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Taliban/AQ vs Taliban - sowing discord

^^Does the pro Pakistan Taliban call themselves Taliban? Who named them as Taliban? .

:) No they dont call themselves as Taliban. Its the media and anti-Pakistan US/India and other who are mixing them.


^^One thing that did strike me as odd, was when another Mehsud, Abdullah was released from Guantanamo so easily, whilst innocent men were kept there much longer. It could be the Mehsuds have a deal with the US. But why harbour Al Q? This then enters the realms of conspiracy.

Yes that is the point Abtullah was released by US and it is more suspecious that US had handed Baitullah Mehsud to Afghanistan instead of Pakistan.
He was a Pakistani and he should have been handed over to Pakistan but Why US had handed him over to Afghanistan ??

Beacuse US knew that Pakistani intellgence will draw every information out of him :)

^^It could be the Mehsuds have a deal with the US. But why harbour Al Q? This then enters the realms of conspiracy.


Not Mehsuds but only Baitullah Mehsud. And Why he is harbouring Al-Qaeda because Uzbeks one of the brutalist of Al-Q members are promoting Takfiri ideology and that is to attack Pakistan and Pakistan forces.

Now this ideology suits US/Karzai, Indian agenda of creating chaos in Pakistan leading to pressurizing it.

And above all this chaos is being used as excuse by US to question our nuclear Programe simple as that.

(Note Thank God roady you have come :P some Indians were calling you and me as talibani :P so now the team is completed)
 
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The US agent Baitullah and his men killed pro-Pakistan Taliban beacuse they were not supporting their ideology of suicide attacks and US agenda.

What a ludicrous concept Baitullah Mehsud a US agent?!

The man spends some of his time across the border attacking US troops which hardly makes him an ally of the Americans.
 
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What a ludicrous concept Baitullah Mehsud a US agent?!

The man spends some of his time across the border attacking US troops which hardly makes him an ally of the Americans.

Such is the logic what astounds me!

Leaves me stumped!

An US agent indeed!!

A very odd thought that is more of a romantic escapism to cloak the frustration dripping with self pity!
 
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Salim,

As you have said repeatedly, "ideology cannot be killed" - isolating the most virulent forms of this ideology by using other Taliban and local groups is a sensible approach in the short to medium term.

If the main issue that the groups left over have is "NATO occupation", rather than imposing a worldwide caliphate at all costs, then that is something that can be worked with, and a process of dialog started.

The idea is good.

It would have been possible in some other area but not when Islam is used since there is no divergence in interpretation allowed!

The feasibility to tweak is minimal. Money may speak! I don't know!

The issue of NATO withdrawal as a sop is no brainer for them. After the NATO withdrawal, it is the world - Islamic knights in shining armour, well oiled and brassoed!!
 
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What a ludicrous concept Baitullah Mehsud a US agent?!

The man spends some of his time across the border attacking US troops which hardly makes him an ally of the Americans.

I wouldn't say it's ludicrous. Stranger things have happened. One or two untermenschen canon fodder troops shouldn't matter. In the bigger picture, if one can sow some discord at the cost of a dozen troops, then why not? Though what she's suggesting is a conspiracy, it's definitely not ludicrous.

PS. I'm not sure Baitullah has attacked US troops (though I'm not sure on this).
 
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PS. I'm not sure Baitullah has attacked US troops (though I'm not sure on this).

I recall this from an attempt by journalists to interview him who were turned down when some of his fighters said he was away fighting in Afghanistan.

I will try to find it to give a better view.
 
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I wouldn't say it's ludicrous. Stranger things have happened. One or two untermenschen canon fodder troops shouldn't matter. In the bigger picture, if one can sow some discord at the cost of a dozen troops, then why not? Though what she's suggesting is a conspiracy, it's definitely not ludicrous.

PS. I'm not sure Baitullah has attacked US troops (though I'm not sure on this).



