The case of the LTTE

[syedali73]

Please read this wonderful article by AVM Shahzad Chaudhry.

The case of the LTTE

Shahzad Chaudhry
Saturday, March 01, 2014

I arrived in Sri Lanka as Pakistan’s high commissioner in September 2006. A new government of an old party under a southern rural leader, Mahinda Rajapakse, had just been swept into power. Seemingly he had won a clear majority on the basis of a strong ethno-nationalist definition – Sinhala Buddhism.

A man of easy manners, comfortable among the people, Rajapakse seemed the farthest from any trappings of academic or intellectual pretension. His nation was, however, caught in the viciousness of a three-decade old insurgency wrought by the inimitable LTTE – in many ways the founders of modern trends in terror. Many a Sri Lankan political leader and an Indian – Rajiv Gandhi – had lost their lives to its most heinous tactic, the suicide bomber, first introduced to Asia by the LTTE. Rajapakse had a promise to keep.

In an effort to re-establish Sinhala predominance in a nation that had let other ethnic compositions such as the Tamils in the north and the east vie for a separate homeland challenging the territorial integrity of this island-state, he sought loyalty and consensus to what he intended to put in place against the insurgency. He placed his brother, a retired lieutenant colonel from the army as the defence secretary and gave him enormous powers and influence. He found in the incumbent army commander, General Fonseka, a man who was willing to go the distance; and he garnered political coalition with many other splinter parties by offering them juicy positions and buying their support for a resolute action to eliminate insurgency. The army commander, in addition, was a hard task master and even more importantly a former colleague of the secretary defence.

Rajapakse was able to forge a consensus in the political arena to any step that he deemed essential in fighting the militant outfit. There remained only two parties in the opposition in parliament, the United National Party (UNP), the main opposition, which had seen repeated stints in power under some illustrious political leaders, and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which represented the Tamils and had a chequered history of a close association with India. The UNP, for the sake of its own survival and relevance to the political landscape, had only one way to go – sign in on Rajapakse’s plan to bring the insurgency to an end through a war. With such momentum and a consensus in its wake it was left to the military to do the honours.

What had brought Sri Lanka to this state of tenuous existence is also equally illuminating. At different times, especially under the long reigns of various UNP governments, war was always meant to encourage a dialogue. And dialogue is what the LTTE loved. It gave the LTTE a much desired relevance as a bona fide political entity with stakes that needed to be addressed. It also enabled them to espouse a political cause that became a popular rallying point for the reasonably effective Tamil diaspora the world over. Even more importantly, it brought the group unrestrained funds that enabled them to pursue ethno-nationalist ends that had a political objective. The southern states of India, especially Tamil Nadu, found common cause and pushed India to support the Tamil agenda.

This dithering approach to what was essentially a fermented secessionist movement remained the singular weakness in the Sri Lankan political process that brought Sri Lanka to a halt, as a society and as a nation. The military too gradually grew wary of war and turned into a largely ceremonial military. Timidity seeped in soon after. The commanders sought a quiet command and then an easy retirement.

In the meanwhile bombs continued to blow up all across Sri Lanka as the LTTE found the response of a society and the state spineless. Talks or dialogue between the LTTE and the government became the proverbial, and the only, elephant in the room. Nations such as Norway wielded unparalleled influence as they became the mediators and practically determined the LTTE’s responses.

The most debilitating aspect to the Sri Lankan response was the ‘go-stop’ nature of their military action. When applied, it was in phases with very long pauses, only aimed at recovering a pass, or lost ground, or simply pushing back an LTTE advance; never to take the war to its logical end and win it. With every pause the LTTE only grew stronger, politically and militarily, because other nations intervened and took over the process of another round of dialogue cementing the political credentials of what essentially was a terror group.

Rajapakse had to change all that. In his simplistic approach to what he could judge was a monumental national disaster, his solution was simple. Forget the niceties and the intellectual parrying that led to a shameful paralysis in decision-making and opt for elimination of the group and its military cadres. He found strength in his military leadership who began moving their troops from their state of passivity. In turn, the military leadership felt emboldened when they saw a fresh and surprising political resolve to do something about the threat that had practically ruled the psychology of a nation.

Sri Lanka had by then begun to appear as a nation afflicted with a perpetual sickness and a surprising disposition of having accepted the LTTE’s terror as a part of their daily lives. This changed with just one political leader who brought political resolve in play.

