Russian military a well-oiled machine in Crimea

[senheiser]

Russian military a well-oiled machine in Crimea | ABQJournal Online

WASHINGTON – From the photographs we’ve seen of the Russian special operations, or “Spetsnaz,” troops that intervened in Crimea, several things are obvious: They’re secretive, moving without insignia and often covering their faces; they’re disciplined and they’re decisive.

The diplomatic response to the Russian intervention is continuing. But Pentagon officials are beginning to assess the military “lessons learned.”

The bottom line is that Russia’s move into Crimea was a study in the speedy deployment of special operations forces to achieve a limited objective.

“What has been most striking to me so far has been the apparent levels of discipline, training and cooperation among the Russian forces,” noted Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, in an interview this week with the military blog War on the Rocks.

The Russians deployed quickly in the hours surrounding reports of their initial movement on Feb. 26. Two days later, when President Obama warned that there would be “costs” for invading Crimea, the Russian forces were already in place and the intervention was nearly a fait accompli.

The Russians are thought to have had roughly 15,000 troops in Crimea when the crisis began, and quickly added about 5,000, mostly special operations troops. The Russians are allowed up to 25,000 military personnel there under their 30-year lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol.

Military analysts note some interesting characteristics of the Russian deployment: President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB lieutenant colonel, chose something closer to a paramilitary “covert action” than a normal military attack. Because troops didn’t have Russian insignia, there was a thin veil of deniability, which the Russians exploited.

At a news conference March 4, Putin denied that Russian troops had invaded, despite photographic evidence to the contrary.

This “deniability” was maintained by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who said on March 5 it was “complete nonsense” that Russian troops had invaded Crimea and that he had “no idea” how Russian military vehicles had gotten there.

These bland denials of reality were useful in several ways: They maintained a fig leaf of legitimacy for an illegal intervention; they allowed Russia a chance to de-escalate an operation that hadn’t officially been acknowledged; and they distanced Putin in case things went badly and Ukrainians were killed.

Putin also showed a notable willingness to take risks. So far, there has been almost no bloodshed between Russians and Ukrainians, but Putin couldn’t have known this when he began.

That’s why the precision and discipline of Russian forces were crucial. Their professionalism reduced the risk of an incident that could have spiraled out of control. Finally, Putin prepared a rationale for his intervention – along with the attendant propaganda. He insisted he was acting to protect Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea.

His troops were welcomed by a generally supportive Crimean population, and his action was lauded back home. This model suggests that Putin might be prepared to move, similarly, to protect Russians in neighboring countries, such as eastern Ukraine or the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova.

Analysts think Putin would be less likely to move against neighboring states, such as Lithuania and Latvia, that have significant Russian-speaking populations – but are also NATO members. Such operations would require far more force – and would test NATO’s “Article 5″ commitment to U.S.-led mutual defense, a risk that’s probably greater than Putin is willing to tolerate

The well-organized Crimea operation also suggests improvement in the quality and training of the Russian military.

Their troops had operated with far less precision a decade ago in Chechnya and in the 2008 invasion of Georgia.

Russia has evidently been getting results for increased spending on its military: The 2012 edition of a survey by the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated Russia would spend 3.78 percent of its GDP on defense in 2013, by far the highest amount in more than a decade.

This Russian army, in short, is not the one that proved so feeble in Afghanistan. It is well-trained and stealthy, and effectively uses a “small footprint.”

And Putin clearly wasn’t deterred by NATO military moves that signaled a commitment to protect member states – but didn’t convey a willingness to check Russian black operations in a friendly, neighboring region.

 

[Hamartia Antidote]

Not having uniforms isn't exactly fooling anybody. Who else could it be...aliens?

 

[graphican]

There hasn't been a single incident of firing, resistance or disapproval when Russians overtook Crimean. America in the last decade has invaded AND destroyed 10s of countries, caused millions of deaths and loss of trillions. This was one clean operation by Russia in which people of Crimean welcomed them. Americans should show some respect to the opinions Crimean Nationals and should feel some shame for their acts and deeds. Let Russia expand a little.. a balanced world is nevertheless in the interest of global peace.

 

[Pakistanisage]

Next step, go for Eastern Ukraine which has always been part of Russia ( Historically ).

Khruschev annexed it with Ukraine like a dumbo.....

 

[Beidou2020]

Wasn't Khrushchev a Ukrainian?

 

[sincity]

The world no longer fighting for expansion of political ideology with most of the political ideology falling short on the promise on the content of it's message. The whole world can see through the intention with the party involved in pushing through the message of democratic revolution. The west promoted democracy revolution to entrap other nation to fall under their umbrella and to serve the West purpose of sole hegomony power in this world. Any nation who not align their national interest to Western geopolitic will be threaten with revolution within their border or can seriously plumet the nation into a civil war. Russia no longer isolated in this world because of their strategic partnership with China. Russia still a major player with their hard power, China have the money with their soft power and both Russia and China have the permanent seat in the UN with veto power. Since both Russia and China don't want to super impose their political believe onto other but to protect their own national interest and preserve their status in the world. Both Russia and China foreign policy never allow foreign power dictated onto them. Russia and China strategic partnership are out of convenient because both nations survival depend on their cooperation between the two. Either Russia or China strong enough alone to push back the West encroachment or respond to the external threat to destablize both Russia and China internal security.