RR due to security reasons i can not disclose the names of those members of Baitullah group who after knowing the reality of Baitullah have deserted him.

And now a first hand account.

After US threats hurrled by US officials to attack FATA, the tribesmen vowed to defend the Pakistani border against any possible US attack.

About 12 days back Pakistani loyal tribesmen in Darra Adamkhel start announcment on loudspeakers asking the tribesmen to be prepared clean their weapons for gaurding the border against US attack.
In the meanwhile Baitullah men came in vehicles and arrested those tribesmen who were asking for fight against US attack.

The Baitullah men warned the villegers if anyone lend support against US attack they will be dealth sternly. The arrested tribesmen were driven by his men to an unknown place.
 
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I recall this from an attempt by journalists to interview him who were turned down when some of his fighters said he was away fighting in Afghanistan.

I will try to find it to give a better view.

That was a lie - I remember that interview in particular because a week before that reports in various newspapers quoted Taliban sources suggesting that he was sick, which had caused his sudden absence from meetings with the Jirga that was negotiating the release of the captured troops.

You also have to account for the reported rejection of B Mehsud by the Afghan Taliban who accused him of ignoring NATO and instead fighting the Pakistani Army.
 
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That was a lie - I remember that interview in particular because a week before that reports in various newspapers quoted Taliban sources suggesting that he was sick, which had caused his sudden absence from meetings with the Jirga that was negotiating the release of the captured troops.

You also have to account for the reported rejection of B Mehsud by the Afghan Taliban who accused him of ignoring NATO and instead fighting the Pakistani Army.

I stand corrected I did find the article it was a bbc one written by a guest journalist.

I accept the notion that the Afghan Taliban are annoyed with Mehsud its not the first time I've heard it but to say he is a US agent I find hard to swallow.
 
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The Baitullah men warned the villegers if anyone lend support against US attack they will be dealth sternly. The arrested tribesmen were driven by his men to an unknown place.

So what to do with Mehsud?

He is a law unto himself who will brazenly violate the recent peace deals.
 
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I stand corrected I did find the article it was a bbc one written by a guest journalist.

I accept the notion that the Afghan Taliban are annoyed with Mehsud its not the first time I've heard it but to say he is a US agent I find hard to swallow.

You were correct about the article. I read the report in the News, and I remember chuckling over the fact that Mehsud's machismo did not allow for his spokespeople to speak of his illness, instead attributing his absence to "fighting NATO".

It works well as propaganda too - people get to hear that Mehsud is putting his life on the line, fighting NATO and living to tell the tale each time!

God's warrior indeed.

However the picture being painted here of Mehsud does not automatically mean he is a US agent - it does indicate that his priorities are different from those of other Taliban groups. He seems to be primarily focused on fighting and attacking Pakistani forces and targets.

Also note that it is his organization the TTP that decided to take the Swat Taliban under its wings. Mullah FM's Taliban being another set of anti-state militants.

I think here one can see perhaps another reason why Pakistan has been reluctant to go after other groups that have focused on fighting NATO 'occupation'. The TTP is definitely primarily concerned with fighting Pakistan, and if their religious rhetoric is the only one around, it becomes much easier for teh TTP to spread out.

By winning over the other groups, the TTP area of influence remains somewhat limited to those agencies its leaders hail from, and are kept in check by those other groups.
 
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Here is an interesting and relevant analysis on the "good Taliban vs bad Taliban" efforts:

Empowering “Soft” Taliban Over “Hard” Taliban: Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy​

By Sadia Sulaiman

The phenomenal rise of various Pakistani Taliban militant groups since 2004 and subsequent militant activities in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have surprised many. In a short span of nearly three years, the Pakistani Taliban threat has developed into a considerable political and security challenge to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The presence of figures from al-Qaeda’s senior leadership and other foreign militant groups in the North Waziristan Agency, South Waziristan Agency and Bajaur Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has provided enormous support to various Pakistani Taliban groups in the shape of ideological, strategic, tactical and logistical assistance, particularly in the development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings.

