Major Shaitan Singh
SENIOR MEMBER

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- Dec 7, 2010
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Olaf was a wonderful ranger: tall, broad, tough. He served a year in the mountain-Jaeger part, and was a corporal. To his credit - a few saboteurs destroyed and Soviet spies. And now, lying among the mossy stones, the group under the command of a young corporal was to eliminate a small detachment of marines, which has been hosted for three days in the rear of the Nazis. The ambush was well thought out and organized. Two companies of rangers, in fact, blocked the coastal area of the Barents Sea. Platoons had been established between the radio and the company commander reported on an hourly basis during the operation in the battalion headquarters, when it was constantly sergeant with a portable walkie-talkie behind him, who knew his job superbly.
Painfully stretched minute, cold to the bone, and Russian spies did not appear. By saving the bay, where they should arrive at the boat, there was only one way - through the gorge, which block it, Olaf group. This means that they will take Russian ...
Unexpected branches crackling behind him made corporal turn his head. Before him stood the old camouflage overalls undersized burly and before Olaf raised machine bayonet came to him right under the heart.Legs gave way, and the corporal fell to the ground. At the same time due to the dwarf birch on the heads of the other rangers jumped Russian marines ...
Radioman group did not have time to transmit a signal about the attack: a knife in the chest was fatal. Bleeding, he cursed the unknown traitor in the headquarters of which is not known how the Russian was able to warn about an ambush.
He was wrong, the radio operator. He could not even imagine what kind of radio transmissions Norwegian rangers have long followed the Soviet radiorazvedchiki. They studied the radio system headquarters and division of mining and Jaeger parts of Norway and during the release of scouts behind enemy vigilant ether, timely letting them know about the measures taken against them by the Nazis ...
It all started during the Russian-Japanese war. And the cradle of signals intelligence can be considered as the Russian navy, where it was first used.
It is interesting to mention that, as radio reconnaissance were radio operators of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla, created in 1918 from individual scattered detachments of armed tug and barge, the team which consisted mainly of the Baltic Fleet sailors. Radiorazvedchiki played a major role in the fact that the fleet has successfully entered into the Caspian Sea. But the interesting thing started then. As on the east and on the west coast of the Caspian Sea was practically no wired connection. That is why between the Whites and the forces of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla a real war for the seizure and destruction of radio stations. Actively used signals intelligence agents seized the radio station used to deceive the enemy.
Bright page in the history of radio reconnaissance entered the station in case of capture of Fort Alexander and its use in the radio game.
December 30, 1919 the first troop ship flotilla approached the peninsula Mangyshlak and surprise attack captured Fort Alexander. For a long time the Whites did not know about the capture of the fort and continue to pass through the "transit" station fort dispatches coming from Denikin's headquarters in Baku and Krasnovodsk to transfer Kolchak in Guriev. One day, a radio operator with the destroyer "Karl Liebknecht" N.Cherukovym who worked at the radio station of the fort, was adopted by a radio message about the transition from the Petrovsky in Guriev steam ship "Layla" with Denikin military mission headed by General Grishin-Almazov. Radiotelegraph Kuzma Ravkov intercepted talks between "Leila" and its accompanying British auxiliary cruiser "President Kruger." Soon after the ship has left the cruiser, it was delayed by red destroyer. The general and his aide shot and accompanied by General Staff officers were captured. Among the twenty-nine prisoners were English and French officers and Dick Renard - advisers White Guard generals. Among the captured documents of value - plan joint campaign of Denikin and Kolchak on Moscow, their personal correspondence.
Through radio fort was actively misinformation white. By order of S. Kirov, who headed the defense of Astrakhan region, all the White Guard radiograms immediately transferred to the headquarters of the 11th Army. There they make the necessary changes to make the most difficult to manage enemy troops, then passed them on the radio operators recipients.

Success stories radiorazvedchikov can cause a great many. They particularly distinguished during the Great Patriotic War, what is not written one book. And it is - an invaluable experience for us.
Undoubtedly, the modern means of communication has leaped forward, but the victory in the confrontation in the air will, as before, on the side of those who are better educated, have more experience, resourceful and cunning.
Part of a group of special forces and military intelligence staffs are tasked detection, communication centers, airfields, batteries guided missiles. Prospective areas of finding such objects are large enough, and if the object is movable, repeatedly changing its location, locate and destroy it can be very difficult. In these cases, it is necessary to remember that most military installations radios and radio stations are broadcast periodically, than you can successfully use. For example, since 1989, over the years, one of the special units of the Baltic Fleet conducted a successful exercise with the mobile node communications for search and detection of objects by means of signals intelligence. For this group, equipped with special equipment, after landing and go to the area of the fighting unfolded positions paging and interception in the most suitable places. They were, as a rule, wooded hills and bushes, the ruins of ancient buildings, tall trees with spreading crown.
