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The Kargil Conflict
Columnist JAMAL HUSSAIN presents a balanced analysis on the Kargil conflict after publication of the Presidentââ¬â¢s memoirs.
Preamble
The much maligned Kargil Conflict has so far been defined primarily by the Indian perspective duly supported, wittingly or unwittingly, by those Pakistanis opposed to President Musharraf. This one sided view has tended to portray General Musharraf as a reckless Army Chief and the Pakistan Army as a ââ¬Ërogue armyââ¬â¢. General Musharrafââ¬â¢s highly popular memoirs, In the Line of Fireââ¬â¢ has given the other side of the story.
Dr. Shireen Mazari in her book: ââ¬ËThe Kargil Crisis 1999ââ¬â¢ had earlier projected the Pakistani viewpoint in 2003 but lack of publicity limited its exposure and hence it did not have the necessary impact on the general public. General Musharrafââ¬Ës memoirs, on the other hand have achieved the near best seller list both in Pakistan and abroad, which has resulted in wide dissemination of the Pakistani point of view. That the aspect has been covered by the very architect of the Kargil Conflict has added to its relevancy besides fuelling further controversy especially among the opponents of Pakistan and / or Musharraf. Now that both versions of the conflict are available, a more balanced analysis of Kargil is finally possible. This paper will analyze some of the mysteries surrounding the operation to help discerning readers to draw their own conclusions about truth or otherwise of various claims and counter claims of Kargil 1999.
Non Controversial Issues on Kargil
There is a general consensus among historians and the public that Kargil was a watershed event which has altered the course of Pakistanââ¬â¢s history. Without Kargil, the 1999 coup/counter coup would have been very unlikely if not impossible. Is Pakistan better or worse off as a result of the military take over that was a direct fall out of the Kargil Conflict is however still open to debate.
The Kargil episode severely dented the nascent thawing of relationship between India and Pakistan which had taken its first tentative step with the famous 1998 visit to Lahore of the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, on the invitation of his counterpart, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The entire peace process got derailed as a result of Kargil and it has taken over half a decade and the damage has not been fully repaired yet.
The majority would agree that the Kashmir dispute has been highlighted in the world forum because of the Kargil Conflict. Which side has gained or lost more as a result is still being contested.
General Musharraf as the Chief of the Army Staff Pakistan Army has taken full responsibility of the planning and execution of Kargil operations. There is however a disagreement on the composition of forces that had occupied the vacant Heights. The fact that Pakistan Army has owned Kargil as its brainchild makes it irrelevant whether the occupiers were all freedom fighters, a mix of freedom fighters and Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops or all members of regular Pakistan Army personnel.
The Indian actions both in the military and diplomatic field eventually forced Pakistan without any preconditions to order a complete withdrawal of the forces that had occupied the Heights.
Was Kargil Operation a Strategic Manoeuvre or a Tactical Action?
The Indians claim that it was aimed at creating strategic effects. Their military and political analysts never tire of voicing the mantra that the armed forces of Pakistan, especially the Pakistan Army will go to any length to avenge the 1971 defeat. According to them the occupation of the Kargil Heights was planned by the Pakistan Army as it would allow it to interdict the Indian main supply route to Siachen thereby strangling their forces there. The eventual evacuation of the Indian forces from Siachen as a result would partially avenge the 1971 loss.
General Musharrafââ¬Ës rationale for Kargil differs. Kargil according to him was a pre-emptive tactical action to forestall the perceived Indian offensive designs in that sector. Occupation of the Heights would in his reckoning force the Indians on the defensive thereby negating their aggressive plans.
Nibbling operations to gain minor tactical advantages along the Line of Control (LOC) has been a recurring feature by both India and Pakistan since the Simla Accord. Barring the Siachen aggression by India that has led to a serious fire fight and a prolonged though limited conflict that is still unresolved, all other incursions were of minor tactical nature that did not precipitate a national crisis.
The planning and execution of the Kargil operations was handled by a very small group of General officers headed by the Army Chief. It appears, at least in the conceptual stage that occupation of the Heights would be one of the many pin prick operations along the LOC that are eventually resolved without provoking a major military reaction from the other side. Not involving the other two services especially the PAF is also an indication that the architects of Kargil were, from their point of view, planning a localized military manoeuvre.
