The History of Downgraded Vera-E Radar Purchase by PAF

[Bratva]

In response to @The Eagle and @Khafee discussion

I hope you understand my reservation, I have to follow certain guidelines, unless it is published and widely known.....

Who says It is not published and Widely known ? And Pakistan got the Downgraded version of VERA in 2005. USA already knows how to avoid the VERA radar because they own the Company which produces this radar and tested it extensively in 2006

Lets start with Wiki Leak cables

CZECH MFA SOLICITS US OPINION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF PASSIVE RADAR TO PAKISTAN

Date:
2004 December 23, 13:26 (Thursday)


B. PRAGUE 1064 C. STATE 172966 Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) and (g) 1.

THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 7 2. (C) As foreshadowed in Reftel A, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, for the second time this year, soliciting US opinion on the possible sale of a Czech-produced passive radar system to Pakistan. 3. (C) As in the previous case, dealt with in Reftels B and C, this MFA request is based on a request from the Czech firm ERA to begin preliminary marketing discussions with the Air Force of Pakistan. Unlike the previous case, the proposed sale would not involve the passive system VERA-E, but an earlier, less powerful model of passive radar, the ASDD-01. 4. (C) Reftel C describes U.S. concerns over a possible reexport of the VERA-E to China as the primary reason for opposing a VERA-E sale to Pakistan. The U.S. concern played an important role in the decision by the GOCR in July to deny ERA permission to move forward with marketing the system to Pakistan.

The firm has recently approached the MFA with new information about the sale of a Swedish radar system, the Erieye, to Pakistan. The Erieye is made by Ericsson Microwave Systems and is described as an active, phased-array pulse-Doppler radar that can be used for Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems. The firm provided news reports stating Pakistan will purchase seven copies of the Eireye. 5. (C) The firm argues that the ASDD-01 is based on the same technology as the Erieye. In addition the firm has offered to discuss reexport concerns. The firm made the suggestions that GPS equipment be included in the hardware to identify its location, and that unannounced spot checks of the equipment be agreed to in any potential contract.


6. (C) Comment: In presenting the formal request for USG views on the proposed sale during a meeting on Dec 22, Czech MFA staff pointed out the huge symbolic benefits of any sale, even a non VERA sale. The GOCR, and the MFA in particular, which were publicly criticized for halting earlier requests to market VERA, are now under renewed public and private pressure from the politically-influential ERA to license exports. As MFA staff did not hesitate to point out, good news on a high-profile sale like this would boost the ability of the weak Czech government to win approval for controversial policy moves, such as the further extension of Czech troops in Iraq. End Comment. 7. Please provide response in the next 90 days, if possible, to the Czech request for Washington advisory opinion. CABANISS

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04PRAGUE1870_a.html


ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN

Created 2005-01-21 14:14
=


classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c)

¶1. (C) Reftel reported the request of the Czech government for the U.S. government's opinion on the potential sale of a passive surveillance system (PSS) to the Air Force of Pakistan. This cable offers additional technical and background information on the system. Note: ref A mistakenly made reference to a 90-day timeframe for receipt of USG views on possible VERA sales. In fact, our commitment to the GOCR (ref B) was to undertake best efforts to provide our views within 30 days. MFA officials are asking about when they can expect our views (ref A dated Dec 23, 2004). We have explained that the holiday period could delay our reply. However, given recent MFA cooperation on USG request to accelerate licenses for a number of weapons exports to Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S., it is in our continuing interest to be as responsive as possible to the Czech request.

¶2. (C) Three Embassy officers (DAO, PolEc and ODC) met January 19 with four representatives from ERA, the Czech company that produces the passive surveillance system, VERA-E. The company was represented by its CEO, Miroslav Sotona, its Commercial Director Milan Bernard, and two marketing managers for ERA's military products. The company gave Embassy representatives a 20-minute briefing on the firm's short history, its civil and military products, and its recent unsuccessful attempts to sell its products in Asia. The company then openly answered all questions for more than 2 hours.

¶3. (C) ERA officials explained that, beginning in the late 90s, ERA initially attempted to market VERA-E to 22 NATO countries and discovered that there was no interest in its military radars. It is now convinced that most NATO countries already have or can afford better, more powerful systems and will never buy VERA. Once ERA realized this, it switched its marketing efforts to Asia, where it quickly found a number of interested buyers. Contract were signed with China and with Vietnam. The firm then discovered that Czech authorities would not approve the applications for export licenses. Altering its strategy, the company decided to do what many western arms manufacturers do: offer one version for allies and a more limited version for sale to non-allies.

This non-NATO version is the ASDD-01. Reftel mistakenly identifies the ASDD-01 as an earlier version of the VERA-E. In fact, the ASDD-01 has never been manufactured. The ASDD-01 would be an intentionally weakened version of the VERA that the company hopes it will be allowed to sell to non-NATO states. The company explained that it tried to reduce the capabilities of VERA to the point where sales to non-NATO states would be politically acceptable, but not so far that the system would no longer be attractive to potential customers

¶4. (C) ASDD-01 stands for Air Situation and Detection Display. The model, which again only exists in theory, would use the same principle as the VERA, time difference of arrival multilateration technique (TODA). It has roughly the same tracking and location capabilities as the VERA-E, but lacks the VERA's identification, or fingerprinting, capabilities. Both the ASDD-01 and the VERA-E are passive radar systems. Era provided the following explanation of the differences between ASDD and VERA, on paper:
ASDD belongs to the category of ELINT/ESM measures. It is based on the wideband principle of electromagnetic signal location and tracking.
The main differences between the VERA-E and the ASDD are as follows:

- The VERA-E, which in general has been designed for NATO partner countries, as developed by ERA, contains an advanced level of precise identification of electromagnetic signal emitters. The method of identifying such signal emissions is sometimes called finger printing. This identification has to be based on algorithms and hardware technologies, which make possible fine interpulse and intrapulse signal analysis.

This method can help to identify the signal emitter up to the level of a specific radar installed onboard a specific aircraft.

- The ASDD utilizes the type identification of radar emitter.
This kind of identification is based on applied software and hardware equipment. The ASDD's identification process relies in principle on just interpulse characteristics of the EM pulse signal. Based on this, it is possible to define general types of radar, which might be used on many types of aircraft.
Based on the above principles of emitter identification, it should be clear that the applied system databases are very different. The difference is in the radar parameters, which go into the database, as well the emitter identification based on the system's database. In general, there is a much simpler database in the ASDD and a more complex database in the VERA-E.

¶5. (C) Regarding measures to prevent reverse engineering or unauthorized copying of its products, company officials explained that 90% of the system's capacity is in the software, and that source codes would not be delivered to the customer.

¶6. (C) In a ironic twist on traditional marketing presentations, ERA did all it could to call attention to the shortcomings and limitations of its product. The firm pointed out that they still use previous generation analog receivers. They called attention to the fact that VERA-E requires a number of vehicles and masts and is awkward to deploy or move. They noted that VERA-E can only pick up radar emissions, not communications or other electronic signals. In answer to the question, ""what do you see if the plane turns off its radar emitter?"" they said, ""nothing."" ERA also said that it hopes the system the US has purchased and is scheduled to test this fall will produce a ""realistic"" evaluation that destroys some of the myths about the capacity of VERA-E in particular, and passive radar in general. The firm acknowledged that VERA-E had been developed on ""a Czech budget"" and that it did not have the R&D resources that competitive firms such as the Italian firm Marconi or the French firm Thales have, and admitted that one of the main attractions of VERA-E is its price, roughly 5 million US dollars.

¶7. (C) The company also explained that it wasn't even certain that Pakistan is still interested, but that if permission is granted to market the ASDD-01 in Pakistan, it would have to build an ASSD-01 that could be taken there for testing. If Pakistan was satisfied with the results of the test, production on its order would begin. In 2003 Pakistan expressed interest in buying six radar sets. It is unlikely that the radar sets would be ready before 2006. ERA officials said Pakistan has already signed contracts, worth roughly 1.7 billion US dollars for a more powerful airborne surveilance system ERIEYE. According to ERA officials, the Swedish system incorporates both active and passive technology. ERA officials explained that if Pakistan were to buy the ASDD-01, it would be used as the land component of an integrated air defense system.

¶8. (C) ERA answered all questions that were asked, at length.
The company shared information on prices and acknowledged that although it has had recent success in selling civil radar sets, its goal is to sell military sets as well, where margins are much higher. It was up front about its marketing strategies. ERA also offered to provide more information in the future, should we have additional questions.

¶9. COMMENT (C) If ERA assertions about Erieye's capabilities are correct, and taking into consideration ERA's willingness to dumbdown their product, post believes Washington should consider a positive response on the question of the Czech export of the ASDD to Pakistan. Otherwise, the willingness of the Czech MFA to consult with the USG on a voluntary basis could come under attack, and even be put at risk in future cases where we have a strong and direct interest in preventing an export of the more capable VERA-E system, as was the case recently with China. END COMMENT

¶10. (U) Post looks forward to receiving Washington's advisory opinion.
HILLAS

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2005/01/05PRAGUE106.html

CZECH PROPOSAL FOR PASSIVE RADAR SYSTEM TO VIETNAM
RENEWED; DEMO MODEL TO PAKISTAN EXPECTED SOON

Created
2005-06-13 08:45

1 (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Winkler told DCM in a June
3rd meeting that the Czech Republic is considering the sale
of the passive surveillance system VERA-E, in a simplified
non-NATO version, to Vietnam, and would like to consult with
the US on this. Winkler explained that French and Swedish
exporters have recently expressed interest in Vietnam and
that has prompted the Czech firm ERA to renew its own sales
efforts there.

¶2. (C) The MFA initially denied this application last Fall
(U.S. views on sale given Reftel A). The manufacturer, ERA,
withdrew the application, but resubmitted it in March. At
that time, the MFA said that its position hadn't changed and
that the sale was not in the interest of the Czech Republic
or its allies. ERA said it had new information to present
with the resubmission and presented this last week (June 2).
Most of the new information involved claims by ERA of sales
or proposed sales of similar radar and surveillance equipment
to Vietnam by other European states, including Germany,
France, Sweden and Poland.

¶3. (C) In a separate June 3rd meeting, Petr Kaiser, head of
the MFA's licensing office, told Embassy Pol-Mil officer that
ERA wants to design and sell to Vietnam a non-NATO version of
the VERA-E and is ready to consider serious reductions in the
capability of the system. The Czech Ministry of Defense,
which has been financially supporting VERA for many years, is
also, according to Kaiser, considering this.

¶4. (C) Kaiser thought there could be a meeting soon to
discuss the concept of a non-NATO VERA-E. He wondered
whether the US would like to have some input in the
discussion about what capabilities a non-NATO machine might
have, or what kind of pre-sales and post-sales safeguards
non-NATO transactions might require.