The formation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007 by various Taliban groups effectively brought together 27 Taliban groups under one umbrella. The union was viewed as an attempt to pursue Talibanization in Pakistan while conducting a “defensive jihad” against Pakistani security forces operating in FATA and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Islam Online, March 6). Baitullah Mahsud, who heads the TTP, is blamed for most of the suicide attacks and terrorist violence in FATA, NWFP and Punjab province in 2007. Mahsud is also accused of involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

A New Alliance in Waziristan

On June 30, Mullah Nazir, commander of the Taliban of the Ahmadzai Wazir Tribe of South Waziristan, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur Wazir, leader of the Taliban of the Uthmanzai Wazir and Daur Tribes of North Waziristan, announced the merger of their groups under a common front, the “Local Taliban Movement,” to fight ISAF-NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan (Islam Online, July 13; Dawn [Karachi], July 1). Subsequently, Hafiz Gul Bahadur was appointed as the overall commander of both the Ahmadzai and Uthmanzai Taliban, Mullah Nazir as the deputy commander and Mufti Abu Haroon as the spokesman of the group (The News [Islamabad], July 13). The formation of the Bahadur-Nazir alliance could be aptly described as a “Waziri alliance” since both Nazir and Bahadur belong to the dominant Wazir Tribe, which nearly encircles the Mahsud Tribe from three sides in Waziristan. As stated by Mullah Nazir, the group has been formed to “defend the Wazir Tribe’s interests in North and South Waziristan” (Daily Times, July 2).

It is, however, generally believed that the bloc was formed as an attempt to counter Baitullah Mahsud and his TTP. As stated by a pro-Mullah Nazir tribal elder who attended a jirga (tribal council) to ratify the Nazir-Bahadur agreement, the move aims at allowing the two leaders to “forge unity against Mahsud” (Daily Times [Lahore], July 8). The agreement comes against a backdrop of increasing terrorist activity by the Baitullah Mahsud-led TTP against the Pakistani government as well as militant raids in June to punish the pro-government Hajji Turkistan group from the neighboring Bhittani tribe. Both Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur are pro-government and shun terrorist activities within Pakistan.

The biggest point of contention between Mullah Nazir and Baitullah Mahsud is the support the latter provides local Uzbek militants belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The dispute can be traced back to March 2007, when Nazir purged the Uzbek militants along with their local supporters from the Ahmadzai Wazir’s tribal territory following accusations they had violated local customs and traditions and indulged in the killing of tribal elders. These Uzbek militants and their local supporters took refuge with Baitullah Mahsud and continued to carry out attacks against Mullah Nazir and his key commanders. Simultaneous attacks were conducted against Mullah Nazir and Commander Malik Khanan on January 7, killing eight militants and injuring three others (BBC, January 7). Khanan was eventually killed by suspected Mahsud and Uzbek militants on June 1 (Dawn, June 1). The killing of Khanan left Mullah Nazir vulnerable to the threat posed by Baitullah Mahsud. The Waziri alliance, therefore, will help Nazir in strengthening his support base among the Ahmadzai Wazir and restrain the Uzbeks and Mahsud militants from harming him. At the same time, Hafiz Gul Bahadur has expressed his concerns several times about the Uzbek militants’ growing anti-Pakistan activities in North Waziristan.

Nazir and Bahadur, while committed to fighting ISAF-NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, are both against the TTP’s terrorist activities in Pakistan (Daily Times, July 2). The policy of Nazir and Bahadur conforms to the broader policy of the Afghan Taliban, who have always advised the Pakistani Taliban to shun fighting Pakistani security forces and focus their energy and resources on Afghanistan (Asia Times Online, May 15, 2007). However, some Taliban militants, especially Baitullah Mahsud, have recently moved closer to al-Qaeda, which advocates conducting terrorist attacks against the Pakistani government and staging global jihad. Mullah Omar, the leader of Afghanistan’s Taliban, has personally disapproved of Baitullah and renounced his relationship with him (Asia Times Online, January 24).