That the Indian reaction to the occupation of the Kargil Heights ended up being anything but local appears to suggest that the Pakistan Army had misread the mindset of the Indian forces. However, the initial unfolding of events had run true to form as envisaged by General Musharraf and his team. The occupation of the Heights was accomplished without much opposition or fuss. With hindsight it appears that finding little resistance the expeditionary force was able to occupy far greater area than they had envisioned in their original plan. Besides upsetting the logistics support that was planned for the operation it also resulted in a far more violent Indian reaction than had been anticipated.
When the incursions were discovered by the Indian Army, it did not ring any alarm bells initially. The Indian Army Corps in the sector thought they could defeat the occupiers through their own efforts. When they failed, the entire Indian Army got involved and even then not much headway was being made. The involvement of IAF added a new dimension to the crisis but the Heights still could not be regained. By then the main supply line to Siachen was being severely disrupted and the situation had turned grave enough for the Indians to mobilize all their national resources to repel the invaders.
Because of the nuclear factor, the Indian political leadership, despite requests from their military commanders did not permit across the LOC / across the international border operations. Pakistan too was constrained from using its airpower or providing open support to the expeditionary force partly because it never accepted its direct involvement during the crisis and partly because it too was not willing to risk an escalation to full scale war for which it was being blamed by the world community.
Through a combination of military action and intense and brilliant diplomatic effort, enough pressure was eventually brought to bear on Pakistan to compel it to order its forces to vacate the Heights. According to foreign correspondents, when the decision to order the forces to withdraw was issued, only about 10% of the occupied Heights had been cleared by the Indian forces.
From the manner the Kargil operation was conceived and initiated and the way the events unfolded leading to an escalation level where the two nuclear armed states could have plunged into a full scale war, discerning readers may conclude for themselves if these operations were really planned for creating strategic effects as claimed by the Indians, or as General Musharraf explains, a tactical pre-emptive manoeuvre that spun out of control and led to a major crisis.
Kargil Operations: Where Should the Buck Stop?
Success has many fathers but failures are orphans - this truism is particularly applicable to the Kargil adventure. Unilateral withdrawal of forces from the Heights without preconditions barring a vague promise from the US President Clinton that he will attempt to aid in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute meant that the gamble had not succeeded. Had it achieved its objective of compelling India to cease its aggressive designs along the LOC and come to the negotiating table for meaningful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, everybody from the Prime Minister downwards would have bent backwards to claim credit. The humiliation of withdrawal without any apparent or immediate gains led to a blame game between the head of the government, PM Nawaz Sharif and his Army Chief, General Musharraf. While the latter openly admitted that Kargil was his brainchild, he made it clear that ââ¬Ëall were on boardââ¬â¢ in the decision making and the top political leadership of the country had cleared the Kargil plan for implementation. Nawaz Sharif on the other hand tried to give the impression that the entire operation was launched without his knowledge or consent and when he finally learnt of the situation it had already blown into a major crisis and the Army eventually ââ¬Ëbeggedââ¬â¢ him to retrieve the situation by arranging a withdrawal through the good offices of the US President.
Musharraf all along has vehemently denied the allegation and instead maintains that the PM was periodically briefed and updated on the military situation throughout the crisis. He further maintains that as the crisis deepened and the government was coming under intense pressure to withdraw the forces from the Heights, his advice to the PM was that the military situation was well under control but it was the prerogative of the PM to decide whether to continue the occupation or order a withdrawal, depending on the geo political and global environment which had become increasingly hostile to the Pakistani point of view.
Dr. Mazari in her book states six recorded instances where the Prime Minister was briefed on Kargil (January 29, February 5, March 12, May 17 and June 22 1999). When presented with documentary evidences of the briefings Nawaz Sharifââ¬â¢s lieutenants finally conceded that, yes they were informed about the crisis but were told that the Army was not involved in the offensive which had been undertaken by the Kashmiri freedom fighters.
The Kargil conflict had started to make international headlines by the end of April 1999 and for the top political leadership of the country to claim that they were unaware of what was going on is truly remarkable, to put it mildly.
The attempts by the Pakistani Prime Minister to put the entire blame of Kargil on his Army Chief and portray his innocence following the withdrawal orders on 3rd - 4th July 1999 lent credence to the Indian claim of a ââ¬Ërogue armyââ¬â¢. The charges and the counter charges about who knew how much flew thick and fast and eventually led to the demise of the Nawaz Sharifââ¬â¢s Government on 12 October 1999 through what the General describes in his memoirs as a ââ¬Ëcounter coupââ¬â¢.
