Pakistan's 'secret' war in Baluchistan

[DESERT FIGHTER]

^^^ we feel for all the people everywhere.

Dont feel for us..... We hate u very much (disgusted from ur pathetic mentality and actions).

 

[Huda]

^^^ we feel for all the people everywhere.

and sir we all know that India is responsible for Balochistan unrest

 

[Huda]

While Pakistan’s security forces have been fully concentrating on the military operation in the Orakai Agency and pocket-resistance in South Waziristan after breaking the backbone of the Taliban militants, Indian involvement in Balochistan continues unabated. Subversive events like targeted killings, kidnappings, attacks on government buildings, oil pipelines etc. have increased in the province. Last year, a number of people were killed in Balochistan because of bomb blasts. In the recent months, some high officials have become target of kidnapping and killing. Militants of Baloch Republican Army (BRA) kidnapped and killed 12 police officials including a deputy superintendent of police and an inspector. People of Balochistan have already been facing the violence since April,8, 2009 when dead bodies of three Baloch nationalist leaders Ghulam Mohammad Baloch, Lala Muneer Baloch and Sher Mohammad Baloch were found in Turbat. On August 6, Excise and Taxation Minister Sardar Rustam Jamali was fatally shot during an attempted incident of car snatching in Karachi. In this connection, on August 14, 2009, Financial Times (online) reported “Settlers from other parts of Pakistan, especially Punjab, have been given deadlines to leave.” In fact, this is what the Indian plotters wanted by inciting the general masses of the province to openly speak against the federation of Pakistan and the Punjabis for all the injustices, created by the Baloch feudal lords (Sardars) who have been fighting for their own so-called status, prestige and influence – most of them have been working on the agenda of foreign countries.

Indian intervention on Balochistan in not confined to verbal statements, it has in fact been proved. In this context, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi organized a seminar titled: South Asia 2020 in connection with Balochistan. In their speeches, various scholars and think tanks maligned Pakistan in one or the other way. Besides the seminar, on November 5, 2009 a secret conference titled: “Pakistan is Problem in Balochistan” was organized by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi. It was headed by the former secretary of RAW and Indian former chief of army staff. In that conference, three Baloch leaders, namely, Dr. Wahid Baloch, Khan of Kalat and Munir Mengal participated. The speech of Dr. Wahid Baloch, General Secretary of the American Friends of Balochistan (AFOB) is of special attention. While vocally raising false allegations in line with the Indian conspiracy against the federation of Pakistan, Dr. Wahid Baloch explained, “Balochistan still remains under the occupation of Pakistan and the international community should interfere in preventing atrocities on the Baloch people, being committed by Pak Army and ISI. Dr. Wahid also indicated his misperceptions that several Baloch leaders, engineers and doctors were kidnapped, tortured and killed ruthlessly through Pakistan’s state terrorism.” Infact, the secret conference organized by the Indian officials itself and participation of the Baloch leaders including anti-Pakistan elements proves that Indian RAW is behind all the events like hostage-takings, sectarian violence, target killings of the high profile leaders and other subversive acts being committed in Balochistan.

While favoring the Sardari system, Dr. Wahid maintained that Balochistan is a tribal society which follows the directions of their tribal chiefs. In this way, he not only justified support for the Baloch Sardars but also for Khan of Kalat as they have been leading separatism in the province. As a matter of fact, the unrest actually started in Balochistan when various projects were undertaken by the previous government to develop the backward regions of the province. The sole aim was to eliminate frustration among the people by providing infrastructure and employment opportunities. The Baloch Sardars who had been backed by Indian and other external powers stared opposing all such developmental projects. These Sardars who were running their own private jails and ‘farrari camps’ resisted the government plans as they did not want to give up the old system of feudalism. It was Pak Army which occupied private jails and farrari camps and thus set free several innocent people. Notably, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) which has been fighting for secession of the province get logistic support from India, while another CIA and Indian-supported separatist group, Jundullah (God’s soldiers) is also working against the cordial relationship of Pakistan with China and Iran. In the past few years, their militants with the cooperation of foreign agents kidnapped and killed many Chinese and Iranian nationals in Pakistan, while committing other subversive acts in the province. While impressing New Delhi, Wahid Baloch said, “We are secular nation and not Islamist or extremist.. our secular culture is under attack by Pakistan and Iran for which we need your help. He requested, “We also need your help for newly established council of Balochistan so that we can establish its offices all over the world.”

