Role of Espionage in Chinese Technology

[Indo-guy]

Surging Chinese Espionage Targets U. S. Space Components « AmericaSpace


Surging Chinese Espionage Targets U. S. Space Components
By Craig Covault

Chinese Fengyun-2 spin stabilized geosynchronous orbit weather satellite is placed in its Long March faring at the Xichang launch site in January 2012. Photo Credit: China Defense Mashup.com

The FBI is pursuing a growing number of Chinese agents trying to obtain and smuggle U. S. space system components into China for use in spacecraft being developed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

“Multiple cases of economic espionage and theft of dual use and military technology have uncovered pervasive Chinese collection activities”, Army Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) told the Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 16.

“China has used its intelligence services to gather information via a significant network of agents and contacts utilizing a variety of methods to obtain U. S. technology to advance their defense industries, global command and control and strategic warfighting capabilities, the DIA director said in a formal Threat Assessment document and briefing to the Congress.

Key missile and stealth technology is also a target of increased Chinese espionage, Justice Dept prosecutions indicate.

Chinese economic espionage and smuggling has already involved secret technology from the Delta IV launch vehicle, space shuttle, the B-2 bomber and space radiation hardened components.

U. S. analysts agree that China is developing a broad range of new military spacecraft and that by smuggling in U. S. space components and designs is a way to increase the capability and reliability of these satellites.

Just this month a Chinese national was indicted by a federal grand jury in Colorado on charges of conspiracy and violations of the Munitions Control Act for allegedly attempting to ship to China hundreds of U. S. satellite computer chips packaged as baby formula.

The radiation hardened chips were bound for Shanghai, where they would have likely ended up inside spacecraft being developed by the PLA, according to documents involved in the case.


Rare image shows a Chinese Beidou navigation spacecraft being lowered into a vacuum chamber for testing. Photo Credit: China Defense Mashup.com

Chinese manufacturers have not yet mastered hardening microchips that are as well protected against space radiation as U. S. made chips. The lack of such protected circuits can be fatal to a spacecraft. For example, the Russians found that the recent failure their Phobos mission craft occurred because its circuits contained non radiation hardened chips.

The U. S. components involve in the most recent China case are radiation hardened “programmable read-only memory” (PROM) devices that facilitate the start-up of space based computer systems and also “static random access memory” (SRAM) devices to store information in space-based hard drives.

“China relies on foreign technology, acquisition of key dual-use components…to advance its military modernization,” says a 2011 Defense Dept. report to Congress.

China “also utilizes a large, well-organized network of enterprises, defense factories, affiliated research institutes, and computer network operations to facilitate the [smuggling] of sensitive U. S. information and export-controlled technology,” says the Defense Dept. report.

According to the grand jury indictment returned earlier this month in Colorado, federal investigators allege the man, Philip Chaohui He (aka Philip Hope) purchased more than 300 integrated circuits in May, 2011 from Aeroflex, a company in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Court papers state that Aeroflex employees grew suspicious of Mr. He’s motives for buying such components.

Mr. He planned to send the electronics to China in two shipments, one in July, 2011, and another in October, the indictment says.
According to the indictment, the first shipment allegedly contained the PROM computer chips. Mr. He allegedly smuggled those into China himself during the summer of 2011 by carrying them into Mexico with a co-conspirator, then flying them from Mexico City to Shanghai, federal authorities believe.

The second shipment that led to his arrest had the SRAM chips, the indictment says.

The indictment alleges that Mr. He drove to the port of Long Beach on Dec. 11, 2011 with the 200 radiation hardened SRAM integrated circuits worth nearly $550,000 in the trunk of his car. The chips were concealed in plastic infant formula containers inside five sealed boxes marked “baby milk powder” in Chinese, the indictment says.

The indictment alleges that at the port, Mr. He met two men, including one with a Chinese passport “in front of a docked ship bearing a Chinese flag. The Chinese flagged ship was registered to Zhenhua Port Machinery Co. Ltd. a subsidiary of the Chinese government owned corporation China Communications Construction”. The ship was scheduled to return to China in a few days.

After his arrest, he was extradited back to Colorado where if convicted he faces up to 35 years in prison and up to $1.5 million in fines on charges of conspiracy, attempted unlawful export and attempted smuggling of U. S. defense articles.


China’s most powerful satcom is the DFH-4 spacecraft bus. Photo Credit: China Defense Mashup.com

The Justice Dept. cited other cases of Chinese space component smuggling. Investigators from the FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)and the Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) have worked several recent important cases. They are:

Economic Espionage / Theft of Shuttle and Delta IV Secrets– According to the Justice Dept., NASA investigators and the FBI collaborated on the FBI arrest of Dongfan “Greg” Chung, a former Rockwell and Boeing engineer on charges of “economic espionage” and the shipment to China of restricted technology and Boeing trade secrets involving the space shuttle and the Delta IV launch vehicle. Chung has been sentenced to 15 years in prison and three years of close supervision after serving his term.