To establish where the buck should stop for the Kargil adventure, a review of the prevailing political scenario of Pakistan during the crisis is essential.
By the beginning of 1999, PM Nawaz Sharif, by virtue of a ââ¬Ëvery heavy mandateââ¬â¢ was fully ensconced as the most powerful Prime Minister of Pakistanââ¬â¢s short history. He had earlier fired a Naval Chief on charges of corruption and his party had allegedly raided the Supreme Court that resulted in the removal of a non-cooperating Chief Justice and a hostile President, who was replaced by a very pliant one. The passing of the `13th amendment had defanged the Presidency by removing its power of dismissal of the government thereby turning it into a largely ceremonial post. This was followed by the firing of the Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat and appointment of his replacement General Pervez Musharraf for this very critical post. Further constitutional amendments were on the card that would have made Nawaz Sharif a virtual dictator with the title of ââ¬ËAmeerul Momineenââ¬â¢ ââ¬â the leader of the righteous. For the passage of this amendment Nawaz Sharif was waiting for the Senate elections which were due a few months down the road. His party would then have had the necessary majority in both the Houses to ensure passing of the constitutional amendment.
Is it conceivable that a PM as powerful as Nawaz Sharif would have tolerated his handpicked Army Chief to have launched a Kargil offensive without his knowledge and approval? Assuming for a moment that the COAS was guilty as charged, and the PM was only informed, as claimed by Nawaz, once the situation had spun out of control, what stopped him from firing the COAS immediately after the crisis. After all, he had dismissed Musharrafââ¬â¢s predecessor General Jehangir Karamat ostensibly for voicing his support for the National Security Council in an address to an armed forces training institution. If General Musharraf had precipitated a national crisis without taking the PM into confidence, there was more than enough justification to have him removed summarily. Unless of course the PM had been briefed on the action plan before or during the operation and he had given his consent and blessings. Removal of the Army Chief then was likely to create a severe backlash within the Army that could threaten his government. Dismissing the Army Chief when he was on an official visit abroad could perhaps pre-empt any effort by General Musharraf to initiate a coup and once the Prime Ministerââ¬â¢s hand picked General (who incidentally was not even from one of the fighting arms of the Army) was sworn in as the new Army Chief, the threat of a coup by the deposed General would be over. Is that how the entire dismissal of General Musharraf was planned which went awry in the execution phase? You may draw your own conclusions.
General Musharrafââ¬â¢s role on Kargil should be assessed in his capacity as the Army Chief and not as the head of the state. Service Chiefs are generally selected for their initiative and boldness and both during war and peace their views tend to be of an offensive nature. Musharraf was no exception. When the Pakistan Army identified a weakness in the disposition of the Indian forces on the Kargil Heights, his staff under his guidance came up with an offensive plan that could exploit this weakness successfully at the tactical level. Purely on the military aspects of the operation, he made three major predictions, which were:
1. The heights could be occupied with relative ease before the onset of summer provided strict secrecy of operations was ensured.
2. The Indian army would find it very difficult to recapture the lost heights militarily.
3. Because of the imbalances in the system of forces of the Indian Army (too many forces deployed in the Indian Held Kashmir) and the nuclearlization of both India and Pakistan, the Indians would not escalate the situation by initiating offensive across the international border unlike their 1965 strategy.
In the event all his three assumptions proved to be correct: the Heights were easily occupied; only about 10% of the heights were retaken by India despite extensive use of all offensive assets at their disposal. The Indians despite threats did not cross the international border.
What the General could not or did not foresee was the loss of diplomatic support as the crisis deepened because India successfully projected Pakistan as the aggressor. The pressure that was brought to bear on Pakistan as a result eventually forced the government to order a retreat.
It may be of interest to note that during the Kargil crisis the Indian Air Chief ACM Tipnis had strongly recommended air attacks across the LOC. He was not permitted to do so by the Vajpayee government as it did not want an escalation. Even in the 2002 crisis, the Indian Generals had stated (in a seminar on the standoff at a Conference in Monterey California in 2005) that the Indian Armed Forces were straining at the leash to teach Pakistan a lesson but they were held back by their faint-hearted politicians. They were politely reminded that they could afford to strain because saner elements were holding the leash and wouldnââ¬â¢t let go that easily.