Impact of the Formation of the Waziri Alliance


The Waziri alliance will lead to Hafiz Gul Bahadur emerging as the strongest Taliban commander in North and South Waziristan—both in terms of manpower and influence with the Afghan Taliban. Both the Ahmadzai Wazir and Uthmanzai Wazir tribes share a border with Afghanistan’s Khost and Pakita provinces while Baitullah Mahsud’s tribe is landlocked. Hence, Mahsudi Taliban militants require a safe passage through Waziri territory to conduct cross-border activities in Afghanistan. In the wake of any open hostility between the TTP and the Waziri alliance, the latter could deny the Waziris safe passage to Afghanistan. That is why Baitullah Mahsud distributed pamphlets in North Waziristan assuring Hafiz Gul Bahadur that he will neither oppose him, nor conduct a fight against him (Dawn, July 3). The alliance also provides strength to the much-weakened Mullah Nazir and assures him of the needed support if Baitullah Mahsud adopts a threatening posture toward him.

The formation of the Waziri alliance may considerably weaken Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The Waziri alliance is presently attempting to woo various Taliban militant groups operating in FATA and NWFP away from the TTP. The Haji Namdar-led Amr bil Maroof wa Nahi Anir Munkir (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vices) militant group operating in Khyber Agency has reportedly joined the Waziri alliance (The News, July 6). Bahadur may also try to attract other non-TTP Taliban militant groups operating in FATA, such as the Shah Khalid group (Mohmand Agency) and the Jaish-e-Islami of Maulvi Wali-ur-Rehman (Bajaur Agency).

Isolating Baitullah Mahsud

There are prospects that the Waziri alliance may also bring the pro-government Hajji Turkistan group of the Bhittani Tribe into its fold. The Bhittani Tribe borders the Mahsud Tribe to its east and provides the latter land passage to the southern districts of NWFP. While the infamous Asmatullah Shaheen group of the Bhittani tribe has joined the TTP, the rival Turkistan group faced an armed onslaught from the TTP militants in June that left nearly 40 Bhittani tribesmen dead. The Mahsud tribe and its Taliban fighters face a complete blockade if the Ahmadzai, Uthmanzai and Bhittani tribes join their ranks in the wake of any aggression by the Mahsuds against one of them.

There is a chance some of the dissenting Mahsud Taliban commanders may join hands with the Waziri alliance, thereby weakening the base of Baitullah Mahsud within his own tribe. The Uzbeks may also come under tremendous pressure from both Nazir and Bahadur. Baitullah Mahsud has a significant number of Uzbek militants in his ranks and any change of loyalty on the part of Uzbek militants from Baitullah to Nazir and Bahadur in an attempt to safeguard their survival may effectively erode Baitullah’s fighting capabilities in the region. As it becomes embroiled in inter-tribal and intra-tribal cleavages, the TTP may shift its focus away from the Pakistani government for the time being.

What can now be expected is a successful and historically-tested “divide and rule” policy by the Pakistani government, based on pitting one rogue against the other with some concessions offered to the one willing to side with the government. Such a strategy could prove more effective than employing troops and conducting military operations in the volatile frontier region.

Empowering “Soft” Taliban Over “Hard” Taliban: Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy
 
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Another interesting analysis of Pashtun Tribal dynamics. This was published before the alliance between Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur was made public, and it is interesting to read how Gul Bahadur strongly opposed B Mehsud's violence against the GoP and PA even then - despite being named deputy leader of the TTP.

