ahojunk
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Now, this is one good looking hotel and casino.
I wonder when it is open for tourism.
South China Sea Forum
- Thread starter SinoChallenger
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Now, this is one good looking hotel and casino.
I wonder when it is open for tourism.
cnleio
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Ewok6102
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Yet your government won't come out and challenge China on it. India has no part to play on the regional disputes and your people's opinion matters little.
Hence China's official political stance on that part of the region. We have trades in its trillions running through that region. It is an important part of our national interest which we must protect.
And no claimants cares what the outsiders think of their individual claims. Ones who say they care did nothing to help, other than offer useless rhetorics and political posturing.
dichoi
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Amid South China Sea Tensions, Japan Strengthens Ties With Philippines, Vietnam
The South China Sea is a large part of Tokyo’s calculations, but aid to Manila and Hanoi has a decades-long history.
By Mina Pollmann
December 02, 2015
As China’s construction projects and the United States’ freedom of navigation operations ratchet up tensions in the South China Sea, Japan is increasing its cooperation with other claimant states – most notably the Philippines and Vietnam. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) plays a large role in this cooperation.
Japan and the Philippines became “strategic partners”back in 2011. Security cooperation has increased since then: Japan and the Philippines took a more concrete step recently when the Japan Marine United Corp won a bid to supply the Philippine Department of Transportation and Communications with ten multirole response vessels this past April. Indicating how seriously Japan takes the relationship, PHP 7.4 billion out of the PHP 8.8 billion (around $200 million) cost for the ten boats actually comes from Japanese ODA to the Philippines. The Philippine government is only putting down PHP 1.4 billion (just under $30 million) for the purchase. Deliveries are expected to take place from 2016 to 2018. Meanwhile, in May, Japan and the Philippines conducted their first joint naval exercises in the South China Sea.
When Filipino President Benigno Aquino III visited Tokyo in June, he signed the Joint Declaration on the Strengthened Strategic Partnership with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. During that visit, both sides agreed to explore the transfer of Japanese military hardware and technology to the Philippines and to start discussions on a visiting forces agreement.
After a bilateral meeting with Aquino on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in late November, Abe said in a press statement, “We welcomed in principle on transfer of defense equipmentand agreed to work together for the early signing of agreement and realization of cooperation in defense equipment.” Furthermore, he added that Aquino requested a “provision of large patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard and Japan would like to consider the specifics of the matter.”
Asahi Shimbun reported last week that Japan is considering offering secondhand TC-90 twin-engine turboprop aircraft, used for Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF) training, to the Philippines. Manila is likely to use these planes for patrol missions over the South China Sea.
Cooperation with the Philippines perhaps should come more naturally, as both Japan and the Philippines are U.S. treaty allies. From that perspective, Japan’s cooperation with Vietnam is more indicative of just how concerned Japan is with China’s ability to get away with unilateral actions in maritime disputes.
Japan has been “strategic partners” with Vietnam longer – their history dates back to 2006, when Abe was prime minister for the first time, actually. Cooperation with Vietnam has also been increasing recently. For example, Japan promised to provide Vietnam with six vessels last year; delivery is expected to be completed this year. The six vessels consist of two former Japanese Fishery Agency patrol boats and four used commercial fishing boats, intended for patrolling purposes. The deal is financed through an ODA package worth 500 million yen (around $4 million).
Following defense consultations in early November, Japan and Vietnam agreed that MSDF vessels will be allowed to make port calls in Cam Ranh Bay. Cam Ranh Bay is a deep-water harbor in central Vietnam alongside the South China Sea and has a strong historical association with Russia (and before that, the Soviet Union). Joint naval exercises between the MSDF and Vietnamese Navy were also discussed.
In all these different aspects of cooperation, Japan is able to do so much because of its economic superpower status. Though Japan’s aid has often been dismissed as purely economic – and, indeed, that is how Japanese aid got started, as reparations to Southeast Asian states designed to boost Japan’s own domestic economic growth – it has gained a strategic element since as early as the 1980s and the 1990s.
Before the 1980s, Japan’s aid to the Philippines was about smoothing Japanese businesses’ entry into the market. However, as the United States began demanding Japan do more to provide for regional security, instead of increasing its defense spending, Japan responded by increasing its share of donor responsibilities in support of the Philippines’ economic recovery. Akira Takahashi describes this as katagawari (taking on someone else’s responsibility), and argued that “Japan’s ODA to the Philippines is most clearly an issue of triangular relations among the U.S., the Philippines, and Japan.” Japan increased its aid to the Philippines because of the recognition that stability in this archipelagic state was vital to Japan’s own security.