In any crisis the service chiefs, if they are worthy of their posts, do come up with aggressive plans keeping primarily the military aspects in mind. It is then up to the top leadership whether civilian or military, who must factor in other issues including the international environment before accepting or rejecting the military proposals. In the case of Kargil while the military aspect of the plan may have been sound, the ability of the government to withstand the international pressure could only be gauged by the head of the government (in a parliamentary form of democracy) who ultimately was to decide whether to give his approval or put it on hold.
Musharraf as the COAS did plan and recommend Kargil based on his judgment on its military aspects but it was the responsibility of the head of government to consider all other factors especially the international environment before giving its consent.
Most experts have concluded that the hostile international environment was one of the key factors that forced Pakistan to accept an unconditional withdrawal. Who then should ultimately be held accountable for the Kargil adventure? You decide.
Who Suffered Higher Casualties?
The Indian official casualty figure during the conflict is around 600 which Pakistan rejects, estimating a figure at least twice as many. Pakistan Army on the other hand has not released any number which has given rise to all kinds of speculations and those Pakistanis opposed to Musharraf publicly state that the casualty figure of Pakistan was much higher than that of India.
In the absence of verifiable data it is difficult to gauge with any degree of confidence which side suffered more. Common sense however dictates that mountainous terrain favours the defenders and since the Indians were on the offensive attempting to regain the heights, their casualty figures were likely to be much higher. The coffin scandal which surfaced in India during the crisis tends to support this theory.
Body count as an indication of victory or defeat can be very misleading as the US Army learnt to its dismay in the Vietnam War. US dead during the Vietnam War were around 59,000 whereas the Vietnamese figure ran into millions - yet USA lost the war. The Israeli ââ¬â Lebanese human loss ratio during the recent conflict was probably around 1:8 in favour of Israel but the world credits victory to Hezbollah. In Iraq, over 3000 American soldiers have perished as compared to over half a million Iraqis. While President Bush may gloat over these figures as a sign of success, his military commanders know better - US is losing in Iraq.
The casualty figures in the Kargil conflict therefore are not critical in deciding who came out victorious. Pakistani forces had to withdraw and the Indians regained the Heights. That is indication enough about which side won. Having said that one would like to add that both during 65 and 71 wars, the Indians had captured the Kargil Heights with relative ease ââ¬â in 65 it was returned but after 71 it was annexed by India as one of the clauses of the Simla agreement. In the Kargil conflict in 1999, for the first time the Indians met fierce resistance in recapturing the Heights and suffered heavy casualties in the process. They now would be far more cautious in their future offensive plans along the LOC.
For Pakistan also the realization must have dawned that even small scale tactical actions can blow up into a major crisis and given the existence of nuclear weapons by both the parties, these are at best avoided. In the prevailing environment, a military solution of the Kashmir dispute by either side may be ruled out. A negotiated settlement is the only recourse. It will be torturous and perhaps will take quite some time and plenty of patience. This is the one silver lining in the otherwise dark ominous Kargil cloud.
Conclusion
The general public both in Pakistan and abroad had so far been exposed to a one sided view of the Kargil conflict which had made any rational judgment difficult. General Musharrafââ¬Ës highly popular memoirs has portrayed his side of the story. Coming from the horseââ¬â¢s mouth, it has generated a great deal of interest and as a result the book has enjoyed a wide readership among his supporters as well as his detractors.
For the Pakistani public, the two burning issues on Kargil are: first, what were the real objectives of Kargil and second, who should ultimately accept responsibly for an operation that eventually had to be abandoned. The paper has attempted to provide answers to the questions by analyzing the prevalent political and military environment that existed in Pakistan during the period based on the available historical data and evaluating the views of the players involved.
You may now be in a better position to decide what happened, how it happened and who should be ultimately held accountable.
About the Author
Air Cdre (Retd) Jamal Hussain was commissioned in the GD (P) branch of the PAF in 1966. During his career as a fighter pilot he has flown nearly all types of fighter aircraft of the PAF. He commanded a Mirage Squadron, a Composite Flying Wing and an Operational Flying Base. He is also a qualified flying instructor. Besides his operational experience, he is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College USA, and National Degree College (NDC). He has also had the privilege of being an instructor in NDC and has served as the Commandant of Joint Services Staff College. At present Air Cdre (Retd) Jamal Hussain has recently taken over as the Director of the newly established Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) located at PAF Base Faisal.