Teachings lasted usually 3-5 days. The first few hours after the start of the watch scouts searched for frequencies at which aired the desired object. After detection of the enemy was determined by his approximate location. To do this, the map of the place was laid base bearing on the subject and already the basis of what it should be next to the road in the open, away from power lines, the commander of the group defines the possible location of the communication. To check sent back 2-3 scout.When an object is detected they left it their tracks (usually one of the cars rented a room), and then the scouts returned to base. Throughout the teaching communication node 3 or 4 times changed its location, and the scouts had every time track it.Teachings given invaluable experience.
However, there were opened and disadvantages. Chief among them - for a permanent job means radio intelligence requires a large number of batteries that weigh much and cause great inconvenience in the transitions. In addition, to ensure continuous operation of technical means of protection base, destroying the object must be a large number of personnel that behind enemy lines is highly undesirable.However, all these shortcomings are more than the possibility of overlap in a short time to detect and identify objects intelligence. And it's a lot.
In modern warfare, winning the one who have the information, will be able to restrict the enemy information about yourself, will be able to deprive him of the ability to manage on their own. Well laid radio interception and direction finding, and timely processing of information more than once helped command grouping of our forces in Chechnya make the right decisions.For example, in September 1999 during the liberation of the territory of Dagestan radio intelligence units pinpointing work stations militants determined the approximate location of their target designation and given weapons. In eight cases out of ten militants managed to inflict serious damage or force them to quickly move to a less advantageous position. As for the militants, the modern means of communication, commercially available, allowing them to successfully conduct electronic warfare. To do this, they have created a special group. They are located, as a rule, in cars or in a well-protected shelters. Small portable station (usually made in Japan) can not only listen to broadcast, but also to determine the direction of the desired radio source. Equipment militants has good power supply and power output, can interfere with military VHF stations.
Known sad example: in 1996 during the first Chechen campaign 324th Guards Motorized Rifle Division attacked Simferopol militia thugs ensconced in one of the villages. It must be said that the militants were well prepared for battle.Aul was surrounded by concrete fortifications, which were connected by deep trenches. There were even a camcorder that allow continuous monitoring of the battlefield. In addition, the fighters were equipped with a good import radio equipment by means of which successfully suppressed radio infantry. As a result of a failure in the management of that fight federal troops suffered heavy losses. Only after interference sources were zapelengovany and it marked artillery strikes, the attack went more successfully.

From 1996 to 1998, the territory of the Chechen bandits were deployed five centers of signals intelligence. Three of them were located in Nogent Yurt district, two - in the south-western part of Chechnya. Attendants consisted not only of the Chechens, but also from the British and American instructors. As we move our troops into the interior of the republic centers were abandoned. But the group reportedly continue to work, constantly changing places of deployment. Often SIGINT noted many times in the air talks in English with American and British personnel.
There are cases when due to violations of the rules of the enemy radio misinformation could spend our units and successfully use it. So, if you type in Grozny in 1995 parts of Maikop Motorised Brigade, listen to broadcast militants found out by order of the commander sent one armored brigade of the mouth.After that, knowing the call sign company and the head, the rebels managed to give the liaison team to follow the company commander in a particular area of the city. As a result, one of the narrow streets of Grozny tanks were stopped and nearly all destroyed.
According to experts, and after the active phase of the counterterrorist operation many units MIA often ambushed by insurgents because of the fact that use open communication.
Often commanders are unaware of the high risk of violation of secrecy are radio and a huge advantage gives control of ether. In this regard, revealing a case of life scout contingent of Soviet troops in Germany. Every year there are competitions were held, one element of which was to find an object in the area. They served well disguised mock rocket launcher. Alternately scouts went to search for the object. Few of them take into account that the fixed frequencies, which employ the army radio station, all the same. On the development of conventional signals and radio communication on this short time no one cared. But once one of the waiting start commanders realized listen ether. As a result, his team found the object in record time. Many were outraged then such a "scam." But it fair? Modern warfare requires unconventional thinking, the ability to use and to adopt the achievements of science and technology. Not only. Stratagem, the ability to turn in their favor oversight enemy - a prerequisite for achieving victory.
