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Procrastination until 2014
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Rahimullah Yusufzai
The message that comes out loud and clear from the latest strategic review of the Obama administrations policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is the continuing pursuit of a military victory against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This has certainly been the objective since 2001 and the US has now shifted the goalpost to give itself and its NATO allies four more years to accomplish the mission of disrupting and dismantling Al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban momentum and handing over security to the Afghan armed forces.
Whatever has been achieved on the Afghanistan battlefield during the last nine years of war doesnt inspire confidence that another four years would be enough, for the job to be by 2014. It has already been called Obamas War because President Barack Obama tripled the number of American troops fighting in Afghanistan, extended the battle to Pakistan by including it in the <AfPak> war theatre and ordered a dramatic increase in drone strikes and clandestine security missions in Pakistans tribal areas. This war will also define his presidency and largely determine his chances of victory in the next presidential election. Judging by his administrations and his troops performance to-date, his prospects of success arent bright.
The ongoing Afghan war has become the longest in US history. It could well become an endless war if the US insists on achieving an objective that has remained elusive thus far. Ironically, it was none other but President Obama who declared in December 2009, when he unveiled his administrations revamped Afghan strategy, that the US commitment to Afghanistan isnt open-ended. In a way it has become open-ended unless midway corrections are made and less ambitious targets are set.
At the outset, it must be noted that President Obamas upbeat review of his Afghan strategy is primarily based on inputs by the US and NATO military commander in Afghanistan, Gen David Petraeus. No military leader would admit failure and someone as celebrated as Petraeus cannot be expected to concede defeat. Credited with turning around the failing war effort in Iraq, he now carries on his shoulders the burden of his nations hopes and was picked precisely for the Afghan mission, even if it meant demoting him from his position as commander of the US Central Command to lead his troops only in Afghanistan.
It was obvious that Obamas review wont herald any changes in the Afghan strategy because Petraeus was already claiming progress in the fight against the Taliban. This was reflected in the findings of the review because Obama mostly repeated whatever Petraeus had reported from the field. Perhaps the only words of caution added to the heartening field reports in the strategic review were to qualify the progress in the battlefield as fragile and to stress the need for making the notable operational gains more durable.
Interestingly, a more independent assessment of the Afghan war carried out by all 16 intelligence agencies in the US, including the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency, was leaked to the press a day before the Obama White House released its strategic review. In fact, there were two intelligence reports, one on Afghanistan and the other on Pakistan, and were collectively referred to as the National Intelligence Estimate. The reports, reflecting a consensus view of every intelligence agency operating in the US and abroad, painted a more pessimistic view of the war than the one portrayed in the Obama review and was repeatedly being touted by both civil and military officials.
It was, therefore, hardly surprising that defence officials argued that the intelligence agencies analysis was outdated as it failed to take into account the events on the battlefield since September 2010 when the NATO forces along with the Afghan National Army wrested territory from Taliban fighters in the southern Kandahar and Helmand provinces and began setting up outposts to prevent their return. The Pentagon and military authorities in Afghanistan complained that the assessment by the intelligence agencies lacked insights from troops on the frontlines.
The disagreement was understandable as the intelligence agencies were independently judging the militarys performance and had apparently not taken into account the latest battleground situation, particularly in the key former Taliban strongholds of Kandahar and Helmand. However, the issue of making the operational gains durable is important because while the US-led forces in the past managed to push back the Taliban they were unable to hold territory. They will need more troops and resources to hold the captured territory and to use the opportunity to win public support and isolate the Taliban.
More importantly, the operational gains, as reported by sections of the media, came at a cost to locals, as the NATO forces demolished villages and flattened houses, orchards and crops in the Arghandab, Panjwai and Zhari districts surrounding the city of Kandahar to deny sanctuaries to the Taliban fighters. Unoccupied houses and farm buildings in villages whose inhabitants had fled the fighting were blown up with explosives, demolished by armoured bulldozers and destroyed by air strikes.
Those suffering losses wont welcome the foreign soldiers and instead side with the Taliban for vengeance. Such a tough policy is evidence of the fact that the NATO commanders have given up any hopes of winning the hearts and minds of the rural folks who normally have to contend with the Taliban fighters seeking food and shelter in their villages.
