Risk of New War Between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Planned Highway

[Hakan]

Planned highway, increasing ceasefire violations heighten war risks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh
​

• The planned construction of the highway is likely to trigger military miscalculation by Azerbaijan against the backdrop of increasing gunfire exchanges and sniper attacks along the Line of Contact.
• Azerbaijan's acquisition of advanced weapons is likely to embolden its military and heighten the threat perception in the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region and Armenia.
• The changing military balance raises the risk of miscalculation that is likely to lead to an escalation of violence, potentially leading to an outbreak of hostilities.

EVENT
The Armenian government on 5 March allocated USD3.9 million for the rebuilding of the Vardenis-Sotk-Kalbajar section of the planned Vardenis-Martakert highway, which will connect Armenia with Azerbaijan's Armenian-populated breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh - the unrecognised by the international community Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR).

At present, the main transportation artery linking Armenia with the NKR is the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road, which is in need of repairs. The Armenian government and secessionist authorities in the NKR consider the construction of a new highway of strategic importance as it will shorten the travel time and connect Armenia with the northern part of the breakaway enclave. The planned 113-kilometre highway is of particular significance from the military viewpoint as it will allow for the transfer of armed forces in case of resumption of hostilities with Azerbaijan. The "Hayastan" All-Armenian Fund collected approximately USD23 million for this project from donations by the Armenian diaspora organisations worldwide and signed contracts with six construction companies from Armenia and the NKR. The construction commenced in January 2014 and is scheduled for completion by the end of 2015.

It is likely that the construction of the strategically important road connecting Armenia with the NKR's third-largest city of Martakert (known as Aghdara in Azerbaijan) will become a major irritant for Azerbaijan, as its effect would be to consolidate Armenian control of the disputed area. Similarly to the airport near the NKR's capital Stepanakert (also known as Khankendi), which Armenia has held back from reopening due to shootdown threats from Azerbaijan, the construction of the second highway to the breakaway region is likely to result in delays, due to risk of attacks, mostly with small-arms, but also the possibility of mortars and artillery use, by the Azeri military.

In this regard, the Paravkar-Vazashen road in Armenia's northeastern Tavush province, due to its proximity to the border with Azerbaijan, sets a precedent, as it has become very dangerous for travelling because of regular gunfire and sniper attacks from the Azeri side. One of the latest incidents occurred on 18 February, when the road came under fire from heavy machine guns, halting traffic but causing no casualties. The constant threat of attacks forced the Armenian government to allocate more than USD1.1 million for the construction of a 3.2-km bypass road, which will be 14 km away from the border, with certain sections shielded by a 2-5-metre-high special protective fence. It is due to be completed by June 2014, according to the Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communication.

Increasing ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact
The growing number of ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact (LC) separating the NKR from Azerbaijan prompted the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue an urgent appeal on 30 January, calling on both sides to take additional steps to stabilise the situation in the conflict zone. This was echoed in the public statement made by the newly appointed US co-chair of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, James Warlick, on 28 February, when he urged both sides to comply with the tradition of adhering to a ceasefire during any Olympic games (in this case the Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia between 7 and 23 February 2014, and then the Paralympic Games between 7 and 16 March). However, instead of de-escalation, on 24 January, the Azeri Ministry of Defence confirmed that Azerbaijan had begun regular air patrols of the LC. In response, the NKR's Ministry of Defence stated that the separatist air defence had been put on full combat alert and was tracking Azeri fighter jets closely. Conflicting accounts of ceasefire violations provided by the Armenian and Azeri sides to the OSCE monitors reveal that the situation along the LC has become extremely volatile, with near daily gunfire exchanges and sniper attacks. Brief armed incursions by both sides, albeit not as frequent and often unreported, have also become more regular and are likely intended to gauge the other side's combat readiness and rapid response capability.

Alarming pattern of Azerbaijan's military procurements
Apart from the steadily growing defence budget, which in 2014 is supposed to reach USD3.75 billion (compared with just USD175 million in 2004), Azerbaijan's acquisition of advanced weaponry is cause for alarm - mostly in Armenia, but also neighbouring Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. In 2013, in fulfilment of contracts signed in 2011-12, Russia provided Azerbaijan with military equipment, including artillery units, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and multiple rocket launchers worth total between USD700 million and USD1 billion. In addition, Azerbaijan approached South Korea with an offer to buy USD3 billion-worth of weapons, which are mostly aimed at enhancing naval capabilities, but also include self-propelled howitzers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and helicopters. In November 2013, Russia supplied Mi-35 attack helicopters, as confirmed by a representative of Russia's state-owned arms export company Rosoboronexport. On 6 March 2014, the Turkish newspaper Sabah reported that Azerbaijan had expressed interest in acquiring attack helicopters equipped with MIZRAK-U long-range anti-tank missiles from the leading Turkish defence company, Roketsan. This year, Turkey will also be supplying 36 self-propelled howitzers T-155 Firtina to Azerbaijan in accordance with a contract signed in 2011.

The primary factor mitigating war risks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the NKR has been Russia's military presence in, and commitment to, the latter, in the form of an August 2010 security treaty. This was underscored in the interview given by the commander of the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, Colonel Andrey Ruzinsky, on 10 October 2013. Ruzinsky stated that if Azerbaijan decided to restore its control over the NKR by force, forces from his base might enter the conflict in accordance with Russia's commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. This base hosts various assets, including MiG-29 fighter jets and attack helicopters.

Azerbaijan is also constrained by Armenia's ballistic missile capabilities, which, if hostilities were to break out, would probably target its energy infrastructure. This much was admitted by the head of the department of security of energy infrastructure of Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security, Javad Tynayev, at the security conference in Baku on 21 November 2013. In particular, Tynayev noted that proximity to the LC poses a threat to oil and gas pipelines. However, Armenia's ballistic missiles are likely to lack the accuracy to guarantee the successful targeting of the main oil (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and gas (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) export pipelines, although the Sangachal terminal on the coast of the Caspian Sea would be at greater risk.

The Azeri armed forces are likely to disrupt the construction of the Vardenis-Martakert highway. The NKR's Martakert district is not entirely controlled by the secessionist forces, and its parts have been reclaimed by the Azeri troops, which only increases the probability of attacks. Any such attempt to derail this project by force runs the risk of potentially resulting in a miscalculation leading to a full-scale combat.

FORECAST
On the one hand, despite having problems with discipline and morale, the Azeri military leadership might be emboldened to act because of its superior weaponry. On the other hand, the Armenian military leadership, fearing that NKR militia is likely to be easily over-run, is likely to opt for limited missile strikes to serve as a deterrent and to forestall further escalation. In other words, Armenia is likely to be forced by its inferiority in conventional forces either to give in or to resort to the use of its missiles to strike Azerbaijan. The continued acquisition of advanced weapons by Azerbaijan has given it military superiority over Armenia, which Russia is unable to restore by its deployments or arms transfers to Armenia. Azerbaijan probably hopes that its growing arsenal will force Armenia to make concessions regarding the NKR dispute, but the changing security dynamic on the ground is likely to force both sides to act before any semblance of accommodation materialises.

Planned highway, increasing ceasefire violations heighten war risks between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh - IHS Jane's 360

@Azeri440 @ASQ-1918 @atatwolf