Fighting in Chechnya have shown that the fight against the major gangs in our time - this is a war for the information, and you can win it only if you know exactly where your opponent is and what he intends to do. ESM can certainly assist in this matter invaluable assistance.
In short, the ability to radioborbu - a great art, not having mastered that, not having learned to apply this invisible weapon to perfection, not even think about winning in a confrontation with a strong opponent.
Painfully stretched minute, cold to the bone, and Russian spies did not appear. By saving the bay, where they should arrive at the boat, there was only one way - through the gorge, which block it, Olaf group. This means that they will take Russian ...
Unexpected branches crackling behind him made corporal turn his head. Before him stood the old camouflage overalls undersized burly and before Olaf raised machine bayonet came to him right under the heart.Legs gave way, and the corporal fell to the ground. At the same time due to the dwarf birch on the heads of the other rangers jumped Russian marines ...
Radioman group did not have time to transmit a signal about the attack: a knife in the chest was fatal. Bleeding, he cursed the unknown traitor in the headquarters of which is not known how the Russian was able to warn about an ambush.
He was wrong, the radio operator. He could not even imagine what kind of radio transmissions Norwegian rangers have long followed the Soviet radiorazvedchiki. They studied the radio system headquarters and division of mining and Jaeger parts of Norway and during the release of scouts behind enemy vigilant ether, timely letting them know about the measures taken against them by the Nazis ...
It all started during the Russian-Japanese war. And the cradle of signals intelligence can be considered as the Russian navy, where it was first used.
It is interesting to mention that, as radio reconnaissance were radio operators of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla, created in 1918 from individual scattered detachments of armed tug and barge, the team which consisted mainly of the Baltic Fleet sailors. Radiorazvedchiki played a major role in the fact that the fleet has successfully entered into the Caspian Sea. But the interesting thing started then. As on the east and on the west coast of the Caspian Sea was practically no wired connection. That is why between the Whites and the forces of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla a real war for the seizure and destruction of radio stations. Actively used signals intelligence agents seized the radio station used to deceive the enemy.
Bright page in the history of radio reconnaissance entered the station in case of capture of Fort Alexander and its use in the radio game.
December 30, 1919 the first troop ship flotilla approached the peninsula Mangyshlak and surprise attack captured Fort Alexander. For a long time the Whites did not know about the capture of the fort and continue to pass through the "transit" station fort dispatches coming from Denikin's headquarters in Baku and Krasnovodsk to transfer Kolchak in Guriev. One day, a radio operator with the destroyer "Karl Liebknecht" N.Cherukovym who worked at the radio station of the fort, was adopted by a radio message about the transition from the Petrovsky in Guriev steam ship "Layla" with Denikin military mission headed by General Grishin-Almazov. Radiotelegraph Kuzma Ravkov intercepted talks between "Leila" and its accompanying British auxiliary cruiser "President Kruger." Soon after the ship has left the cruiser, it was delayed by red destroyer. The general and his aide shot and accompanied by General Staff officers were captured. Among the twenty-nine prisoners were English and French officers and Dick Renard - advisers White Guard generals. Among the captured documents of value - plan joint campaign of Denikin and Kolchak on Moscow, their personal correspondence.
Through radio fort was actively misinformation white. By order of S. Kirov, who headed the defense of Astrakhan region, all the White Guard radiograms immediately transferred to the headquarters of the 11th Army. There they make the necessary changes to make the most difficult to manage enemy troops, then passed them on the radio operators recipients.

Success stories radiorazvedchikov can cause a great many. They particularly distinguished during the Great Patriotic War, what is not written one book. And it is - an invaluable experience for us.
Undoubtedly, the modern means of communication has leaped forward, but the victory in the confrontation in the air will, as before, on the side of those who are better educated, have more experience, resourceful and cunning.
Part of a group of special forces and military intelligence staffs are tasked detection, communication centers, airfields, batteries guided missiles. Prospective areas of finding such objects are large enough, and if the object is movable, repeatedly changing its location, locate and destroy it can be very difficult. In these cases, it is necessary to remember that most military installations radios and radio stations are broadcast periodically, than you can successfully use. For example, since 1989, over the years, one of the special units of the Baltic Fleet conducted a successful exercise with the mobile node communications for search and detection of objects by means of signals intelligence. For this group, equipped with special equipment, after landing and go to the area of the fighting unfolded positions paging and interception in the most suitable places. They were, as a rule, wooded hills and bushes, the ruins of ancient buildings, tall trees with spreading crown.
