Vietnam People’s Army. In an interview in December 2009, Dung said: “As concerns our issue with China in the East Sea, we are trying our best to resolve it, and in the near future we will be discussing, negotiating, and delimit the maritime borders with our friend. So the situation will be gradually stabilized and we keep strengthening our relations with China in order to fight the common enemy.” Although China’s increasing assertiveness in the SCS, most notably its deployment of the HSYS-891 drilling rig in Vietnamese waters during the summer of 2014, has shattered much of Vietnam’s trust in Beijing, the military leadership in Hanoi continues to cling to solidarity as a strategy to deal with Beijing and the SCS issue.

None of these strategies has been pursued to its fullest capacity, and the intensity and scope with which they have been practiced has varied over time. For most of the period between 1990 and 2008, Vietnam did little to internationalize the issue. The strategies most salient during this period were a gradual and low-key consolidation of presence and forces, self-restraint and self-constraint, and solidarity. The rising tide of tensions since 2009 has changed the intensity and scope of Vietnam’s strategies, with a focus now on strengthening of presence and forces and internationalization. Overall, Vietnam’s approach to the SCS issue combines deterrence with reassurance. While having stabilizing effects, this “hedging” approach has its own problems: Combining deterrence and reassurance undermines the credibility of both. With the increasing tension in the last few years, this hedging approach has proven increasingly ineffective, creating growing frustration with the policy.

The U.S. Commitment

The United States stands out among outside stakeholders to the SCS with its intense interest in the region. Since 2010, American leaders have repeatedly declared that Washington has a “strong national interest” in freedom of navigation and a “strong interest” in the peaceful and lawful settlement of the disputes there. Both the U.S. economy and U.S. global power and regional primacy in the Asia-Pacific depend to various extents on freedom and peace in the waterways running through the SCS.

In fact, the impact of a blockade in the SCS on the U.S. economy would be significant but not extremely high. Less tangible but more important is the role of the SCS for U.S. global power. U.S. naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, of which the SCS is a critical part, is a key to its regional primacy in the Indo-Pacific, which in turn is a major pillar undergirding the U.S.-led liberal world order. Important as it is, this link from the SCS to U.S. interests is not direct and not very visible and tangible. This fact makes it harder to convince the American public of the significance of the SCS to their interests.

American commitment to the SCS is limited by the U.S. need for breathing space after two expensive wars and a severe economic crisis. China has acted to take advantage of this virtual power vacuum, intensifying its revisionist actions in the region. However, as those revisionist actions become more visible to the American public, U.S. commitment to this critical region may once again strengthen.

Japan’s Role

Japan’s interests in the SCS derive primarily from its dependence on the waterways there and its preference for a U.S.-led regional order. If China dominates this chokepoint, it will be able to switch off at will about 60 percent of Japan’s energy supplies, and it will likely replace the United States as the sponsor and leader of a new regional order. A Chinese-led regional order will most likely be far less liberal and favorable to Japan than the current U.S.-led order. Japan thus shares with both the United States and Vietnam a strong interest in maintaining the status quo in the region. What role can Japan play in maintaining stability in the SCS?

First, Japan – and the United States, for that matter – is ill-suited to act as an honest broker to the dispute. The honest broker must be trusted as such by both sides of the dispute, and Japan hardly fits that bill with China, particularly given its own dispute with China in the East China Sea.

Second, Japan is unable to play the role of an external deterrent. Lacking nuclear weapons and perhaps more dependent on China economically than vice versa, Japan is simply unable to deter China in general.

Balancing, therefore, remains the only possible role for Japan to play. Japan is willing to support Vietnam against China, as evidenced by Tokyo’s provision of coast guard ships as gifts to Vietnam during its oilrig crisis with China recently. But does Japan, even when joining forces with Vietnam, have the capacity to balance China? This is an interesting question that needs more study, but a look at the combined military and economic power of the two suggests that they cannot. China possesses several key advantages over a Japan-Vietnam coalition, most obviously its nuclear weapons and its central role in Asia’s economy.

The most effective role for Japan to play in the SCS is to facilitate a coalition with the United States, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries that share a common interest in maintaining the status quo. Only a U.S.-led coalition can balance Chinese power in the region. Given its high stakes in the SCS – and the perception of those stakes by its elites – Japan is likely to be willing to play this role. But there is an issue with the coalition leader: With its geographic and psychological distance to the SCS, Washington may be the least willing among this coalition’s members. This may be a factor that prevents the coalition from unilaterally escalating the conflict, but it may also be a factor that encourages China to underestimate the resolve of its rivals and become dangerously provocative.