With regards to Vietnam, again, the situation was a bit more complicated. Japan froze ODA following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. In the early 1990s, Japan had to be careful about resuming aid until the U.S.-Vietnam relationship improved, according to Junichi Inada. Japan did not want to get ahead of the United States, but also recognized that giving aid to Vietnam would not only be about Japan’s business interests, but about reintegrating Vietnam into the region. There were political motivations driving Japan’s desire to resume aid.
This informal recognition that foreign aid should not only be an economic tool but a foreign policy tool developed in the 1990s and was made explicit in Japan’s updated ODA charter. Japan’s ODA charter, first adopted in 1992, then revised in 2003, was updated again in February 2015. The charter declares, “The objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity (emphasis added).”
Under the new charter, Japan is allowed to send aid to foreign militaries for non-combat use, though military aid should still be avoided. But, depending on how the charter is read, Japan could still justify “non-combat” surveillance assets, including radar systems, maritime surveillance aircraft, and other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance hardware. This could be particularly useful for the Philippines and Vietnam, of course.
Japan is interested in what China does, and has a stake in how the disputes in the South China Sea are resolved for many reasons. First, Japan is concerned about the impact of tensions in the South China Sea on Japanese shipping – and by extension – its economy; second, Japan wants to mitigate the “Finlandization” of littoral states in the absence of outside balancing; third, Japan is obsessed with upholding international law and preventing China from setting a negative precedent that force can be used to resolve territorial disputes (a precedent which could have repercussions for Japan’s own island dispute with China in the East China Sea); and fourth, Japan wants to entice greater U.S. commitment to Japan’s security by demonstrating that Japan is willing and able to “burden-share” in providing security to the Asia-Pacific.
For all these reasons, expect to see continued Japanese cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam – through ODA, defense equipment transfers, and other means.
Amid South China Sea Tensions, Japan Strengthens Ties With Philippines, Vietnam | The Diplomat
shoot up ! China taken with force. There is illegal action of Chinese aggressor in sea territory of Vietnam.
Amid South China Sea Tensions, Japan Strengthens Ties With Philippines, Vietnam
The South China Sea is a large part of Tokyo’s calculations, but aid to Manila and Hanoi has a decades-long history.
By Mina Pollmann
December 02, 2015
As China’s construction projects and the United States’ freedom of navigation operations ratchet up tensions in the South China Sea, Japan is increasing its cooperation with other claimant states – most notably the Philippines and Vietnam. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) plays a large role in this cooperation.
Japan and the Philippines became “strategic partners”back in 2011. Security cooperation has increased since then: Japan and the Philippines took a more concrete step recently when the Japan Marine United Corp won a bid to supply the Philippine Department of Transportation and Communications with ten multirole response vessels this past April. Indicating how seriously Japan takes the relationship, PHP 7.4 billion out of the PHP 8.8 billion (around $200 million) cost for the ten boats actually comes from Japanese ODA to the Philippines. The Philippine government is only putting down PHP 1.4 billion (just under $30 million) for the purchase. Deliveries are expected to take place from 2016 to 2018. Meanwhile, in May, Japan and the Philippines conducted their first joint naval exercises in the South China Sea.
When Filipino President Benigno Aquino III visited Tokyo in June, he signed the Joint Declaration on the Strengthened Strategic Partnership with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. During that visit, both sides agreed to explore the transfer of Japanese military hardware and technology to the Philippines and to start discussions on a visiting forces agreement.
After a bilateral meeting with Aquino on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in late November, Abe said in a press statement, “We welcomed in principle on transfer of defense equipmentand agreed to work together for the early signing of agreement and realization of cooperation in defense equipment.” Furthermore, he added that Aquino requested a “provision of large patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard and Japan would like to consider the specifics of the matter.”
Asahi Shimbun reported last week that Japan is considering offering secondhand TC-90 twin-engine turboprop aircraft, used for Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF) training, to the Philippines. Manila is likely to use these planes for patrol missions over the South China Sea.
Cooperation with the Philippines perhaps should come more naturally, as both Japan and the Philippines are U.S. treaty allies. From that perspective, Japan’s cooperation with Vietnam is more indicative of just how concerned Japan is with China’s ability to get away with unilateral actions in maritime disputes.