Teachings lasted usually 3-5 days. The first few hours after the start of the watch scouts searched for frequencies at which aired the desired object. After detection of the enemy was determined by his approximate location. To do this, the map of the place was laid base bearing on the subject and already the basis of what it should be next to the road in the open, away from power lines, the commander of the group defines the possible location of the communication. To check sent back 2-3 scout.When an object is detected they left it their tracks (usually one of the cars rented a room), and then the scouts returned to base. Throughout the teaching communication node 3 or 4 times changed its location, and the scouts had every time track it.Teachings given invaluable experience.
However, there were opened and disadvantages. Chief among them - for a permanent job means radio intelligence requires a large number of batteries that weigh much and cause great inconvenience in the transitions. In addition, to ensure continuous operation of technical means of protection base, destroying the object must be a large number of personnel that behind enemy lines is highly undesirable.However, all these shortcomings are more than the possibility of overlap in a short time to detect and identify objects intelligence. And it's a lot.
In modern warfare, winning the one who have the information, will be able to restrict the enemy information about yourself, will be able to deprive him of the ability to manage on their own. Well laid radio interception and direction finding, and timely processing of information more than once helped command grouping of our forces in Chechnya make the right decisions.For example, in September 1999 during the liberation of the territory of Dagestan radio intelligence units pinpointing work stations militants determined the approximate location of their target designation and given weapons. In eight cases out of ten militants managed to inflict serious damage or force them to quickly move to a less advantageous position. As for the militants, the modern means of communication, commercially available, allowing them to successfully conduct electronic warfare. To do this, they have created a special group. They are located, as a rule, in cars or in a well-protected shelters. Small portable station (usually made in Japan) can not only listen to broadcast, but also to determine the direction of the desired radio source. Equipment militants has good power supply and power output, can interfere with military VHF stations.
Known sad example: in 1996 during the first Chechen campaign 324th Guards Motorized Rifle Division attacked Simferopol militia thugs ensconced in one of the villages. It must be said that the militants were well prepared for battle.Aul was surrounded by concrete fortifications, which were connected by deep trenches. There were even a camcorder that allow continuous monitoring of the battlefield. In addition, the fighters were equipped with a good import radio equipment by means of which successfully suppressed radio infantry. As a result of a failure in the management of that fight federal troops suffered heavy losses. Only after interference sources were zapelengovany and it marked artillery strikes, the attack went more successfully.

From 1996 to 1998, the territory of the Chechen bandits were deployed five centers of signals intelligence. Three of them were located in Nogent Yurt district, two - in the south-western part of Chechnya. Attendants consisted not only of the Chechens, but also from the British and American instructors. As we move our troops into the interior of the republic centers were abandoned. But the group reportedly continue to work, constantly changing places of deployment. Often SIGINT noted many times in the air talks in English with American and British personnel.
There are cases when due to violations of the rules of the enemy radio misinformation could spend our units and successfully use it. So, if you type in Grozny in 1995 parts of Maikop Motorised Brigade, listen to broadcast militants found out by order of the commander sent one armored brigade of the mouth.After that, knowing the call sign company and the head, the rebels managed to give the liaison team to follow the company commander in a particular area of the city. As a result, one of the narrow streets of Grozny tanks were stopped and nearly all destroyed.
According to experts, and after the active phase of the counterterrorist operation many units MIA often ambushed by insurgents because of the fact that use open communication.
Often commanders are unaware of the high risk of violation of secrecy are radio and a huge advantage gives control of ether. In this regard, revealing a case of life scout contingent of Soviet troops in Germany. Every year there are competitions were held, one element of which was to find an object in the area. They served well disguised mock rocket launcher. Alternately scouts went to search for the object. Few of them take into account that the fixed frequencies, which employ the army radio station, all the same. On the development of conventional signals and radio communication on this short time no one cared. But once one of the waiting start commanders realized listen ether. As a result, his team found the object in record time. Many were outraged then such a "scam." But it fair? Modern warfare requires unconventional thinking, the ability to use and to adopt the achievements of science and technology. Not only. Stratagem, the ability to turn in their favor oversight enemy - a prerequisite for achieving victory.
Fighting in Chechnya have shown that the fight against the major gangs in our time - this is a war for the information, and you can win it only if you know exactly where your opponent is and what he intends to do. ESM can certainly assist in this matter invaluable assistance.
In short, the ability to radioborbu - a great art, not having mastered that, not having learned to apply this invisible weapon to perfection, not even think about winning in a confrontation with a strong opponent.