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Opinion: The hornets’ nest.

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Opinion The hornets’ nest

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Javed Hussain

It is 1817 square miles in area – a mass of rugged hills and mountains, cliffs, ravines and defiles. The roads are few and movement on these is vulnerable to interdiction. It shares a 150 kilometres border with the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktia. About 600,000 people inhabit the area, mostly in the valleys. Among them live an estimated 38,000 insurgents of different hues. It’s a hornets’ nest. Welcome to North Waziristan.

The Americans, also of different hues, want the Pakistan Army to go into the hornets’ nest and take out the ‘terrorists’, who, according to them, are conducting attacks against their forces. “To make the kind of progress we need to make in Afghanistan, progress in Pakistan is critical,” says Admiral Mullen – implicit in this statement is that unless North Waziristan is cleared, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won.

The only fighters making forays from North Waziristan into eastern Afghanistan are part of the Haqqani group, and they are only one-fifth of the group whose strength is estimated at 5,000. The remaining group operates out of the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost.

Most of the casualties suffered by the foreign forces have been inflicted by Mullah Omar’s Taliban, who operate mainly in the south and north out of their sanctuaries in the Hindukash and scores of villages, and whose strength is placed at 25,000. Yet the Americans think that the Haqqani group is responsible for their lack of progress.

The other insurgents in North Waziristan, apart from a handful of Central Asians, are all Pakistanis who are not involved in the fighting in Afghanistan – the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which controls most of the Agency, has an estimated 20,000 fighters; the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, about 15,000. Both are hardened, experienced guerrilla fighters who fought the Pakistan Army between 2004 and 2008, and prevailed.

Apart from these two, about 2,000 fighters of the Jihadi groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, are said to have taken refuge in North Waziristan – and like them, they also look up to Mullah Omar.

If an operation is launched in North Waziristan, it will have to contend with the harsh geography that favours the guerrillas, 38,000 fighters who know the terrain well and enjoy the support of the local population, driven towards them by the incessant drone attacks, and also with roads that lack the capacity to support large forces logistically, and the vulnerability of movement of these to ambush.

Moreover, if Mullah Nazir, who commands a force of 5,000-10,000 fighters in South Waziristan, and who had stayed neutral during the army operation in 2009, gets sucked into the war on the side of the insurgents, the army’s rear areas would become extremely vulnerable. But if he stays neutral, the TTP cadres in other agencies would threaten the rear areas, besides reaching out to other parts of the country along with the Jihadi groups.

And if the Afghan Taliban also join the war in North Waziristan, engaging them would have far-reaching geopolitical implications for Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban’s intervention would, however, eminently suit the US command in Afghanistan – the more they go, the better for them!

The Pakistan Army would also have to be wary of the effect the operation would have on the minds of its Pakhtun soldiers in particular, and on the people of FATA – it could lead to their alienation from their country. Remember the reaction of the Bengali soldiers and the people of East Pakistan to the army operation there in 1971?

If, however, despite the unfavourable environment, the Pakistan Army still decides to go in, it would have to muster the necessary infantry resources, since a counter-insurgency war is essentially infantry’s war. History has proved time and again that unless an army has the resources to fight and win, it must avoid war, most of all a counter-insurgency war. Nine years on, the Americans continue to pay dearly for ignoring history.

Since the army had gone into South Waziristan with insufficient infantry, the insurgents were able to escape to North Waziristan and other FATA agencies from where they stage hit-and-run attacks against the security forces. To forestall a repeat of this, North Waziristan will have to be isolated to prevent ingress into it or escape from it, prior to launching the main offensive, after which, the two forces (isolating and offensive) would alternate as hammer and anvil until the noose is tightened and the insurgents are strangulated.

The insurgents basically are mountain fighters. They would make full use of the heights in the area to hide as well as to dominate the valleys and roads. The heights, therefore, will have to be secured in the opening stages of the offensive in order to force them to descend into the valleys where they would be exposed to the army’s air- and ground-delivered firepower. This would require troop-carrying helicopters in large numbers.

It is the isolation phase that consumes maximum infantry resources. North Waziristan is almost 340 kilometres in circumference, out of which, it shares a 150 kilometres border with Afghanistan. As a rough guide, if a rifle company is deployed every kilometre, 41,000 infantrymen would be required (340x120 men), (four companies in a battalion – 480 men, three battalions in a brigade, and three brigades in a division). A division has about 12,000 men, but only about 4,320 infantrymen, the rest are in other arms and services; hence about nine divisions.

On the other hand, the offensive force would require about six divisions (216 companies – 54 battalions, 26,000 infantrymen), unless 50 per cent of the infantry are drawn from the Frontier Corps.

