pakistani342
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Notes:
1. In the post-Zahir Shah era, all Afghan cabinets continued to be dominated by Pakhtuns completely out of proportion to the population ratio. -- would be interesting in getting an Afghan perspective on this.
2. During the Taliban regime: Eleven of their governors, even in Pakhtun provinces, were from the minority ethnic groups as were five members of the cabinet.
3. girls schools have existed in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. -- anybody have references to this?
4. Author predicts a full-fledged civil war -- interestingly this week there have been numerous references to a this in articles.
....
original article here
S Iftikhar Murshed
Sunday, August 18, 2013
Though only a certified lunatic would claim to be an Afghan expert, this is precisely how a western scholar introduced himself to me in a lengthy email about Mullah Omars latest Eid message. He explained that he had read the tealeaves and was convinced that the militarily-crippled Taliban were now willing to: (i) share power through a broad-based multiethnic government; (ii) sever ties with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates as is apparent from the statement we do not intend to harm anyone, nor will we allow anyone to harm others from our soil, and; (iii) recognise that modern education is a fundamental need of every society in the present time.
But there is nothing extraordinary about any of these elements. The establishment of a multiethnic dispensation has never been a problem with the Taliban so long as this does not interfere with their objective of imposing their narrow-minded, literalist and bigoted interpretation of Islamic teachings on the rest of Afghanistan. Yet, in another sense, this is entirely different from the previous Afghan experience, which needs to be revisited in order to understand the complexity of the prevailing situation.
Ever since the kingdom of Afghanistan was founded as a loose confederation of Pakhtun tribes under Ahmad Shah Abdali, the power base in the country has constantly remained extremely narrow. Its exercise has been the privilege of the Pakhtuns, and within the Pakhtuns that of the Durranis, and within the Durranis of the Barakzais. For almost half a century during which power rested with the Mohammadzai branch of the Barakzai clan, Afghanistan was controlled by an inner cabinet consisting of key members of the royal family and a few of their trusted associates.
The successful coup by Sardar Mohammed Daud Khan in July 1973 against his cousin, King Zahir Shah, merely ended the monarchy but did not result in any diffusion of power. In effect, power was merely transferred from the former oligarchy to a single individual. Through all this the other ethnic groups were mere bystanders and they became the victims of internal colonisation.
All Afghan governments, with the exception of the Tajik-dominated Rabbani regime (1992-1996), have been preoccupied with exclusively Pakhtun issues. For instance, Article 35 of the 1964 constitution stipulated the learning of Pashto in schools, support for research in Pashto literature and the elevation of Pashto as the national language.
In the post-Zahir Shah era, all Afghan cabinets continued to be dominated by Pakhtuns completely out of proportion to the population ratio. For instance, in a cabinet of 16, the number of non-Pakhtuns hardly exceeded one and very rarely two. Even this meagre representation was not always ensured. Pakhtuns were appointed governors in most provinces, even where the population was predominantly of other ethnic groups, and it was inconceivable that a non-Pakhtun could be appointed governor of a Pakhtun province.
This was to completely change during the five-year rule of the Taliban (1996-2001). Eleven of their governors, even in Pakhtun provinces, were from the minority ethnic groups as were five members of the cabinet. The unmistakable assumption in Mullah Omars Eid message is that he alone will be the supreme leader of the country as the amir-ul-momineen and all Afghans, irrespective of their ethnicity, have been invited to serve the homeland in accordance with his edicts.
It is, therefore, not surprising that in the same message he rejected the 2014 elections as a deceiving drama in which the Taliban will not participate. The writing on the wall is hideously clear. If at all there is to be an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process that the world incessantly talks about but does not understand, its exclusive purpose has to be the transfer of power to the Taliban. The constitution of the country will be scrapped and replaced by a 35-page document containing 14 chapters and 85 clauses which was promulgated by Mullah Omar in August 2010.
The second element on which the self-styled Afghan expert assigns so much importance is Mullah Omars assurance that we will not allow anyone to harm others from our soil. Pakistani analysts have been no less upbeat in their assessments and one of them was fairly certain that the Afghan Taliban also accept that they will have to sever ties with Al-Qaeda or any other groups that ...export terror to the rest of the world.
But the Taliban have never had an external agenda and this has been repeated by them time and again. In several meetings with us, Mullah Omar said that he wanted to get rid of Osama bin Laden but pretended that he did not know how. He proposed a meeting of a small group of ulema from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and a third Islamic country for deciding Bin Ladens fate. The purpose was just to buy time because Mullah Omar knew that the proposal would be rejected by the Saudis.
Subsequently, the Taliban established a judicial commission headed by their chief justice for the purpose of receiving evidence about the Al-Qaeda leaders involvement in terrorism. A solemn promise was made to Pakistan that Bin Laden would be punished if his guilt was established. But within days the commission was unexpectedly dissolved.