The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban​

By Rahimullah Yusufzai

Baitullah Mehsud


Though members of militant Islamic groups such as the Pakistani Taliban and other jihadis have almost the same anti-United States and pro-al-Qaeda worldview, they are not especially disciplined when it comes to organizational matters. Difficulty in this area explains the existence of so many extremist factions operating under different leaders and commanders who sometimes express conflicting opinions on domestic and international issues.

The formation of an umbrella organization, Tehrek-e-Taliban-Pakistan (Movement of Pakistani Taliban, or TTP) on December 14, 2007, was meant to bring the different Taliban groups operating in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) into one formation and improve their coordination (The News International [Islamabad], December 15, 2007). Its spokesman, Maulvi Omar, a shadowy figure using a fake name, claimed that 27 Taliban factions operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were part of the movement. Nobody was surprised when Baitullah Mehsud, amir of the Taliban in the territory populated by the Mehsud Pashtun tribe in South Waziristan, was named as leader of the TTP. He was the most powerful among the Pakistani Taliban commanders and it was natural that he would lead the organization.

Tribal Nature of the Pakistani Taliban

The tribal nature of some of the Taliban groups soon became evident when militants in North Waziristan warned the Mehsud-led Taliban in neighboring South Waziristan not to launch attacks against the Pakistan Army in their part of the tribal region (The News International, January 30). The warning came from Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the amir of the Taliban in North Waziristan, despite the fact that he was earlier named deputy to Mehsud in the Tehrek-e-Taliban-Pakistan. Association with the TTP and being its deputy leader did not mean much when it came to the territorial and tribal limits of each Taliban group and commander. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was particularly furious when Mehsud’s men started firing rockets into the army’s camp at Razmak, a town in North Waziristan, during the recent fighting between the military and the Mehsud-commanded militants.

It was also evident that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his Taliban fighters failed to abide by one of the major decisions of the TTP by refusing to coordinate attacks on the security forces in North Waziristan to help ease pressure on the Taliban fighting under Mehsud’s command in South Waziristan. This failure defied a Taliban decision that every Taliban group was required to come to the assistance of others in its area of operation that were under attack from the Pakistan Army. As part of that policy, a Taliban group in the semi-tribal area of Darra Adamkhel seized five military trucks packed with ammunition and supplies for the troops in South Waziristan. The attack triggered fighting in the gun-manufacturing town in a bid to overstretch the resources of the Pakistan Army (Dawn [Islamabad], January 26). Taliban factions in Mohmand, Bajaur and Orakzai tribal regions and also in the Swat district of the NWFP launched attacks against the security forces during this period as part of a strategy to ease military pressure on Mehsud and his men. But instead of launching attacks on the military, the Taliban fighters in North Waziristan announced an extension of their unilateral ceasefire with the government and even issued a warning to Mehsud to stay out of their territory. One reason the North Waziristan militants stayed out of the conflict in South Waziristan was the fact that they belonged to different Pashtun tribes; Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud belongs to the Mehsud tribe, while Hafiz Gul Bahadur and others in his group belong to the Torikhel Wazir and Daur tribes.

Command Structure in the Pakistani Taliban

The lack of coordination between the Taliban factions in South Waziristan and North Waziristan also showed that the TTP had yet to attain unity in the ranks of the militants operating in different tribal regions and districts. On paper, the TTP looks impressive, with powerful components in all seven tribal agencies and in most of the six semi-tribal Frontier Regions and several settled districts of the NWFP. Its command structure also appears strong, with representatives from tribal regions and districts where the militants had fought the army to a standstill or forced the government to deploy large numbers of troops to secure the area. Led by Mehsud from South Waziristan, the TTP’s deputy leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur belongs to North Waziristan and the second deputy head, Maulana Faqir Muhammad, is from Bajaur. Taliban groups in Swat and elsewhere are also represented on the TTP’s 40-member decision-making shura (consultative council). However, these groups also have regional and local political agendas and are, therefore, under pressure from their tribes and communities not to become involved in wider conflicts that could transform their areas into battlegrounds and contribute to their suffering.