NASA and the FBI discovered that Chung served as an illegal agent of China for more than 30 years and kept more than 300,000 pages of Boeing secrets stashed in his home as part of his Chinese espionage mission. The Justice Dept. says the documents were shipped to China by mail, by ship and also routed by another U. S. based Chinese agent named Chi Mak. Shuttle and Delta IV secrets were also sent to China by diplomatic pouch from the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, the Justice Dept. says. Chung also made several verbal briefings in China to government military and technology personnel.

More Radiation-Hardened Defense Components–On March 24, 2011, Lian Yang, a Chinese resident of Washington state, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act by attempting to sell radiation hardened military and aerospace technology to China. Yang attempted to purchase and export from the United States to China 300 radiation-hardened, PROM programmable semiconductor devices that are used in satellites. The complaint alleges that Yang contemplated creating a shell company in the United States that would appear to be purchasing the parts, concealing the fact that the parts were to be shipped to China.

In another case, the Justice Dept says that two Chinese nationals, Hong Wei Xian, and Li Li, have pleaded guilty in federal court in Virginia for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act by attempting to export more PROM circuits designed for satellite use. The pair is associated with the Beijing Space Science and Technology Development Company, China’s primary contractor for satellite and launch vehicle development. They have been sentenced to two years in prison.

Military Technical Data to China – Another Chinese man “Sixing Liu”, aka “Steve Liu,” of Deerfield, Ill., has been arrested in Chicago on a criminal charge of exporting defense-related technical data without a license. Liu, a native of China with a doctorate degree in electrical engineering, worked as a senior staff engineer for Space & Navigation, a New Jersey-based division of L-3 Communications.

He was part of a team that worked on precision navigation devices and other innovative components for the U.S. Defense Dept. In November 2010, he traveled to China and, upon his return to the United States later that month, federal inspectors found him to be in possession of a computer that contained hundreds of documents related to the company’s projects, as well as images of Liu making a presentation at a technology conference sponsored by the Chinese government. Many of the documents on his computer were marked as containing sensitive proprietary company information and/or export-controlled technical data which he carried into China and revealed to officials there.

Electronics Used in Military Radar & Electronic Warfare—In early 2011 Ms. Yufeing Wei was sentenced in the District of Massachusetts to 36 months in prison, while her co-defendant, Zhen Zhou Wu, was sentenced to 97 months in prison. Their company, Chitron Electronics, Inc. was fined $15.5 million. The pair and their company were convicted of conspiring for a period of more than ten years to illegally export sensitive U. S. components to China. They included military components and sensitive electronics used in military phased array radar, electronic warfare and missile systems. Several Chinese military entities were among those receiving the exported equipment, the Justice Dept. says.

Stealth Missile Exhaust Designs and B-2 bomber Data to China –Also in early 2011 a federal judge in the District of Hawaii sentenced Noshir Gowadia, 66, of Maui to 32 years in prison for communicating classified national defense information to China. Gowadia assisted the China in developing a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system capable of rendering a Chinese cruise missile resistant to detection by U. S. infrared missiles, the Defense Dept. report to Congress says. A jury also convicted Gowadia of three counts of illegally communicating classified information to China regarding lock-on range for infrared missiles that could be used to attack U.S. B-2 bombers. Gowadia was also convicted of unlawfully exporting classified information about the B-2, this country’s most highly classified aircraft.

Here are some other reports...

 

[SirHatesALot]

All guns blazing @Indo-guy
Thanks for the effort.

 

[Indo-guy]

@BLACKGOLD thanks for encouragement



Chinese espionage

By Sean Noonan

Paris prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin on Jan. 14 began an inquiry into allegations of commercial espionage carried out against French carmaker Renault. The allegations first became public when Renault suspended three of its employees on Jan. 3 after an internal investigation that began in August 2010. Within days, citing an anonymous French government source, Reuters reported that French intelligence services were looking into the possibility that China played a role in the Renault espionage case. While the French government refused to officially confirm this accusation, speculation has run wild that Chinese state-sponsored spies were stealing electric-vehicle technology from Renault.

The Chinese are well-known perpetrators of industrial espionage and have been caught before in France, but the details that have emerged so far about the Renault operation differ from the usual Chinese method of operation. And much has been learned about this MO just in the last two years across the Atlantic, where the United States has been increasingly aggressive in investigating and prosecuting cases of Chinese espionage. If Chinese intelligence services were indeed responsible for espionage at Renault it would be one of only a few known cases involving non-Chinese nationals and would have involved the largest amount of money since the case of the legendary Larry Wu-Tai Chin, China’s most successful spy.

STRATFOR has previously detailed the Chinese intelligence services and the workings of espionage with Chinese characteristics. A look back at Chinese espionage activities uncovered in the United States in 2010, since our latest report was compiled, can provide more context and detail about current Chinese intelligence operations.

Chinese Espionage in the U.S.

