Pakistan tilts back to the West in multipolar era

[Muji.Iqbal]

The multipolar moment has arrived in Pakistan’s backyard. Last month, China made its foray into Middle East diplomacy by brokering the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization agreement. And India continues to boldly push forward with transactional, selective alignments, maintaining its close partnership with Russia, while also engaging the United States to deter and counter China.

Pakistan too is attempting its own geopolitical rebalancing. It seeks to revive ties with the United States and other Western countries. This pivot to the West comes after an earlier one to the East that began more than a decade ago. But, like the previous pivot, Pakistan’s efforts to rekindle ties with the West are unlikely to succeed unless it embraces the imperatives of economic reform and political stability.

Pakistan’s squandered Eastern pivot

The year 2011 was a low point in U.S.-Pakistan relations. It began with the killing of two young Pakistanis by a Central Intelligence Agency contractor, who was then detained for nearly two months. Then came the Abbottabad raid in May, when U.S. special forces killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin. The unilateral U.S. operation in northern Pakistan not only embarrassed the Pakistan government and army, but also reignited accusations of Pakistani perfidy in Washington. The year concluded with the killing of over two dozen Pakistani soldiers by NATO forces at the Salala border post near Afghanistan.

In response, Pakistan shut down the NATO supply route into Afghanistan for seven months. It also intensified counterintelligence operations targeting the U.S. intelligence community. The U.S. engaged in its own parallel campaign here at home.

At the same time, Pakistan’s traditionally Western-centric national security elite moved to deepen their partnership with China, already a longtime partner. The two countries accelerated their defense partnership — including the joint production of the JF-17 fighter jet and increased joint exercises — resulting in what Sameer Lalwani of the U.S. Institute of Peace argues is now a “threshold alliance.” The “latent capacity of the China-Pakistan military partnership,” Lalwani writes, “allows the option of burden sharing and interoperability in a crisis.”

Alongside the growing defense partnership came a new dimension to the relationship: the economy. In 2015, the two countries launched a bilateral segment of the Belt and Road Initiative known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Like the defense tilt, it brought some early dividends in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) — roughly $20 billion in projects in its first phase, mainly in the electric power sector.

CPEC provided Pakistan with a shot in the arm when foreign investors shied away from the country due to security risks. It also offered a potential framework for driving economic growth and regional connectivity untied to a U.S.- or India-centric strategic architecture. Notionally, Pakistan could rapidly address infrastructure capacity deficiencies, providing its industries with the means to produce and get their goods out into the world.

But Pakistani elites squandered the opportunity. They pushed forward poorly-negotiated projects based on electoral timelines without consideration for Pakistan’s ability to afford and leverage that newly installed capacity. And as CPEC-related imports grew, Pakistan’s exports actually declined, thanks in part to the government’s pegging of the exchange rate.

The combination resulted in uneven growth, a balance of payments crisis, and an imbalanced economic partnership. The privileging of Chinese FDI crowded out investors from other countries. And Pakistani officials proposed poor solutions, such as creating a U.S. zone within CPEC. Meanwhile, Pakistani officials — including in the army — came to realize that Beijing simply wouldn’t write off their debts. As arrears to Chinese electric power producers mounted, Beijing insisted that they be repaid — while also providing short-term emergency lending to Islamabad.

The reverse pivot

Since 2011, Pakistan had also expanded relations with other middle and great powers, including Turkey and Russia. And the strategic partnership with China gained even more importance after India’s annexation of the disputed region in Kashmir in 2019 and Sino-Indian clashes along their shared frontier in 2020. The prospects of a two-front war have blunted New Delhi’s belligerence toward Islamabad since the China-India frontier has heated up.

But Pakistan’s dependence on China in both the economic and military domains began to weigh on the Pakistan Army. So too did Washington’s snubbing. Culturally oriented toward the West, commanders of the Pakistan Army and Pakistani elites in general relish in the spectacle of visits from senior U.S. officials and dignitaries.