A case study of Baitullah Mehsud’s leadership in South Waziristan would be instructive in understanding the tribal influences that impede unity among Taliban factions in FATA. As a Mehsud tribesman, he cannot freely operate in the Wana area, which is inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, even though both the tribes live side by side in South Waziristan and are almost equally affected by Talibanization. Past rivalries have kept the Ahmadzai Wazir and Mehsud tribes apart, and their relations to this day are uneasy and uncertain. As a consequence, Taliban members belonging to the two tribes maintained separate command structures to avoid friction and prevent tribal animosities from poisoning their relations. The Taliban among the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe thus functioned independently of commander Mehsud, first under the command of the late Nek Muhammad and then Haji Omar, Noor Islam, Maulvi Muhammad Abbas, Javed Karmazkhel and Maulvi Aziz. Last April, a split occurred among these Taliban commanders, with Maulvi Muhammad Nazir and Haji Hannan ousting Haji Omar and his allies for offering protection to foreign militants from Uzbekistan and other countries and accepting arms and money from the Pakistan Army. The Taliban in Wana have thus parted ways on the issue of supporting or opposing the presence in their area of Uzbek militants aligned with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (The News International, January 26). In fact, tribal animosities have also influenced the decision of some Taliban fighters to join one or the other side on this issue. Haji Omar and Maulvi Nazir belong to different sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe and this was a factor in pushing them into rival Taliban camps.

It would also be wrong to assume that all Mehsud clans and tribesmen support Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. Many blame him for bringing suffering on the tribe and making their villages a battleground for the military and the militants. However, they cannot speak out against him due to fear of reprisal. The Mehsuds living outside their tribal homes in South Waziristan are relatively free to express their opinion about the Taliban commander, though they must be careful because Mehsud has followers and informants even in places like Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, where Mehsud families have migrated and become largely urbanized. The Shabikhel sub-tribe of the Mehsud is apparently proud of Baitullah because he is one of their own, but other clans do not have that kind of bond with the Taliban leader. Tribal affinities are fairly strong in Waziristan and it is common for members of a tribe to become closer in the event of a dispute with other tribes.

Factionalism in Waziristan and Bajaur


On occasion, there are reports that Taliban commanders and the rank and file in North Waziristan have developed differences on certain issues and split into factions comprising members from the Torikhel Wazir and Daur tribes. There are also signs that the local Taliban have evolved into Miramshah and Mir Ali factions, named after the two major towns in North Waziristan. The Mir Ali group often complains that their area has suffered greater damage as a result of militants’ attacks and retaliatory military strikes than Miramshah, which is the headquarters of North Waziristan and is better defended by government security forces.

In the Bajaur tribal region, the Taliban militants are mainly concentrated in the Mamond area, which is on the border of Afghanistan’s eastern Kunar province. The top Taliban commander in Bajaur, Maulana Faqir Muhammad, also belonged to Mamond, as did his deputy Maulana Liaquat Ali, who was killed in a U.S. missile strike on an Islamic school in Chingai village on October 30, 2006 (The Nation [Pakistan], October 31, 2006). The Taliban influence has only marginally spread to other parts of Bajaur.

There is no denying the fact that tribal affiliations play a major role in the formation of Taliban groups and the choice of commanders. The Taliban and other jihad advocates often claim that they believe in the concept of a common Muslim ummah (community) and reject the division of their religion into groups based on ethnicity, language, geographical borders and tribes. In practice this is easier said than done. In tribal societies such as that of the Pashtuns inhabiting Pakistan and Afghanistan, even ideologically-driven radical Taliban and jihadist fighters gravitate toward their own tribe and local commander whether fighting U.S.-led Coalition forces or the armed forces of Pakistan.

The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban
 
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I remember the BBC also interviewed Haji Omar and as he was viewed as the Amir of North Waziristans Taliban I had been wondering what became of him.
 
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