¶5. (C) Kaiser argued that ERA is trying to be a responsible
corporation. He revealed that ERA had a board meeting within
the last two weeks to discuss the ongoing suit, filed by
Czech arms dealer Omnipol, over last year's canceled license
for the sale of VERA-E to China. At that meeting ERA
representatives decided to go against Omnipol and not be a
party to the suit. Apparently, Kaiser reasoned, some at ERA
feel it is not appropriate to sell VERA-E to China at this
time.

¶6. (C) Kaiser cautioned that the proposed sale to Vietnam is
an issue that is not going to go away anytime soon.

¶7. (C) Meanwhile, in a related matter, Kaiser informed
Embassy Pol-mil officer that Pakistan has asked for a model
of ERA's passive surveillance system ASDD to begin testing.
The Czechs plan to loan this model, for a couple of weeks.
Kaiser said the approval for this loan is in the pipeline and
could be given within the next 2 weeks.

¶8. COMMENT: (C) As discussed Reftel B, the Czech MFA has
offered assurances that they want to continue consulting with
USG on VERA sales. Embassy believes it is in the USG
interest to engage the Czechs in a discussion on a non-NATO
version of VERA. In December, 2004, the Czech MFA asked for
the USG opinion on a proposed Pakistani purchase of a less
capable version of VERA. The absence of a USG response has
left the Czechs to decide for themselves what technical
capabilities are appropriate and what conditions to attach to
the sale. Post is aware that the U.S. won't have the chance
to test its own VERA-E until this fall. Nevertheless, post
encourages Washington to consider the Czech offer to discuss
what modifications might be appropriate for a non-NATO
version of the VERA-E.

¶9. ACTION REQUEST: (C) Please indicate Washington's
willingness to begin a technical discussion on a possible
non-NATO version of the VERA-E, and Washington's views on the
proposed sale of such a device to Vietnam.
CABANISS

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2005/06/05PRAGUE892.html


Then Czec Republic gave its permission to lease Less advance version of VERA to Pakistan in September 2005

Czech Republic to lend radar system to Pakistan

The Associated Press

Sep 20, 2005

PRAGUE, Czech Republic (AP) - The Czech Republic has approved a plan to lend Pakistan a radar system reportedly capable of detecting stealth jets, an official said Tuesday.

The Industry and Trade Ministry agreed to lend Pakistan a demo version of the system, known as ``Vera,'' ministry spokesman Ivo Mravinac said. Three other government ministries that must approve licenses for arms deals raised no objections to the loan.

A new license would have to be issued if Pakistan opts to buy Vera after its trial of the system, Mravinac said.

Amnesty International expressed concern about the deal.

``It can't be ruled out that information about the system can leak from Pakistan to other countries, such as China,'' said Karel Dolejsi, an arms expert with the international human rights group's local branch.

So far, the Czech government has approved the sale of the system to the United States and Estonia. Last year, the government canceled a planned sale of the radar to China at the United States' request.

Recently, the Industry and Trade Ministry refused to issue a license to sell Vera to Vietnam, Mravinac said.



CZECHS LICENSE A ONE-YEAR VERA SYSTEM LOAN TO PAKISTAN

Created
2005-09-21 12:01


1) (S) Czech News agency CTK late September 20 reported the
Ministry of Industry and Trade has licensed a lease of the
VERA passive surveillance system to Pakistan. This
information is slightly different from that previously
provided by GOCR sources, which maintained the proposed
transfer was a one-year loan, rather than a lease. According
to previous discussions with the MFA, the unit would have to
be returned to the Czech Republic, even if Pakistan decides
to purchase a system. A sale to Pakistan would require a new
license application. A history of the circumstances
surrounding this deal can be found in Refs A-I.

2) (S) While following up on the news story with the Ministry
of Industry and Trade, Post learned that the license was
quietly issued Sep 12th. The Ministry's head of licensing Sep
21st told us he was unhappy that the matter had become
public. Under the Czech export-control system, the issuance
of a license ends the Czech Governmental involvement in a
deal, unless there are some conditions added to the license
that require further government oversight. Examples of these
would be inspections or proof that nonproliferation measures
have been added to a system. The MFA had insisted that such
conditions be part of any issuance of a license to Pakistan.
Embassy Prague is seeking details of the final conditions
that were imposed.

3) (S) In 2004, when the GOCR approved a license for the
export of the VERA to China it took high level U.S.
intervention to convince then PM Spidla to intervene and
prevent the sale (REF J). That event was politically damaging
to Spidla, despite the GOCR's public statement that the
intervention was actually based on the EU's China arms
embargo. PM Paroubek, facing elections next year, is not
likely to be keen to block a Pakistan deal.
DODMAN

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2005/09/05PRAGUE1363.html


CZECHS IN ASIA: CONTINUED FOCUS ON CHINA, BUT
INCREASING ENGAGEMENT PLANNED IN INDIA, VIETNAM

Created 2006-01-13 18:04

(C) Summary. The Czech Republic plans active engagement
with East and South Asia in the first half of 2006, with most
attention focused on China. During a visit to Prague in
December, the Chinese PM closed an investment agreement that,
according to critics, noticeably favors Chinese interests
over Czech (and may violate EU rules). Several visits to
China are being planned for the coming months, with the focus
squarely on commercial issues; the Speaker of Parliament has
floated the idea of a visit to Tibet as a means of drawing
attention to human rights, but the proposal is likely to
fail. PM Paroubek will visit India this month, on the heels
of a visit by President Klaus; among the business deals the
GOCR hopes to discuss is possible Indian purchase of a VERA
radar system, which would be a counterweight to the system
Pakistan is planning to acquire. Several leading Czech
officials plan to visit Vietnam this year, and a visit to
Prague by the Vietnamese PM is possible in the spring.
President Karzai intends to visit Prague this year, as the
Czechs contemplate increasing their engagement in
Afghanistan. The Czech MFA continues to work with the North
Koreans to define their relationship, and the Czechs will be
pursuing the question of conditions for North Korean workers
in the CR. Despite this flurry of activity, the Czech MFA
admits it does not have a coherent Asia strategy, and hopes
to coordinate this with the USG. End summary.

----------------
India & Pakistan
----------------

PRAGUE 00000046 002 OF 003



¶5. (C) The Czechs seek increased economic cooperation with
India as well. PM Paroubek plans to travel to New Delhi and
Calcutta the week of January 17, 2006. Paroubek will meet
with Indian President and prominent Indian business leaders,
and deliver a speech at a business conference. His visit
follows a December trip to India by Czech President Klaus.
According to Fury, Paroubek will not pursue any significant
political topics during his visit, but (as in China) will
focus almost exclusively on business. One topic likely to be
raised is Indian interest in purchasing a version of the
Czech-made VERA passive surveillance system. Fury said the
Indian interest in the purchase is a result of Pakistan's
intention to also acquire the technology (note: Czech
officials had approached us in 2004 regarding a possible
VERA-E sale to India; the USG did not indicate objections to
the sale, but there appear to have been no active discussions
on an actual deal since then).

¶6. (SBU) Fury noted that Deputy FM Tomas Pojar will also
travel to India and Pakistan in coming months. Further on
Pakistan, the Czechs plan to airlift 11 Pakistani children to
Prague in January to provide medical treatment

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2006/01/06PRAGUE46.html

VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK
Date:

2006 January 27, 17:21 (Friday)


Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraphs 13 and 14. 2. (S/NF)

Summary. In a significant change from previous practice, the Armaments Division of the Czech Ministry of Defense has broken its silence towards the U.S. on its views about sales of the VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Through contacts, we knew the Armaments Division has consistently supported increased exports of Czech passive surveillance technology. That office had been the only key player unwilling to discuss VERA-E with U.S. officials. The Armaments Division has now approached us with specific questions about the consistency of U.S. concerns over Czech arms sales to countries that have already purchased U.S. arms. In support of their position the Czechs are now citing China's efforts to develop its own passive surveillance technology. Seeking to end U.S. objections to VERA sales, the Armaments Division has also proposed a more positive step: greater U.S.- Czech technical collaboration in the field of passive surveillance. Embassy Prague seeks guidance on the proposal in para 13 and the appropriate response to the questions contained in para 14. End summary.


3. (U) DATT, ODC Deputy, and PolOff met January 27 with: Josef Taborsky, Senior Program Manager, MOD Armaments Division; and Richard Macha, Lt Col Lubor Koudleka, and Josef Stastny, of the MOD's International Relations Branch.
--- ARE YOU AMERICANS CONSISTENT? SHOW US HOW YOU HANDLE YOUR OWN ARMS SALES --- --- --- --- ---

4. (S/NF) Leading the meeting for the Czech side, International Relations Branch Director Macha said that the Armaments Division (and the MOD generally) would like general information about the licensing scheme for U.S. military technology exports. He also said the MOD would like to consult with the United States on concrete examples of such transfers. Accordingly the MOD asked for the text of a real-world agreement covering a U.S. technology export that would prevent the misuse of sensitive U.S. technologies by third parties. As a suggested case, the Czechs gave the example of Pakistan's acquisition of the P-3 Orion, equipped with the AN/ALR66C electronic support measures system and the EP2060 pulse analyzer. The MOD would like to examine provisions within the agreement that prevent proliferation of the technology to China.

5. (S/NF) DATT acknowledged the already-close cooperation between the U.S. and the Czech Republic on selecting appropriate destinations for VERA, noting the United States placed great value on the Czechs' willingness to consult with us on our strategic interests before making a decision on a sale. In response to Macha's first question, DATT and PolOff outlined the work of the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the consultative role of the interagency community. Emboffs did not address the idea of providing a sample of an agreement covering a U.S. military-technology transfer. --- --- --- --- LETS COLLABORATE --- --- --- ---

6. (S/NF) Macha said the MOD would be interested in working closely with U.S. technical experts to establish the parameters for a downgraded version of the VERA-E system, one which would be appropriate for export to non-NATO countries: "Our main goal is to ask our more knowledgeable partner how to do it." The MOD would also like to invite a technical team to the Czech Republic to jointly address the adequacy of nonproliferation countermeasures in their passive surveillance systems. Macha said such a team could choose to PRAGUE 00000095 002 OF 003 demonstrate U.S. concerns about proliferation to third countries by breaking/overcoming the countermeasures currently present in the ASDD-01 system. In addition to technical meetings, the MOD would welcome agreement of a way forward at upcoming U.S. Czech Pol-Mil talks, notionally scheduled for the spring (Note: dates for these talks have not yet been finalized. End note.).

7. (S/NF) Taborsky spoke at length about the loss of Czech sales due to the Czechs voluntary desire to protect U.S. strategic interests. He said Ukraine had been quick to sell the Kolchuga system to countries that had sought the Czech ASDD-01 and been denied. Macha further mentioned that China was now developing its own passive surveillance detection system and wondered to us whether it would be better to allow China to arm itself with the VERA-E, a known system, rather than with a system with unknown operating characteristics and capabilities.

DATT responded that the United States was interested in the Czechs maintaining their hi-tech defense industry, and the USG realized that the brains behind this cutting edge technology would best be kept gainfully employed at ERA, where they would be less vulnerable to financial offers from potentially-hostile countries seeking to buy their knowledge.