That in turn suggests the potential for a new era of instability and tension in the SCS, with each stakeholder playing their own role.

Alexander L. Vuving is an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Government.
 
@Chinese-Dragon @Edison Chen @hans @Sanchez @Carlosa @Viet @Nihonjin1051 @SvenSvensonov

I found this to be a thorough and compelling article about the struggle over the SCS. I would be curious to hear your feedback (or pushback, if that is the case).
---

Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea | The Diplomat

Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea
Prospects for regional security hinges heavily on how these actors relate to the South China Sea issue.

By Alexander L. Vuving
November 26, 2014

Between May and July 2014, China unilaterally deployed a giant drilling rig in waters claimed by Vietnam as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The move led to a fierce confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese government vessels and saw relations between the two countries deteriorate to their lowest point since 1988. The standoff also served as a litmus test to identify who will side with whom in this conflict. While most of the world remained neutral, several states came out in support of Vietnam in one form or another. Among these supporters, the United States and Japan stood out as the most powerful and staunchest.

The fault line between Vietnam, the U.S., and Japan on one side and China on the other can be seen as one between status quo and revisionist powers. The former share the same objective of maintaining the balance of power that has kept the region in peace for the last two decades. China, with its long period of rapid economic growth in the last three decades, appears to be determined to use its newfound power to assert its sovereignty claims, which in end effect would amount to its dominance of the region. The prospects for regional security hinges heavily on how these actors relate to the South China Sea (SCS) issue.

The Stakes

The prevailing narrative portrays the SCS issue as a territorial dispute driven by conflict over natural resources between the littoral states. This provides a very truncated picture that fails to illuminate the identity and motives of the stakeholders. Besides its economic value, the SCS also has an enormous strategic value for several countries and an increasing symbolic value for some of the disputants.

China claims a vast area of the SCS that lies within a unilaterally drawn U-shape line as its own territories and waters, while Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the EEZ and continental shelf surrounding its mainland’s coasts. The SCS is believed to be rich in fish stocks, energy reserves, and mineral ores. Some estimates put the oil and gas reserves in the SCS at about 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s. With roughly ten percent of the world’s catch, the region also has one of the largest fishing stocks in the world.

The SCS constitutes one of the inner seas that lie within what China’s strategic planners and analysts term the “first island chain.” Offering easy access to the industrial centers of the country, these maritime zones are critical to the defense of the Chinese homeland against invaders coming from the seas. The SCS is even more important to the defense of Vietnam. If it is sometimes likened to China’s backyard, it is literally the front door to Vietnam.

The SCS has strategic value not only for the littoral states but also for other regional and major powers from outside. The shortest shipping routes between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean, the sea lines of communication that pass through the SCS carry nearly one-third of world trade and a half of the global oil and gas shipping. Not only the economies of Southeast Asia but also those of Northeast Asia are heavily dependent on these trading routes. About 80 percent of the oil and gas imports of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are shipped through the SCS.

While all players in the SCS issue share a large stake in its waterways, powers with hegemonic ambitions such as the United States and China have an additional interest based on the strategic value of those sea lines. Given its location as a chokepoint on the Asian lifeline and one of the global arteries, control of access to the SCS is a sine qua non for naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, which in turn is a critical pillar of regional primacy in East Asia.

Besides its economic and strategic value, the SCS also has an enormous symbolic value for China and Vietnam. Conflicts and stakes in this region have made it a strong symbol of identity for both nations. Vietnam, for example, has declared the Paracel and Spratly Islands to be its territories in the new constitution of 2013.

Vietnam’s Strategies

No single strategy can describe how Vietnam is dealing with the SCS issue. Instead, Vietnam pursues a multitude of approaches that employ a wide range of mechanisms stretching from hard to soft power. At least seven distinct strategies can be identified.

At the hard extreme of the spectrum, Vietnam tries to strengthen its presence and forces, both military and non-military, in the SCS. During the “scramble for the Spratlys” in 1988, when Beijing and Hanoi competed for foothold on the Spratly Islands, Vietnam set up permanent military garrisons on 11 land features in the archipelago, increasing its possessions here from 10 to 21 land features. From 1989 to 1991, Vietnam went out to occupy six underwater shoals on its continental shelf southwest of the Spratlys by putting up permanent high-pillar structures and manning them with garrisons. Slowly but surely, Vietnam continues to consolidate and increase its presence in these areas with more troops, facilities, equipment, and civilians. Since 2007, Vietnam started to populate the largest of its possessions in the Spratly Islands with permanent civilian habitants. Taking a leaf out of China’s playbook, Vietnam decided in 2012 to create a fisheries surveillance force as a third force, after the navy and the coast guard, to patrol its maritime waters, and in 2014, after the oil rig crisis, to lightly arm these vessels. To build a minimum deterrent force on the sea, Vietnam continued to modernize its navy and air force. A key element in this deterrent force is a submarine fleet it is building with six Kilo-class vessels.