Dr. Wahid read out a message of Balochs to the audience, and requested to the Indian high officials to raise the question of Balochistan on all international forums and the UN bodies. Concluding his anit-Pakistan speech, Wahid Baloch pointed out that the ultimate goal of Baloch struggle was to seek a greater Balochistan comprising territory on either side of the Gold Smith line in Pakistan as well as Iran. Beside, Khan of Kalat expressed similar thoughts like Dr. Wahid, indicating that the meeting has been a source of good interaction with the Indians and they will use every source so as to get support for their struggle of independence.

Indian involvement in Balochistan could also be judged from the fact the Munir Mengal repeated the thoughts of Dr. Wahid in the meeting held with the faculty of IDSA which assured him that India fully backs Baloch struggle and will definitely undertake necessary steps for making the same a success. It also pledged that all future activities of Baloch movement like guidance and help will be coordinated under the sponsorship of IDSA. Besides, Munir Mengal also gave a presentation at ORF in which he also misinterpreted the economic aspects of Gwader Port as a threat to international community, opposing proposed China’s naval base at Gwader. However, finally, Dr. Wahid, Munir Mengal and Khan of Kalat remarked that their visit was very successful. They also met Indian deputy minister and other officials who told them that this was the first meeting of its kind and things will further improve by the next such meeting. They also assured to the Baloch leaders that Baloch movement has not gained the momentum as expected, therefore they could not support them openly nevertheless, covert support will continue. While encouraging Baloch leaders to continue their struggle with full zeal and enthusiasm, the Indian official paid 25000 dollars to each Baloch leader assuring them more positive response by the next secret meeting to be held in February 2010. After such conferences and secret meeting among the Indian officials, foreign agents and Baloch leaders, particularly Indian involvement in Balochistan has proved. There hardly remains any doubt about the foreign involvement, particularly the Indian meddling in the province of Balochistan.

 

[ajtr]

Free Baluchistan​

Selig S. Harrison | February 1, 2011
As the Islamist nightmare envelops Pakistan, the Obama administration ponders what the United States should do. But the bitter reality is that the United States is already doing too much in Pakistan. It is the American shadow everywhere, the Pakistani feeling of being smothered by the U.S. embrace, that gives the Islamists their principal rallying cry.

Evidence is everywhere of what the Economist calls “a rising tide of anti-American passion.” The leading spokesman of traditional Muslim theology, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), opposes the “war on terror” because “it is an American war” and blames a U.S. plot for the recent assassination of the moderate Punjab governor, Salman Taseer.

The endless procession of U.S. leaders paying goodwill visits to Islamabad, most recently Vice President Joe Biden, evokes sneers and ridicule in the Urdu-language press, accompanied by cartoons showing Pakistanis scratching fleas crawling over their bodies. The late special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, liked free-swinging encounters with Pakistani journalists that left a trail of bitterness expressed in the Urdu media, but this did not deter Holbrooke and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from return visits.

To calm the situation down, the United States should start by phasing out drone attacks in the Pashtun border areas with their massive civilian casualties and should end the $1 billion plus in annual subsidies to the armed forces that make them look like American puppets. At the same time, less visible education and development aid provided by the Kerry-Lugar bill should be continued, together with the International Monetary Fund credits that keep the Pakistani state afloat, and access to U.S. markets for Pakistani textile exports should be increased.