 

[senheiser]

Analysis: Crimea intervention - The increasing sophistication of Russia's military resurgence - IHS Jane's 360
Tim Ripley, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
26 March 2014

Russian soldiers march outside a Ukrainian military base in Perevalne, Crimea, on 20 March. Source: PA Photos
Late on 25 March, the last Ukrainian warship blockaded in its port on Crimea's west coast surrendered to Russian forces, completing just over three weeks of operations to wrest the strategic peninsula from Kiev's control.

This whirlwind campaign seems to herald a new sophistication in how Russian commanders conduct military operations. The most distinctive feature of the Russian operation was its emphasis on economy of effort. Unlike previous interventions in Afghanistan in the Soviet era, or Chechnya and Georgia more recently, where Russian commanders relied on mass employment of tanks and artillery, the Crimea intervention featured fewer than 10,000 assault troops lined up against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel. The heaviest fighting vehicle employed by the Russians against the Ukrainians was the wheeled BTR-80 armoured personnel carrier (APC).

Once Russian troops had moved to blockade Ukrainian military personnel in their bases, psychological warfare, internet/media propaganda, intimidation, and bribery were their main weapons to undermine their opponents' will to resist, rather than overwhelming firepower. Russian troops also displayed considerably discipline and patience during this phase. In addition, they appeared well equipped, boasting new personnel equipment, body armour, and light wheeled armoured vehicles.

This novel approach was necessitated by Russian President Vladimir Putin's need for the operation to be launched within a tight timeframe after the fall of the pro-Moscow regime in Kiev on 27 February.

Although the operation may have been planned for many months, there was insufficient time to mobilise a larger force. Russian commanders had to make do with naval infantry from the Black Sea Fleet already based in Crimea, backed up by a couple of battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos flown onto the peninsula. Economy of force also fitted the campaign's political narrative: that this was a mission to protect Crimea's Russian-speaking population rather than an invasion.

In just over three weeks, the will of the Ukrainian forces in Crimea was broken and all 190 of their bases had surrendered with barely a shot being fired by their defenders. However, even if some Ukrainian heavy armour was present in Crimea, many of the Ukrainian forces were naval and administrative personnel rather than combat troops. Organised military resistance was never a serious prospect. Instead of achieving a simple military triumph on the battlefield, the Russian armed forces facilitated a political and psychological victory.

What now?
In the wake of his success, there has been intense speculation about President Putin's future intentions. In his 18 March victory speech after the fall of Crimea, he laid out his underlying worldview. Russia's loss of power and status at the end of the Cold War in 1989 was a deliberate, generational humiliation at the hands of the West - and a reason for hatred and apprehension.

For the Russian president, Ukraine's strategic importance to Russia is the key issue. In Putin's view, Ukraine is the pivotal connector between East and West. Control of Ukraine means control of the Black Sea and unobstructed access to potentially sympathetic populations in central Europe and the Balkans - in nations such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Serbia - and the exercise of time honoured 'pan-slavism' with a view to greater integration. These strategic perspectives appear to have been largely lost to Western leaders.

Ukraine is sufficiently important that in 2004, the last time a split from Russian control seemed likely, Viktor Yushchenko, the pro-Western opposition and Orange Revolution leader and later president, was nearly fatally poisoned and permanently disfigured by the use of dioxin. In any case, the Kremlin sees a 'colour revolution', heralding liberal democracy amongst Slavonic people, as threatening and utterly unacceptable.

A significant effect of the Crimea campaign has been to further test NATO and EU resolve. Russian leaders tend to think in larger pictures than their Western counterparts. 'Atlanticists' are likely to consider individual nations or small groups of countries, threats to them, and their specific importance, without interconnecting them.

Russian analysts evaluate - and have whole branches of study devoted to - the Black Sea-Baltic region as a strategic territory and subject in itself. Russia has generally controlled these areas between Russia proper and foreign countries, referred to in a wider context as the 'near abroad'.

Speculation has shifted to Moldova - and its adjacent, unrecognised Russian-speaking enclave of Transnistria or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) - as the next test of Western resolve in the face of possible intervention by Putin. A potential justification or pretext for a Russian incursion here is the small self-declared republic's wish to become part of Russia and the disputed presence of a battalion of 400 Russian peace-keeping troops.

On 25 March, Russia announced the start of territorial defence exercises in Transnistria, which Moldovan sources described to IHS Jane's on the same day as of concern even if anticipated.

Although part of NATO and the EU, the Baltic States are the northern end of the Black Sea-Baltic space and are vulnerable. The disapproving tone of some Russian rhetoric suggests they exist under sufferance.

From the Russian Air Assault Division base at Pskov near the Latvian-Estonian border, forces could - from a near standing start - cut off Estonia from the rest of the EU in less than 40 minutes, according to a former Russian air assault division commander.

The same could be done along the 80 km Polish-Lithuanian border, which runs between Belarus and the Russian Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. In both cases, one or all the Baltic States could be enclosed, controlled, and separated from the rest of Europe. In the Baltic, eastern Ukraine, and Moldova-Transnistria Russian military units are in place, available for further exploitation if President Putin so desires.

 

[airmarshal]

Despite what western propagandists say, Russia victory in Crimea was comprehensive.

It will be very difficult for america and its pack of wolves to bleed Russian bear. They have bitten more than can chew.

 

[Khan_patriot]

One more reason to love Putin.....