In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, fearful that Washington had truly moved on from the region, efforts by the Pakistan Army to reach out to the Biden administration accelerated.

By late 2021, the U.S. and Pakistan began to pursue a reset in the relationship. While U.S. officials have set realistic expectations for the reset, focusing on non-strategic, low-hanging fruit, Pakistani officials appear unable to accept the new, limited terms of the relationship.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari recently completed his fifth visit to the U.S. in the past year. During a visit in December, Zardari spent 10 days in the U.S. and only managed to speak with Secretary of State Antony Blinken by phone, though the two men were both in Washington. By comparison, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval made a brief scheduled visit to Washington earlier this year, meeting with at least three cabinet members as well as senior military officials, including the chairman of the joint chiefs.

The Pakistan Army appears desperate to gain the attention of Washington, using third parties to convey the danger that it could fall victim to the "Chinese debt trap." An analyst, citing unnamed Pakistani officials, even spoke of Chinese requests to make a port call at Gwadar — home to a Chinese-operated port and long speculated as a potential future Chinese naval base. This counterproductive messaging — likely the result of the army ignoring the advice of the country’s diplomats — could damage its relationship with Beijing.

Troubles back home are also alienating a key booster of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation: the Pakistani diaspora. In response to the crackdown on former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party, Pakistani-American advocacy groups are now mobilizing members of Congress to issue statements against human rights violations in Pakistan.

Economic reform creates real strategic depth

Pakistan’s rulers are right to seek to correct the imbalances in their relationship with Beijing. But they must come to terms with Washington’s indifference to their strategic predicament.

Case in point, a new report by the Center for a New American Security recommends that in the event of an India-China border flare-up, the U.S. should “be prepared to extend full support to India” and convey to Pakistan “the need to stay neutral.” Why would Pakistan stay neutral after India, its archrival, unilaterally annexed Kashmir? After all, it is this act and New Delhi’s subsequent bluster that were among the drivers of the Chinese incursions into Indian-claimed territory in 2020.

What Pakistan must learn is that the nations that are making the most of this multipolar moment are doing so because of their respective economic strengths. Saudi Arabia is flush with cash and India, while a lower-middle-income country, is a huge market coveted by U.S. investors. Both are able to attract Fortune 500 CEOs and titans of finance at forums in their countries, even as they butt heads with the U.S. on oil prices or human rights.

Pakistan must grow past seeking the extraction of geopolitical rents. It should shield itself from emerging geopolitical divides while focusing on domestic economic reform and human development. Pakistan is a large country — the world’s fifth-largest in population. If and once Pakistan puts itself on the path of sustainable growth, visitors will come to it and Pakistani officials won’t have to sit in Washington waiting for a phone call.

You got to be kidding me.

Most Pakistanis prefer China over USA. Where do you get your information from: FOX News?

The American Geroge w Bush administration was very pro-India.

We won't forget that.

And when Pakistan got nuclear weapons, USA did the Pressler amendment. So why should we be pro-USA? Chinese are much better to work with.

 

[Super Falcon]

The west has a firm grip on the balls of Pakistani generals. The dollar loving generals will always obey their colonial masters. The only way for Pakistan to become truly independent is for the masses to rise up against them and force them below the law. There is no other two ways about it.

From a strategic standpoint, it is as clear as daylight that a Pakistan under the Eastern camp is far more beneficial for the nation and its people. Makes sense from an economic, military and strategic standpoint. But until the generals are holding the country hostage, nothing will change.