8. (S/NF) Taborsky presented a Czech idea for collaboration between the United States and the Czech Republic on developing future technology in this field. He suggested the creation of a joint U.S. DOD - Czech MOD research and development project, with funding from both governments. When the DATT and ODC Deputy clarified that the private sector takes the lead in developing military technology for the United States, the Czechs responded that they would also welcome a joint venture involving a U.S. firm.

9. (S/NF) DATT noted the United States would soon provide the MOD with a letter outlining the test results for the U.S-owned VERA-E system. Such information would assist the Czechs in their marketing efforts to countries that were the most appropriate destinations (understood by both sides to be NATO allies and other aligned countries such as Australia). While welcoming the idea of a letter as a positive step, Taborsky said there had been little interest in the VERA-E among NATO allies and it would be good to see the United States' high regard for the VERA-E system demonstrated by further U.S. orders. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- WHO ARE THE POTENTIAL BUYERS THESE DAYS? --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

10 (S/NF) PolOff asked Macha which countries were currently considered potential customers for either the ASDD-01 or VERA-E systems. Macha responded that only one country, Pakistan, was considered a current case. (Note: ERA (the manufacturer) had applied to the MOD for a preliminary opinion on a sale of one downgraded system to Pakistan. ERA had previously been granted permission for a 6-month lease to Pakistan, but that license had been abandoned because Pakistan had chosen to buy the system instead and would need a new license (ref A)). Macha said the MOD would advise ERA that it would not render an opinion on the case until after further discussion with the U.S. in the Spring. PolOff asked about rumors that India and Malaysia were interested in new purchases. Macha indicated it would also be helpful to learn U.S. opinion about a transfer to Malaysia (Note: We do not/not consider this a formal request. See para 15). Macha also said there had been interest from Greece and Australia.

11. (S/NF) (Comment We are at a point of danger and opportunity. The MOD's Armaments Division, which has been deeply cynical about U.S. motives for blocking VERA exports, has decided to try to move beyond a status quo that does not allow for widespread sales. From their perspective, any change is good. If we cannot show them that the United States has deployed effective methods to prevent proliferation of our own technology, then the Armaments Division will argue within the GOCR that U.S. decision-making is driven more by economic concerns than strategic ones. Under such circumstances they would argue that the Czechs should be no more accommodating to U.S. strategic concerns than the U.S. PRAGUE 00000095 003 OF 003 is itself. That line of reasoning could win converts within the GOCR, even though it willfully makes incorrect assumptions about the equivalency of U.S. and Czech military systems in the field of passive surveillance.

12. (S/NF) (Comment continued) In terms of the proposed collaboration. VERA's supporters in the Czech Republic feel the U.S. could have no objection to the sale of a system with characteristics that were defined by a joint U.S.-Czech team. They do acknowledge the difficulty of downgrading a system to the extent that it eliminates U.S. strategic concerns without leaving the resulting platform so ineffective that there is no market interest. Any future U.S. collaboration with the Czechs in developing next-generation technology would do much to relieve the political pressure within the GOCR to authorize sales to countries that are of concern to the United States.

13. (S/NF) (Action request) Robust engagement with the Czechs on these topics will be crucial to preserving their political willingness to pre-clear VERA and ASDD-01 sales with the United States. This summer will likely see the arrival of new defense and foreign ministers and the departure for a new assignment of the head of the MFA's licensing department, who has been very supportive of U.S. positions. New incumbents in these positions, and in the GOCR generally, may need to be convinced that the Czech defense industry's jewel in the crown should continue to forgo tens of millions of dollars of business because of U.S. strategic interests. Post recommends acceptance of the Czech offer for collaboration of technical experts on counterproliferation measures mentioned in para 6. The U.S. has already confirmed it would "welcome further dialogue and cooperation with the Czech Republic on the specific capabilities and the licensing conditions or provisos of the ASDD-01 to be sold to Pakistan, as well as any other safeguard measures employed to protect the technology." (ref A)

14 (S/NF) (Action request continued) Post further requests: A) The Department provide a response to the Czech's question surrounding the P-3 Orion transfer to Pakistan mentioned in para 4. B) A statement of the U.S. position regarding the Czech's suggestion for collaboration on joint development of next-generation military technologies (para 8). (End action request) 15. (S/NF) (Comment continued) While the MOD is interested in learning U.S. opinion about a possible sale to Malaysia, we do not believe that our answer to this theoretical case would do more than arm our critics with more examples of U.S. opposition to a sale. The MOD is not the guardian of the consultative mechanism worked out between the GOCR and the United States. That function rests with the MFA, and Post will seek confirmation that the GOCR would like a formal opinion on a Malaysia sale. If such a request is made, the way in which we deliver our (likely negative) response must form part of our engagement on the issues raised above. Post recommends the Department solicit interagency opinion on a Malaysia case only when the Czech MFA formally requests such an opinion and only as part of an integrated response that will keep the consultative process alive. (End comment) DODMAN

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04PRAGUE1870_a.html

Then this happened

CZECH DEFENSE MINISTER ON VERA-E, AFGHAN PRT,

Created
2006-03-17 15:51

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons
1.4 (b) & (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador met March 14 with Czech Defense
Minister Karel Kuehnl to present the letter from SECDEF
Rumsfeld on the positive results of U.S. testing of the
VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Afghanistan and
missile defense were also discussed. Kuehnl welcomed the
SECDEF's letter but said that actual sales of the VERA-E
would be important in the future.

--------------------------------------
VERA-E: U.S. SEAL-OF-APPROVAL WELCOME
BUT CZECHS SAY MORE SALES ARE NEEDED
--------------------------------------

2. (C) Kuehnl welcomed SECDEF Rumsfeld's favorable letter on
the VERA-E, saying the Czech Republic never had doubts about
the system's technical capabilities. He agreed with the
Ambassador that such a document would be useful in marketing
the system to allies. However the Minister observed that the
Czech Republic's industrial and social policies were taking a
back seat to national security policy on this issue. He said
praise of the system would not be enough. Failure of the VERA
to become commercially successful would lead to a "grave"
domestic political problem. Kuehnl said he is committed to
maintaining the superiority of allies, and not making them
more vulnerable. He hoped with the help of the United States
the Czechs could find ways to make Czech passive surveillance
technology less of a proliferation threat and therefore more
exportable. The Minister asked that the Ambassador
communicate the Czech request for practical measures to
Washington for action. The Ambassador responded that
Washington was aware and engaged, as the letter from SECDEF
Rumsfeld indicated. He said he understood the Minister's
concerns from both an economic and a political standpoint,
and assured Kuehnl the United States is grateful for Czech
cooperation on the VERA-E issue.

--------
COMMENT:
--------

5. (C) Kuehnl's position on increased VERA-E system sales is
a reflection of rising pressure within the GOCR to authorize
more exports of this technology. The Minister believes there
is scope for more bilateral U.S.-Czech cooperation on this
issue.

http://cablegate.1wise.es/cable/2006/03/06PRAGUE283.html


U.S.-CZECH POL-MIL TALKS A SUCCESS
Date:
2006 May 22, 13:08 (Monday)

-- PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE DETECTION SYSTEMS (paras 14-16): The Czechs reiterated their desire to work with the USG on cooperative technology ventures related to VERA. Amb Loftis conveyed our appreciation of the consultation process on VERA sales and our understanding of the 30-day window for a U.S. response (except in the case of US Military List) and the USG desire to prevent the proliferation of this technology to countries of concern. There was no specific discussion regarding potential sales from the Czechs or particular countries.

--------- --------- --------- ------- PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS (VERA-E) --------- --------- --------- ------- 14. (C) In a surprisingly brief session, GOCR representatives took a cooperative and positive tone on VERA. The Czechs thanked the United States for SECDEF Rumsfeld,s letter on the successful results of U.S. testing of the VERA-E, which demonstrated that the systems was as effective as claimed by the manufacturer.

15. (S) Ambassador Loftis thanked the Czechs for consulting with the United States before transferring the technology to others. He recognized that the GOCR is bound by its law to respond to license requests within 30 days, and promised the USG would do try to work as &expeditiously as possible8 with that timeframe in mind. However, he warned that the USG might not always be able to meet the 30-day deadline because of the need to comply with U.S. law covering VERA components of U.S.-origin.

16. (S) Jahoda said the Czechs remain committed to bilateral agreement to consult with USG before transfer of the technology to others. The Czech delegation welcomed the possibility of U.S. interest in joint research and development efforts, whether government-to-government or business-to-business. Ambassador Loftis indicated the first step towards such cooperation would involve the appropriate preliminary framework to allow such cooperation to begin. Embassy Prague,s Office of Defense Cooperation will take the lead in working with the GOCR to explore this initiative.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06PRAGUE544_a.html


Then below mentioned news piece Happened and wikileak cable confirmed Pakistan placed an order for vera Radar

Czech radar company sold to US

23 Nov. 2006 | Frantisek Bouc / The Prague Post |

The most formidable Czech military defensive tool - the Vera surveillance radar, which is the only system that can detect the "invisible" U.S. Stealth bomber - is now owned by Americans. U.S. surveillance and flight tracking developer Rannoch Corporation has taken over ERA, the Pardubice-based company that developed Vera. The deal took place in late October, but the daily Mlada fronta Dnes reported it Nov. 11.


"The ERA facilities are truly world-class," said Rannoch President Dave Ellison in an official statement. "We realize the potential of the combined teams to offer the most comprehensive and technically advanced solutions." Defense Ministry representatives and east Bohemian regional officials were unaware of the development.

ERA Vice Chairman Milan Bernard confirmed the transaction, adding that ERA's management first wanted to notify the company's shareholders. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, but Bernard said that they would be announced later this month. Defense Ministry spokesman Andrej Cirtek said the takeover was "a strictly private matter," and the government would not interfere in it.

ERA's Multilateration Surveillance System (MSS) is the best-selling technology around the globe for tracking civilian airplanes, and also the most advanced and proven wide-range multi-altitude radar. The company's main asset, however, is the radar system Vera.

Traditional radar sends a signal that bounces off a target, letting the radar operators know that something is there. Vera uses "passive location," a unique way of identifying a target without sending out that signal. The technology allows the radar system to be unidentifiable and thus unjammable. Vera can simultaneously monitor up to 200 aircraft, and it is able to precisely determine their distance and altitude.

The ERA company has received orders for Vera from many countries, including Pakistan, China, Malaysia and Egypt. The U.S. government has repeatedly expressed concern about the Czech radar being sold to countries it deems unfriendly. As a result, ERA had to give up a planned transaction with China in 2004, after the Czech Defense Ministry banned the deal. So far, Vera radar has been sold to the United States and Estonia, and leased to Pakistan. Vera is expected to become a key tool in NATO's new air control system, according to Marshall Billingsley, NATO's investment department director.

http://www.czechinvest.org/en/czech-radar-company-sold


U.S. COMPANY BUYS MANUFACTURER OF VERA-E PASSIVE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Created 2006-10-30 12:26



Classified By: Political Counselor Michael Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (U) This cable contains sensitive business information.
Please protect accordingly.