We chose to focus on operations in the United States for two reasons. First, the United States is a major target for Chinese industrial espionage. This is because it is a leader in technology development, particularly in military hardware desired by China’s expanding military, and a potential adversary at the forefront of Chinese defense thinking. Second, while it is not the only country developing major new technologies in which China would be interested, the United States has been the most aggressive in prosecuting espionage cases against Chinese agents, thereby producing available data for us to work with. Since 2008, at least seven cases have been prosecuted each year in the United States against individuals spying for China. Five were prosecuted in 2007. Going back to about 2000, from one to three cases were prosecuted annually, and before that, less than one was prosecuted per year.

Most of the cases involved charges of violating export restrictions or stealing trade secrets rather than the capital crime of stealing state secrets. As the premier agency leading such investigations, the FBI has clearly made a policy decision to refocus on counterintelligence after an overwhelming focus on counterterrorism following 9/11, and its capability to conduct such investigations has grown. In 2010, 11 Chinese espionage cases were prosecuted in the United States, the highest number yet, and they featured a wide range of espionage targets.

Ten of the 11 cases involved technology acquisition, and five were overt attempts to purchase and illegally export encryption devices, mobile-phone components, high-end analog-to-digital converters, microchips designed for aerospace applications and radiation-hardened semiconductors. These technologies can be used in a wide range of Chinese industries. While the mobile-phone technology would be limited to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as China Mobile, the aerospace-related microchips could be used in anything from rockets to fighter jets. Xian Hongwei and someone known as “Li Li” were arrested in September 2010 for allegedly attempting to purchase those aerospace-related microchips from BAE Systems, which is one of the companies involved in the development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Similar espionage may have played a role in China’s development of the new J-20 fifth-generation fighter, but that is only speculation.



Five other cases in 2010 involved stealing trade secrets. These included organic light- emitting diode processes from Dupont, hybrid vehicle technology from GM, insecticide formulas from the Dow Chemical Company, paint formulas from Valspar and various vehicle design specifications from Ford. These types of Chinese cases, while often encouraged by state officials, are more similar to industrial espionage conducted by corporations. Since many of the major car companies in China are state-run, these technologies benefit both industry and the state.

But that does not mean these efforts are directed from Beijing. History shows that such espionage activities are not well coordinated. Various Chinese company executives (who are also Communist Party officials) have different requirements for their industrial espionage. In cases where two SOEs are competing to sell similar products, they may both try to recruit agents to steal the same technology. There are also a growing number of private Chinese companies getting involved in espionage. One notable example was when Du Shanshan and Qin Yu passed on technology from GM to Chery Automobile, a private, rather than state-run, manufacturer. In the five trade-secret cases in 2010, most of the suspects were caught because of poor tradecraft. They stored data on their hard drives, sent e-mails on company computers and had obvious communications with companies in China. This is not the kind of tradecraft we would expect from trained intelligence officers. Most of these cases probably involved ad hoc agents, some of whom were likely recruited while working in the United States and offered jobs back in China when they were found to have access to important technology.

These cases show how Chinese state-run companies can have an interest in espionage in order to improve their own products, both for the success of their companies and in the national interest of China. The U.S. Department of Justice has not provided specific details on how the stolen defense-related technologies were intended to be used in China, so it is hard to tell whether they would have enhanced China’s military capability.

First-generation Chinese carried out 10 of the 11 publicized cases in the United States last year. Some were living or working temporarily in the United States, others had become naturalized American citizens (with the exception of Xian and Li, who were caught in Hungary). The Chinese intelligence services rely on ethnic Chinese agents because the services do not generally trust outsiders. When recruiting, they also use threats against family members or the individuals themselves. Second- and third-generation Chinese who have assimilated in a new culture are rarely willing to spy, and the Chinese government has much less leverage over this segment of the ethnic-Chinese population living overseas.

In the 11 cases in 2010, it is not clear what payments, if any, the agents might have received. In some cases, such as those involving the trade secrets from Valspar and Ford, the information likely helped the agents land better jobs and/or receive promotions back in China. Cash does not typically rule the effectiveness of newly recruited Chinese spies, as it might with Western recruits. Instead, new Chinese agents are usually motivated by intelligence-service coercion or ideological affinity for China.

The outlier in 2010 was Glenn Duffie Shriver, an American student with no Chinese heritage who applied to work at both the U.S. State Department and the CIA. His was the first publicized case of the Chinese trying to develop an agent in place in the United States since Larry Chin. Shriver studied in China in 2002 and 2003. The recruitment process began when he returned to China in 2004 to seek employment and improve his language capabilities. After responding to an ad for someone with an English-language background to write a political paper, Shriver was paid $120 for producing an article on U.S.-Chinese relations regarding Taiwan and North Korea.

The woman who hired him then introduced him to two Chinese intelligence officers named Wu and Tang. They paid Shriver a total of $70,000 in three payments while he tried to land a job with the U.S. government. Shriver failed the exams to become a foreign service officer and began pursuing a career with the CIA. He was accused of lying on his CIA application by not mentioning at least one trip to China and at least 20 meetings with Chinese intelligence officers. It is not clear how he was exposed, but customs records and passport stamps would have easily revealed any trips to China that he did not report in his CIA application. On Oct. 22, 2010, Shriver pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide national defense information to intelligence officers of the People’s Republic of China and was sentenced to 48 months in prison in accordance with his plea agreement.