Very well for doing it this the time

 

[zhxy]

Our very bad experience with various Japan - funded projects from North to South (Japan is still the best among Western in term of infrastructure engineering) has made Japan from a beloved country by most Vietnamese, to be an alienated country.

it is Vietnam's fault, not Japan

 

[AViet]

it is Vietnam's fault, not Japan

Poor engineering quality (scope of works of Japanese) in following projects:
- wrong conceptual design of Phase 1, Ring Road 3 in Hanoi, partly leading to frequent traffic jam in this section. Phase 2 had to change the design.
- wrong engineering design of 2 bridges at Ben Luc Long Thanh expressway, which did not meet Vietnamese standard for wind load, leading to both bridges construction in limbo for 3 years. The whole road should have been completed long time ago had the design been correct.
- wrong enginnering design and pillow type selection of beam pillows in Ben Thanh Suoi Tien metro line (Line 1, Ho Chi Minh city) leading to one pillow falled unexpectedly 2 years ago. The Japanese did not admit their faults, because if they do, whole line should be destroyed and rebuilt. Now they have tied all the pillows by barbed wire and continue test running.
- and many more (Da Nang Quang Ngai expressway, Nghi Son oil refinery, all have big quality problems under Japanese management, which cannot be solved completely. Can Tho bridge construction witnessed the worst ever accident in modern construction history. Vietnamese contractors have engineered and built by themselves many other bridges, some are bigger and more difficult, but none has seen such kind of incident (killed 60 workers)

The list are endless, because Vietnamese, mainly South Vietnamese, are still so obsessed with Japan.

 

[zhxy]

Poor engineering quality (scope of works of Japanese) in following projects:
- wrong conceptual design of Phase 1, Ring Road 3 in Hanoi, partly leading to frequent traffic jam in this section. Phase 2 had to change the design.
- wrong engineering design of 2 bridges at Ben Luc Long Thanh expressway, which did not meet Vietnamese standard for wind load, leading to both bridges construction in limbo for 3 years. The whole road should have been completed long time ago had the design been correct.

- wrong enginnering design and pillow type selection of beam pillows in Ben Thanh Suoi Tien metro line (Line 1, Ho Chi Minh city) leading to one pillow falled unexpectedly 2 years ago. The Japanese did not admit their faults, because if they do, whole line should be destroyed and rebuilt. Now they have tied all the pillows by barbed wire and continue test running.
- and many more (Da Nang Quang Ngai expressway, Nghi Son oil refinery, all have big quality problems under Japanese management, which cannot be solved completely. Can Tho bridge construction witnessed the worst ever accident in modern construction history. Vietnamese contractors have engineered and built by themselves many other bridges, some are bigger and more difficult, but none has seen such kind of incident (killed 60 workers)

The list are endless.

It's Vietnam's fault.

1. Design risks are inevitable and no country can avoid them. Blaming a particular country is biased and unjust.

2. In some cases, Vietnam is also responsible for that. There have been many cases of Chinese contractors behind schedule because their construction materials were vandalized and stolen. It's the Vietnamese government's fault for not ensuring security from the start.

3. Japanese contractors do it wrong, but that doesn't mean Chinese contractors are better. For example, in the case that happened a few years ago, there was a serious labor accident involving a Chinese contractor, and the Vietnamese minister at the time, Dinh La Thang, complained about them (Dinh La Thang now in jail for corruption). The problem is that Chinese contractors often do not attach importance to projects in Vietnam, they often bring their new workers and engineers, do not have much experience to work in Vietnamese projects, and they consider the The project is like a training process for their engineer and it leads to more risks, slower progress, more frequent accidents.

4. There are some other exceptions, unrelated to the contractor's qualifications: for example, a Russian contractor works on a thermal power plant project in the South of Vietnam. Billion dollar project but delayed by sanctions. The Russians cannot buy gas turbines from the west.

There are countless reasons for error and risk in a project, so it makes no sense to blame a specific country. So it's Vietnam's fault first

 

[Abdul Rehman Majeed]

The multipolar moment has arrived in Pakistan’s backyard. Last month, China made its foray into Middle East diplomacy by brokering the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization agreement. And India continues to boldly push forward with transactional, selective alignments, maintaining its close partnership with Russia, while also engaging the United States to deter and counter China.