2. (C/NF) Summary: Representatives of Rannoch Corporation, a
Virginia-based company specializing in air traffic control
(ATC) technology, purchased Czech company ERA A.S. on October

26. The new owners plan to quadruple production capacity for
the VERA-E in the first year, and state that this new
capacity would be aimed at supplying only the U.S., NATO
allies, and "responsible countries" that are acceptable to
the USG. Rannoch hopes to hold on to ERA for no longer than
two to three years. Rannoch executives say they place a high
priority on USG relations, thus avoiding factors that cou
make prospective U.S. purchasers of the company less likely
to buy them out. End summary.

¶3. (SBU) Representatives of Rannoch Corporation, a
Virginia-based company specializing in air traffic control
(ATC) technology, met with members of Embassy Prague on
October 25 to provide details of their planned takeover of
ERA, the manufacturer of the VERA passive surveillance
system. (Note: ERA confirmed on October 27 that the purchase
had been successfully concluded. End note). Rannoch's
President David A. Ellison and Chief Financial Officer John
¶D. Young, described ERA's civilian air traffic control
equipment as a world leader, and said that Rannoch's
acquisition of ERA, its main competitor, would mean increased
success in civilian airport air traffic control tenders.

¶4. (SBU) Turning to military systems, Ellison also expressed
Rannoch's interest in expanding production of the VERA,
because of the increased margins on military technology
compared to the highly competitive civilian market. Ellison
said ERA is currently only able to produce four VERA systems
per year. Based on Rannoch's previous marketing efforts in
the U.S., Rannoch executives foresee potential for further
U.S. and allied VERA purchases, possibly for non-traditional
applications such as military testing and homeland security.
However, current orders from Pakistan mean that ERA's order
books would be full for some time. Ellison said Rannoch plans
to initiate a shift-based system, initially doubling
production capacity to four systems every six months before
increasing capacity again within a year to allow ERA to
produce 16 VERA systems per year. Rannoch is currently also
looking at purchasing the Czech Ministry of Defense's share
of the intellectual property rights in the VERA system.

¶5. (SBU) Both executives said that Rannoch would like to
avoid dealings with shady arms exporters and would thus
immediately undertake a review of ERA's business partners in
the area of international marketing. As a part of this
strategy, Rannoch intended to buy out Czech exporter
Omnipol's holding in ERA.

¶6. (SBU) Ellison also claimed that Rannoch would want to
ensure good relations with the U.S. Government. He
volunteered to send the Embassy a list of the countries
currently being considered by ERA as potential buyers of the
VERA system. Ellison noted that ERA seemed to have several
deals in the works considering VERA sales. In response to a
question from Ellison, Poloff explained that the governments
generally cannot share details of any classified discussions
that may take place between governments about licensing arms
exports (Note: It is an open secret in Prague that U.S.
security concerns are the reason the Czech Government has
refused to license several VERA sales. End note.) However,
Poloff also warned that several of the Czech companies
marketing VERA around the world had failed to get an export
license from the Czech authorities due to Czech foreign
policy concerns. Ellison and Young both were at pains to
point out that any poor relations with the United States
Government could hurt them financially: Rannoch sees its
investment as only a short to medium-term involvement with
ERA, ideally lasting about two years. They hope that one of
the large U.S. defense firms will want to buy ERA after
Rannoch demonstrates the real worth of the company. They said
ERA would be less appealing to a buyer if it came with the
baggage of strained relations with Washington. However,
Ellison did assert that VERA was not unique, and mentioned
that one of his Internet searches had turned up a Chinese

claim to have developed a similar system.

-------
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C/NF) It appears Rannoch's purchase of ERA could lead to
a paradigm shift in the way the USG prevents the VERA system
from falling into the wrong hands. If Rannoch turns out to be
genuinely committed to prioritizing USG relations over
questionable sales, the United States may have the option to
prevent future problems even before the company begins
talking to the wrong prospective customers. Because Rannoch
is incorporated in the U.S., there is also the possibility of
the VERA now falling fully within the jurisdiction of U.S.
defense export licensing controls. From a bilateral relations
perspective such an outcome would be very favorable. If
Rannoch only applied for a Czech export license after
receiving a U.S. license, there would no longer be any U.S.
requests for license refusals in Prague, and the U.S.
Government might no longer be seen as a barrier to the
success of a prominent Czech company. Such an outcome would
also reduce political pressure on pro-U.S. officials in the
Czech government who have often stood in the way of attempts
to send VERA to inappropriate destination countries.
GRABER

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2006/10/06PRAGUE1350.html


CZECH MFA SOLICITS INFORMAL U.S. OPINION ON FOUR
VERA/TAMARA/BORAP DEALS

Created 2006-11-09 12:04

Classified By: Political Counselor Michael Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Czech Government is considering
granting permission for Czech export companies to begin to
negotiate sales of several radar and similar systems to
Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Vietnam. If future
applications are made for export licenses for the VERA, the
Czech MFA intends to work with the United States to reach a
decision. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Poloff met October 26 with Czech MFA Common Foreign
Security and Policy Director Vaclav Balek to discuss exports
of sensitive Czech military technology. Balek shared that the
Czech Government is considering issuing a preliminary opinion
on applications from several (unnamed) Czech export companies
to negotiate sales of radar and/or passive surveillance
technology to Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Vietnam. Balek
highlighted that these were not formal license applications
but were instead "preliminary applications for the start of
negotiations with partners." He was keen to point out that
these applications were subject to a degree of uncertainty.
The applications indicated neither a destination country's
definite interest in purchasing a system nor that an eventual
export license application would be approved by the Czech
Government.

¶3. (S/NF) Balek said that any future exports of the VERA
would be subject to a range of nonproliferation controls,
including the incorporation of chips that would cause the
system to self-destruct if operated outside of the
destination country. (Note: We believe that applications to
purchase the "VERA" refer to the slightly limited ASDD-01
version of the system that is normally offered to non-NATO
countries. End note.) Balek outlined the following requests
and probable Czech Government decisions:

Indonesia: VERA
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Ecuador: VERA
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Nigeria: Tamara
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Vietnam: VERA or Tamara or BORAP.
- likely to refuse permission for preliminary negotiations on
VERA and Tamara
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations on
BORAP.

(Note: While the VERA and the BORAP are manufactured by ERA
a.s., Balek guessed that the Tamara systems in question were
manufactured by Tesla Pardubice for delivery to France in the
early 1990s. That deal had fallen apart in a price dispute,
leaving two unsold systems in the Czech Republic. End note)

¶4. (S/NF) Balek said that, if the U.S. had an opinion on
sales to these particular destination countries, it would be
helpful for the Czechs to hear the U.S. side early in the
process. Poloff reminded Balek that USG opposition to a VERA
transfer to Vietnam was unlikely to change. Balek agreed,
indicating that this was a primary reason for the Czechs'
likely refusal to authorize commercial negotiations on the
purchase of a VERA. (Note: There is currently no agreement
committing the Czech Government to consult with the U.S. over
surveillance systems other than the VERA. However our
cooperation on other arms exports suggests that the Czech MFA
could be receptive to clearly articulated U.S. concerns about
other systems. End note.)

-------
COMMENT
-------
¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, the VERA and BORAP are manufactured
by ERA a.s., based in Pardubice, Czech Republic. These
applications all predate the October 26 purchase of ERA by
Rannoch, a U.S. firm (Reftel). All of the applications were
made by Czech export companies specializing in military
material, rather than ERA itself. It remains to be seen if

Rannoch would back these export companies and support further
negotiations with these destination countries. Regardless of
Rannoch's opinion, if the VERA now falls within the
jurisdiction of U.S. defense export licensing controls, the
USG will have a useful tool at its disposal to ensure that
VERAs are not sent to the wrong countries.
¶6. (S/NF) Pending resolution of the issues raised by the
Rannoch acquisition of ERA, the Czech MFA must still rule on
the current applications to negotiate with these four
destination countries. Post has already made it clear to the
Czechs that the USG remains opposed to a transfer to Vietnam.
The Czech MFA did not/not make a formal request with a 30-day
timeline for a final USG opinion on any of these destination
countries (Note: For an actual marketing or export license
application involving the VERA, the USG has committed to
providing the Czech Government with its opinion within 30
days. End note). The Czech MFA's decision to consult with the
Embassy at so early a stage provides an opportunity to stop
problematic negotiations before they begin in earnest. There
is no history of the Czech Republic consulting the U.S. on
BORAP or the Tamara and this may be our only chance to
intervene in those cases. If a USG opinion on the
appropriateness of these destination countries is not easily
available in Washington, Post will make it clear to the
Czechs that the USG will be able to provide a formal and
timely response on the VERA cases if negotiations lead to an
actual application for a license. We will also note that we
are also considering the implications of the Rannoch
acquisition of ERA.
GRABER

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2006/11/06PRAGUE1398.html

 

[The Eagle]

Who says It is not published and Widely known ?

My friend, suspense was deliberately put for the interest of readers in that particular thread.

 

[Tps43]

 

[monitor]

In response to @The Eagle and @Khafee discussion



Who says It is not published and Widely known ? And Pakistan got the Downgraded version of VERA in 2005. USA already knows how to avoid the VERA radar because they own the Company which produces this radar and tested it extensively in 2006

Lets start with Wiki Leak cables

CZECH MFA SOLICITS US OPINION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF PASSIVE RADAR TO PAKISTAN

Date:
2004 December 23, 13:26 (Thursday)


B. PRAGUE 1064 C. STATE 172966 Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) and (g) 1.

THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 7 2. (C) As foreshadowed in Reftel A, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, for the second time this year, soliciting US opinion on the possible sale of a Czech-produced passive radar system to Pakistan. 3. (C) As in the previous case, dealt with in Reftels B and C, this MFA request is based on a request from the Czech firm ERA to begin preliminary marketing discussions with the Air Force of Pakistan. Unlike the previous case, the proposed sale would not involve the passive system VERA-E, but an earlier, less powerful model of passive radar, the ASDD-01. 4. (C) Reftel C describes U.S. concerns over a possible reexport of the VERA-E to China as the primary reason for opposing a VERA-E sale to Pakistan. The U.S. concern played an important role in the decision by the GOCR in July to deny ERA permission to move forward with marketing the system to Pakistan.

The firm has recently approached the MFA with new information about the sale of a Swedish radar system, the Erieye, to Pakistan. The Erieye is made by Ericsson Microwave Systems and is described as an active, phased-array pulse-Doppler radar that can be used for Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems. The firm provided news reports stating Pakistan will purchase seven copies of the Eireye. 5. (C) The firm argues that the ASDD-01 is based on the same technology as the Erieye. In addition the firm has offered to discuss reexport concerns. The firm made the suggestions that GPS equipment be included in the hardware to identify its location, and that unannounced spot checks of the equipment be agreed to in any potential contract.