The rest is history. Sri Lanka’s real war against the LTTE began with a three-pronged push along three geographical lines to squeeze the space on the LTTE. All this while vertical envelopment with artillery and their air force (a dormant air force was revived) continued to target and attrit the enemy, while the Sri Lankan Navy was deployed to close any escape routes out from the north-eastern geographical extremity of Sri Lanka. Finally the trap closed, and gouged away everything with it – cleaning Sri Lanka of the LTTE. This was in March 2009. The war lasted almost three years.

I have recently returned from Sri Lanka, and have found it a different nation. It is a nation on the go. Rajapakse and his brothers are now leading it in the economic sphere. Yes, there are allegations of violation of human rights and of corruption at certain levels, but largely – and very visibly progress – shows itself in all spheres. Sri Lanka has freed itself from the yoke of war and has taken the energy in the nation to even better ends.

The case of the LTTE - Shahzad Chaudhry

The writer is a retired air-vice marshal of the Pakistan Air Force and served as its deputy chief of staff.

Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com

 

[syedali73]

And now read the following by Mr. Ayaz Amir:

TTP ceasefire: should Pakistan be taken seriously?

Ayaz Amir
Tuesday, March 04, 2014

So there we have it. The resolve stories were a bit premature. Appeasement wins again and of course it will be hailed as a triumph of statesmanship. And the army while scowling in private will in public hide behind the fig-leaf of civilian supremacy. The inevitable – the having to take on the Taliban (TTP) – has been merely postponed, not the necessity of it eliminated.

Other countries compete in summer and winter Olympics. The Pakistan we have grown up with has come to specialise in playing games with itself. So just when it looked that government and army might have cast irresolution aside comes the charade of the ceasefire between the state of Pakistan and the Holy Shura of the TTP. It’s like Vladimir Putin and the Chechen rebels declaring a mutual ceasefire, or India in Indian Kashmir declaring a ceasefire with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. But then of course Pakistan, wafted by the winds of jihad, is in a class by itself.

Do these wizards really think there is common ground, any meeting point, between the Pakistani state and the messianic Islamist warriors of the TTP dedicated to the overthrow of the Pakistani state? If they think there is can they let us know? For you only negotiate if some common ground exists. Merely brandishing olive branches is never enough.

So what will government and army gain by this reprieve? Will the TTP come any closer to altering its makeup and becoming a force for peace? Will the army be in a better position, a month from now, to deliver a decisive blow against the TTP? What then are government and army hoping to achieve by this month long ceasefire?

From the TTP’s standpoint it makes perfect sense. The aerial strikes, via PAF and helicopter gunships, have been called off. The TTP will have a chance to regroup, relocate, make up for any losses suffered, and prepare for the next round. In return it has ceded nothing, not an inch of ground, not even any theoretical concession.

Government and army of course are crowing about a fictitious victory: sense was knocked into the TTP which is why, taking a small U-turn, it has agreed to a ceasefire. But the ceasefire at this stage, with the TTP under pressure from the patchy aerial offensive, means relief for the TTP, none for government and army. The 23 FC soldiers whose throats were slit – this particular horror forcing the military to act – are not about to be brought back to life. The TTP is not about to renounce violence or lay down its arms. Or is it so hard for the wizards to understand this?

But we will be told to be patient and not rush to judgement. We will be told that this is just the first step, leading to talks and, with luck holding, a peaceful settlement. Fine, let us suspend disbelief, let us eschew negative thoughts and with open and welcoming arms embrace optimism. But the old nagging question remains: can anyone tell us, if not in detail in bare outline, the likely contours of a Taliban settlement? Kuch toh bataien…tell us something.

On this point we encounter the silence of the mountains. Even as government and army shift from one leg to another, painting appeasement and one-sided concessionism in the colours of victory, we are expected to take the government’s word on trust.

So far about the one thing which has happened is that the four-man government committee has been knocked out into the cold and the interior minister has emerged centre-stage to take charge of the so-called peace efforts. Let us wish him success and see what miracles he brings about. In a way this is good because the four-man committee was toothless. With all the ropes now finally in Nisar’s hands – and by the way, the announcement of the ceasefire from the government side came from the interior ministry – at least there won’t be room for any excuses when the delusions of peace finally dissipate and the hard rocks of reality rise more clearly from the waters.