Vietnam is well aware that it cannot rely on military force alone to deter China. One strategy to compensate for this deficit is to get powerful third parties involved. Vietnam’s application of this strategy is, however, limited to the oil and gas industry in the SCS only. But perhaps Hanoi has no other option but to give concessions in the oil blocks that lie within China’s U-shaped line to large companies from major powers, something it has done so far to ExxonMobil from the United States, ONGC from India, and Gazprom from Russia. The extent to which Vietnam has limited its pursuit of this strategy is remarkable; it has repeatedly pledged that it will not form an alliance with any other country against a third party, a coded statement to reassure China of Vietnam’s non-aligned posture.

Instead of forming alliances with powerful partners, Vietnam places more emphasis on internationalization of the issue to interlock and deter China. During most of the 1990s and 2000s, Vietnam remained largely modest in its attempt to internationalize the SCS issue. But responding to Chinese assertiveness in the region since 2008, Vietnam has become increasingly proactive and determined to bring the issue to the world’s attention and enlist the support of foreign partners. For example, international conferences on the SCS issue have become a thriving industry in Vietnam since 2009. Hanoi has also tried to include the SCS issue as an agenda item in its talks – and as a rhetorical device, in the joint statements – with most other foreign governments. Starting with the ASEAN and ARF meetings, international forums such as EAS, APEC, the UN, and ASEM have become diplomatic battlegrounds for Vietnam over the SCS dispute.

Vietnam’s effort to internationalize and multilateralize the issue does not come at the expense of its bilateral dialogues with China. Not only does Vietnam take advantage of all possible channels to talk with China, it is also proud of being able to maintain those channels. Besides the government-to-government channel, Vietnam also cultivates ties between the two Communist Parties and the two militaries to keep special access to China. The uniqueness of the party-to-party and the military-to-military relations between Vietnam and China lies in the fact that both sides emphasize their ideological bonds and, particularly for the militaries, their common interests in opposing the West. With regard to negotiation to resolve the territorial disputes, Vietnam accepts a bilateral approach to the Paracel Islands while insisting on a multilateral approach to the Spratly Islands, arguing that the multilateral nature of the dispute over the latter requires multilateral negotiation.

Toward the soft end of the spectrum, self-restraint and self-constraint to reassure China is also a key element in Vietnam’s approach to the SCS. Hanoi’s political leaders and military strategists reason that China, mindful of its superior forces, will seize the moment when Hanoi lets itself be provoked to escalate the conflict and overwhelm Vietnam. But for Hanoi, self-restraint and self-constraint are not only a tactic to avoid being provoked; they are a systematic approach based on the belief that it can convince Beijing of Hanoi’s benign intentions. Hanoi has, for instance, tried to erase public memories of Vietnam’s military conflicts with Communist China, both on the land borders and in the SCS during the 1970s and 1980s. To reassure Beijing, Hanoi has also unilaterally set tight limits on its room of action. One example is its “three no’s” policy, under which Vietnam vows not to participate in any military alliance, not to allow any foreign military bases on its soil, and not ally with any other country against a third country.

Softer than self-restraint, deference is also a principal element of Vietnam’s strategy toward China. Many Vietnamese leaders and strategists argue that combining resistance with deference is key to Vietnam’s ability to survive in China’s shadow for thousands of years. Acts of deference signaled Vietnam’s acceptance of its subordinate position to China in a hierarchy of states, and Hanoi continues to show deference to Beijing. Two recent examples include visits to China by Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh in the wake of the oilrig crisis. Minh used a trade fair in Nanning, China to go to China before traveling to the United States in September 2014. In October, Thanh led a delegation of thirteen high-ranking military officers to China, preceding the long-planned visit to Vietnam by the U.S. secretary of defense in November.

While preparing for the contingency of a military showdown with China in the SCS, Vietnam hopes that ideological bonds will prevent the worst and serve to isolate, compartmentalize, and attenuate the conflict. Predicated on solidarity between the two communist regimes, this strategy enjoys powerful support among the military leadership and Communist Party conservatives. The underlying thinking is best articulated by General Le Van Dung, then-head of the Political General Directorate of the Vietnam People’s Army. In an interview in December 2009, Dung said: “As concerns our issue with China in the East Sea, we are trying our best to resolve it, and in the near future we will be discussing, negotiating, and delimit the maritime borders with our friend. So the situation will be gradually stabilized and we keep strengthening our relations with China in order to fight the common enemy.” Although China’s increasing assertiveness in the SCS, most notably its deployment of the HSYS-891 drilling rig in Vietnamese waters during the summer of 2014, has shattered much of Vietnam’s trust in Beijing, the military leadership in Hanoi continues to cling to solidarity as a strategy to deal with Beijing and the SCS issue.