6. (C) Comment: In presenting the formal request for USG views on the proposed sale during a meeting on Dec 22, Czech MFA staff pointed out the huge symbolic benefits of any sale, even a non VERA sale. The GOCR, and the MFA in particular, which were publicly criticized for halting earlier requests to market VERA, are now under renewed public and private pressure from the politically-influential ERA to license exports. As MFA staff did not hesitate to point out, good news on a high-profile sale like this would boost the ability of the weak Czech government to win approval for controversial policy moves, such as the further extension of Czech troops in Iraq. End Comment. 7. Please provide response in the next 90 days, if possible, to the Czech request for Washington advisory opinion. CABANISS

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04PRAGUE1870_a.html


ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN

Created 2005-01-21 14:14
=


classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c)

¶1. (C) Reftel reported the request of the Czech government for the U.S. government's opinion on the potential sale of a passive surveillance system (PSS) to the Air Force of Pakistan. This cable offers additional technical and background information on the system. Note: ref A mistakenly made reference to a 90-day timeframe for receipt of USG views on possible VERA sales. In fact, our commitment to the GOCR (ref B) was to undertake best efforts to provide our views within 30 days. MFA officials are asking about when they can expect our views (ref A dated Dec 23, 2004). We have explained that the holiday period could delay our reply. However, given recent MFA cooperation on USG request to accelerate licenses for a number of weapons exports to Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S., it is in our continuing interest to be as responsive as possible to the Czech request.

¶2. (C) Three Embassy officers (DAO, PolEc and ODC) met January 19 with four representatives from ERA, the Czech company that produces the passive surveillance system, VERA-E. The company was represented by its CEO, Miroslav Sotona, its Commercial Director Milan Bernard, and two marketing managers for ERA's military products. The company gave Embassy representatives a 20-minute briefing on the firm's short history, its civil and military products, and its recent unsuccessful attempts to sell its products in Asia. The company then openly answered all questions for more than 2 hours.

¶3. (C) ERA officials explained that, beginning in the late 90s, ERA initially attempted to market VERA-E to 22 NATO countries and discovered that there was no interest in its military radars. It is now convinced that most NATO countries already have or can afford better, more powerful systems and will never buy VERA. Once ERA realized this, it switched its marketing efforts to Asia, where it quickly found a number of interested buyers. Contract were signed with China and with Vietnam. The firm then discovered that Czech authorities would not approve the applications for export licenses. Altering its strategy, the company decided to do what many western arms manufacturers do: offer one version for allies and a more limited version for sale to non-allies.

This non-NATO version is the ASDD-01. Reftel mistakenly identifies the ASDD-01 as an earlier version of the VERA-E. In fact, the ASDD-01 has never been manufactured. The ASDD-01 would be an intentionally weakened version of the VERA that the company hopes it will be allowed to sell to non-NATO states. The company explained that it tried to reduce the capabilities of VERA to the point where sales to non-NATO states would be politically acceptable, but not so far that the system would no longer be attractive to potential customers

¶4. (C) ASDD-01 stands for Air Situation and Detection Display. The model, which again only exists in theory, would use the same principle as the VERA, time difference of arrival multilateration technique (TODA). It has roughly the same tracking and location capabilities as the VERA-E, but lacks the VERA's identification, or fingerprinting, capabilities. Both the ASDD-01 and the VERA-E are passive radar systems. Era provided the following explanation of the differences between ASDD and VERA, on paper:
ASDD belongs to the category of ELINT/ESM measures. It is based on the wideband principle of electromagnetic signal location and tracking.
The main differences between the VERA-E and the ASDD are as follows:

- The VERA-E, which in general has been designed for NATO partner countries, as developed by ERA, contains an advanced level of precise identification of electromagnetic signal emitters. The method of identifying such signal emissions is sometimes called finger printing. This identification has to be based on algorithms and hardware technologies, which make possible fine interpulse and intrapulse signal analysis.

This method can help to identify the signal emitter up to the level of a specific radar installed onboard a specific aircraft.

- The ASDD utilizes the type identification of radar emitter.
This kind of identification is based on applied software and hardware equipment. The ASDD's identification process relies in principle on just interpulse characteristics of the EM pulse signal. Based on this, it is possible to define general types of radar, which might be used on many types of aircraft.
Based on the above principles of emitter identification, it should be clear that the applied system databases are very different. The difference is in the radar parameters, which go into the database, as well the emitter identification based on the system's database. In general, there is a much simpler database in the ASDD and a more complex database in the VERA-E.

¶5. (C) Regarding measures to prevent reverse engineering or unauthorized copying of its products, company officials explained that 90% of the system's capacity is in the software, and that source codes would not be delivered to the customer.

¶6. (C) In a ironic twist on traditional marketing presentations, ERA did all it could to call attention to the shortcomings and limitations of its product. The firm pointed out that they still use previous generation analog receivers. They called attention to the fact that VERA-E requires a number of vehicles and masts and is awkward to deploy or move. They noted that VERA-E can only pick up radar emissions, not communications or other electronic signals. In answer to the question, ""what do you see if the plane turns off its radar emitter?"" they said, ""nothing."" ERA also said that it hopes the system the US has purchased and is scheduled to test this fall will produce a ""realistic"" evaluation that destroys some of the myths about the capacity of VERA-E in particular, and passive radar in general. The firm acknowledged that VERA-E had been developed on ""a Czech budget"" and that it did not have the R&D resources that competitive firms such as the Italian firm Marconi or the French firm Thales have, and admitted that one of the main attractions of VERA-E is its price, roughly 5 million US dollars.

¶7. (C) The company also explained that it wasn't even certain that Pakistan is still interested, but that if permission is granted to market the ASDD-01 in Pakistan, it would have to build an ASSD-01 that could be taken there for testing. If Pakistan was satisfied with the results of the test, production on its order would begin. In 2003 Pakistan expressed interest in buying six radar sets. It is unlikely that the radar sets would be ready before 2006. ERA officials said Pakistan has already signed contracts, worth roughly 1.7 billion US dollars for a more powerful airborne surveilance system ERIEYE. According to ERA officials, the Swedish system incorporates both active and passive technology. ERA officials explained that if Pakistan were to buy the ASDD-01, it would be used as the land component of an integrated air defense system.

¶8. (C) ERA answered all questions that were asked, at length.
The company shared information on prices and acknowledged that although it has had recent success in selling civil radar sets, its goal is to sell military sets as well, where margins are much higher. It was up front about its marketing strategies. ERA also offered to provide more information in the future, should we have additional questions.

¶9. COMMENT (C) If ERA assertions about Erieye's capabilities are correct, and taking into consideration ERA's willingness to dumbdown their product, post believes Washington should consider a positive response on the question of the Czech export of the ASDD to Pakistan. Otherwise, the willingness of the Czech MFA to consult with the USG on a voluntary basis could come under attack, and even be put at risk in future cases where we have a strong and direct interest in preventing an export of the more capable VERA-E system, as was the case recently with China. END COMMENT

¶10. (U) Post looks forward to receiving Washington's advisory opinion.
HILLAS

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2005/01/05PRAGUE106.html

CZECH PROPOSAL FOR PASSIVE RADAR SYSTEM TO VIETNAM
RENEWED; DEMO MODEL TO PAKISTAN EXPECTED SOON

Created
2005-06-13 08:45

1 (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Winkler told DCM in a June
3rd meeting that the Czech Republic is considering the sale
of the passive surveillance system VERA-E, in a simplified
non-NATO version, to Vietnam, and would like to consult with
the US on this. Winkler explained that French and Swedish
exporters have recently expressed interest in Vietnam and
that has prompted the Czech firm ERA to renew its own sales
efforts there.

¶2. (C) The MFA initially denied this application last Fall
(U.S. views on sale given Reftel A). The manufacturer, ERA,
withdrew the application, but resubmitted it in March. At
that time, the MFA said that its position hadn't changed and
that the sale was not in the interest of the Czech Republic
or its allies. ERA said it had new information to present
with the resubmission and presented this last week (June 2).
Most of the new information involved claims by ERA of sales
or proposed sales of similar radar and surveillance equipment
to Vietnam by other European states, including Germany,
France, Sweden and Poland.

¶3. (C) In a separate June 3rd meeting, Petr Kaiser, head of
the MFA's licensing office, told Embassy Pol-Mil officer that
ERA wants to design and sell to Vietnam a non-NATO version of
the VERA-E and is ready to consider serious reductions in the
capability of the system. The Czech Ministry of Defense,
which has been financially supporting VERA for many years, is
also, according to Kaiser, considering this.

¶4. (C) Kaiser thought there could be a meeting soon to
discuss the concept of a non-NATO VERA-E. He wondered
whether the US would like to have some input in the
discussion about what capabilities a non-NATO machine might
have, or what kind of pre-sales and post-sales safeguards
non-NATO transactions might require.

¶5. (C) Kaiser argued that ERA is trying to be a responsible
corporation. He revealed that ERA had a board meeting within
the last two weeks to discuss the ongoing suit, filed by
Czech arms dealer Omnipol, over last year's canceled license
for the sale of VERA-E to China. At that meeting ERA
representatives decided to go against Omnipol and not be a
party to the suit. Apparently, Kaiser reasoned, some at ERA
feel it is not appropriate to sell VERA-E to China at this
time.

¶6. (C) Kaiser cautioned that the proposed sale to Vietnam is
an issue that is not going to go away anytime soon.

¶7. (C) Meanwhile, in a related matter, Kaiser informed
Embassy Pol-mil officer that Pakistan has asked for a model
of ERA's passive surveillance system ASDD to begin testing.
The Czechs plan to loan this model, for a couple of weeks.
Kaiser said the approval for this loan is in the pipeline and
could be given within the next 2 weeks.

¶8. COMMENT: (C) As discussed Reftel B, the Czech MFA has
offered assurances that they want to continue consulting with
USG on VERA sales. Embassy believes it is in the USG
interest to engage the Czechs in a discussion on a non-NATO
version of VERA. In December, 2004, the Czech MFA asked for
the USG opinion on a proposed Pakistani purchase of a less
capable version of VERA. The absence of a USG response has
left the Czechs to decide for themselves what technical
capabilities are appropriate and what conditions to attach to
the sale. Post is aware that the U.S. won't have the chance
to test its own VERA-E until this fall. Nevertheless, post
encourages Washington to consider the Czech offer to discuss
what modifications might be appropriate for a non-NATO
version of the VERA-E.

¶9. ACTION REQUEST: (C) Please indicate Washington's
willingness to begin a technical discussion on a possible
non-NATO version of the VERA-E, and Washington's views on the
proposed sale of such a device to Vietnam.
CABANISS

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2005/06/05PRAGUE892.html


Then Czec Republic gave its permission to lease Less advance version of VERA to Pakistan in September 2005

Czech Republic to lend radar system to Pakistan

The Associated Press

Sep 20, 2005

PRAGUE, Czech Republic (AP) - The Czech Republic has approved a plan to lend Pakistan a radar system reportedly capable of detecting stealth jets, an official said Tuesday.