Columnist JAMAL HUSSAIN presents a balanced analysis on the Kargil conflict after publication of the Presidentââ¬â¢s memoirs.
Preamble
The much maligned Kargil Conflict has so far been defined primarily by the Indian perspective duly supported, wittingly or unwittingly, by those Pakistanis opposed to President Musharraf. This one sided view has tended to portray General Musharraf as a reckless Army Chief and the Pakistan Army as a ââ¬Ërogue armyââ¬â¢. General Musharrafââ¬â¢s highly popular memoirs, In the Line of Fireââ¬â¢ has given the other side of the story.
Dr. Shireen Mazari in her book: ââ¬ËThe Kargil Crisis 1999ââ¬â¢ had earlier projected the Pakistani viewpoint in 2003 but lack of publicity limited its exposure and hence it did not have the necessary impact on the general public. General Musharrafââ¬Ës memoirs, on the other hand have achieved the near best seller list both in Pakistan and abroad, which has resulted in wide dissemination of the Pakistani point of view. That the aspect has been covered by the very architect of the Kargil Conflict has added to its relevancy besides fuelling further controversy especially among the opponents of Pakistan and / or Musharraf. Now that both versions of the conflict are available, a more balanced analysis of Kargil is finally possible. This paper will analyze some of the mysteries surrounding the operation to help discerning readers to draw their own conclusions about truth or otherwise of various claims and counter claims of Kargil 1999.
Non Controversial Issues on Kargil
There is a general consensus among historians and the public that Kargil was a watershed event which has altered the course of Pakistanââ¬â¢s history. Without Kargil, the 1999 coup/counter coup would have been very unlikely if not impossible. Is Pakistan better or worse off as a result of the military take over that was a direct fall out of the Kargil Conflict is however still open to debate.
The Kargil episode severely dented the nascent thawing of relationship between India and Pakistan which had taken its first tentative step with the famous 1998 visit to Lahore of the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, on the invitation of his counterpart, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The entire peace process got derailed as a result of Kargil and it has taken over half a decade and the damage has not been fully repaired yet.
The majority would agree that the Kashmir dispute has been highlighted in the world forum because of the Kargil Conflict. Which side has gained or lost more as a result is still being contested.
General Musharraf as the Chief of the Army Staff Pakistan Army has taken full responsibility of the planning and execution of Kargil operations. There is however a disagreement on the composition of forces that had occupied the vacant Heights. The fact that Pakistan Army has owned Kargil as its brainchild makes it irrelevant whether the occupiers were all freedom fighters, a mix of freedom fighters and Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops or all members of regular Pakistan Army personnel.
The Indian actions both in the military and diplomatic field eventually forced Pakistan without any preconditions to order a complete withdrawal of the forces that had occupied the Heights.
Was Kargil Operation a Strategic Manoeuvre or a Tactical Action?
The Indians claim that it was aimed at creating strategic effects. Their military and political analysts never tire of voicing the mantra that the armed forces of Pakistan, especially the Pakistan Army will go to any length to avenge the 1971 defeat. According to them the occupation of the Kargil Heights was planned by the Pakistan Army as it would allow it to interdict the Indian main supply route to Siachen thereby strangling their forces there. The eventual evacuation of the Indian forces from Siachen as a result would partially avenge the 1971 loss.
General Musharrafââ¬Ës rationale for Kargil differs. Kargil according to him was a pre-emptive tactical action to forestall the perceived Indian offensive designs in that sector. Occupation of the Heights would in his reckoning force the Indians on the defensive thereby negating their aggressive plans.
Nibbling operations to gain minor tactical advantages along the Line of Control (LOC) has been a recurring feature by both India and Pakistan since the Simla Accord. Barring the Siachen aggression by India that has led to a serious fire fight and a prolonged though limited conflict that is still unresolved, all other incursions were of minor tactical nature that did not precipitate a national crisis.
The planning and execution of the Kargil operations was handled by a very small group of General officers headed by the Army Chief. It appears, at least in the conceptual stage that occupation of the Heights would be one of the many pin prick operations along the LOC that are eventually resolved without provoking a major military reaction from the other side. Not involving the other two services especially the PAF is also an indication that the architects of Kargil were, from their point of view, planning a localized military manoeuvre.