One common point in the Obama review and the National Intelligence Estimate is the issue of militants sanctuaries in Pakistan. Both focused on the threat posed by the militants operating out of Pakistan and expressed dissatisfaction with Islamabads efforts to dismantle these safe havens. Both assessments agree that the US-led war efforts would be doomed unless Pakistan cracks down on the sanctuaries. There is no doubt that militants hideouts exist in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and Pakistans security forces, for almost seven years now, have been trying to defeat the militants and destroy their sanctuaries.
But the sanctuaries in Pakistan are part of the problem that originated in Afghanistan and one which will remain unresolved until the US and its allies score a military victory or agree to a negotiated settlement involving the Taliban and Gulbadin Hekmatyars Hezb-e-Islami. Dismantling the sanctuaries in Pakistan, particularly those of the Afghan Taliban, would facilitate the task of the coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan, but there will still be no durable peace unless there is national reconciliation among the warring Afghan factions fighting each other since the emergence of Taliban in 1994.
Facing tough challenges in Afghanistan, the US will henceforth be exerting greater pressure on Pakistan to do the needful for the weakening of the Afghan Taliban and going after the remnants of Al-Qaeda. The do more demands will grow and Pakistan blamed more often for NATOs failure in Afghanistan.
Another scapegoat is the government of Hamid Karzai, who was once hailed as a popularly elected leader and is now derided as an erratic and incompetent president heading an inefficient and corrupt government. Though President Obama, surprisingly, didnt say anything on how he wanted to tackle the issue of pushing Pakistan to dismantle militants sanctuaries and forcing the Karzai government to mend its ways, one could expect arm-twisting and other tough tactics to be employed by the US to achieve at least a semblance of victory in Afghanistan.
However, the US needs to dispassionately review the war strategy in the <AfPak> region, instead of claiming progress on the basis of temporary gains in the battlefield. There is no harm in admitting that Afghans increasingly see the foreigners as an occupation force and that 2010, with 700 deaths already, was the bloodiest year for their soldiers since 2001. It would also help their cause if the US and its allies lowered their expectations as to how a military victory should look like, and instead explored the possibility of a negotiated settlement that serves the purpose of face-saving for all parties to the Afghan conflict.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahimy usufzai@yahoo.com
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Rahimullah Yusufzai
The message that comes out loud and clear from the latest strategic review of the Obama administrations policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is the continuing pursuit of a military victory against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This has certainly been the objective since 2001 and the US has now shifted the goalpost to give itself and its NATO allies four more years to accomplish the mission of disrupting and dismantling Al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban momentum and handing over security to the Afghan armed forces.
Whatever has been achieved on the Afghanistan battlefield during the last nine years of war doesnt inspire confidence that another four years would be enough, for the job to be by 2014. It has already been called Obamas War because President Barack Obama tripled the number of American troops fighting in Afghanistan, extended the battle to Pakistan by including it in the <AfPak> war theatre and ordered a dramatic increase in drone strikes and clandestine security missions in Pakistans tribal areas. This war will also define his presidency and largely determine his chances of victory in the next presidential election. Judging by his administrations and his troops performance to-date, his prospects of success arent bright.
The ongoing Afghan war has become the longest in US history. It could well become an endless war if the US insists on achieving an objective that has remained elusive thus far. Ironically, it was none other but President Obama who declared in December 2009, when he unveiled his administrations revamped Afghan strategy, that the US commitment to Afghanistan isnt open-ended. In a way it has become open-ended unless midway corrections are made and less ambitious targets are set.
At the outset, it must be noted that President Obamas upbeat review of his Afghan strategy is primarily based on inputs by the US and NATO military commander in Afghanistan, Gen David Petraeus. No military leader would admit failure and someone as celebrated as Petraeus cannot be expected to concede defeat. Credited with turning around the failing war effort in Iraq, he now carries on his shoulders the burden of his nations hopes and was picked precisely for the Afghan mission, even if it meant demoting him from his position as commander of the US Central Command to lead his troops only in Afghanistan.
It was obvious that Obamas review wont herald any changes in the Afghan strategy because Petraeus was already claiming progress in the fight against the Taliban. This was reflected in the findings of the review because Obama mostly repeated whatever Petraeus had reported from the field. Perhaps the only words of caution added to the heartening field reports in the strategic review were to qualify the progress in the battlefield as fragile and to stress the need for making the notable operational gains more durable.