Pakistan too is attempting its own geopolitical rebalancing. It seeks to revive ties with the United States and other Western countries. This pivot to the West comes after an earlier one to the East that began more than a decade ago. But, like the previous pivot, Pakistan’s efforts to rekindle ties with the West are unlikely to succeed unless it embraces the imperatives of economic reform and political stability.

Pakistan’s squandered Eastern pivot

The year 2011 was a low point in U.S.-Pakistan relations. It began with the killing of two young Pakistanis by a Central Intelligence Agency contractor, who was then detained for nearly two months. Then came the Abbottabad raid in May, when U.S. special forces killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin. The unilateral U.S. operation in northern Pakistan not only embarrassed the Pakistan government and army, but also reignited accusations of Pakistani perfidy in Washington. The year concluded with the killing of over two dozen Pakistani soldiers by NATO forces at the Salala border post near Afghanistan.

In response, Pakistan shut down the NATO supply route into Afghanistan for seven months. It also intensified counterintelligence operations targeting the U.S. intelligence community. The U.S. engaged in its own parallel campaign here at home.

At the same time, Pakistan’s traditionally Western-centric national security elite moved to deepen their partnership with China, already a longtime partner. The two countries accelerated their defense partnership — including the joint production of the JF-17 fighter jet and increased joint exercises — resulting in what Sameer Lalwani of the U.S. Institute of Peace argues is now a “threshold alliance.” The “latent capacity of the China-Pakistan military partnership,” Lalwani writes, “allows the option of burden sharing and interoperability in a crisis.”

Alongside the growing defense partnership came a new dimension to the relationship: the economy. In 2015, the two countries launched a bilateral segment of the Belt and Road Initiative known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Like the defense tilt, it brought some early dividends in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) — roughly $20 billion in projects in its first phase, mainly in the electric power sector.

CPEC provided Pakistan with a shot in the arm when foreign investors shied away from the country due to security risks. It also offered a potential framework for driving economic growth and regional connectivity untied to a U.S.- or India-centric strategic architecture. Notionally, Pakistan could rapidly address infrastructure capacity deficiencies, providing its industries with the means to produce and get their goods out into the world.

But Pakistani elites squandered the opportunity. They pushed forward poorly-negotiated projects based on electoral timelines without consideration for Pakistan’s ability to afford and leverage that newly installed capacity. And as CPEC-related imports grew, Pakistan’s exports actually declined, thanks in part to the government’s pegging of the exchange rate.

The combination resulted in uneven growth, a balance of payments crisis, and an imbalanced economic partnership. The privileging of Chinese FDI crowded out investors from other countries. And Pakistani officials proposed poor solutions, such as creating a U.S. zone within CPEC. Meanwhile, Pakistani officials — including in the army — came to realize that Beijing simply wouldn’t write off their debts. As arrears to Chinese electric power producers mounted, Beijing insisted that they be repaid — while also providing short-term emergency lending to Islamabad.

The reverse pivot

Since 2011, Pakistan had also expanded relations with other middle and great powers, including Turkey and Russia. And the strategic partnership with China gained even more importance after India’s annexation of the disputed region in Kashmir in 2019 and Sino-Indian clashes along their shared frontier in 2020. The prospects of a two-front war have blunted New Delhi’s belligerence toward Islamabad since the China-India frontier has heated up.

But Pakistan’s dependence on China in both the economic and military domains began to weigh on the Pakistan Army. So too did Washington’s snubbing. Culturally oriented toward the West, commanders of the Pakistan Army and Pakistani elites in general relish in the spectacle of visits from senior U.S. officials and dignitaries.

In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, fearful that Washington had truly moved on from the region, efforts by the Pakistan Army to reach out to the Biden administration accelerated.