Instead of publicly prodding the Punjabi-dominated armed forces to step up their offensive against Pashtun tribal militants in the Afghan border areas, the United States should recognize that Islamabad is afraid of stirring up Pashtun ethnic sentiment there that could break up the fragile multiethnic Pakistani federation.

The Pashtuns of the former**–Northwest Frontier Province (now called Kyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have an ancient history of resisting Punjabi incursions, but the Army did not come into direct conflict with the Pashtuns following the creation of Pakistan until July 2002, when, at the behest of the United States, it sent a division into FATA to attack al-Qaeda and Taliban forces at key transit points on the Afghan border. Heavy casualties resulted, displacing some fifty thousand people. This was a historic break with the autonomy agreements negotiated by the British with FATA tribes and honored until then by Pakistan. As the “war on terror” has proceeded, the FATA Pashtuns have been politicized and radicalized as never before.

The underlying reason that Pakistan’s U.S. links are so unpopular and make such a tempting target for the Islamists is that America is perceived as anti-Muslim.

The Islamists focus not only on Muslim casualties in next door Afghanistan, but above all on U.S. support for Israel and on the American military presence throughout the Arabian Sea , the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf in areas near Pakistan.

Why does the United States keep pouring aid into Pakistan despite its active support for the Taliban in Afghanistan at the expense of U.S.-NATO forces and its inability or unwillingness to help the United States root out al-Qaeda from its mountain sanctuaries?

American officials point to its arsenal of seventy to ninety nuclear weapons, arguing that a tight U.S. embrace of the Pakistani military and intelligence elite is necessary to make sure that another nuclear-proliferation racket does not emerge like the one organized by nuclear czar A. Q. Khan.

This is an understandable concern because many of the same generals who colluded with Khan are still in high places. But the larger danger to the United States is that the nuclear arsenal will fall into the hands of the Islamist sympathizers inside the nuclear establishment, or that the Islamists will completely take over the armed forces, branding current military leaders as U.S. stooges.

While doing less elsewhere in Pakistan, the United States should do more to support anti-Islamist forces along the southern Arabian Sea coast. First, it should support anti-Islamist Sindhi leaders of the Sufi variant of Islam with their network of 124,000 shrines. Most important, it should aid the 6 million Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan in the face of growing ISI repression. Pakistan has given China a base at Gwadar in the heart of Baluch territory. So an independent Baluchistan would serve U.S. strategic interests in addition to the immediate goal of countering Islamist forces.

MORE BY SELIG S. HARRISON

 

[Xeric]

Another gem from SELIG S. HARRISON.

We all know that he's famous for his '“early warning” of foreign policy crises' but the guy's an AH:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/72275-selig-s-harrison-s-lying-bastard-2.html

---------------

And as for his "Punjabi Army being resented by Pukthoon and Balochs" here's something i posted in the TT section:

This would give a great insight towards the recruiting practices of Pakistan Army and would help shut up some idiots!!


Changing Demographics of the Army's Officer Corps - Pakistan Conflict Monitor

Changing Demographics of the Army's Officer Corps

Army The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps [pdf], Atlantic Council's South Asia Center // Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University via the Human Security Gateway, 14 July 2010

EXCERPT: "The Pakistan army elicits many concerns about terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the coherence of the state. However, very little is actually known about this institution. This essay mobilizes unique data to address one important facet: the army’s geographical recruitment base. We find that the Pakistan army has been successful at expanding the geographical recruitment base while some groups (namely those who are native to Sindh) remain highly under-represented. We also find that the officer corps is increasingly coming from urban areas. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these important shifts subject to the limitations of our data. [...] Unfortunately, there are few sources of empirical data about the Pakistan army despite these varied concerns about the army and its role in Pakistan’s security and that of the region. This essay, employing unique and difficult to obtain district-level officer recruitment data from 1971 to 2005, explores an important aspect of the institution: its geographical representativeness over time."