The Industry and Trade Ministry agreed to lend Pakistan a demo version of the system, known as ``Vera,'' ministry spokesman Ivo Mravinac said. Three other government ministries that must approve licenses for arms deals raised no objections to the loan.

A new license would have to be issued if Pakistan opts to buy Vera after its trial of the system, Mravinac said.

Amnesty International expressed concern about the deal.

``It can't be ruled out that information about the system can leak from Pakistan to other countries, such as China,'' said Karel Dolejsi, an arms expert with the international human rights group's local branch.

So far, the Czech government has approved the sale of the system to the United States and Estonia. Last year, the government canceled a planned sale of the radar to China at the United States' request.

Recently, the Industry and Trade Ministry refused to issue a license to sell Vera to Vietnam, Mravinac said.



CZECHS LICENSE A ONE-YEAR VERA SYSTEM LOAN TO PAKISTAN

Created
2005-09-21 12:01


1) (S) Czech News agency CTK late September 20 reported the
Ministry of Industry and Trade has licensed a lease of the
VERA passive surveillance system to Pakistan. This
information is slightly different from that previously
provided by GOCR sources, which maintained the proposed
transfer was a one-year loan, rather than a lease. According
to previous discussions with the MFA, the unit would have to
be returned to the Czech Republic, even if Pakistan decides
to purchase a system. A sale to Pakistan would require a new
license application. A history of the circumstances
surrounding this deal can be found in Refs A-I.

2) (S) While following up on the news story with the Ministry
of Industry and Trade, Post learned that the license was
quietly issued Sep 12th. The Ministry's head of licensing Sep
21st told us he was unhappy that the matter had become
public. Under the Czech export-control system, the issuance
of a license ends the Czech Governmental involvement in a
deal, unless there are some conditions added to the license
that require further government oversight. Examples of these
would be inspections or proof that nonproliferation measures
have been added to a system. The MFA had insisted that such
conditions be part of any issuance of a license to Pakistan.
Embassy Prague is seeking details of the final conditions
that were imposed.

3) (S) In 2004, when the GOCR approved a license for the
export of the VERA to China it took high level U.S.
intervention to convince then PM Spidla to intervene and
prevent the sale (REF J). That event was politically damaging
to Spidla, despite the GOCR's public statement that the
intervention was actually based on the EU's China arms
embargo. PM Paroubek, facing elections next year, is not
likely to be keen to block a Pakistan deal.
DODMAN

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2005/09/05PRAGUE1363.html


CZECHS IN ASIA: CONTINUED FOCUS ON CHINA, BUT
INCREASING ENGAGEMENT PLANNED IN INDIA, VIETNAM

Created 2006-01-13 18:04

(C) Summary. The Czech Republic plans active engagement
with East and South Asia in the first half of 2006, with most
attention focused on China. During a visit to Prague in
December, the Chinese PM closed an investment agreement that,
according to critics, noticeably favors Chinese interests
over Czech (and may violate EU rules). Several visits to
China are being planned for the coming months, with the focus
squarely on commercial issues; the Speaker of Parliament has
floated the idea of a visit to Tibet as a means of drawing
attention to human rights, but the proposal is likely to
fail. PM Paroubek will visit India this month, on the heels
of a visit by President Klaus; among the business deals the
GOCR hopes to discuss is possible Indian purchase of a VERA
radar system, which would be a counterweight to the system
Pakistan is planning to acquire. Several leading Czech
officials plan to visit Vietnam this year, and a visit to
Prague by the Vietnamese PM is possible in the spring.
President Karzai intends to visit Prague this year, as the
Czechs contemplate increasing their engagement in
Afghanistan. The Czech MFA continues to work with the North
Koreans to define their relationship, and the Czechs will be
pursuing the question of conditions for North Korean workers
in the CR. Despite this flurry of activity, the Czech MFA
admits it does not have a coherent Asia strategy, and hopes
to coordinate this with the USG. End summary.

----------------
India & Pakistan
----------------

PRAGUE 00000046 002 OF 003



¶5. (C) The Czechs seek increased economic cooperation with
India as well. PM Paroubek plans to travel to New Delhi and
Calcutta the week of January 17, 2006. Paroubek will meet
with Indian President and prominent Indian business leaders,
and deliver a speech at a business conference. His visit
follows a December trip to India by Czech President Klaus.
According to Fury, Paroubek will not pursue any significant
political topics during his visit, but (as in China) will
focus almost exclusively on business. One topic likely to be
raised is Indian interest in purchasing a version of the
Czech-made VERA passive surveillance system. Fury said the
Indian interest in the purchase is a result of Pakistan's
intention to also acquire the technology (note: Czech
officials had approached us in 2004 regarding a possible
VERA-E sale to India; the USG did not indicate objections to
the sale, but there appear to have been no active discussions
on an actual deal since then).

¶6. (SBU) Fury noted that Deputy FM Tomas Pojar will also
travel to India and Pakistan in coming months. Further on
Pakistan, the Czechs plan to airlift 11 Pakistani children to
Prague in January to provide medical treatment

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2006/01/06PRAGUE46.html

VERA-E SYSTEM: CZECH MOD HARDLINERS WANT TO TALK
Date:

2006 January 27, 17:21 (Friday)


Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraphs 13 and 14. 2. (S/NF)

Summary. In a significant change from previous practice, the Armaments Division of the Czech Ministry of Defense has broken its silence towards the U.S. on its views about sales of the VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Through contacts, we knew the Armaments Division has consistently supported increased exports of Czech passive surveillance technology. That office had been the only key player unwilling to discuss VERA-E with U.S. officials. The Armaments Division has now approached us with specific questions about the consistency of U.S. concerns over Czech arms sales to countries that have already purchased U.S. arms. In support of their position the Czechs are now citing China's efforts to develop its own passive surveillance technology. Seeking to end U.S. objections to VERA sales, the Armaments Division has also proposed a more positive step: greater U.S.- Czech technical collaboration in the field of passive surveillance. Embassy Prague seeks guidance on the proposal in para 13 and the appropriate response to the questions contained in para 14. End summary.


3. (U) DATT, ODC Deputy, and PolOff met January 27 with: Josef Taborsky, Senior Program Manager, MOD Armaments Division; and Richard Macha, Lt Col Lubor Koudleka, and Josef Stastny, of the MOD's International Relations Branch.
--- ARE YOU AMERICANS CONSISTENT? SHOW US HOW YOU HANDLE YOUR OWN ARMS SALES --- --- --- --- ---

4. (S/NF) Leading the meeting for the Czech side, International Relations Branch Director Macha said that the Armaments Division (and the MOD generally) would like general information about the licensing scheme for U.S. military technology exports. He also said the MOD would like to consult with the United States on concrete examples of such transfers. Accordingly the MOD asked for the text of a real-world agreement covering a U.S. technology export that would prevent the misuse of sensitive U.S. technologies by third parties. As a suggested case, the Czechs gave the example of Pakistan's acquisition of the P-3 Orion, equipped with the AN/ALR66C electronic support measures system and the EP2060 pulse analyzer. The MOD would like to examine provisions within the agreement that prevent proliferation of the technology to China.

5. (S/NF) DATT acknowledged the already-close cooperation between the U.S. and the Czech Republic on selecting appropriate destinations for VERA, noting the United States placed great value on the Czechs' willingness to consult with us on our strategic interests before making a decision on a sale. In response to Macha's first question, DATT and PolOff outlined the work of the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the consultative role of the interagency community. Emboffs did not address the idea of providing a sample of an agreement covering a U.S. military-technology transfer. --- --- --- --- LETS COLLABORATE --- --- --- ---

6. (S/NF) Macha said the MOD would be interested in working closely with U.S. technical experts to establish the parameters for a downgraded version of the VERA-E system, one which would be appropriate for export to non-NATO countries: "Our main goal is to ask our more knowledgeable partner how to do it." The MOD would also like to invite a technical team to the Czech Republic to jointly address the adequacy of nonproliferation countermeasures in their passive surveillance systems. Macha said such a team could choose to PRAGUE 00000095 002 OF 003 demonstrate U.S. concerns about proliferation to third countries by breaking/overcoming the countermeasures currently present in the ASDD-01 system. In addition to technical meetings, the MOD would welcome agreement of a way forward at upcoming U.S. Czech Pol-Mil talks, notionally scheduled for the spring (Note: dates for these talks have not yet been finalized. End note.).

7. (S/NF) Taborsky spoke at length about the loss of Czech sales due to the Czechs voluntary desire to protect U.S. strategic interests. He said Ukraine had been quick to sell the Kolchuga system to countries that had sought the Czech ASDD-01 and been denied. Macha further mentioned that China was now developing its own passive surveillance detection system and wondered to us whether it would be better to allow China to arm itself with the VERA-E, a known system, rather than with a system with unknown operating characteristics and capabilities.

DATT responded that the United States was interested in the Czechs maintaining their hi-tech defense industry, and the USG realized that the brains behind this cutting edge technology would best be kept gainfully employed at ERA, where they would be less vulnerable to financial offers from potentially-hostile countries seeking to buy their knowledge.

8. (S/NF) Taborsky presented a Czech idea for collaboration between the United States and the Czech Republic on developing future technology in this field. He suggested the creation of a joint U.S. DOD - Czech MOD research and development project, with funding from both governments. When the DATT and ODC Deputy clarified that the private sector takes the lead in developing military technology for the United States, the Czechs responded that they would also welcome a joint venture involving a U.S. firm.

9. (S/NF) DATT noted the United States would soon provide the MOD with a letter outlining the test results for the U.S-owned VERA-E system. Such information would assist the Czechs in their marketing efforts to countries that were the most appropriate destinations (understood by both sides to be NATO allies and other aligned countries such as Australia). While welcoming the idea of a letter as a positive step, Taborsky said there had been little interest in the VERA-E among NATO allies and it would be good to see the United States' high regard for the VERA-E system demonstrated by further U.S. orders. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- WHO ARE THE POTENTIAL BUYERS THESE DAYS? --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

10 (S/NF) PolOff asked Macha which countries were currently considered potential customers for either the ASDD-01 or VERA-E systems. Macha responded that only one country, Pakistan, was considered a current case. (Note: ERA (the manufacturer) had applied to the MOD for a preliminary opinion on a sale of one downgraded system to Pakistan. ERA had previously been granted permission for a 6-month lease to Pakistan, but that license had been abandoned because Pakistan had chosen to buy the system instead and would need a new license (ref A)). Macha said the MOD would advise ERA that it would not render an opinion on the case until after further discussion with the U.S. in the Spring. PolOff asked about rumors that India and Malaysia were interested in new purchases. Macha indicated it would also be helpful to learn U.S. opinion about a transfer to Malaysia (Note: We do not/not consider this a formal request. See para 15). Macha also said there had been interest from Greece and Australia.