Japan has been “strategic partners” with Vietnam longer – their history dates back to 2006, when Abe was prime minister for the first time, actually. Cooperation with Vietnam has also been increasing recently. For example, Japan promised to provide Vietnam with six vessels last year; delivery is expected to be completed this year. The six vessels consist of two former Japanese Fishery Agency patrol boats and four used commercial fishing boats, intended for patrolling purposes. The deal is financed through an ODA package worth 500 million yen (around $4 million).
Following defense consultations in early November, Japan and Vietnam agreed that MSDF vessels will be allowed to make port calls in Cam Ranh Bay. Cam Ranh Bay is a deep-water harbor in central Vietnam alongside the South China Sea and has a strong historical association with Russia (and before that, the Soviet Union). Joint naval exercises between the MSDF and Vietnamese Navy were also discussed.
In all these different aspects of cooperation, Japan is able to do so much because of its economic superpower status. Though Japan’s aid has often been dismissed as purely economic – and, indeed, that is how Japanese aid got started, as reparations to Southeast Asian states designed to boost Japan’s own domestic economic growth – it has gained a strategic element since as early as the 1980s and the 1990s.
Before the 1980s, Japan’s aid to the Philippines was about smoothing Japanese businesses’ entry into the market. However, as the United States began demanding Japan do more to provide for regional security, instead of increasing its defense spending, Japan responded by increasing its share of donor responsibilities in support of the Philippines’ economic recovery. Akira Takahashi describes this as katagawari (taking on someone else’s responsibility), and argued that “Japan’s ODA to the Philippines is most clearly an issue of triangular relations among the U.S., the Philippines, and Japan.” Japan increased its aid to the Philippines because of the recognition that stability in this archipelagic state was vital to Japan’s own security.
With regards to Vietnam, again, the situation was a bit more complicated. Japan froze ODA following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. In the early 1990s, Japan had to be careful about resuming aid until the U.S.-Vietnam relationship improved, according to Junichi Inada. Japan did not want to get ahead of the United States, but also recognized that giving aid to Vietnam would not only be about Japan’s business interests, but about reintegrating Vietnam into the region. There were political motivations driving Japan’s desire to resume aid.
This informal recognition that foreign aid should not only be an economic tool but a foreign policy tool developed in the 1990s and was made explicit in Japan’s updated ODA charter. Japan’s ODA charter, first adopted in 1992, then revised in 2003, was updated again in February 2015. The charter declares, “The objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity (emphasis added).”
Under the new charter, Japan is allowed to send aid to foreign militaries for non-combat use, though military aid should still be avoided. But, depending on how the charter is read, Japan could still justify “non-combat” surveillance assets, including radar systems, maritime surveillance aircraft, and other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance hardware. This could be particularly useful for the Philippines and Vietnam, of course.
Japan is interested in what China does, and has a stake in how the disputes in the South China Sea are resolved for many reasons. First, Japan is concerned about the impact of tensions in the South China Sea on Japanese shipping – and by extension – its economy; second, Japan wants to mitigate the “Finlandization” of littoral states in the absence of outside balancing; third, Japan is obsessed with upholding international law and preventing China from setting a negative precedent that force can be used to resolve territorial disputes (a precedent which could have repercussions for Japan’s own island dispute with China in the East China Sea); and fourth, Japan wants to entice greater U.S. commitment to Japan’s security by demonstrating that Japan is willing and able to “burden-share” in providing security to the Asia-Pacific.
For all these reasons, expect to see continued Japanese cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam – through ODA, defense equipment transfers, and other means.
Amid South China Sea Tensions, Japan Strengthens Ties With Philippines, Vietnam | The Diplomat
shoot up ! China taken with force. There is illegal action of Chinese aggressor in sea territory of Vietnam.
ahojunk
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@SEAISIFrom this
to this
Good work!
And what makes me feel even better is the viets jumping and crying. But nothing they can do to change it
A small note - The top picture is that of Dongmen Island and the bottom picture is that of Nanxun Island. However, due to the "standardization", the buildings on the new islands are very similar, so they could be easily mistaken for each other.
Pulsar
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If as you say, "National Interest" RULES, then why are you wasting everyone's time as a permanent member in the UN Security Council? You need to make way for others who follow the rule of law.
HongWu002
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Sounds like a threat to put Hawaii on the list of targets in the event of any attack on our Spratly island bases! Another powerful move!
Beijing says bolstering S. China Sea defense same as US presence in Hawaii — RT News
Beijing says bolstering S. China Sea defense same as US presence in Hawaii — RT News
Dungeness
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Possible another Pearl Harbor?
