The Groundwork to Induct a Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile

[Amaa'n]

Quwa Premium Excerpt
On 06 May 2020, the RAND Corporation published an article outlining several challenges many countries face in their efforts to deploy long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.[1] The main point of the piece is that the upfront cost of long-range SAMs, such as the S-400, are not indicative of the true cost required to exact enough value out of those systems. Rather, to effectively use long-range SAMs, the end-user must invest in different radar types to cover blind spots, build a secure, high-speed information exchange (i.e., data link) system to share target tracking data, and fine-tune training and processes to eliminate errors.[2]

In other words, the end-user must acquire and acclimate to an eco-system of high-cost assets before even contemplating the induction of a long-range SAM. Otherwise, the end-user will either fail to use the long-range SAM effectively, or worse, risk losing it to enemy fire. In terms of the latter, for example, the enemy can saturate an air defence battery with a large number of cruise missiles.[3] In fact, this is one of the ways Pakistan can potentially work to counteract India’s S-400, and wider air defence network in general.

However, on the other end of the spectrum, one can also argue that Pakistan also built the eco-system it would need to one day employ its own long-range SAM. Indeed, there have also been reports of Pakistan expressing interest in such a system. In 2018, a Ministry of Defence Production (MoDP) official told Russian News Agency TASS that the armed forces were studying the feasibility of procuring three or four FD-2000 batteries from China.[4] But Pakistan’s interest in the FD-2000 dates back to the early 2000s, and though it has not followed through on it yet, in the years since it built an eco-system to fully leverage it.

Project Vision: Eliminating Blind Spots, Giving Situational Awareness to All
In 1999, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) started ‘Project Vision,’ an initiative aimed at building one situational awareness picture using land, sea, and air-based assets.

The single ‘Recognized Air and Maritime Picture (RAMP)’ leverages the PAF’s airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and the army and navy’s land-based radars. The RAMP offers 24/7 coverage of both Pakistani and foreign territory, with the latter reaching some several hundred miles across Pakistan’s borders on both land and sea. The latter varies based on the location of the ship.[5]

In terms of employing a long-range SAM, the RAMP offers several benefits…

End of Excerpt (407/1,402 words)

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[1] Peter A. Wilson and John V. Parachini. “Russian S-400 Surface to Air Missile System: Is It Worth the Sticker Price?” The RAND Blog. RAND Corporation. 06 May 2020. URL: https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/05/russian-s-400-surface-to-air-missile-system-is-it-worth.html

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Pakistan will strengthen air defense cooperation with China.” Russian News Agency TASS. 29 November 2018. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5854256

[5] Alan Warnes. “PAF’s Eagle-eyed view.” Asian Military Review. 29 November 2018. URL: https://asianmilitaryreview.com/2018/11/pafs-eagle-eyed-view/

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

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Plz provide the whole article

 

[The Raven]

It's interesting seeing the dynamics at play of using long range SAM and air defence systems as either defensive/offensive system. Classically, long range SAM systems have been used in tiered multi-layered air defence networks comprising short, medium, and long range systems to protect against cruise missiles, aircraft, and some ABM capability (the Soviets were particularity pioneers in this regard, case in point, the air defence network to protect the Moscow region during the Cold War).

However, recent cases have demonstrated the effective use of mobile long range air defence systems in a more offensive oriented approach. Advances in solid state radar technology has enabled the deployment of relatively long range mobile radar systems, along with concomitant command and control systems, as well as the associated long range missiles. Case in point is the deployment of the S-400 system in Syria by the Russians.

Although still prone to attack as classical fixed point air defence systems, greater mobility and support from other short and medium range systems to provide some multi-layered protection against a range of air threats, including long range stand-off weapons, provides some tactical deployment capability which can be leveraged in an offensive posture. This is particularly apparent in relatively confined theatre of operations between opposing forces, again, case in point is the interplay between the Israeli air forces approach against the Russian S-400 system in Syria.

The deployment of the S-400 in the sub-continent provides another testing and proving ground between these tactical approaches. What will be interesting to see is how effectively the indians can integrate their other Israeli (Spyder and Barak) as well as indigenous (Akash) systems with the S-400, and whether they are capable of developing a semi-offensive threat (as part of their "integrated battle groups") to curtail PAF's operations.

Meanwhile, the PAF will have to demonstrate a greater long-range stand-off capability to track, target, and neutralise the S-400 system and its associated support infrastructure, the first steps of which have been taken with further development of a longer ranged Raad missile.

Another critical piece of the puzzle will be to develop integrated decoy and offensive strike packages, analogous to the US approach of using the MALD (Miniature Air Launched Decoy) alongside the JSOW, HARM, and other long-range stand off weapons, to defeat the S-400 system.

The MALD, JSOW, and HARM integrated approach to defeating the S-400 system.

Interestingly, our own Integrated Dynamics, a developer of UAV and drone systems, has developed a "lightweight, high-speed, mini-turbojet decoy system with autonomous navigation, pre-strike decoy, and fire & forget capabilities". Of particular interest is that according to the brochure of this system, it can be fitted with flares and/or "radar enhancing devices", in other words, it can be programmed to replicate a flight profile and RCS signature of a fighter sized target to act a decoy. This would provide an effective and cheap method to spoof an air defence system to not only deplete its missile batteries, but also reveal its radar signature and location. Although not as sophisticated as the MALD/JSOW/HARM combination, the principle is the same - use relatively inexpensive decoys to "activate" a SAM system, and offensive assets (fighters equipped with ARMs and stand-off weapons, in the case of the PAF, the MAR-1, Raad, CM400-AKG, LD-10) to destroy and neutralise the radar and system itself.

Integrated Dynamics "Tornado" decoy system.

http://idaerospace.com/tornado/

Product brochure

http://idaerospace.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Tornado.pdf

 

[Falcon26]

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[peagle]

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You go on their website and please pay a monthly subscription fee. You can read all articles on the website, and cancel anytime you wish. The site is a good effort by Pakistanis, I'm sure they'll appreciate your support