By late 2021, the U.S. and Pakistan began to pursue a reset in the relationship. While U.S. officials have set realistic expectations for the reset, focusing on non-strategic, low-hanging fruit, Pakistani officials appear unable to accept the new, limited terms of the relationship.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari recently completed his fifth visit to the U.S. in the past year. During a visit in December, Zardari spent 10 days in the U.S. and only managed to speak with Secretary of State Antony Blinken by phone, though the two men were both in Washington. By comparison, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval made a brief scheduled visit to Washington earlier this year, meeting with at least three cabinet members as well as senior military officials, including the chairman of the joint chiefs.

The Pakistan Army appears desperate to gain the attention of Washington, using third parties to convey the danger that it could fall victim to the "Chinese debt trap." An analyst, citing unnamed Pakistani officials, even spoke of Chinese requests to make a port call at Gwadar — home to a Chinese-operated port and long speculated as a potential future Chinese naval base. This counterproductive messaging — likely the result of the army ignoring the advice of the country’s diplomats — could damage its relationship with Beijing.

Troubles back home are also alienating a key booster of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation: the Pakistani diaspora. In response to the crackdown on former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party, Pakistani-American advocacy groups are now mobilizing members of Congress to issue statements against human rights violations in Pakistan.

Economic reform creates real strategic depth

Pakistan’s rulers are right to seek to correct the imbalances in their relationship with Beijing. But they must come to terms with Washington’s indifference to their strategic predicament.

Case in point, a new report by the Center for a New American Security recommends that in the event of an India-China border flare-up, the U.S. should “be prepared to extend full support to India” and convey to Pakistan “the need to stay neutral.” Why would Pakistan stay neutral after India, its archrival, unilaterally annexed Kashmir? After all, it is this act and New Delhi’s subsequent bluster that were among the drivers of the Chinese incursions into Indian-claimed territory in 2020.

What Pakistan must learn is that the nations that are making the most of this multipolar moment are doing so because of their respective economic strengths. Saudi Arabia is flush with cash and India, while a lower-middle-income country, is a huge market coveted by U.S. investors. Both are able to attract Fortune 500 CEOs and titans of finance at forums in their countries, even as they butt heads with the U.S. on oil prices or human rights.

Pakistan must grow past seeking the extraction of geopolitical rents. It should shield itself from emerging geopolitical divides while focusing on domestic economic reform and human development. Pakistan is a large country — the world’s fifth-largest in population. If and once Pakistan puts itself on the path of sustainable growth, visitors will come to it and Pakistani officials won’t have to sit in Washington waiting for a phone call.

Pakistan has always been with the West and China.

 

[AViet]

It's Vietnam's fault.

1. Design risks are inevitable and no country can avoid them. Blaming a particular country is biased and unjust.

2. In some cases, Vietnam is also responsible for that. There have been many cases of Chinese contractors behind schedule because their construction materials were vandalized and stolen. It's the Vietnamese government's fault for not ensuring security from the start.

3. Japanese contractors do it wrong, but that doesn't mean Chinese contractors are better. For example, in the case that happened a few years ago, there was a serious labor accident involving a Chinese contractor, and the Vietnamese minister at the time, Dinh La Thang, complained about them (Dinh La Thang now in jail for corruption). The problem is that Chinese contractors often do not attach importance to projects in Vietnam, they often bring their new workers and engineers, do not have much experience to work in Vietnamese projects, and they consider the The project is like a training process for their engineer and it leads to more risks, slower progress, more frequent accidents.

4. There are some other exceptional situations, which are not related to the capacity of the contractor: for example, a Russian contractor working on a thermal power plant project in the south of Vietnam. The project is billions of dollars but is permanently delayed because of Russia's sanctions, they can't buy turbines from the west.

There are countless reasons for error and risk in a project, so it makes no sense to blame a specific country. So it's Vietnam's fault first

I was involved in one of the mentioned Japanese projects at managerial level. Has seen how they evaluated Vietnamese engineers. They considered all Vietnamese were kids who needed to be taught and lectured (even high ranked Vietnamese like Deputy general director of corporations). Obviously, we should blame ourselves first, because of our own poorer work ethic, which cannot match that of the Jap. But such work attitude of the Japanese will always lead to quality problems, as they do not want to listen to anyone, especially from the host countries, who they consider inferior. One again, it is our own fault to let them think so, but such attitude will forever lead to quality problems. (We Japanese know all. You are Vietnamese. You know nothing. Your advice is funny. Just shut up and follow).

