The Rajapaksas Will Ruin Sri Lanka’s Economy
Gotabaya Rajapaksa
took his oath as Sri Lanka’s seventh executive president, at the sacred Buddhist temple Ruwanwelisaya in Anuradhapura. Three days later, his brother, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, was
sworn in as prime minister.
It is no coincidence that Gotabaya’s inauguration ceremony occurred at an ancient temple built by Sinhalese King Dutugemenu—who is best known for defeating an invading Tamil king from the Chola kingdom. Though the president
wrote on Twitter that he was “now the President of all Sri Lankans, whether they voted for [him] or not and irrespective of their ethnicity or religious beliefs,” t
he swearing-in ceremony indicates that the president will interpret his win as a mandate for reinforcing Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony. This interpretation advances the view that Sri Lankan minorities are invaders or guests permitted citizenry only by the grace of Sri Lanka’s rightful Sinhalese Buddhist guardians.
Now, ultranationalist Sinhalese Buddhist groups that have incited anti-Muslim riots, attacked non-Buddhist places of worship, and conducted anti-halal boycott campaigns have even stated their intention to disband—openly noting that Gotabaya’s presidency renders them redundant.
Political observers fear that members of these radical groups will be absorbed into mainstream politics. Empowered by an election victory that required little minority support, the Rajapaksa regime is likely to govern based on an anti-pluralistic “Sinhala first” or “Sinhala only” orientation, an approach that academics have long held responsible for civil conflict.
Regulations such as the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, which denied official status to the Tamil language, and policies that limited Tamils’ admissions to universities in the 1970s resulted in the emergence of several Tamil armed groups. Among them was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which fought a civil war against the government from 1983 to 2009 in hopes of forming an independent Tamil state.
Like a well-oiled family business, the Rajapaksa brothers’ government benefits from deep trust, close personal connections, and stability—a dynamic alien to coalition politics.
Radical Sinhalese Buddhist groups loyal to the Rajapaksas’ political party, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), such as the Bodu Bala Sena and the Nawa Sinhala Ravaya, have been stoking ethnic divisions in the country since at least 2013.
When serious intelligence oversights enabled the
Easter Attacks in April, Gotabaya Rajapaksa was able to seize on ethnic divisions and highlight his own credentials as the efficient defense secretary who helped end Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war. At the war’s culmination, LTTE combatants kept Tamil civilians hostage as human shields. According to a United Nations
investigation, Sri Lankan government forces continued to fire, killing up to 40,000 civilians within a few months.
Hospitals and no-fire zones were attacked, women and girls were raped en masse, and surrendered militants were shot at close range. Despite Gotabaya’s claims that the war was a “humanitarian effort” which employed a policy of “zero civilian casualties,” the extremely high election turnout among Tamils in the country’s north and east is evidence to the contrary. Tamils who have not already fled the country do not wish to see the former defense secretary occupy Sri Lanka’s highest office.
While there is a long history of anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka, too often overshadowed by the civil war, Islamophobia has risen following the Easter attacks. In May, the leader of one of the country’s largest Buddhist chapters called for stoning Muslims to death and spread rumors that Muslim-owned restaurants used “sterilization medicine” in their food to reduce Sinhalese Buddhist fertility rates. During elections, campaigners for the SLPP claimed that the opposing party, the United National Party (UNP), was planning to put sterilization medicine in sanitary napkins—following a UNP pledge to provide free sanitary napkins to women.
The head of Gotabaya’s legal team was even
videotaped telling Muslims that if they did not vote for the former defense secretary, Muslims would get “a massive thrashing.”
While Gotabaya’s campaign capitalized on fear of Sri Lanka’s Muslim minority, it also exploited suspicions of Tamil Hindu minorities deeply embedded by the civil war. Allegations of
“secret deals” between the main Tamil party and the incumbent UNP government were actively propagated by the Rajapaksas and repeatedly broadcast on TV channels supporting Gotabaya’s candidacy. While ethnic polarization may have helped increase Gotabaya’s vote share among the majority Sinhalese community, silencing those critical of the Rajapaksas’ ethnocratic nationalism or shunning human rights obligations will only harm the country in the long run.
Although Mahinda Rajapaksa’s human rights record is
abysmal, his brother Gotabaya is known within the family as the “
Terminator.” His counterterrorism strategy during his tenure as defense secretary was characterized by brute force. When a senior military officer and elected official claimed there was eyewitness evidence of the the defense secretary ordering army officers to shoot and kill surrendering LTTE leaders at the end of the war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa openly threatened to execute the general during
a BBC interview—citing treason and betrayal of the country.
In 2009 the editor in chief of
The Sunday Leader,
Lasantha Wickramatunga, was brutally killed after exposing corruption by Mahinda Rajapaksa. Gotabaya is likely to employ a similar approach toward dissent.
Several journalists have already left the country, and some have stopped reporting altogether.
A director of the Criminal Investigations Department whose purview included several high-profile cases has been
transferred out of his role, and the department’s inspector of police has
fled the country.
Gotabaya’s election victory is also a precursor to shifts in Sri Lankan foreign policy. As long as the EU and Western democracies require commitments to human rights, pluralism, and democracy, the Rajapaksas are likely to cultivate other foreign allies. Gotabaya’s election campaign, for example, attacked a $480 million
Millennium Challenge Corporation grant to improve public transportation and land administration on grounds that U.S. development assistance interfered with Sri Lankan sovereignty.
If the Rajapaksas prioritize major infrastructure projects—the type China likes to fund—to promote growth, Fitch Ratings
warns that the erosion of fiscal flexibility could “undermine policy credibility, investor confidence, and potentially complicate relations with the IMF.” Sri Lanka’s debt-to-exports ratio is already extremely high, and the country cannot afford foreign direct investment to stagnate or external financing to become more expensive than it already is.
In the end, there will be limited numbers of ports and parcels of land that Sri Lanka can lease away to its neighbors. And there will be only so much that foreign nations—allies or foes—will lend to a country that cannot pay it back. Gotabaya’s presidency threatens to shrink the economic pie for all Sri Lankans, but it will also result in enduring political division if it succeeds in triggering vicious cycles of Sinhalese ethnic outbidding as nationalists seek to be even more exclusionary than their opponents.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/27/gotabaya-mahinda-rajapaksa-ruin-sri-lanka-economy/