Read the full article http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SAC_CPASS_TheChangingPakistanArmyOfficerCorps.pdf [pdf].

---

Some excerpts from the PDF file:

......Geographic Distribution of New Officer Recruits Across Time

We next depict cartographically district market shares of officer recruitments for 1974,
1984, 1994 and 2005. We used 1974 as our first end point for the cartographic analysis
of recruitment shares due to the 1971 war, which saw the emergence of East Pakistan as
an independent Bangladesh. We wanted to permit adequate time to lapse to permit both
recruitment and records of recruitment to re-equilibrate after the conclusion of the 1971
war. These analyses are presented in Figures 2 through 5.


Figures 2 through 5 dramatically demonstrate that the Pakistan army has been successful in making the army more geographically representative.

As depicted in Figure 2, in 1974 the center of gravity for officer recruitment largely centered on key districts in the Punjab with a few in the NWFP.

By 1984 (see Figure 3), officer recruitment had expanded throughout the rest of Punjab, large parts of Sindh, NWFP, the Northern Areas and selected districts in Baluchistan. Changes between 1984 and 1994 were less dramatic but illustrate continued expansion of officer recruitment. Changes between 1984 and 1994 were less dramatic and illustrate some continuity as evidenced by comparing Figures 3 and 4.

By 2005, as shown in Figure 5, officer recruitment had expanded into many more districts in Baluchistan and indeed into most of the districts in the country. Those districts without any recruits were generally in Baluchistan. It must be recalled that each of these maps capture one snapshot for each year’s batch of officers, which does vary from year to year. However, comparing the distribution of recruits between 1974 and 2005 demonstrates vividly that officers are now coming from most districts in the country.

One serious limitation of our data must be kept in mind: these are district level data not officer data. One cannot assume that a recruit from Baluchistan is in fact ethnically Baluc. Nonetheless, a Punjabi, for example, who has lived and/or has been raised in Baluchistan is likely to have a very different worldview than one who has spent much or most of his life in the Punjab. Even though we cannot identify the ethnicity of the recruit, the expanded geographical reach of the Pakistan army suggests that its various efforts have born fruit at least with geographical variation.

A less granular analysis of officer recruitment is depicted in Figure 6, which shows the market share of officer recruits for the four provinces (Baluchistan, NWFP, Punjab, Sindh), the Federal Capital (Islamabad), Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas and FATA. As demonstrated in Figure 6, the market share for the Punjab had declined dramatically from a high of over 80 percent in 1971 to a low of less than 40 percent in 2001.

--

The crux (of the research)

.....Conclusions and Implications

In summary, analyses of these data show that new officers entering the Pakistan army to a significant degree resemble the geographic (as opposed to ethnic) population distribution of Pakistan writ large with a few notable exceptions. By 2005, Sindh remains underrepresented despite improvement while the Punjab and NWFP are over-represented to varying degrees, depending upon the year in question. However, Punjab is increasingly less dominant in annual officer intake. By 2005, most of the country’s districts have produced recruits in a marked change since the first year in our data series. Curiously, using officer intake for 1981 and 1998, the urbanization of these cohorts appears to be higher than the urbanization of Pakistan overall using census estimates.

It must be kept in mind that our data do not and cannot provide insights into the overall composition of the entire army because we only have data for yearly officer intake. We have no cohort information (e.g. how many attended the PMA long course or
other courses together or even how the officers broke out into the five courses) and we do not have officer-level data on their career paths. As such, we have no information about the relative rates of retaining persons from these various and often relatively new districts for officer production. While the army may be increasing recruits from these areas annually, the army may also be losing them to attrition. Such differential attrition—if it exists—could be due to individuals’ perceived or real discrimination in the army;
institutional barriers (e.g. bias in promotion); individuals’ discomfort with being posted far away from home; individuals’ poor preparedness intellectually or physically for the army; or discomfort with any other aspect of the army life style. Finally, we have data
about geographical origins not ethnic identity. While in many cases these will be isomorphous, one cannot make this assumption. Thus the above analyses pertain to geographic –not ethnic—characteristics of the officer intake. Despite these empirical
caveats, these analyses do suggest that the army has made important strides in achieving its objective of becoming at least a more geographically—if not ethnically—representative force.