But a crucial month will have been lost and we will be that much closer to the Americans pulling out of Afghanistan. When that happens, the calculus of everything will change. And if anyone thinks that when that moment of vindication for Taliban arms arrives, the TTP led by Mullah Fazlullah of Swat fame will be in a more reasonable frame of mind regarding the confused republic of Pakistan, he will have to be counted amongst the diehard brigade.

Air-Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry’s piece in this paper last Saturday, ‘The case of the LTTE’, about the Tamil Tigers insurgency in Sri Lanka where he was ambassador in 2006 is worth reading by everyone concerned. It explains how peace talks and concessionism failed and finally what it took to defeat and crush the LTTE.

The Tamils at least had genuine grievances against the Sinhalese-dominated state. The Taliban insurgency is being fuelled not by a sense of genuine grievance but by the messianic desire to impose their will on the Pakistani state. The Taliban are not fighting for fundamental rights or Fata autonomy. They are fighting for their version, their very convoluted and primitive version, of the holy kingdom. And the Pakistani state is shuffling and shifting and making a spectacle of itself, and hoping, desperately hoping, that tough decisions will not be required and like manna descends from heaven peace will somehow descend from the skies.

Pakistan’s Pakhtun tribal population, the overwhelming majority, is committed to Pakistan, not because Pakhtuns sway to the sound of Iqbal’s poetry but because their economic interests are tied to Pakistan. But where the TTP holds sway they are sunk into a sullen and apathetic silence because they have lost faith in the ability of the Pakistani state to protect them and fight the Taliban. If the army really bares its fangs it can be assured of the support of the tribal people. But who will give that vitamin shot to the state and the army?

Under Gen Kayani the Pakistan Army perpetuated one of the great hoaxes of our time when it led most people to believe that because of tough terrain it was difficult going into North Waziristan. The tough terrain is in South Waziristan, not the north which is relatively flat.

Now look at the comedy which has been going on in Miranshah, the principal town of North Waziristan. There we have an army div hqs, the FC hqs and close by an establishment of the famous Haqqanis. Hakeemullah Mehsud’s house where the drone got him is hardly 4-5 kilometres from the div hqs. The villages where live our Uzbek, Chechen, and Arab friends are not far away. All this is common knowledge there. An operation could have been undertaken, had the will been there, long ago. But the nation has been fed the tale of North Waziristan’s near-impregnability. Where does fiction end and reality begin?

Meanwhile comes news of the attack on the Islamabad courts. And as I switched on the TV there was every channel in the land going on and on about the TTP spokesman Shahidullah Shahid saying the TTP had nothing to do with this attack. He’s right. This is another Indo-Zionist-CIA conspiracy to sabotage the peace talks.

Trust the TTP’s media apologists, and there is no shortage of this clan here, to plug this line and urge the government to remain steadfast to the peace process – a phenomenon visible through special goggles only to the TTP apologists and the Chamberlainites of the interior ministry.

Email: winlust@yahoo.com

TTP ceasefire: should Pakistan be taken seriously? - Ayaz Amir

 

[Marwat Khan Lodhi]

Why the writer is comparing LTTE with the Taliban situation? One is an ethnic movement, another is ideological one. Pakistan is not at war with pashtun ethnic group, the opponents are religous extremists of various ethnicities and nationalities. So giving the example of LTTE is stupid, at best it can be compared with BLA.
Stretagy similar to one against LTTE wont work against taliban. There was no escape route for tamils, they got cornered. Taliban have easy escape route to afghanistan...afghanistan is their stretagic depth. Moreover it is an ideology, it doesnt matter how many of them are killed, they would emerge again after some time....and you can not force against pashtun tribesmen as sri lankan army used against tamils...sri lankan army had clear enemy, tamils. You have enemy who draws support from pashtun region but not from all segments of that society. Except madrassaa clan and affectees of military operations, the rest of pashtun nation do not find itself compatible with taliban. You have friends among tribesmen, the malaks, aman lashkars, pashtun nationalists.....it is not a simple situation like LTTE. On one hand it is tug of war between taliban and traditional pashtuns. On national level it is war between pakistani state and revolutionaries. On world level it is extention of alqaida, the rise of jihadism.