A few Americans have been accused of being Chinese agents before, such as former Defense Department official James Fondren, who was caught and convicted in 2009. These cases are rare, though they may increase as Beijing tries to reach higher levels of infiltration. It is also possible that the FBI has been reaching only for low-hanging fruit and that Chinese espionage involving Americans at higher levels is going undetected. If this were the case, it would not be consistent with the general Chinese espionage MO.

China takes a mosaic approach to intelligence, which is a wholly different paradigm than that of the West. Instead of recruiting a few high-level sources, the Chinese recruit as many low-level operatives as possible who are charged with vacuuming up all available open-source information and compiling and analyzing the innumerable bits of intelligence to assemble a complete picture. This method fits well with Chinese demographics, which are characterized by countless thousands of capable and industrious people working overseas as well as thousands more analyzing various pieces of the mosaic back home.

Another case in 2010 was an alleged China-based cyber-attack against Google, in which servers were hacked and customer account information was accessed. Last year, more than 30 other major companies reported similar infiltration attempts occurring in 2009, though we do not know how widespread the effort really is. China’s cyber-espionage capabilities are well known and no doubt will continue to provide more valuable information for China’s intelligence services.

The Renault Case

Few details have been released about the Renault case, which will likely remain confidential until French prosecutors finish their investigation. But enough information has trickled in to give us some idea of the kind of operation that would have targeted Renault’s electric-vehicle program. Three Renault managers were accused: Matthieu Tenenbaum, who was deputy director of Renault’s electric-vehicle program; Michel Balthazard, who was a member of the Renault management board; and Bertrand Rochette, a subordinate of Balthazard who was responsible for pilot projects. Various media reports — mostly from Le Figaro — claim that the State Grid Corporation of China opened bank accounts for two of the three managers (it is unknown which two). Money was allegedly wired through Malta, and Renault’s investigators found deposits of 500,000 euros (about $665,000) and 130,000 euros (about $175,000) respectively in Swiss and Liechtenstein bank accounts.

Assuming this is true, it is still unclear what the money was for. Given that the three executives had positions close to the electric-vehicle program, it seems that some related technology was the target. Patrick Pelata, Renault’s chief operating officer, said that “not the smallest nugget of technical or strategic information on the innovation plan has filtered out of the enterprise.” In other words, Renault uncovered the operation before any technology was leaked — or it is intentionally trying to downplay the damage done in order to reassure investors and protect stock prices. But Pelata also called the operation “a system organized to collect economic, technological and strategic information to serve interests abroad.”

Renault is convinced a foreign entity was involved in a sophisticated intelligence operation against the company. The question is, what foreign entity? On Jan. 13, Renault filed an official complaint with French authorities, saying it was the victim of organized industrial espionage, among other things, committed by “persons unknown.” French Industry Minister Eric Besson clarified Jan. 14 that there was no information to suggest Chinese involvement in the case, though he previously said France was facing “economic war,” presuming that the culprits came from outside France. The source for the original rumors of Chinese involvement is unclear, but the French clearly backed away from the accusation, especially after Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei called the accusation “baseless and irresponsible” on Jan. 11 (of course, even if the Chinese were the culprits they would certainly not admit it).

The Chinese have definitely targeted energy-efficient motor vehicle technology in the past, in addition to the Ford and GM cases, and Renault itself is no stranger to industrial espionage activities. In 2007, Li Li Whuang was charged with breach of trust and fraudulent access to a computer system while working as a trainee at Valeo, a French automotive components manufacturer, in 2005. The 24-year-old was studying in Paris when she was offered the trainee position at Valeo. Investigators found files on her computer related to a project with BMW and another with Renault.

The new Renault case, however, is very different from most Chinese espionage cases. First, it involved recruiting three French nationals with no ethnic ties to China, rather than first-generation Chinese. Second, the alleged payments to two of three Renault employees were much larger than Chinese agents usually receive, even those who are not ethnic Chinese. The one notable exception is the case of Larry Chin, who is believed to have received more than $1 million in the 30 years he spied for China as a translator for U.S. intelligence services. Renault executives would also be paid as much or more in salaries than what was found in these bank accounts, though we don’t know if more money was transferred in and out of the accounts. This may not be unprecedented, however; STRATFOR sources have reported being offered many millions of dollars to work for the Chinese government.

Another problem is the alleged use of a Chinese state-owned company to funnel payments to the Renault executives. Using a company traceable not only to China but to the government itself is a huge error in tradecraft. This is not likely a mistake that the Chinese intelligence services would make. In Chin’s case, all payments were made in cash and were exchanged in careful meetings outside the United States, in places where there was no surveillance.