The implications of this changing recruitment base over time may be very important, if uncertain, at this juncture. As the army—a key provider of social advancement and other perquisites in Pakistan—becomes more accessible, the army could be a foundation of greater national cohesion rather than a source of ethnic tension.

However, as the army expands its recruitment base, it must also expand military infrastructure into new areas. This is particularly true for provinces that are not well served by roads and other transport infrastructure, such as Balochistan. (Note that the vast majority of military assets are concentrated in the Punjab.)
Such expansion of army infrastructure is likely necessary for several reasons. In poorly connected areas, potential recruits may be unwilling to undertake potentially costly long trips to be considered for recruitment. Individuals in such areas may also have limited access to education and may be unprepared for military service. This may make them even less willing to undertake arduous journeys if they expect that they will not be qualified. This concern remains even for those from Balochistan and Sindh if they are unaware of military policies to relax standards for them. In areas with poor military presence, individuals may have less interest in military service compared to those areas with significant military presence due the above-noted “influencer effect.”59) Pakistanis outside of the Punjab and NWFP have not always welcomed the introduction of cantonments and other military infrastructure. Baloch ethno-nationalist insurgents cite the expansion of military presence in Balochistan as concrete evidence of “Punjabi colonization.” This resentment persists even while some welcome the introduction of cantonments because they are accompanied by expanded access to utilities (e.g. gas connections, electrification, potable water, better roads, etc.); access to better schools; employment opportunities due to base activities and activities supporting such bases among other facilities and services. Conversely, some residents resent the fact that it takes the introduction of a military facility to bring such amenities to a community.

The expansion of the military into Balochistan exhibits the entire of range of such sentiments.60 The impact of expanded geographical recruitment base upon the army’s ability to conduct internal security operations is less clear. On the one hand, training persons from ethnic groups with longstanding grievances with the center may provide important military training to co-ethnics who rise against the state. On the other hand, their successful integration into the army creates opportunities for their near and extended families which in turn may diminish ethnic grievances and further integrate these ethnic groups into the Pakistani national project.

Expanded recruitment also distributes the cost of military action to new segments of Pakistani society. As these family members become more familiar with military operations, they may increasingly support the operation if they believe the operation to be just or addressing Pakistani national interests. However, as the costs of military action increases and as civilian and military casualties mount, support for such operations may diminish putting increased pressure both on the army and the civilian administration (assuming a civilian dispensation).61 This cluster of concerns is particularly timely given that the percentage of recruits from the NWFP has increased in recent years and it is in this area where the Pakistan army has been most engaged against Pakistan’s domestic 60 militants. Despite expanding public opinion polls, extant polling does not employ sample sizes that permit scientifically valid comparisons across provinces much less within provinces. At this juncture, it is impossible to tell how expanded recruitment from the NWFP, increased operational tempo in the same area and public support or lack thereof for these operations interplay.62 Perhaps the most important questions about the Pakistan army surround the posited Islamization of the Pakistan army, anti-Americanism, and politicization. As is well-known, Zia ul Haq sought to Islamize the Pakistan army during his tenure of army chief in the 1980s. However, scholars of the Pakistan army have remained dubious that there were deep impacts upon the institution.63 Similarly, the 1989 U.S. cutoff of military education to the Pakistan military under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has led to widespread fears that the Pakistan army harbors strong anti-U.S. sentiment. (This is likely to be the case although the reasons may in fact pre-date the 1990 cessation of military assistance and training.) And as is well known, the army has long been subject to politicization. This politicization has been manifested in the politicized selection of the army chief and other army leadership; the army’s role in manipulating and undermining political institutions and the judiciary, often using the state’s intelligences agencies; the army’s historical and pervasive involvement in governing the country including introducing massive changes to the country’s constitution. These questions about the social, political and indeed religious commitments of the Pakistan army officer corps are no doubt at the core of international concerns about this institution.

