fatman17
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Pakistan's frontier policy
Aparna Pande
There was only one sensible thing to do and that was to withdraw our troops from the North West Frontier. A committee had studied the problem and recommended that the army be withdrawn from Waziristan.' Astonishing as it may sound this is not a statement by former president General Musharraf, present President Zardari or present Army Chief General Kayani. This was stated over five decades ago by Pakistan's first military ruler, General Ayub Khan.
In his memoirs Ayub Khan states the 'sheer futility' of the various campaigns by the Pakistani forces in the North-West regions. 'It was a great waste of time; and a great waste of men. Nothing was really achieved and when Pakistan was established there were several army divisions as well as Scouts and Levies all tied up on the Frontier. All they did was to provide a constant irritation to the tribesmen, and a target for them to fire at. Also, no real progress would be possible in this part of Pakistan while this state of affairs continued.' Thus when a committee led by a British officer, Lieutenant-General Francis Tuker recommended that the military be withdrawn from the tribal areas the military - and civilian - wings of the new Pakistani government accepted the proposal.
Through the decades we also see a consistency in the view that the only option for the Pakistan government is to withdraw before these 'fierce, barbaric tribesmen.' For decades leaders from various quarters of Pakistani politics have insisted that the Pakistani administration leave the tribal areas alone.
There has also been a similar approach towards the tribesmen. All Pakistani administrations - following their British predecessors - have insisted that these tribesmen cannot, and do not want to be, civilised or modernised. And thus the only way to deal with them is to leave them alone. Thus Ayub's policy was clear: 'we will not intrude upon their areas unless they ask us.'
There is also this paradoxical and naïve belief that even though the tribesmen do not recognise Pakistani governmental presence because they are good Muslims they will, by default, be pro-Pakistan and when hailed in the name of Islam will come to the aid of Pakistan. The tribesmen are also seen as errant children, who may make a few mistakes but by and large are still 'your kith and kin.'
As Ayub states in his memoirs years ago, 'I was made responsible for a major part of the withdrawal. Now, troops had been in this kind of area for over a hundred years and any withdrawal of this kind is always a difficult and potentially dangerous business. A few days before the evacuation a group of my men were fired upon by the tribesmen and several of them were killed. I was extremely angry and decided to retaliate quickly and severely. As a result I was faced not only with angry tribesmen but also with a worried divisional commander and the political agent, who claimed that my action was irregular. I met the tribesmen and made my stand clear.
I told them that they must never again kill our soldiers, who were good Muslims, like themselves, and that the killing was senseless. Also I stressed that these men were defenders of Pakistan which was now their country as well as mine. Then I explained that we were going to pull out of Waziristan, but that if any of my men were harmed and if they opened fire on them I would turn back and attack. They knew I meant what I said and I was glad that when we pulled out, the tribesmen and their chiefs picketed the hills for us. They put white flags on the strong points and all the leading maliks helped. We were able to arrange an orderly and successful withdrawal.'
We can see a similarity in the past ceasefires in North and South Waziristan and in Swat. In each case both before and after the army withdrew, soldiers were shot at or killed, government officials were kidnapped, tortured or killed and all that normally happened was that the tribesmen were asked to be good Muslims, not to indulge in such activities and then left alone.
Thus the withdrawal of a government from its frontier areas, the withdrawal of the military before non-state actors and the forsaking of your territory is not something new to Pakistan's policy towards its tribal areas. Along with this is the naïve and yet deep belief that commonalities of religion will be sufficient to tie people to a country even though those people have never been exposed to any form of government presence and the country on the other side of the border (Afghanistan) shares a similar religion as well as ethno-linguistic ties.
As German social scientist Max Weber said decades ago, a state is a human community that has monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Not only should the state be the only entity who has the 'right' to use of violence but control of territory is one of the key characteristics of the state.