Thus, STRATFOR doubts that the Renault theft was perpetrated by the Chinese. The leak suggesting otherwise was likely an assumption based on China’s frequent involvement in industrial espionage. Still, it could be a sign of new methods in Chinese spycraft.

Higher-level Recruitment?

The Shriver and Renault cases could suggest that some Chinese intelligence operations are so sophisticated that counterintelligence officers are unaware of their activities. They could mean that the Chinese are recruiting higher-level sources and offering them large sums of money. Chin, who got his start working for the U.S. Army during the Korean War, remained undetected until 1985, when a defector exposed him. There may be others who are just as well hidden. However, according to STRATFOR sources, including current and former counterintelligence officers, the vast majority of Chinese espionage operations are perpetrated at low levels by untrained agents.

There is little indication that the Chinese have switched from the high-quantity, low-quality mosaic intelligence method, and cyber-espionage activities such as hacking Google demonstrate that the mosaic method is only growing. The Internet allows China to recruit from its large base of capable computer users to find valuable information in the national interest. It provides even more opportunities to vacuum up information for intelligence analysis. Indeed, cyber-espionage is being used as another form of “insurance,” a way to ensure that the information collected by the intelligence services from other sources is accurate.

If China is responsible for the Renault penetration, the case would represent a change in the Chinese espionage MO, one aiming at a higher level and willing to spend more money, even though most of the cases prosecuted in the United States pointed to a continuation of the mosaic paradigm. Nevertheless, counterintelligence officers are likely watching carefully for higher-level recruits, fearing that others like Chin and Shriver may have remained undetected for years. These cases may be an indication of new resources made available to Western counterintelligence agencies and not new efforts by the Chinese.

There is huge material on Chinese espionage ....

Think need to create separate threads ...but I will try to house all in one thread first

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_intelligence_activity_abroad

 

[Indo-guy]

wiki page on Chinese Espionage

Method of operation[edit source]

It is generally believed that Chinese intelligence agencies operate differently from other espionage organizations by employing primarily academics or students who will be in their host country only a short time, rather than spending years cultivating a few high-level sources or double agents.[1][2][3] Much information about the Chinese intelligence services comes from defectors, whom the PRC accuses of lying to promote an anti-PRC agenda.[4][5][6][7] One known exception to this rule is the case of Katrina Leung, who was accused of starting an affair with an FBI agent to gain sensitive documents from him. A U.S. judge dismissed all charges against her due to prosecutorial misconduct.[8][9]

The United States believes the Chinese military has been developing network technology in recent years in order to perform espionage on other nations. Several cases of computer intrusions suspected of Chinese involvement have been found in various countries including Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, India and the United States.[10][11][12]

In 2009, Canadian researchers say they have found evidence that Chinese hackers had gained access to computers possessed by government and private organizations in 103 countries, although researchers say there is no conclusive evidence China's government was behind it.[13] Beijing also denied involvement. The researchers said the computers penetrated include those of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles.[14]

Ira Winkler, a former National Security Agency staff and a security consultant, said that Chinese intelligence operatives work by approaching ethnic Chinese by reminding them of "Chinese heritage, telling them they must help".[15]

Objectives[edit source]

It is believed that Chinese espionage is aimed at gaining commercial, technological, and military secrets.[16][17][18][19]

Two diplomats who defected in Australia have claimed that China operates more than 1,000 spies and informants in Australia alone; their mission, they said, is industrial espionage but also disruption of the Falun Gong movement. China accused them of lying so they could stay in Australia. Canadian businessman Joe Wang believes that threatening letters he received after broadcasting programs about alleged human rights abuses in China were from the Chinese consulate; one of the envelopes contained boric acid. In November 2005 the United States arrested four people in Los Angeles on suspicion of being involved in a Chinese spy ring.

Taiwanese-American scientist Wen Ho Lee (born in Nantou, Taiwan 21 December 1939) was accused and investigated on the grounds of espionage in 1999 but was acquitted of all charges except for mishandling classified data. Chinese "Subtle Spying" practice avoids and defends against the United States' prosecution-heavy investigative counterintelligence procedures by introducing large elements of plausible deniability and obfuscating the line between deliberate and unintentional espionage activities.

Intelligence activity worldwide[edit source]

In recent years, the Chinese government is thought[by whom?] to have played a key role in conducting espionage activities on several other nations and regions.[citation needed]

Asia[edit source]

India[edit source]

India has quietly informed companies to avoid using Chinese-made telecommunications equipment, fearing that it may have spy capabilities embedded within it. Also, India's intelligence service, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) believes that China is using dozens of study centers that it has set up in Nepal near the Indian border in part for the purposes of spying on India.[20][21] In August 2011 a Chinese research vessel disguised as a fishing trawler was detected off the coast of Little Andaman, collecting data in a geostrategically sensitive region.[22][23]