That the Indian reaction to the occupation of the Kargil Heights ended up being anything but local appears to suggest that the Pakistan Army had misread the mindset of the Indian forces. However, the initial unfolding of events had run true to form as envisaged by General Musharraf and his team. The occupation of the Heights was accomplished without much opposition or fuss. With hindsight it appears that finding little resistance the expeditionary force was able to occupy far greater area than they had envisioned in their original plan. Besides upsetting the logistics support that was planned for the operation it also resulted in a far more violent Indian reaction than had been anticipated.
When the incursions were discovered by the Indian Army, it did not ring any alarm bells initially. The Indian Army Corps in the sector thought they could defeat the occupiers through their own efforts. When they failed, the entire Indian Army got involved and even then not much headway was being made. The involvement of IAF added a new dimension to the crisis but the Heights still could not be regained. By then the main supply line to Siachen was being severely disrupted and the situation had turned grave enough for the Indians to mobilize all their national resources to repel the invaders.
Because of the nuclear factor, the Indian political leadership, despite requests from their military commanders did not permit across the LOC / across the international border operations. Pakistan too was constrained from using its airpower or providing open support to the expeditionary force partly because it never accepted its direct involvement during the crisis and partly because it too was not willing to risk an escalation to full scale war for which it was being blamed by the world community.
Through a combination of military action and intense and brilliant diplomatic effort, enough pressure was eventually brought to bear on Pakistan to compel it to order its forces to vacate the Heights. According to foreign correspondents, when the decision to order the forces to withdraw was issued, only about 10% of the occupied Heights had been cleared by the Indian forces.
From the manner the Kargil operation was conceived and initiated and the way the events unfolded leading to an escalation level where the two nuclear armed states could have plunged into a full scale war, discerning readers may conclude for themselves if these operations were really planned for creating strategic effects as claimed by the Indians, or as General Musharraf explains, a tactical pre-emptive manoeuvre that spun out of control and led to a major crisis.
Kargil Operations: Where Should the Buck Stop?
Success has many fathers but failures are orphans - this truism is particularly applicable to the Kargil adventure. Unilateral withdrawal of forces from the Heights without preconditions barring a vague promise from the US President Clinton that he will attempt to aid in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute meant that the gamble had not succeeded. Had it achieved its objective of compelling India to cease its aggressive designs along the LOC and come to the negotiating table for meaningful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, everybody from the Prime Minister downwards would have bent backwards to claim credit. The humiliation of withdrawal without any apparent or immediate gains led to a blame game between the head of the government, PM Nawaz Sharif and his Army Chief, General Musharraf. While the latter openly admitted that Kargil was his brainchild, he made it clear that ââ¬Ëall were on boardââ¬â¢ in the decision making and the top political leadership of the country had cleared the Kargil plan for implementation. Nawaz Sharif on the other hand tried to give the impression that the entire operation was launched without his knowledge or consent and when he finally learnt of the situation it had already blown into a major crisis and the Army eventually ââ¬Ëbeggedââ¬â¢ him to retrieve the situation by arranging a withdrawal through the good offices of the US President.
Musharraf all along has vehemently denied the allegation and instead maintains that the PM was periodically briefed and updated on the military situation throughout the crisis. He further maintains that as the crisis deepened and the government was coming under intense pressure to withdraw the forces from the Heights, his advice to the PM was that the military situation was well under control but it was the prerogative of the PM to decide whether to continue the occupation or order a withdrawal, depending on the geo political and global environment which had become increasingly hostile to the Pakistani point of view.
Dr. Mazari in her book states six recorded instances where the Prime Minister was briefed on Kargil (January 29, February 5, March 12, May 17 and June 22 1999). When presented with documentary evidences of the briefings Nawaz Sharifââ¬â¢s lieutenants finally conceded that, yes they were informed about the crisis but were told that the Army was not involved in the offensive which had been undertaken by the Kashmiri freedom fighters.
The Kargil conflict had started to make international headlines by the end of April 1999 and for the top political leadership of the country to claim that they were unaware of what was going on is truly remarkable, to put it mildly.
The attempts by the Pakistani Prime Minister to put the entire blame of Kargil on his Army Chief and portray his innocence following the withdrawal orders on 3rd - 4th July 1999 lent credence to the Indian claim of a ââ¬Ërogue armyââ¬â¢. The charges and the counter charges about who knew how much flew thick and fast and eventually led to the demise of the Nawaz Sharifââ¬â¢s Government on 12 October 1999 through what the General describes in his memoirs as a ââ¬Ëcounter coupââ¬â¢.