Dungeness
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Penguin
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What an idiot comparison, since HawaiI is not contested by the US's neighbours. Typical Russian RT garbage
dichoi
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Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea were discussed by Malcolm Turnbull in his recent trip to the US. Picture: Nathan Edwards
Malcolm Turnbull weighs South China Sea exercises
Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea were discussed by Malcolm Turnbull in his recent trip to the US. Picture: Nathan Edwards
The Turnbull government is considering formal freedom of navigation exercises to dispute Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The national security committee of cabinet has, over a period of months, been briefed on all the available options and combinations possible for such an exercise by Australian planes or ships.
The Turnbull government has not decided whether to conduct such an exercise, and if it did so, when and exactly what form such an exercise would take.
Sources have told The Australian that freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea were discussed by Malcolm Turnbull in his recent trip to the US. Both the Americans, and a number of Southeast Asian nations, have communicated to Canberra their support for a separate Australian freedom of navigation exercise.
According to sources, the Japanese have offered to participate in such an exercise in partnership with US naval vessels, but Washington’s judgment, at this stage, is that any circumstance that brings Chinese and Japanese vessels into potential unfriendly contact is best avoided.
Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and a number of Southeast Asian capitals have called for freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, and have criticised Beijing’s massive land reclamation activities and installation of potential military bases in the disputed region.
A freedom of navigation exercise would involve sailing or flying within the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters zone of a disputed territory. Under international law, an artificial island cannot generate territorial waters.
Therefore, even if Beijing’s broad territorial claims in the South China Sea were valid, the artificial islands they built do not legally generate a 12NM territorial waters limit.
Beijing has created several such artificial islands in the South China Sea. Under its “nine dash line” maps, Beijing claims almost all of the South China Sea as Chinese territory.
In October, Washington sent the USS Lassen into a claimed Chinese 12NM zone as part of a formal FON exercise. The US also sent vessels through the territorial waters of land-reclamation structures created by The Philippines and Vietnam to demonstrate that it was not objecting only to China’s activities, although China’s land reclamation efforts dwarf all activities of other regional nations.
In November, an Australian air force plane flew over disputed waters in the South China Sea and was challenged by the Chinese navy, which advised the RAAF plane it was “threatening the security of our station” and told it to “leave immediately”.
The RAAF pilot involved radioed to the Chinese: “We are an Australian aircraft exercising freedom-of-navigation rights in international airspace.”
The RAAF plane was not flying directly within the 12NM territorial water zone.
Depending on the altitude of a plane involved, it can be difficult to triangulate its exact position in terms of territorial waters. The lower the altitude of the plane, the easier it is to make such calculations.
The Chinese are known to challenge planes and ships well outside the 12NM limit of any of their claimed territories. Nonetheless, sources say both the number of RAAF patrols and their tendency to fly within areas where the Chinese don’t want them to fly has increased markedly over the past 12 to 18 months.
The Australian military routinely patrols in the South China Sea, under Operation Gateway. The flights typically take place from Butterworth base in Malaysia, and are normally undertaken by P3-Orion aircraft.
Although these planes have a role in anti-submarine warfare, the primary purpose of their patrols over the South China Sea is intelligence-gathering as part of the “five eyes” intelligence and surveillance operations.
The tempo of these operations had declined in recent years because so much of Australia’s military effort was devoted to the Middle East. This has been reversed in part to respond to Chinese activities in the South China Sea.
If the Turnbull government decides to conduct a formal freedom of navigation exercise, the Orions would be a likely way to do it.
However, Australia also frequently sends frigates, and occasionally supply ships, through the South China Sea on their way to port visits to friendly Asian nations.
Sources suggest the government directed that these missions go through the South China Sea when possible, rather than by any other route, to reinforce Canberra’s insistence on the rights of free passage and over flight in the South China Sea.
Australia traditionally sends its submarines into the South China Sea on intelligence gathering operations.
Because their voyages are by design conducted in stealth, a submarine is not a likely option for a freedom of navigation exercise.
The flight of the RAAF plane that provoked the Chinese navy response has earnt Canberra a good deal of appreciation in Washington.
There have been a number of such flights, and this one became public only because a BBC crew was on a nearby flight and heard the Chinese and Australian radio communications.
Washington sources say that more US freedom of navigation exercises are likely.