Interestingly, a more independent assessment of the Afghan war carried out by all 16 intelligence agencies in the US, including the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency, was leaked to the press a day before the Obama White House released its strategic review. In fact, there were two intelligence reports, one on Afghanistan and the other on Pakistan, and were collectively referred to as the National Intelligence Estimate. The reports, reflecting a consensus view of every intelligence agency operating in the US and abroad, painted a more pessimistic view of the war than the one portrayed in the Obama review and was repeatedly being touted by both civil and military officials.
It was, therefore, hardly surprising that defence officials argued that the intelligence agencies analysis was outdated as it failed to take into account the events on the battlefield since September 2010 when the NATO forces along with the Afghan National Army wrested territory from Taliban fighters in the southern Kandahar and Helmand provinces and began setting up outposts to prevent their return. The Pentagon and military authorities in Afghanistan complained that the assessment by the intelligence agencies lacked insights from troops on the frontlines.
The disagreement was understandable as the intelligence agencies were independently judging the militarys performance and had apparently not taken into account the latest battleground situation, particularly in the key former Taliban strongholds of Kandahar and Helmand. However, the issue of making the operational gains durable is important because while the US-led forces in the past managed to push back the Taliban they were unable to hold territory. They will need more troops and resources to hold the captured territory and to use the opportunity to win public support and isolate the Taliban.
More importantly, the operational gains, as reported by sections of the media, came at a cost to locals, as the NATO forces demolished villages and flattened houses, orchards and crops in the Arghandab, Panjwai and Zhari districts surrounding the city of Kandahar to deny sanctuaries to the Taliban fighters. Unoccupied houses and farm buildings in villages whose inhabitants had fled the fighting were blown up with explosives, demolished by armoured bulldozers and destroyed by air strikes.
Those suffering losses wont welcome the foreign soldiers and instead side with the Taliban for vengeance. Such a tough policy is evidence of the fact that the NATO commanders have given up any hopes of winning the hearts and minds of the rural folks who normally have to contend with the Taliban fighters seeking food and shelter in their villages.
One common point in the Obama review and the National Intelligence Estimate is the issue of militants sanctuaries in Pakistan. Both focused on the threat posed by the militants operating out of Pakistan and expressed dissatisfaction with Islamabads efforts to dismantle these safe havens. Both assessments agree that the US-led war efforts would be doomed unless Pakistan cracks down on the sanctuaries. There is no doubt that militants hideouts exist in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and Pakistans security forces, for almost seven years now, have been trying to defeat the militants and destroy their sanctuaries.
But the sanctuaries in Pakistan are part of the problem that originated in Afghanistan and one which will remain unresolved until the US and its allies score a military victory or agree to a negotiated settlement involving the Taliban and Gulbadin Hekmatyars Hezb-e-Islami. Dismantling the sanctuaries in Pakistan, particularly those of the Afghan Taliban, would facilitate the task of the coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan, but there will still be no durable peace unless there is national reconciliation among the warring Afghan factions fighting each other since the emergence of Taliban in 1994.
Facing tough challenges in Afghanistan, the US will henceforth be exerting greater pressure on Pakistan to do the needful for the weakening of the Afghan Taliban and going after the remnants of Al-Qaeda. The do more demands will grow and Pakistan blamed more often for NATOs failure in Afghanistan.
Another scapegoat is the government of Hamid Karzai, who was once hailed as a popularly elected leader and is now derided as an erratic and incompetent president heading an inefficient and corrupt government. Though President Obama, surprisingly, didnt say anything on how he wanted to tackle the issue of pushing Pakistan to dismantle militants sanctuaries and forcing the Karzai government to mend its ways, one could expect arm-twisting and other tough tactics to be employed by the US to achieve at least a semblance of victory in Afghanistan.
However, the US needs to dispassionately review the war strategy in the <AfPak> region, instead of claiming progress on the basis of temporary gains in the battlefield. There is no harm in admitting that Afghans increasingly see the foreigners as an occupation force and that 2010, with 700 deaths already, was the bloodiest year for their soldiers since 2001. It would also help their cause if the US and its allies lowered their expectations as to how a military victory should look like, and instead explored the possibility of a negotiated settlement that serves the purpose of face-saving for all parties to the Afghan conflict.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahimy usufzai@yahoo.com