11. (S/NF) (Comment We are at a point of danger and opportunity. The MOD's Armaments Division, which has been deeply cynical about U.S. motives for blocking VERA exports, has decided to try to move beyond a status quo that does not allow for widespread sales. From their perspective, any change is good. If we cannot show them that the United States has deployed effective methods to prevent proliferation of our own technology, then the Armaments Division will argue within the GOCR that U.S. decision-making is driven more by economic concerns than strategic ones. Under such circumstances they would argue that the Czechs should be no more accommodating to U.S. strategic concerns than the U.S. PRAGUE 00000095 003 OF 003 is itself. That line of reasoning could win converts within the GOCR, even though it willfully makes incorrect assumptions about the equivalency of U.S. and Czech military systems in the field of passive surveillance.

12. (S/NF) (Comment continued) In terms of the proposed collaboration. VERA's supporters in the Czech Republic feel the U.S. could have no objection to the sale of a system with characteristics that were defined by a joint U.S.-Czech team. They do acknowledge the difficulty of downgrading a system to the extent that it eliminates U.S. strategic concerns without leaving the resulting platform so ineffective that there is no market interest. Any future U.S. collaboration with the Czechs in developing next-generation technology would do much to relieve the political pressure within the GOCR to authorize sales to countries that are of concern to the United States.

13. (S/NF) (Action request) Robust engagement with the Czechs on these topics will be crucial to preserving their political willingness to pre-clear VERA and ASDD-01 sales with the United States. This summer will likely see the arrival of new defense and foreign ministers and the departure for a new assignment of the head of the MFA's licensing department, who has been very supportive of U.S. positions. New incumbents in these positions, and in the GOCR generally, may need to be convinced that the Czech defense industry's jewel in the crown should continue to forgo tens of millions of dollars of business because of U.S. strategic interests. Post recommends acceptance of the Czech offer for collaboration of technical experts on counterproliferation measures mentioned in para 6. The U.S. has already confirmed it would "welcome further dialogue and cooperation with the Czech Republic on the specific capabilities and the licensing conditions or provisos of the ASDD-01 to be sold to Pakistan, as well as any other safeguard measures employed to protect the technology." (ref A)

14 (S/NF) (Action request continued) Post further requests: A) The Department provide a response to the Czech's question surrounding the P-3 Orion transfer to Pakistan mentioned in para 4. B) A statement of the U.S. position regarding the Czech's suggestion for collaboration on joint development of next-generation military technologies (para 8). (End action request) 15. (S/NF) (Comment continued) While the MOD is interested in learning U.S. opinion about a possible sale to Malaysia, we do not believe that our answer to this theoretical case would do more than arm our critics with more examples of U.S. opposition to a sale. The MOD is not the guardian of the consultative mechanism worked out between the GOCR and the United States. That function rests with the MFA, and Post will seek confirmation that the GOCR would like a formal opinion on a Malaysia sale. If such a request is made, the way in which we deliver our (likely negative) response must form part of our engagement on the issues raised above. Post recommends the Department solicit interagency opinion on a Malaysia case only when the Czech MFA formally requests such an opinion and only as part of an integrated response that will keep the consultative process alive. (End comment) DODMAN

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04PRAGUE1870_a.html

Then this happened

CZECH DEFENSE MINISTER ON VERA-E, AFGHAN PRT,

Created
2006-03-17 15:51

Classified By: Acting DCM Michael Dodman for reasons
1.4 (b) & (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador met March 14 with Czech Defense
Minister Karel Kuehnl to present the letter from SECDEF
Rumsfeld on the positive results of U.S. testing of the
VERA-E passive surveillance detection system. Afghanistan and
missile defense were also discussed. Kuehnl welcomed the
SECDEF's letter but said that actual sales of the VERA-E
would be important in the future.

--------------------------------------
VERA-E: U.S. SEAL-OF-APPROVAL WELCOME
BUT CZECHS SAY MORE SALES ARE NEEDED
--------------------------------------

2. (C) Kuehnl welcomed SECDEF Rumsfeld's favorable letter on
the VERA-E, saying the Czech Republic never had doubts about
the system's technical capabilities. He agreed with the
Ambassador that such a document would be useful in marketing
the system to allies. However the Minister observed that the
Czech Republic's industrial and social policies were taking a
back seat to national security policy on this issue. He said
praise of the system would not be enough. Failure of the VERA
to become commercially successful would lead to a "grave"
domestic political problem. Kuehnl said he is committed to
maintaining the superiority of allies, and not making them
more vulnerable. He hoped with the help of the United States
the Czechs could find ways to make Czech passive surveillance
technology less of a proliferation threat and therefore more
exportable. The Minister asked that the Ambassador
communicate the Czech request for practical measures to
Washington for action. The Ambassador responded that
Washington was aware and engaged, as the letter from SECDEF
Rumsfeld indicated. He said he understood the Minister's
concerns from both an economic and a political standpoint,
and assured Kuehnl the United States is grateful for Czech
cooperation on the VERA-E issue.

--------
COMMENT:
--------

5. (C) Kuehnl's position on increased VERA-E system sales is
a reflection of rising pressure within the GOCR to authorize
more exports of this technology. The Minister believes there
is scope for more bilateral U.S.-Czech cooperation on this
issue.

http://cablegate.1wise.es/cable/2006/03/06PRAGUE283.html


U.S.-CZECH POL-MIL TALKS A SUCCESS
Date:
2006 May 22, 13:08 (Monday)

-- PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE DETECTION SYSTEMS (paras 14-16): The Czechs reiterated their desire to work with the USG on cooperative technology ventures related to VERA. Amb Loftis conveyed our appreciation of the consultation process on VERA sales and our understanding of the 30-day window for a U.S. response (except in the case of US Military List) and the USG desire to prevent the proliferation of this technology to countries of concern. There was no specific discussion regarding potential sales from the Czechs or particular countries.

--------- --------- --------- ------- PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS (VERA-E) --------- --------- --------- ------- 14. (C) In a surprisingly brief session, GOCR representatives took a cooperative and positive tone on VERA. The Czechs thanked the United States for SECDEF Rumsfeld,s letter on the successful results of U.S. testing of the VERA-E, which demonstrated that the systems was as effective as claimed by the manufacturer.

15. (S) Ambassador Loftis thanked the Czechs for consulting with the United States before transferring the technology to others. He recognized that the GOCR is bound by its law to respond to license requests within 30 days, and promised the USG would do try to work as &expeditiously as possible8 with that timeframe in mind. However, he warned that the USG might not always be able to meet the 30-day deadline because of the need to comply with U.S. law covering VERA components of U.S.-origin.

16. (S) Jahoda said the Czechs remain committed to bilateral agreement to consult with USG before transfer of the technology to others. The Czech delegation welcomed the possibility of U.S. interest in joint research and development efforts, whether government-to-government or business-to-business. Ambassador Loftis indicated the first step towards such cooperation would involve the appropriate preliminary framework to allow such cooperation to begin. Embassy Prague,s Office of Defense Cooperation will take the lead in working with the GOCR to explore this initiative.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06PRAGUE544_a.html


Then below mentioned news piece Happened and wikileak cable confirmed Pakistan placed an order for vera Radar

Czech radar company sold to US

23 Nov. 2006 | Frantisek Bouc / The Prague Post |

The most formidable Czech military defensive tool - the Vera surveillance radar, which is the only system that can detect the "invisible" U.S. Stealth bomber - is now owned by Americans. U.S. surveillance and flight tracking developer Rannoch Corporation has taken over ERA, the Pardubice-based company that developed Vera. The deal took place in late October, but the daily Mlada fronta Dnes reported it Nov. 11.


"The ERA facilities are truly world-class," said Rannoch President Dave Ellison in an official statement. "We realize the potential of the combined teams to offer the most comprehensive and technically advanced solutions." Defense Ministry representatives and east Bohemian regional officials were unaware of the development.

ERA Vice Chairman Milan Bernard confirmed the transaction, adding that ERA's management first wanted to notify the company's shareholders. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, but Bernard said that they would be announced later this month. Defense Ministry spokesman Andrej Cirtek said the takeover was "a strictly private matter," and the government would not interfere in it.

ERA's Multilateration Surveillance System (MSS) is the best-selling technology around the globe for tracking civilian airplanes, and also the most advanced and proven wide-range multi-altitude radar. The company's main asset, however, is the radar system Vera.

Traditional radar sends a signal that bounces off a target, letting the radar operators know that something is there. Vera uses "passive location," a unique way of identifying a target without sending out that signal. The technology allows the radar system to be unidentifiable and thus unjammable. Vera can simultaneously monitor up to 200 aircraft, and it is able to precisely determine their distance and altitude.

The ERA company has received orders for Vera from many countries, including Pakistan, China, Malaysia and Egypt. The U.S. government has repeatedly expressed concern about the Czech radar being sold to countries it deems unfriendly. As a result, ERA had to give up a planned transaction with China in 2004, after the Czech Defense Ministry banned the deal. So far, Vera radar has been sold to the United States and Estonia, and leased to Pakistan. Vera is expected to become a key tool in NATO's new air control system, according to Marshall Billingsley, NATO's investment department director.

http://www.czechinvest.org/en/czech-radar-company-sold


U.S. COMPANY BUYS MANUFACTURER OF VERA-E PASSIVE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Created 2006-10-30 12:26



Classified By: Political Counselor Michael Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (U) This cable contains sensitive business information.
Please protect accordingly.

2. (C/NF) Summary: Representatives of Rannoch Corporation, a
Virginia-based company specializing in air traffic control
(ATC) technology, purchased Czech company ERA A.S. on October

26. The new owners plan to quadruple production capacity for
the VERA-E in the first year, and state that this new
capacity would be aimed at supplying only the U.S., NATO
allies, and "responsible countries" that are acceptable to
the USG. Rannoch hopes to hold on to ERA for no longer than
two to three years. Rannoch executives say they place a high
priority on USG relations, thus avoiding factors that cou
make prospective U.S. purchasers of the company less likely
to buy them out. End summary.

¶3. (SBU) Representatives of Rannoch Corporation, a
Virginia-based company specializing in air traffic control
(ATC) technology, met with members of Embassy Prague on
October 25 to provide details of their planned takeover of
ERA, the manufacturer of the VERA passive surveillance
system. (Note: ERA confirmed on October 27 that the purchase
had been successfully concluded. End note). Rannoch's
President David A. Ellison and Chief Financial Officer John
¶D. Young, described ERA's civilian air traffic control
equipment as a world leader, and said that Rannoch's
acquisition of ERA, its main competitor, would mean increased
success in civilian airport air traffic control tenders.

¶4. (SBU) Turning to military systems, Ellison also expressed
Rannoch's interest in expanding production of the VERA,
because of the increased margins on military technology
compared to the highly competitive civilian market. Ellison
said ERA is currently only able to produce four VERA systems
per year. Based on Rannoch's previous marketing efforts in
the U.S., Rannoch executives foresee potential for further
U.S. and allied VERA purchases, possibly for non-traditional
applications such as military testing and homeland security.
However, current orders from Pakistan mean that ERA's order
books would be full for some time. Ellison said Rannoch plans
to initiate a shift-based system, initially doubling
production capacity to four systems every six months before
increasing capacity again within a year to allow ERA to
produce 16 VERA systems per year. Rannoch is currently also
looking at purchasing the Czech Ministry of Defense's share
of the intellectual property rights in the VERA system.