Nocookies | The Australian
Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea were discussed by Malcolm Turnbull in his recent trip to the US. Picture: Nathan Edwards
Malcolm Turnbull weighs South China Sea exercises
- THE AUSTRALIAN
- JANUARY 26, 2016 12:00AM
- SAVE
- Greg Sheridan[/paste:font]
Foreign Editor
Melbourne
Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea were discussed by Malcolm Turnbull in his recent trip to the US. Picture: Nathan Edwards
The Turnbull government is considering formal freedom of navigation exercises to dispute Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The national security committee of cabinet has, over a period of months, been briefed on all the available options and combinations possible for such an exercise by Australian planes or ships.
The Turnbull government has not decided whether to conduct such an exercise, and if it did so, when and exactly what form such an exercise would take.
Sources have told The Australian that freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea were discussed by Malcolm Turnbull in his recent trip to the US. Both the Americans, and a number of Southeast Asian nations, have communicated to Canberra their support for a separate Australian freedom of navigation exercise.
According to sources, the Japanese have offered to participate in such an exercise in partnership with US naval vessels, but Washington’s judgment, at this stage, is that any circumstance that brings Chinese and Japanese vessels into potential unfriendly contact is best avoided.
Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and a number of Southeast Asian capitals have called for freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, and have criticised Beijing’s massive land reclamation activities and installation of potential military bases in the disputed region.
A freedom of navigation exercise would involve sailing or flying within the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters zone of a disputed territory. Under international law, an artificial island cannot generate territorial waters.
Therefore, even if Beijing’s broad territorial claims in the South China Sea were valid, the artificial islands they built do not legally generate a 12NM territorial waters limit.
Beijing has created several such artificial islands in the South China Sea. Under its “nine dash line” maps, Beijing claims almost all of the South China Sea as Chinese territory.
In October, Washington sent the USS Lassen into a claimed Chinese 12NM zone as part of a formal FON exercise. The US also sent vessels through the territorial waters of land-reclamation structures created by The Philippines and Vietnam to demonstrate that it was not objecting only to China’s activities, although China’s land reclamation efforts dwarf all activities of other regional nations.
In November, an Australian air force plane flew over disputed waters in the South China Sea and was challenged by the Chinese navy, which advised the RAAF plane it was “threatening the security of our station” and told it to “leave immediately”.
The RAAF pilot involved radioed to the Chinese: “We are an Australian aircraft exercising freedom-of-navigation rights in international airspace.”
The RAAF plane was not flying directly within the 12NM territorial water zone.
Depending on the altitude of a plane involved, it can be difficult to triangulate its exact position in terms of territorial waters. The lower the altitude of the plane, the easier it is to make such calculations.
The Chinese are known to challenge planes and ships well outside the 12NM limit of any of their claimed territories. Nonetheless, sources say both the number of RAAF patrols and their tendency to fly within areas where the Chinese don’t want them to fly has increased markedly over the past 12 to 18 months.
The Australian military routinely patrols in the South China Sea, under Operation Gateway. The flights typically take place from Butterworth base in Malaysia, and are normally undertaken by P3-Orion aircraft.
Although these planes have a role in anti-submarine warfare, the primary purpose of their patrols over the South China Sea is intelligence-gathering as part of the “five eyes” intelligence and surveillance operations.
The tempo of these operations had declined in recent years because so much of Australia’s military effort was devoted to the Middle East. This has been reversed in part to respond to Chinese activities in the South China Sea.
If the Turnbull government decides to conduct a formal freedom of navigation exercise, the Orions would be a likely way to do it.
However, Australia also frequently sends frigates, and occasionally supply ships, through the South China Sea on their way to port visits to friendly Asian nations.
Sources suggest the government directed that these missions go through the South China Sea when possible, rather than by any other route, to reinforce Canberra’s insistence on the rights of free passage and over flight in the South China Sea.
Australia traditionally sends its submarines into the South China Sea on intelligence gathering operations.
Because their voyages are by design conducted in stealth, a submarine is not a likely option for a freedom of navigation exercise.
The flight of the RAAF plane that provoked the Chinese navy response has earnt Canberra a good deal of appreciation in Washington.
There have been a number of such flights, and this one became public only because a BBC crew was on a nearby flight and heard the Chinese and Australian radio communications.
Washington sources say that more US freedom of navigation exercises are likely.
Nocookies | The Australian
Kiss_of_the_Dragon
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Where you get that is the contested land, we stand on our island, we do what ever we want. Hawaii has been stolen by US, they don't have the legal right.
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