I've worked with the Chinese too. They are never as arrogant as the Japs and will listen. Possibly there will be quality problems in future if more Chinese projects come, but the problems will not have roots from the arrogance.

When I was in the UK, I heard some English partners complained same thing about the Japs, aka. arrogance, kind of. Possibly such attitude are not directed at Vietnamese only, but to all other people, and not really arrogance but the closeness nature of the Japanese culture.

 

[Muji.Iqbal]

Very well for doing it this the time

But there is no point in being Pro-USA. USA has betrayed Pakistan many times.

Better to side with China this time. At least they bring development.

Pakistan has always been with the West and China.

A big mistake for Pakistan siding with the West.
This time we will side with China.

Hopefully the Russians will wake up and realize that their alliance with India is now outdated.

 

[nahtanbob]

But there is no point in being Pro-USA. USA has betrayed Pakistan many times.

Better to side with China this time. At least they bring development.

Your army generals think otherwise

 

[Muji.Iqbal]

Your army generals think otherwise

Disagree, most Pakistanis are Pro-Chinese. You can ask any Pakistani in the Middle East.

 

[nahtanbob]

Disagree, most Pakistanis are Pro-Chinese. You can ask any Pakistani in the Middle East.

I can put any guy on the street in power. They will do exactly what your generals are doing. you can be pro-Chinese all you want. But China will be China. They take care of their interests first. If they need to strike a deal with India they will dump you under the bus and move on. your generals and diplomats learnt some hard lessons in the cold war.

I asked simple questions
Does China buy Pakistani products ?
Do they employ Pakistani expatriates ?
Can China provide hydrocarbons ?

 

[Muji.Iqbal]

I can put any guy on the street in power. They will do exactly what your generals are doing. you can be pro-Chinese all you want. But China will be China. They take care of their interests first. If they need to strike a deal with India they will dump you under the bus and move on. your generals and diplomats learnt some hard lessons in the cold war.

Chinese will look after themselves first agreed. Everybody does that.
But Chinese and Pakistani interests merge hence why we are friends.

I can put any guy on the street in power. They will do exactly what your generals are doing. you can be pro-Chinese all you want. But China will be China. They take care of their interests first. If they need to strike a deal with India they will dump you under the bus and move on. your generals and diplomats learnt some hard lessons in the cold war.

I asked simple questions
Does China buy Pakistani products ?
Do they employ Pakistani expatriates ?
Can China provide hydrocarbons ?

Haha, now I know you are an Indiot.

China and India are enemies because of territorial disputes.

China would not dump Pakistan for India.

 

[nahtanbob]

Chinese will look after themselves first agreed. Everybody does that.
But Chinese and Pakistani interests merge hence why we are friends.

Beyond mutual dislike of India ? What do you have in common ?

India and China do not have civilizational dislike of each other unlike India/Pakistan.

Look at history. If England patches up with France, France & Germany patch up what stops India-China tomorrow ?

 

[Muji.Iqbal]

Beyond mutual dislike of India ? What do you have in common ?

India and China do not have civilizational dislike of each other unlike India/Pakistan.

Look at history. If England patches up with France, France & Germany patch up what stops India-China tomorrow ?

What a rubbish comment. What do China and India have in common. Not much either.
Different languages, different culture, different religion.

We can offer access to the Arabian sea for China. So China benefits as well.

 

[nahtanbob]

What a rubbish comment. What do China and India have in common. Not much either.
Different languages, different culture, different religion.

We can offer access to the Arabian sea for China. So China benefits as well.

Different languages, different culture, different religion - couldn't we say that about China and Pakistan too ?

India has a long coastline on the Arabian Sea