Unfortunately, this current effort cannot address these questions squarely with these data alone for reasons noted throughout this essay. However, ongoing and future research may provide modest—but important—insights into the army. Working with a
team of quantitative analysts, we are assembling a panel of district-level household economic survey data from 1991 to 2005. (1991 is the earliest year for such data). These additional data will allow us to further characterize the districts from which officers are recruited in terms of social liberalism, educational attainment, urbanicity, among other 62 house-hold and district-level socioeconomic and demographic variables that may explain variation in district-wise recruitment outcome.

However, even the results of this ongoing research are circumscribed by an ecological fallacy problem. That is, the best we can do is characterize more fully the districts from which officers come. We cannot assume that that any particular officer has a similar set of characteristics as the district in part because officer recruitment is not random; rather it is the product of both supply-side and demand-side considerations.

While our results narrowly advance our understanding of the Pakistan army, the changes that we have documented in officer recruitment are very important in terms of the social impacts of the army’s role in the nation; the operational and political
constraints upon the army; and even the army’s capabilities to deal with critical internal security challenges that are likely to deepen rather than recede in the policy-relevant future. As such these highly-caveated findings should be of interest to policy makers and analysts alike and may help them refocus inquiries about this important institution, even if this present and future analyses cannot answer these queries comprehensively.

 

[mehru]

Free Baluchistan​

While doing less elsewhere in Pakistan, the United States should do more to support anti-Islamist forces along the southern Arabian Sea coast. First, it should support anti-Islamist Sindhi leaders of the Sufi variant of Islam with their network of 124,000 shrines. Most important, it should aid the 6 million Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan in the face of growing ISI repression. Pakistan has given China a base at Gwadar in the heart of Baluch territory. So an independent Baluchistan would serve U.S. strategic interests in addition to the immediate goal of countering Islamist forces.

MORE BY SELIG S. HARRISON

Rather than boiling my blood, this para made me laugh.

anti-Islamist Sindhi leaders of the Sufi variant of Islam

what this means?

 

[RabzonKhan]

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

i wish i could have been present for this wonderful event.....that young girl in traditional Baluch garb really melted my heart. What a sweetheart. God bless them all.

More such events are needed, they have a very unique culture which cannot be found elsewhere. A strong, noble peoples.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

Rather than boiling my blood, this para made me laugh.

anti-Islamist Sindhi leaders of the Sufi variant of Islam

what this means?

anti Islamist Sufis???


heh, news to me


sure makes a lot of sense!

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

Selig Harrison's an old fart, Xeric Sahib. A 'hangover' from a different era.

he wasnt nice enough to his children; they didnt send him off to a retirement home somewhere in Ft. Lauderdale florida. He should stick to playing bridge with the oldies and consider putting pen in his arse rather than on paper

Pakistan is multi-culural. Always has been, always will be. Unity through diversity.

 

[muse]

How Pakistani is that - a day for "culture" - one more thing displayed as "arrested development" --- Everything must be defined, it must exist within rigidly defined parameters, that way the Pakistanis can recognize it and know how to interact with it and that makes it "traditional"- God forbid if they experience realities with out boundaries or realities of which the most coherent thing that can be said is that they are evolving or in a constant state of flux -

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

please elaborate, sir

 

[muse]

To be balouch means (fill in the blanks) huge Turbans, curious and quaint tribal costumes and such, well, it means dancing particular dances (interestingly enough, all with Islamican mores, that is you mush shake your bosums about, please do so while seated and and with the spirit of restrain - something I am obviously innocent of -

A single day, in a city of 18m million for people who are like anybody else, unless of course we insist on defining them in a particular way -- Why not we just get past this culture in the service of the state rubbish and just have fun, x many days of this festival and that festival, for no rerason but to sell a little of this and that, eat all kinds of good food, enjoy music and dance - in the end there are no Balouch in the sense of a ethnic identity, there are only people who live in Karachi, that's their experience, their reality -- lets praise and have fun with that, whatever that may be.