¶5. (SBU) Both executives said that Rannoch would like to
avoid dealings with shady arms exporters and would thus
immediately undertake a review of ERA's business partners in
the area of international marketing. As a part of this
strategy, Rannoch intended to buy out Czech exporter
Omnipol's holding in ERA.

¶6. (SBU) Ellison also claimed that Rannoch would want to
ensure good relations with the U.S. Government. He
volunteered to send the Embassy a list of the countries
currently being considered by ERA as potential buyers of the
VERA system. Ellison noted that ERA seemed to have several
deals in the works considering VERA sales. In response to a
question from Ellison, Poloff explained that the governments
generally cannot share details of any classified discussions
that may take place between governments about licensing arms
exports (Note: It is an open secret in Prague that U.S.
security concerns are the reason the Czech Government has
refused to license several VERA sales. End note.) However,
Poloff also warned that several of the Czech companies
marketing VERA around the world had failed to get an export
license from the Czech authorities due to Czech foreign
policy concerns. Ellison and Young both were at pains to
point out that any poor relations with the United States
Government could hurt them financially: Rannoch sees its
investment as only a short to medium-term involvement with
ERA, ideally lasting about two years. They hope that one of
the large U.S. defense firms will want to buy ERA after
Rannoch demonstrates the real worth of the company. They said
ERA would be less appealing to a buyer if it came with the
baggage of strained relations with Washington. However,
Ellison did assert that VERA was not unique, and mentioned
that one of his Internet searches had turned up a Chinese

claim to have developed a similar system.

-------
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C/NF) It appears Rannoch's purchase of ERA could lead to
a paradigm shift in the way the USG prevents the VERA system
from falling into the wrong hands. If Rannoch turns out to be
genuinely committed to prioritizing USG relations over
questionable sales, the United States may have the option to
prevent future problems even before the company begins
talking to the wrong prospective customers. Because Rannoch
is incorporated in the U.S., there is also the possibility of
the VERA now falling fully within the jurisdiction of U.S.
defense export licensing controls. From a bilateral relations
perspective such an outcome would be very favorable. If
Rannoch only applied for a Czech export license after
receiving a U.S. license, there would no longer be any U.S.
requests for license refusals in Prague, and the U.S.
Government might no longer be seen as a barrier to the
success of a prominent Czech company. Such an outcome would
also reduce political pressure on pro-U.S. officials in the
Czech government who have often stood in the way of attempts
to send VERA to inappropriate destination countries.
GRABER

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2006/10/06PRAGUE1350.html


CZECH MFA SOLICITS INFORMAL U.S. OPINION ON FOUR
VERA/TAMARA/BORAP DEALS

Created 2006-11-09 12:04

Classified By: Political Counselor Michael Dodman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Czech Government is considering
granting permission for Czech export companies to begin to
negotiate sales of several radar and similar systems to
Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Vietnam. If future
applications are made for export licenses for the VERA, the
Czech MFA intends to work with the United States to reach a
decision. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Poloff met October 26 with Czech MFA Common Foreign
Security and Policy Director Vaclav Balek to discuss exports
of sensitive Czech military technology. Balek shared that the
Czech Government is considering issuing a preliminary opinion
on applications from several (unnamed) Czech export companies
to negotiate sales of radar and/or passive surveillance
technology to Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Vietnam. Balek
highlighted that these were not formal license applications
but were instead "preliminary applications for the start of
negotiations with partners." He was keen to point out that
these applications were subject to a degree of uncertainty.
The applications indicated neither a destination country's
definite interest in purchasing a system nor that an eventual
export license application would be approved by the Czech
Government.

¶3. (S/NF) Balek said that any future exports of the VERA
would be subject to a range of nonproliferation controls,
including the incorporation of chips that would cause the
system to self-destruct if operated outside of the
destination country. (Note: We believe that applications to
purchase the "VERA" refer to the slightly limited ASDD-01
version of the system that is normally offered to non-NATO
countries. End note.) Balek outlined the following requests
and probable Czech Government decisions:

Indonesia: VERA
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Ecuador: VERA
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Nigeria: Tamara
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations

Vietnam: VERA or Tamara or BORAP.
- likely to refuse permission for preliminary negotiations on
VERA and Tamara
- likely to grant permission for preliminary negotiations on
BORAP.

(Note: While the VERA and the BORAP are manufactured by ERA
a.s., Balek guessed that the Tamara systems in question were
manufactured by Tesla Pardubice for delivery to France in the
early 1990s. That deal had fallen apart in a price dispute,
leaving two unsold systems in the Czech Republic. End note)

¶4. (S/NF) Balek said that, if the U.S. had an opinion on
sales to these particular destination countries, it would be
helpful for the Czechs to hear the U.S. side early in the
process. Poloff reminded Balek that USG opposition to a VERA
transfer to Vietnam was unlikely to change. Balek agreed,
indicating that this was a primary reason for the Czechs'
likely refusal to authorize commercial negotiations on the
purchase of a VERA. (Note: There is currently no agreement
committing the Czech Government to consult with the U.S. over
surveillance systems other than the VERA. However our
cooperation on other arms exports suggests that the Czech MFA
could be receptive to clearly articulated U.S. concerns about
other systems. End note.)

-------
COMMENT
-------
¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, the VERA and BORAP are manufactured
by ERA a.s., based in Pardubice, Czech Republic. These
applications all predate the October 26 purchase of ERA by
Rannoch, a U.S. firm (Reftel). All of the applications were
made by Czech export companies specializing in military
material, rather than ERA itself. It remains to be seen if

Rannoch would back these export companies and support further
negotiations with these destination countries. Regardless of
Rannoch's opinion, if the VERA now falls within the
jurisdiction of U.S. defense export licensing controls, the
USG will have a useful tool at its disposal to ensure that
VERAs are not sent to the wrong countries.
¶6. (S/NF) Pending resolution of the issues raised by the
Rannoch acquisition of ERA, the Czech MFA must still rule on
the current applications to negotiate with these four
destination countries. Post has already made it clear to the
Czechs that the USG remains opposed to a transfer to Vietnam.
The Czech MFA did not/not make a formal request with a 30-day
timeline for a final USG opinion on any of these destination
countries (Note: For an actual marketing or export license
application involving the VERA, the USG has committed to
providing the Czech Government with its opinion within 30
days. End note). The Czech MFA's decision to consult with the
Embassy at so early a stage provides an opportunity to stop
problematic negotiations before they begin in earnest. There
is no history of the Czech Republic consulting the U.S. on
BORAP or the Tamara and this may be our only chance to
intervene in those cases. If a USG opinion on the
appropriateness of these destination countries is not easily
available in Washington, Post will make it clear to the
Czechs that the USG will be able to provide a formal and
timely response on the VERA cases if negotiations lead to an
actual application for a license. We will also note that we
are also considering the implications of the Rannoch
acquisition of ERA.
GRABER

http://wikileaks.wikimee.net/cable/2006/11/06PRAGUE1398.html

Seems interesting article. Can you please a give a summery what happened regarding VERA to paf ?

 

[Bratva]

Seems interesting article. Can you please a give a summery what happened regarding VERA to paf ?

Pakistan got the downgraded version with anti proliferation controls embedded in the system plus czech can do unannounced visits to check if Pakistan is abiding by the agreement.

And USA knows the in's and out's of system

 

[HRK]

if I am not wrong Sales of that system was never made .... it was just tested in Pakistan but returned same as you have also cited about the licence for one year lease of VERA system

 

[Bratva]

if I am not wrong Sales of that system was never made .... it was just tested in Pakistan but returned same as you have also cited about the licence for one year lease of VERA system

I was under the same impression, until i read this bit. No Idea what to make of it except, Pakistan did purchase some of the downgraded version of radar

Turning to military systems, Ellison also expressed
Rannoch's interest in expanding production of the VERA,
because of the increased margins on military technology
compared to the highly competitive civilian market. Ellison
said ERA is currently only able to produce four VERA systems
per year. Based on Rannoch's previous marketing efforts in
the U.S., Rannoch executives foresee potential for further
U.S. and allied VERA purchases, possibly for non-traditional
applications such as military testing and homeland security.
However, current orders from Pakistan mean that ERA's order
books would be full for some time. Ellison said Rannoch plans
to initiate a shift-based system, initially doubling
production capacity to four systems every six months before
increasing capacity again within a year to allow ERA to
produce 16 VERA systems per year. Rannoch is currently also
looking at purchasing the Czech Ministry of Defense's share
of the intellectual property rights in the VERA system.

 

[Safriz]

The autonomous VERA system was never purchased. It was partially integrated in another system, with washed down capabilities.

 

[Basel]

I was under the same impression, until i read this bit. No Idea what to make of it except, Pakistan did purchase some of the downgraded version of radar

Turning to military systems, Ellison also expressed
Rannoch's interest in expanding production of the VERA,
because of the increased margins on military technology
compared to the highly competitive civilian market. Ellison
said ERA is currently only able to produce four VERA systems
per year. Based on Rannoch's previous marketing efforts in
the U.S., Rannoch executives foresee potential for further
U.S. and allied VERA purchases, possibly for non-traditional
applications such as military testing and homeland security.
However, current orders from Pakistan mean that ERA's order
books would be full for some time. Ellison said Rannoch plans
to initiate a shift-based system, initially doubling
production capacity to four systems every six months before
increasing capacity again within a year to allow ERA to
produce 16 VERA systems per year. Rannoch is currently also
looking at purchasing the Czech Ministry of Defense's share
of the intellectual property rights in the VERA system.

What capabilities that downgraded system offer? Why Pakistan went for downgraded version when AWACS offer better tech and other advance AESA GBRs are available?

 

[Hu Yao]

As we Chinese Army has lots of VERA systems, our experiences are Vera is useless. Those system are overy rated.

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

@Bilal Khan 777

 

[Divergent]

I know someone who works in PAF and this time on my visit I may even see the bases. It’s going to be really good

 

[Bilal Khan 777]

I like active systems. ERA VERA all drama.

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

I like active systems. ERA VERA all drama.

Sir what are your thoughts on Ukraine's radar development work? They recently began testing an active phased-array air surveillance radar with an instrumented range of up to 500 km (350 km range for 3m2 RCS targets).

Iskra 80K6T.

http://ukroboronprom.com.ua/en/media/3d-radar-80k6t-vid-iskry-gotuyetsya-provedennya-vyprobuvan.html

 

[Bilal Khan 777]

Sir what are your thoughts on Ukraine's radar development work? They recently began testing an active phased-array air surveillance radar with an instrumented range of up to 500 km (350 km range for 3m2 RCS targets).

Iskra 80K6T.

http://ukroboronprom.com.ua/en/media/3d-radar-80k6t-vid-iskry-gotuyetsya-provedennya-vyprobuvan.html

All prototype stage. All theoretical. All real work is done at Moscow Radio institute. Unless they have access to western TR modules and Western processors, their systems would not be close to what we need in our theatre.