To establish where the buck should stop for the Kargil adventure, a review of the prevailing political scenario of Pakistan during the crisis is essential.
By the beginning of 1999, PM Nawaz Sharif, by virtue of a ââ¬Ëvery heavy mandateââ¬â¢ was fully ensconced as the most powerful Prime Minister of Pakistanââ¬â¢s short history. He had earlier fired a Naval Chief on charges of corruption and his party had allegedly raided the Supreme Court that resulted in the removal of a non-cooperating Chief Justice and a hostile President, who was replaced by a very pliant one. The passing of the `13th amendment had defanged the Presidency by removing its power of dismissal of the government thereby turning it into a largely ceremonial post. This was followed by the firing of the Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat and appointment of his replacement General Pervez Musharraf for this very critical post. Further constitutional amendments were on the card that would have made Nawaz Sharif a virtual dictator with the title of ââ¬ËAmeerul Momineenââ¬â¢ ââ¬â the leader of the righteous. For the passage of this amendment Nawaz Sharif was waiting for the Senate elections which were due a few months down the road. His party would then have had the necessary majority in both the Houses to ensure passing of the constitutional amendment.
Is it conceivable that a PM as powerful as Nawaz Sharif would have tolerated his handpicked Army Chief to have launched a Kargil offensive without his knowledge and approval? Assuming for a moment that the COAS was guilty as charged, and the PM was only informed, as claimed by Nawaz, once the situation had spun out of control, what stopped him from firing the COAS immediately after the crisis. After all, he had dismissed Musharrafââ¬â¢s predecessor General Jehangir Karamat ostensibly for voicing his support for the National Security Council in an address to an armed forces training institution. If General Musharraf had precipitated a national crisis without taking the PM into confidence, there was more than enough justification to have him removed summarily. Unless of course the PM had been briefed on the action plan before or during the operation and he had given his consent and blessings. Removal of the Army Chief then was likely to create a severe backlash within the Army that could threaten his government. Dismissing the Army Chief when he was on an official visit abroad could perhaps pre-empt any effort by General Musharraf to initiate a coup and once the Prime Ministerââ¬â¢s hand picked General (who incidentally was not even from one of the fighting arms of the Army) was sworn in as the new Army Chief, the threat of a coup by the deposed General would be over. Is that how the entire dismissal of General Musharraf was planned which went awry in the execution phase? You may draw your own conclusions.
General Musharrafââ¬â¢s role on Kargil should be assessed in his capacity as the Army Chief and not as the head of the state. Service Chiefs are generally selected for their initiative and boldness and both during war and peace their views tend to be of an offensive nature. Musharraf was no exception. When the Pakistan Army identified a weakness in the disposition of the Indian forces on the Kargil Heights, his staff under his guidance came up with an offensive plan that could exploit this weakness successfully at the tactical level. Purely on the military aspects of the operation, he made three major predictions, which were:
1. The heights could be occupied with relative ease before the onset of summer provided strict secrecy of operations was ensured.
2. The Indian army would find it very difficult to recapture the lost heights militarily.
3. Because of the imbalances in the system of forces of the Indian Army (too many forces deployed in the Indian Held Kashmir) and the nuclearlization of both India and Pakistan, the Indians would not escalate the situation by initiating offensive across the international border unlike their 1965 strategy.
In the event all his three assumptions proved to be correct: the Heights were easily occupied; only about 10% of the heights were retaken by India despite extensive use of all offensive assets at their disposal. The Indians despite threats did not cross the international border.
What the General could not or did not foresee was the loss of diplomatic support as the crisis deepened because India successfully projected Pakistan as the aggressor. The pressure that was brought to bear on Pakistan as a result eventually forced the government to order a retreat.
It may be of interest to note that during the Kargil crisis the Indian Air Chief ACM Tipnis had strongly recommended air attacks across the LOC. He was not permitted to do so by the Vajpayee government as it did not want an escalation. Even in the 2002 crisis, the Indian Generals had stated (in a seminar on the standoff at a Conference in Monterey California in 2005) that the Indian Armed Forces were straining at the leash to teach Pakistan a lesson but they were held back by their faint-hearted politicians. They were politely reminded that they could afford to strain because saner elements were holding the leash and wouldnââ¬â¢t let go that easily.