None of these strategies has been pursued to its fullest capacity, and the intensity and scope with which they have been practiced has varied over time. For most of the period between 1990 and 2008, Vietnam did little to internationalize the issue. The strategies most salient during this period were a gradual and low-key consolidation of presence and forces, self-restraint and self-constraint, and solidarity. The rising tide of tensions since 2009 has changed the intensity and scope of Vietnam’s strategies, with a focus now on strengthening of presence and forces and internationalization. Overall, Vietnam’s approach to the SCS issue combines deterrence with reassurance. While having stabilizing effects, this “hedging” approach has its own problems: Combining deterrence and reassurance undermines the credibility of both. With the increasing tension in the last few years, this hedging approach has proven increasingly ineffective, creating growing frustration with the policy.

The U.S. Commitment

The United States stands out among outside stakeholders to the SCS with its intense interest in the region. Since 2010, American leaders have repeatedly declared that Washington has a “strong national interest” in freedom of navigation and a “strong interest” in the peaceful and lawful settlement of the disputes there. Both the U.S. economy and U.S. global power and regional primacy in the Asia-Pacific depend to various extents on freedom and peace in the waterways running through the SCS.

In fact, the impact of a blockade in the SCS on the U.S. economy would be significant but not extremely high. Less tangible but more important is the role of the SCS for U.S. global power. U.S. naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, of which the SCS is a critical part, is a key to its regional primacy in the Indo-Pacific, which in turn is a major pillar undergirding the U.S.-led liberal world order. Important as it is, this link from the SCS to U.S. interests is not direct and not very visible and tangible. This fact makes it harder to convince the American public of the significance of the SCS to their interests.

American commitment to the SCS is limited by the U.S. need for breathing space after two expensive wars and a severe economic crisis. China has acted to take advantage of this virtual power vacuum, intensifying its revisionist actions in the region. However, as those revisionist actions become more visible to the American public, U.S. commitment to this critical region may once again strengthen.

Japan’s Role

Japan’s interests in the SCS derive primarily from its dependence on the waterways there and its preference for a U.S.-led regional order. If China dominates this chokepoint, it will be able to switch off at will about 60 percent of Japan’s energy supplies, and it will likely replace the United States as the sponsor and leader of a new regional order. A Chinese-led regional order will most likely be far less liberal and favorable to Japan than the current U.S.-led order. Japan thus shares with both the United States and Vietnam a strong interest in maintaining the status quo in the region. What role can Japan play in maintaining stability in the SCS?

First, Japan – and the United States, for that matter – is ill-suited to act as an honest broker to the dispute. The honest broker must be trusted as such by both sides of the dispute, and Japan hardly fits that bill with China, particularly given its own dispute with China in the East China Sea.

Second, Japan is unable to play the role of an external deterrent. Lacking nuclear weapons and perhaps more dependent on China economically than vice versa, Japan is simply unable to deter China in general.

Balancing, therefore, remains the only possible role for Japan to play. Japan is willing to support Vietnam against China, as evidenced by Tokyo’s provision of coast guard ships as gifts to Vietnam during its oilrig crisis with China recently. But does Japan, even when joining forces with Vietnam, have the capacity to balance China? This is an interesting question that needs more study, but a look at the combined military and economic power of the two suggests that they cannot. China possesses several key advantages over a Japan-Vietnam coalition, most obviously its nuclear weapons and its central role in Asia’s economy.

The most effective role for Japan to play in the SCS is to facilitate a coalition with the United States, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries that share a common interest in maintaining the status quo. Only a U.S.-led coalition can balance Chinese power in the region. Given its high stakes in the SCS – and the perception of those stakes by its elites – Japan is likely to be willing to play this role. But there is an issue with the coalition leader: With its geographic and psychological distance to the SCS, Washington may be the least willing among this coalition’s members. This may be a factor that prevents the coalition from unilaterally escalating the conflict, but it may also be a factor that encourages China to underestimate the resolve of its rivals and become dangerously provocative.

That in turn suggests the potential for a new era of instability and tension in the SCS, with each stakeholder playing their own role.

Alexander L. Vuving is an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Government.

Very good article, thank you.
 

Latest posts

Back
Top Bottom