Perhaps groups of people alienated within Pakistan may cease to be alienated if we quit pointing out how they are other than Pakistani.

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

give it time.....already the process is underway. If it werent, none of those Baluch would be speaking Urdu the national language

 

[RabzonKhan]

PPP failure in Balochistan

Editorial
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2011.


Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has admitted to the failure of his government to implement the Balochistan package, announced with such fanfare 16 months ago. It was called the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package so as to suggest that the full extent of the provision of rights to the people of Balochistan was to commence with the initiation of the package. The beginning was proud and, admittedly, modest. But it seems that even this was not delivered. And it was not money which was lacking; it was the flaccid will of the PPP leadership.

The package was modest (aghaz) but the points so far implemented from the 38-page package are even more modest: 15 out of 61. Now the government says it will “do its best” to implement the package by the end of 2013. It says it has no money, but does it take money to convene the meetings of the concerned committees too? Senator Raza Rabbani, who had spearheaded the formulation of the package, left the committee in frustration. And after him, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, the only troubleshooter in the cabinet, took on the job and was able to convene only one meeting in four months, and that only to inform how miserably the package had failed.

It must have galled Prime Minister Gilani to hear Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani implementing his own package in Balochistan to improve the lot of the common man there. His party’s government in Quetta was wobbly to begin with, and inaction on the package has done nothing to improve it, with important party leaders in Quetta threatening to resign and go home. What the Baloch people have lost in these days of lethargy compounded by scandals of corruption are a number of projects that could have made a difference. Most important among them were: A 500-megawatt Dera Ismail Khan-Zhob electricity transmission line; the Sabakzai and Mirani dams; a 300-line telephone exchange for Musakhel district; a cancer ward at the Sandeman Hospital in Quetta; interest-free loans for the mining sector and waiving agricultural loans of up to Rs500,000.

Meanwhile, the upheaval in Balochistan has continued, gas pipelines blown up with dull regularity and railway tracks dug up to disrupt the country’s communication with the province. The trouble in Balochistan is deeper than most people think. It is terrorism instigated from within, not inspired from without, despite our allegation that India is interfering in the province from Afghanistan. The reasons for the Baloch disaffection are all there to be seen. And the non-implementation of the Balochistan package has simply highlighted the rights the people of the province don’t have. The operation of the security agencies against the ‘terrorists’ is of no use if no measures are taken to improve the lives of the people who are in a state of rebellion.

Balochistan sustains its meagre population with great difficulty and this helps explain the sense of alienation, frustration and resentment among its population. They are doing whatever they can, including inflicting violence on the non-Baloch who have lived among them for years. Action taken to curb this violence has given rise to ‘disappearances’ which are now being looked into by the Supreme Court. The solutions suggested by the honourable court have not materialised also because the federal government has not provided relief alongside the recovery of the people who have disappeared over these years of upheaval.

Rehman Malik could have at least initiated action with regard to a commission to determine the circumstances leading to the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti; a judicial inquiry into the allotment of land in Gwadar; finances due to the provincial government on account of flood relief; a special quota in Higher Education Commission scholarships; and rationalisation of the gas royalty formula. The state of affairs in Quetta is that the Balochistan Assembly is without an opposition, since almost every MPA is a minister. However, it is alienated from the centre, which has promised dialogue with it, but delivered little. In such a situation, it is foolhardy to suggest that a foreign power is behind the unrest.