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by Iman Qureshi
Probably around the time that then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage infamously informed President Pervez Musharraf that he would bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if it didnt comply with American demands, the following correspondence between the two countries, recently declassified and published by the National Security Archive on 13 September 2010, took place.
These documents reveal that the US voiced to Pakistan their refusal to engage in any discourse with the Taliban, and instead forge straight ahead with military action.
US Ambassador to Pakistan tells President Musharraf that there was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban.
The US further put to Pakistan a list of seven non-negotiable demands:
1. To stop al Qaeda at the border;
2. Provide the US with blanket landing rights to conduct operations;
3. Provide territorial and naval access;
4. Provide intelligence;
5. Publicly condemn terrorist attacks;
6. Cut off recruits and supplies to the Taliban;
7. Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and help the US destroy Osama Bin Laden.
Pakistan accepted these demands without condition, but in the dialogue recorded, Pakistans then intelligence (ISI) chief Mahmoud Ahmed expresses some caveats:
Following any military action, there should be a prompt economic recovery effort. You are there to kill terrorists, not make enemies. Islamabad wants a friendly government in Kabul.
Ahmed further warned, a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now.
Upon travelling to Kabul and speaking to Mullah Omar himself, Ahmed told US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin that a negotiated solution would be preferable to military action. I implore you not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations. Omar himself is frightened. That much was clear in his last meeting.
Ahmed further suggested that it would be best for the Afghans to seek out al- Qaeda and Osama bin Laden themselves, and warned that if the Taliban were eliminated, Afghanistan would revert warlordism.
Instead, Ambassador Chamberlin reported back that Ahmeds reservations were in solely domestic interests: Should military action commence, Musharraf wants to be able to tell the Pakistani people that he sought a peaceful solution.
This is not just a remarkably short-sighted evaluation by the Ambassador, and also one that reveals Americas refusal to seriously take into consideration any advice given by the Pakistanis.
With the benefit of hindsight, these documents show that Pakistan grasped a more realistic view of the situation, and had the US not refused to negotiate on an equal footing with Pakistan rather than act as an imperialistic force, they would have certainly have benefitted from Pakistans suggestions.
If the US had engaged in dialogue with the Talibanwhich they obstinately had no inclination to dothey might have come to a solution whereby the Taliban themselves tracked down and eliminated the terrorist factions of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Indeed, it is now apparent that the Taliban and al-Qaeda do not share ideology. At the very best, war could have been avoided altogether.
As it stands, this war is despairingly far from winning Afghani hearts and minds any time soon. Lets hope that the US will soon have the sense to rectify past mistakes and embark on reasonable negotiations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan ten years late is better than never.
Iman Qureshi
Probably around the time that then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage infamously informed President Pervez Musharraf that he would bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if it didnt comply with American demands, the following correspondence between the two countries, recently declassified and published by the National Security Archive on 13 September 2010, took place.
These documents reveal that the US voiced to Pakistan their refusal to engage in any discourse with the Taliban, and instead forge straight ahead with military action.
US Ambassador to Pakistan tells President Musharraf that there was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban.
The US further put to Pakistan a list of seven non-negotiable demands:
1. To stop al Qaeda at the border;
2. Provide the US with blanket landing rights to conduct operations;
3. Provide territorial and naval access;
4. Provide intelligence;
5. Publicly condemn terrorist attacks;
6. Cut off recruits and supplies to the Taliban;
7. Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and help the US destroy Osama Bin Laden.
Pakistan accepted these demands without condition, but in the dialogue recorded, Pakistans then intelligence (ISI) chief Mahmoud Ahmed expresses some caveats:
Following any military action, there should be a prompt economic recovery effort. You are there to kill terrorists, not make enemies. Islamabad wants a friendly government in Kabul.
Ahmed further warned, a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now.
Upon travelling to Kabul and speaking to Mullah Omar himself, Ahmed told US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin that a negotiated solution would be preferable to military action. I implore you not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations. Omar himself is frightened. That much was clear in his last meeting.
Ahmed further suggested that it would be best for the Afghans to seek out al- Qaeda and Osama bin Laden themselves, and warned that if the Taliban were eliminated, Afghanistan would revert warlordism.
Instead, Ambassador Chamberlin reported back that Ahmeds reservations were in solely domestic interests: Should military action commence, Musharraf wants to be able to tell the Pakistani people that he sought a peaceful solution.
This is not just a remarkably short-sighted evaluation by the Ambassador, and also one that reveals Americas refusal to seriously take into consideration any advice given by the Pakistanis.
With the benefit of hindsight, these documents show that Pakistan grasped a more realistic view of the situation, and had the US not refused to negotiate on an equal footing with Pakistan rather than act as an imperialistic force, they would have certainly have benefitted from Pakistans suggestions.
If the US had engaged in dialogue with the Talibanwhich they obstinately had no inclination to dothey might have come to a solution whereby the Taliban themselves tracked down and eliminated the terrorist factions of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Indeed, it is now apparent that the Taliban and al-Qaeda do not share ideology. At the very best, war could have been avoided altogether.
As it stands, this war is despairingly far from winning Afghani hearts and minds any time soon. Lets hope that the US will soon have the sense to rectify past mistakes and embark on reasonable negotiations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan ten years late is better than never.
Iman Qureshi