The "Luckycat" hacking campaign that targeted Japan and Tibet also targeted India.[24][25] A Trojan horse was inserted into a Microsoft Word file ostensibly about India's ballistic missile defense program, allowing for the command and control servers to connect and extract information. The attacks were subsequently traced back to a Chinese graduate student from Sichuan and the Chinese government is suspected of planning the attacks.[26]

Japan[edit source]

According to a report by Trend Micro the "Luckycat" hacker group is engaged in cyber-espionage on targets in Japan, India and Tibet. During the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, the hackers inserted a Trojan virus into PDF attachments to emails being circulated containing information about radiation dosage measurements.[24][27] Investigation into ownership of the command and control servers by Trend Micro and The New York Times linked the malware to Gu Kaiyuan, through QQ numbers and the alias "scuhkr".[26][28] Mr. Gu is a former graduate student of the Information Security Institute of Sichuan University in Chengdu and wrote his master's thesis on computer hacking.[29] James A. Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes the attacks were state-sponsored.[26]

Sri Lanka[edit source]

In Sri Lanka, Jayalalithaa Jayaram – head of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – stated that Chinese laborers working in parts of the country devastated by the Sri Lankan Civil War were infiltrated with Chinese spies on surveillance missions targeted at Tamil Nadu, India.[30]

Republic of China[edit source]

The PRC and ROC regularly accuse each other of spying.[31] Presidential aide Wang Jen-ping was found in 2009 to have sold nearly 100 confidential documents to China since 2007; Military intelligence officer Lo Chi-cheng was found to have been acting as a double agent in 2010 for China since 2007; Maj. Gen. Lo Hsien-che, electronic communications and information bureau chief during the administration of former President Chen Shui-bian, has been suspected of selling military secrets to Mainland China since 2004.[32]

In 2007 the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau stated that 500 gigabyte Maxtor Basics Personal Storage 3200 hard drives produced by Seagate Technology and manufactured in Thailand may have been modified by a Chinese subcontractor and shipped with the Virus.Win32.AutoRun.ah virus.[33][34] As many as 1,800 drives sold in the Netherlands and Taiwan after August 2007 were reportedly infected with the virus, which scanned for passwords for products such as World of Warcraft and QQ and uploading them to a website in Beijing.[35]

Europe[edit source]

Belgium[edit source]

Belgian Justice Minister Jo Vandeurzen accused the Chinese government of electronic espionage against the government of Belgium, while Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht informed the Belgian Federal Parliament that his ministry was hacked by Chinese agents. The espionage is possibly linked to Belgium hosting the headquarters of NATO and the European Union.[36]

The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Leuven was also believed to be the center for a group of Chinese students in Europe conducting industrial espionage, operating under a front organization called The Chinese Students' and Scholars' Association of Leuven.[37][38] In 2005 a leading figure of the Association defected to Belgium, providing information to the Sûreté de l’Etat on hundreds of spies engaged in economic espionage across Europe.[39][40] The group had no obvious links to Chinese diplomats and was focused on getting moles into laboratories and universities in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, France and Belgium.[41] The People's Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, dismissed the reports as fabrications triggered by fears of China's economic development.[42]

France[edit source]

There have been several incidents of suspected Chinese spies in France. This includes Shi Pei Pu, a Chinese opera singer from Beijing who convinced a French diplomat that he was a woman, and spied on France.[43]

French media also portrayed Li Li Whuang (李&#26446, a 22-year-old Chinese intern at car parts maker Valeo, as an industrial spy.[44] Both the French prosecution and Valeo refuted media claims of spying and the case was later considered to be a psychosis.[45][46] Li Li was ultimately convicted of violating the confidentiality clause of her contract and served two months in prison, but was allowed to continue her doctoral studies at the University of Technology of Compiègne.[47]

Germany[edit source]

Germany suspects China of spying both on German corporations and on Uyghur expatriates living in the country.[48][49]

The Federal Ministry of the Interior estimates that Chinese economic espionage could be costing Germany between 20 and 50 billions euros annually.[50] Spies are reportedly targeting mid- and small-scale companies that do not have as strong security regimens as larger corporations.[51] Berthold Stoppelkamp, head of the Working Group for Economic Security (ASW), stated that German companies had a poor security culture making espionage easier, exacerbated by the absence of a "strong, centralized" police command.[52] Walter Opfermann, a counter-intelligence expert for the state of Baden-Württemberg, claimed that China is using extremely sophisticated electronic attacks capable of endangering portions of critical German infrastructure, having gathered sensitive information through techniques such as phone hacking and Trojan emails.[53]

Between August and September 2007 Chinese hackers have been suspected of using Trojan horse spyware on various government computers, including those of the Chancellory, the Ministry of Economics and Technology, and the Ministry of Education and Research.[54][55] Germans officials believe Trojan viruses were inserted in Microsoft Word and PowerPoint files, and approximately 160 gigabytes of data were siphoned to Canton, Lanzhou and Beijing via South Korea, on instructions from the People's Liberation Army.[56]