In any crisis the service chiefs, if they are worthy of their posts, do come up with aggressive plans keeping primarily the military aspects in mind. It is then up to the top leadership whether civilian or military, who must factor in other issues including the international environment before accepting or rejecting the military proposals. In the case of Kargil while the military aspect of the plan may have been sound, the ability of the government to withstand the international pressure could only be gauged by the head of the government (in a parliamentary form of democracy) who ultimately was to decide whether to give his approval or put it on hold.
Musharraf as the COAS did plan and recommend Kargil based on his judgment on its military aspects but it was the responsibility of the head of government to consider all other factors especially the international environment before giving its consent.
Most experts have concluded that the hostile international environment was one of the key factors that forced Pakistan to accept an unconditional withdrawal. Who then should ultimately be held accountable for the Kargil adventure? You decide.
Who Suffered Higher Casualties?
The Indian official casualty figure during the conflict is around 600 which Pakistan rejects, estimating a figure at least twice as many. Pakistan Army on the other hand has not released any number which has given rise to all kinds of speculations and those Pakistanis opposed to Musharraf publicly state that the casualty figure of Pakistan was much higher than that of India.
In the absence of verifiable data it is difficult to gauge with any degree of confidence which side suffered more. Common sense however dictates that mountainous terrain favours the defenders and since the Indians were on the offensive attempting to regain the heights, their casualty figures were likely to be much higher. The coffin scandal which surfaced in India during the crisis tends to support this theory.
Body count as an indication of victory or defeat can be very misleading as the US Army learnt to its dismay in the Vietnam War. US dead during the Vietnam War were around 59,000 whereas the Vietnamese figure ran into millions - yet USA lost the war. The Israeli ââ¬â Lebanese human loss ratio during the recent conflict was probably around 1:8 in favour of Israel but the world credits victory to Hezbollah. In Iraq, over 3000 American soldiers have perished as compared to over half a million Iraqis. While President Bush may gloat over these figures as a sign of success, his military commanders know better - US is losing in Iraq.
The casualty figures in the Kargil conflict therefore are not critical in deciding who came out victorious. Pakistani forces had to withdraw and the Indians regained the Heights. That is indication enough about which side won. Having said that one would like to add that both during 65 and 71 wars, the Indians had captured the Kargil Heights with relative ease ââ¬â in 65 it was returned but after 71 it was annexed by India as one of the clauses of the Simla agreement. In the Kargil conflict in 1999, for the first time the Indians met fierce resistance in recapturing the Heights and suffered heavy casualties in the process. They now would be far more cautious in their future offensive plans along the LOC.
For Pakistan also the realization must have dawned that even small scale tactical actions can blow up into a major crisis and given the existence of nuclear weapons by both the parties, these are at best avoided. In the prevailing environment, a military solution of the Kashmir dispute by either side may be ruled out. A negotiated settlement is the only recourse. It will be torturous and perhaps will take quite some time and plenty of patience. This is the one silver lining in the otherwise dark ominous Kargil cloud.
Conclusion
The general public both in Pakistan and abroad had so far been exposed to a one sided view of the Kargil conflict which had made any rational judgment difficult. General Musharrafââ¬Ës highly popular memoirs has portrayed his side of the story. Coming from the horseââ¬â¢s mouth, it has generated a great deal of interest and as a result the book has enjoyed a wide readership among his supporters as well as his detractors.
For the Pakistani public, the two burning issues on Kargil are: first, what were the real objectives of Kargil and second, who should ultimately accept responsibly for an operation that eventually had to be abandoned. The paper has attempted to provide answers to the questions by analyzing the prevalent political and military environment that existed in Pakistan during the period based on the available historical data and evaluating the views of the players involved.
You may now be in a better position to decide what happened, how it happened and who should be ultimately held accountable.
About the Author
Air Cdre (Retd) Jamal Hussain was commissioned in the GD (P) branch of the PAF in 1966. During his career as a fighter pilot he has flown nearly all types of fighter aircraft of the PAF. He commanded a Mirage Squadron, a Composite Flying Wing and an Operational Flying Base. He is also a qualified flying instructor. Besides his operational experience, he is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College USA, and National Degree College (NDC). He has also had the privilege of being an instructor in NDC and has served as the Commandant of Joint Services Staff College. At present Air Cdre (Retd) Jamal Hussain has recently taken over as the Director of the newly established Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) located at PAF Base Faisal.