Several months later, in what is undoubtedly the highest level contact between the Taliban and the US on terrorism-related issues, deputy foreign minister Mullah Jalil told the US under-secretary of state, Thomas Pickering, during a meeting in Islamabad on May 27, 2000 that the judicial commission would be reactivated if there was proof of Bin Ladens terrorist activities. The usual assurance was given that Afghan territory would never be used against third countries. Fourteen months later the fateful events of 9/11 occurred.
The third element in the message that has impressed the Afghan expert and Pakistani analysts is Mullah Omars emphasis on modern education. One commentator has described this as the real shocker while another has gone completely off the deep end and actually believes that issues such as the Afghan constitution and womens education are being discussed in the unofficial and preliminary meetings between the Taliban and the Afghan High Peace Council.
Most analysts are not even aware that girls schools have existed in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In September 1997, a team of UNHCR experts led by Ms Sathu Suikkri of Finland was taken to a secondary school for 80 girls and 60 boys in Kandahar. They were told that such schools exist in every village of the province and this was also the findings of the survey undertaken by a Swedish NGO. Hasan Rehmani, the one-legged governor of Kandahar and a close aide of Mullah Omar, told Suikkri that the UN could set up any number of schools for girls and requested that particular attention should be given to income-generating programmes for women.
We were informed by Sri Wijeratne, a Sri Lankan lawyer who was at the time the head of the Islamabad-based UNHCR (Afghanistan), that the Taliban had agreed to open the first formal girls school in Kandahar and the UNHCR deputy high commissioner would be flying in from Geneva to inaugurate the project on March 8, 1998. However, the visit was abruptly cancelled at the last minute and the project was abandoned.
On April 17, 1998, Bill Richardson, the US permanent representative to the UN later to become energy secretary and then governor of New Mexico visited Kabul where he had extensive discussions with Mullah Muhammad Rabbani, the chairman of the Taliban ruling council. Later that day, a jubilant Richardson announced at a press conference in Islamabad that the Taliban had not only agreed to establish hundreds of girls school but also a womens university for which funds would be provided. The promised finances never arrived.
Mullah Omars latest Eid message contains nothing new but is, nevertheless, important in one sense. The rejection of next years election presages the intensification of the conflict which is likely to degenerate into a full-fledged civil war. The consequences for Pakistan are obvious. This is the aspect of the message that was obscured by the rosy haze of optimism in the assessments of the Afghan expert and the Pakistani commentators.
1. In the post-Zahir Shah era, all Afghan cabinets continued to be dominated by Pakhtuns completely out of proportion to the population ratio. -- would be interesting in getting an Afghan perspective on this.
2. During the Taliban regime: Eleven of their governors, even in Pakhtun provinces, were from the minority ethnic groups as were five members of the cabinet.
3. girls schools have existed in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. -- anybody have references to this?
4. Author predicts a full-fledged civil war -- interestingly this week there have been numerous references to a this in articles.
....
original article here
S Iftikhar Murshed
Sunday, August 18, 2013
Though only a certified lunatic would claim to be an Afghan expert, this is precisely how a western scholar introduced himself to me in a lengthy email about Mullah Omars latest Eid message. He explained that he had read the tealeaves and was convinced that the militarily-crippled Taliban were now willing to: (i) share power through a broad-based multiethnic government; (ii) sever ties with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates as is apparent from the statement we do not intend to harm anyone, nor will we allow anyone to harm others from our soil, and; (iii) recognise that modern education is a fundamental need of every society in the present time.
But there is nothing extraordinary about any of these elements. The establishment of a multiethnic dispensation has never been a problem with the Taliban so long as this does not interfere with their objective of imposing their narrow-minded, literalist and bigoted interpretation of Islamic teachings on the rest of Afghanistan. Yet, in another sense, this is entirely different from the previous Afghan experience, which needs to be revisited in order to understand the complexity of the prevailing situation.
Ever since the kingdom of Afghanistan was founded as a loose confederation of Pakhtun tribes under Ahmad Shah Abdali, the power base in the country has constantly remained extremely narrow. Its exercise has been the privilege of the Pakhtuns, and within the Pakhtuns that of the Durranis, and within the Durranis of the Barakzais. For almost half a century during which power rested with the Mohammadzai branch of the Barakzai clan, Afghanistan was controlled by an inner cabinet consisting of key members of the royal family and a few of their trusted associates.
The successful coup by Sardar Mohammed Daud Khan in July 1973 against his cousin, King Zahir Shah, merely ended the monarchy but did not result in any diffusion of power. In effect, power was merely transferred from the former oligarchy to a single individual. Through all this the other ethnic groups were mere bystanders and they became the victims of internal colonisation.
All Afghan governments, with the exception of the Tajik-dominated Rabbani regime (1992-1996), have been preoccupied with exclusively Pakhtun issues. For instance, Article 35 of the 1964 constitution stipulated the learning of Pashto in schools, support for research in Pashto literature and the elevation of Pashto as the national language.