In 2011, a 64-year old German man was charged with spying on Uighurs in Munich between April 2008 and October 2009.[57][58] Munich is a center for expatriate Uyghurs, and in November 2009 members of the Federal Criminal Police Office arrested four Chinese nationals on charges of spying on Uyghurs. In 2007 Chinese diplomat Ji Wumin left Germany after being observed meeting with individuals engaged in surveillance of Munich Uyghurs, and German investigators suspect China is coordinating espionage activities out of its Munich consulate in the Neuhausen district.[59]

Poland[edit source]

In May 2009, Stefan Zielonka, a Polish cipher officer working for the Military Information Services, disappeared. He is suspected of providing the Chinese or Russian governments with Polish and NATO cryptography information.[60][61] Zielonka's body was later retrieved from the Vistula river, although investigators remain uncertain as to whether Zielonka was attempting to defect or commit suicide, or whether the body retrieved actually was Zielonka's.[62]

Russia[edit source]

In December 2007, Igor Reshetin, the Chief Executive of Tsniimash-Export, and three researchers were sentenced to prison for passing on dual-purpose technology to the Chinese. Analysts speculated that the leaked technology could help China develop improved missiles and accelerate the Chinese space program.[63][64] In September 2010, the Russian Federal Security Service detained two scientists working at the Baltic State Technical University in Saint Petersburg. The two are charged with passing on classified information to China, possibly through the Harbin Engineering University.[65][66]

Sweden[edit source]

Babur Maihesuti, a Chinese Uighur who became a Swedish citizen was arrested for spying on the Uighur refugee communities in Sweden, Norway, Germany and the United States, and ultimately sentenced for illegal espionage activity.[67][68][69]

United Kingdom[edit source]

UK officials, including experts at its MI5 intelligence agency, are fearful that China could shut down businesses in the nation with Chinese cyber attacks and spy equipment embedded in computer and telecommunications equipment. [70][71]

North America[edit source]

Canada[edit source]

Former Chineses spies have reported that China has more than 1000 spies in Canada, more than in any other country outside China. The Canadian government fears that the Chinese have stolen considerable business and industrial secrets from the country.[72][73] The head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Richard Fadden in a television interview was assumed to have implied that various Canadian politicians at provincial and municipal levels had ties to Chinese intelligence. In an interview, he claimed that some politicians were under the influence of a foreign government, but he withdrew the statement a few days later. It was assumed by Chinese groups in Canada, and others, that he was referring to China because in the same interview he stressed the high level of Chinese spying in Canada, however Fadden did not say specifically which country these politicians were under the influence of. His statement was withdrawn a few days later.[74]

In 2012 Mark Bourrie, an Ottawa-based freelance journalist, stated that the State Council-run Xinhua News Agency asked him to collect information on the Dalai Lama through their Ottawa bureau chief, Dacheng Zhang, by exploiting his journalistic access to the Parliament of Canada.[75] Bourrie stated that he was asked to write for Xinhua in 2009 and sought advice from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), but was ignored. Bourrie was asked to collected information on the Sixth World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet at the Ottawa Convention Centre, although Xinhua had no intention of writing a story on the proceedings. Bourrie stated that at that point "We were there under false pretenses, pretending to be journalists but acting as government agents."[76] Xinhua collects extensive information on Tibetan and Falun Gong dissidents in Canada, and is accused of being engaged in espionage by Chinese defector Chen Yonglin and Reporters Without Borders.[77]

United States[edit source]

Main article: Chinese intelligence operations in the United States

China is suspected of having a long history of espionage in the United States against military and industrial secrets, often resorting to direct espionage, exploitation of commercial entities, and a network of scientific, academic, and business contacts. Several U.S. citizens have been convicted for spying for China. Naturalized citizen Dongfan Chung, an engineer working with Boeing, was the first person convicted under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Chung is suspected of having passed on classified information on designs including the Delta IV rocket, F-15 Eagle, B-52 Stratofortress and the CH-46 and CH-47 helicopters.[78]

China’s espionage and cyber attacks against the US government and business organizations are a major concern, according to the seventh annual report (issued Sept 2009) to the US Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.[79] “Although attribution is a problem in cyber attacks, the scale and coordination of the attacks strongly indicates Chinese state involvement,” said commission vice chairman Larry Wortzel. “In addition to harming U.S. interests, Chinese human and cyber espionage activities provide China with a method for leaping forward in economic, technological, and military development.” The report cited that the number of cyber attacks from China against the US Department of Defense computer systems had grown from 43,880 in 2007 to 54,640 in 2008, a nearly 20 percent increase.[80][81] Reuters reported that the Commission found that the Chinese government has placed many of its computer network responsibilities under the direction of the People's Liberation Army, and was using the data mostly for military purposes.[82] In response, China slammed the report as “full of prejudice,” and warning it could damage China-US relations. "We advise this so-called commission not to always view China through tinted glasses," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said.[83]

In 2008 the Chinese government was accused of secretly copying information from the laptop of Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez during a trade mission to Beijing in order to gain information on American corporations.[84][85] The allegations were subsequently dismissed by Qin Gang, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.[86]