For various reasons and for many decades the Pakistani state has created 'ungoverned spaces' in its north-western frontier regions. These regions have become vacuums where other non-state actors, like the Pakistani Taliban and the Al Qaeda, have stepped in and taken control. Pakistan's government owes it to its people to regain that territory and stabilise the country
(Source: Asian Affairs)
Aparna Pande
There was only one sensible thing to do and that was to withdraw our troops from the North West Frontier. A committee had studied the problem and recommended that the army be withdrawn from Waziristan.' Astonishing as it may sound this is not a statement by former president General Musharraf, present President Zardari or present Army Chief General Kayani. This was stated over five decades ago by Pakistan's first military ruler, General Ayub Khan.
In his memoirs Ayub Khan states the 'sheer futility' of the various campaigns by the Pakistani forces in the North-West regions. 'It was a great waste of time; and a great waste of men. Nothing was really achieved and when Pakistan was established there were several army divisions as well as Scouts and Levies all tied up on the Frontier. All they did was to provide a constant irritation to the tribesmen, and a target for them to fire at. Also, no real progress would be possible in this part of Pakistan while this state of affairs continued.' Thus when a committee led by a British officer, Lieutenant-General Francis Tuker recommended that the military be withdrawn from the tribal areas the military - and civilian - wings of the new Pakistani government accepted the proposal.
Through the decades we also see a consistency in the view that the only option for the Pakistan government is to withdraw before these 'fierce, barbaric tribesmen.' For decades leaders from various quarters of Pakistani politics have insisted that the Pakistani administration leave the tribal areas alone.
There has also been a similar approach towards the tribesmen. All Pakistani administrations - following their British predecessors - have insisted that these tribesmen cannot, and do not want to be, civilised or modernised. And thus the only way to deal with them is to leave them alone. Thus Ayub's policy was clear: 'we will not intrude upon their areas unless they ask us.'
There is also this paradoxical and naïve belief that even though the tribesmen do not recognise Pakistani governmental presence because they are good Muslims they will, by default, be pro-Pakistan and when hailed in the name of Islam will come to the aid of Pakistan. The tribesmen are also seen as errant children, who may make a few mistakes but by and large are still 'your kith and kin.'
As Ayub states in his memoirs years ago, 'I was made responsible for a major part of the withdrawal. Now, troops had been in this kind of area for over a hundred years and any withdrawal of this kind is always a difficult and potentially dangerous business. A few days before the evacuation a group of my men were fired upon by the tribesmen and several of them were killed. I was extremely angry and decided to retaliate quickly and severely. As a result I was faced not only with angry tribesmen but also with a worried divisional commander and the political agent, who claimed that my action was irregular. I met the tribesmen and made my stand clear.
I told them that they must never again kill our soldiers, who were good Muslims, like themselves, and that the killing was senseless. Also I stressed that these men were defenders of Pakistan which was now their country as well as mine. Then I explained that we were going to pull out of Waziristan, but that if any of my men were harmed and if they opened fire on them I would turn back and attack. They knew I meant what I said and I was glad that when we pulled out, the tribesmen and their chiefs picketed the hills for us. They put white flags on the strong points and all the leading maliks helped. We were able to arrange an orderly and successful withdrawal.'
We can see a similarity in the past ceasefires in North and South Waziristan and in Swat. In each case both before and after the army withdrew, soldiers were shot at or killed, government officials were kidnapped, tortured or killed and all that normally happened was that the tribesmen were asked to be good Muslims, not to indulge in such activities and then left alone.
Thus the withdrawal of a government from its frontier areas, the withdrawal of the military before non-state actors and the forsaking of your territory is not something new to Pakistan's policy towards its tribal areas. Along with this is the naïve and yet deep belief that commonalities of religion will be sufficient to tie people to a country even though those people have never been exposed to any form of government presence and the country on the other side of the border (Afghanistan) shares a similar religion as well as ethno-linguistic ties.
As German social scientist Max Weber said decades ago, a state is a human community that has monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Not only should the state be the only entity who has the 'right' to use of violence but control of territory is one of the key characteristics of the state.
For various reasons and for many decades the Pakistani state has created 'ungoverned spaces' in its north-western frontier regions. These regions have become vacuums where other non-state actors, like the Pakistani Taliban and the Al Qaeda, have stepped in and taken control. Pakistan's government owes it to its people to regain that territory and stabilise the country
(Source: Asian Affairs)