In the post-Zahir Shah era, all Afghan cabinets continued to be dominated by Pakhtuns completely out of proportion to the population ratio. For instance, in a cabinet of 16, the number of non-Pakhtuns hardly exceeded one and very rarely two. Even this meagre representation was not always ensured. Pakhtuns were appointed governors in most provinces, even where the population was predominantly of other ethnic groups, and it was inconceivable that a non-Pakhtun could be appointed governor of a Pakhtun province.
This was to completely change during the five-year rule of the Taliban (1996-2001). Eleven of their governors, even in Pakhtun provinces, were from the minority ethnic groups as were five members of the cabinet. The unmistakable assumption in Mullah Omars Eid message is that he alone will be the supreme leader of the country as the amir-ul-momineen and all Afghans, irrespective of their ethnicity, have been invited to serve the homeland in accordance with his edicts.
It is, therefore, not surprising that in the same message he rejected the 2014 elections as a deceiving drama in which the Taliban will not participate. The writing on the wall is hideously clear. If at all there is to be an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process that the world incessantly talks about but does not understand, its exclusive purpose has to be the transfer of power to the Taliban. The constitution of the country will be scrapped and replaced by a 35-page document containing 14 chapters and 85 clauses which was promulgated by Mullah Omar in August 2010.
The second element on which the self-styled Afghan expert assigns so much importance is Mullah Omars assurance that we will not allow anyone to harm others from our soil. Pakistani analysts have been no less upbeat in their assessments and one of them was fairly certain that the Afghan Taliban also accept that they will have to sever ties with Al-Qaeda or any other groups that ...export terror to the rest of the world.
But the Taliban have never had an external agenda and this has been repeated by them time and again. In several meetings with us, Mullah Omar said that he wanted to get rid of Osama bin Laden but pretended that he did not know how. He proposed a meeting of a small group of ulema from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and a third Islamic country for deciding Bin Ladens fate. The purpose was just to buy time because Mullah Omar knew that the proposal would be rejected by the Saudis.
Subsequently, the Taliban established a judicial commission headed by their chief justice for the purpose of receiving evidence about the Al-Qaeda leaders involvement in terrorism. A solemn promise was made to Pakistan that Bin Laden would be punished if his guilt was established. But within days the commission was unexpectedly dissolved.
Several months later, in what is undoubtedly the highest level contact between the Taliban and the US on terrorism-related issues, deputy foreign minister Mullah Jalil told the US under-secretary of state, Thomas Pickering, during a meeting in Islamabad on May 27, 2000 that the judicial commission would be reactivated if there was proof of Bin Ladens terrorist activities. The usual assurance was given that Afghan territory would never be used against third countries. Fourteen months later the fateful events of 9/11 occurred.
The third element in the message that has impressed the Afghan expert and Pakistani analysts is Mullah Omars emphasis on modern education. One commentator has described this as the real shocker while another has gone completely off the deep end and actually believes that issues such as the Afghan constitution and womens education are being discussed in the unofficial and preliminary meetings between the Taliban and the Afghan High Peace Council.
Most analysts are not even aware that girls schools have existed in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In September 1997, a team of UNHCR experts led by Ms Sathu Suikkri of Finland was taken to a secondary school for 80 girls and 60 boys in Kandahar. They were told that such schools exist in every village of the province and this was also the findings of the survey undertaken by a Swedish NGO. Hasan Rehmani, the one-legged governor of Kandahar and a close aide of Mullah Omar, told Suikkri that the UN could set up any number of schools for girls and requested that particular attention should be given to income-generating programmes for women.
We were informed by Sri Wijeratne, a Sri Lankan lawyer who was at the time the head of the Islamabad-based UNHCR (Afghanistan), that the Taliban had agreed to open the first formal girls school in Kandahar and the UNHCR deputy high commissioner would be flying in from Geneva to inaugurate the project on March 8, 1998. However, the visit was abruptly cancelled at the last minute and the project was abandoned.
On April 17, 1998, Bill Richardson, the US permanent representative to the UN later to become energy secretary and then governor of New Mexico visited Kabul where he had extensive discussions with Mullah Muhammad Rabbani, the chairman of the Taliban ruling council. Later that day, a jubilant Richardson announced at a press conference in Islamabad that the Taliban had not only agreed to establish hundreds of girls school but also a womens university for which funds would be provided. The promised finances never arrived.
Mullah Omars latest Eid message contains nothing new but is, nevertheless, important in one sense. The rejection of next years election presages the intensification of the conflict which is likely to degenerate into a full-fledged civil war. The consequences for Pakistan are obvious. This is the aspect of the message that was obscured by the rosy haze of optimism in the assessments of the Afghan expert and the Pakistani commentators.