Oceania[edit source]

Australia[edit source]

Australia believes that Chinese have been spying on Australian businesses and the Falun Gong movement. A former Chinese diplomat has claimed that he spied for China and that China has 1000 spies in Australia.[87][88] A male Chinese student from Fujian was granted a protection visa by the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia after revealing that he had been instructed to spy on Australian targets in exchange for an overseas scholarship, reporting to the Ministry of State Security.[89] Reported targets included Chinese students with anti-Communist sentiments and Falun Gong practitioners.[90][91]

Nicola Roxon, the Attorney-General of Australia, blocked the Shenzhen-based corporation Huawei from seeking a supply contract for the National Broadband Network, on the advise of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.[92] The Australian government feared Huawei would provide backdoor access for Chinese cyber espionage.[93]

The Chinese government is suspected of orchestrating an attack on the email network used by the Parliament of Australia, allowing unauthorized access to thousands of emails and compromising the computers of several senior Australian politicians including Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, and Minister of Defense Stephen Smith.[94][95]

South America[edit source]

Experts believe that China has recently increased its spy capabilities in Latin America, perhaps with help from the Cuban government.[96]

Peru[edit source]

The computer security firm ESET reported that tens of thousands of blueprints were stolen from Peruvian corporations through malware, which were traced to Chinese e-mail accounts. This was done through an AutoCAD worm called ACAD/Medre.A, written in AutoLISP, which located AutoCAD files, at which point they were sent to QQ and 163.com email accounts in China.[97] ESET researcher Righard Zwienenberg claimed this was Chinese industrial espionage.[98] The virus was mostly localized to Peru but spread to a few neighboring countries before being contained.[99]

=================================================================================

 

[Indo-guy]

Chinese Spy slept in US for 2 decades

Chinese Spy 'Slept' In U.S. for 2 Decades - washingtonpost.com

================================================================================

Espionage Virus sents Blueprints to China

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9346734/Espionage-virus-sent-blueprints-to-China.html

================================================================================

China — spies, sexpionage, and cyber wars against America


http://www.haciendapub.com/articles/china-—-spies-sexpionage-and-cyber-wars-against-america

 

[Indo-guy]

================================================================================

From China with Love

From China With Love | FRONTLINE | PBS

 

[Indo-guy]

Chinese spies stole US trade secretary data

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...ole-data-from-US-trade-secretarys-laptop.html

 

[Kiss_of_the_Dragon]

I didn't know China has such capability, I think china must have devoted a large amount of resource for this spying business, very informative.

thank you @Indo-guy

 

[Indo-guy]

================================================================================

I didn't know China has such capability, I think china must have devoted a large amount of resource for this spying business, very informative.

thank you @Indo-guy

Thanks to you too...



China suspected as spies hack Gillard

http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/china-suspected-as-spies-hack-gillard/story-e6frf7jo-1226029705738

 

[Indo-guy]

Chinese Espionage Targets Small German Companies




Chinese Espionage Targets Small German Companies, Die Welt Says - Bloomberg

=============================================================

Fearful Chinese Spy Applies for Protection


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uDXTgTqT1Ao



A Chinese student, who's name remains undisclosed, faces the wrath of the Chinese regime's National Security Bureau (NSB) for failing to report on the activities of other Chinese students at his university.Before leaving China he entered into an agreement with the NSB that he would receive an all expenses paid trip to study abroad. The agreement required him to spy on fellow students with anti-communist sentiments and included students practicing Falun Gong -- a traditional meditation practice persecuted in China. After befriending a local Falun Gong practitioner he decided not to report her and instead told her about the Chinese spies with a warning to "take care of her safety." However when the NSB found out the reaction was swift. The student's father was detained and interrogated back in China. The authorities demanded repayment of his son's student fees within three months, a figure just under 80,000 US dollars. The student's father had no way to make this huge repayment so the family fled for their safety.Distraught by this outcome the young student now living in Australia applied to Australian Immigration for a protection visa, believing he would be persecuted if he returned to China. Australian immigration denied his request so he applied to the Australian government's Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal recognized the student's status came under the criteria for the international Refugee Convention. He was finally granted a protection visa at the Tribunal's hearing.

 

[Indo-guy]

Germany Suspects China of Spying on Uighur Expatriates

http://www.spiegel.de/international...of-spying-on-uighur-expatriates-a-663090.html

 

[Indo-guy]

Germany accuses China of industrial espionage

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/22/germany-china-industrial-espionage

 

[Indo-guy]

Scientific Espionage by Chinese Scientists

http://www.labtimes.org/labtimes/issues/lt2008/lt03/lt_2008_03_18_21.pdf

 

[Kiss_of_the_Dragon]

Sun Tzi Art of war chapter 14: spying enemy to extract valuable informations

 

[Indo-guy]

Thanks ....I need to read it then ....





Reports identify Chinese grad student in hacks against Tibetans, others

Reports identify Chinese grad student in hacks against Tibetans, others | Ars Technica