The total requirement of infantry for the two forces (isolating and offensive) would be 67,000, giving the army a ratio of 1.76 infantrymen to an insurgent. It would become 2:1 with the addition of the supporting arms and Special Forces – hardly sufficient, considering the harsh terrain and a skilled adversary. But, if the task of securing North Waziristan’s 150 kilometres border with Afghanistan is undertaken by the Americans, the Pakistan Army would need 190 companies (48 battalions, about five divisions or 23,000 men) in the isolating force, and the Americans, about 18,000 – and another 31,000 for securing Kurram Agency’s 110 kilometres border with Afghanistan, for a total of 31,000 men. Yet despite having 140,000 foreign and nearly 200,000 Afghan troops, they maintain that they lack the resources for undertaking this task.

By deploying 31,000 men, the Americans would be able to intercept the insurgents they say are denying them “the kind of progress we need to make in Afghanistan” – and thus make the kind of progress they need to make, many times over!

The geo-strategic, geo-tactical and geo-political considerations militate against an operation in North Waziristan. By carrying out this operation, we would only be serving American interests.



The writer is a retired brigadier.

Email: javedhussainpa@yahoo.com
 
wow, finally after a long time a well written and well informed piece about the workings of an army, complications and requirements a of counter insurgency offensive, straight out of the horses' mouth.

Reading this well articulated article can only one understand why the chief of army is hesitant at launching such offensive, it's not smoke and mirrors like many in the western media would like to think, these are one hell of reasons to stop in your tracks and rethink a thousand times before even attempting to launch such a daunting operation.
 
Bravo to the writer... This honesty amongst the Pak Army soldiers is where all my optimism and hope lies for my country!!!

Say No to such operations!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
Twisted numbers and carefully crafted story with an agenda. If what he says is true, pakistan has 50000 strong armed non-state elements in its territory. Where is the sovereignity of state and the rights of the people under them? Isn't their life and safety in the interest of Pakistan(Read the conclusion of the article)?
The article somehow takes without proof that only so and so groups are more successful in killing more Americans. The logistic difficulties have merit, if the numbers are to be believed. The article also assumes army personnel from FATA will revolt if the operation starts, which contradicts what happened in Swat and South Waziristan. It bloats the number of insurgents present there.
Basically the author started with a conjecture and went about proving it. BS reasons but probably good analysis on the risks.
 
@rubyjackass
It bloats the number of insurgents present there.

do u have otherwise?
 
A lot of people in my opinion, exaggerate the ‘Islamic threat’ posed by Pakistan. A lot of people sneer and look disparagingly at Pakistan’s Islamization. A lot of people think extremists will 'take over the central government of Pakistan.' In my opinion, yes extremism has increased in Pakistan, but it is MORE to do with the current events post 2001 in our western neighbor and its effects being felt here than Pakistan's 'policy of Islamization' (which obviously plays a role as well, but not as much as Afghanistan's destabilization contributes). I believe the Islamization of Pakistan served as a mere tool of unification than 'the actual implementation of Shariah Law'. Although the Blasphemy Law and the Hadood Ordinance were brought in by Zia (parts of Hadood Ordinance were amended, hopefully Blasphemy Law too will undergo that in the future), Pakistan has never really been an 'Islamic society' on any kind of level in any part of its history.


A lot of people also think it started from Zia-ul-Haq’s time. It reached an all-time peak in Zia’s time, but the seeds were sowed in the 1950’s in the 1956 Constitution for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It was really brought into action during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s time, where Ahmedis were declared non-Muslims constitutionally in 1973 and Pakistan started working on the ‘Muslim nuclear bomb’. It reached an all-time high during Zia’s time, when Saudi Arabia and USA along with Pakistan hosted ‘Wahabi’ Mujahideen camps that fought the Soviets: but the seeds of ‘Islamization’ were sowed earlier.


Was Pakistan wrong to ‘Islamize’? Should it have embraced a secular democracy, a model India did? The answer could be yes or no. Pakistan and India are ‘artificial’ countries. Before 1947, many states of India were ruled by their separate rulers, had separate languages, customs. Pakistan and India formed very fragmented countries in 1947. A lot of Indians and Western people sneer at Pakistan’s Islamization, and look up to India’s secular democracy. Both were right and wrong in their own ways. Pakistan and India took two very different paths in governance, and are seeing different results today.


Why did Pakistan Islamize? Because Pakistan felt it had to unify the Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis, Muhajirs in some way. They were culturally and ethnically different in every way, religion was the glue that stuck them together. Afghanistan and Afghani Pashtuns have always looked down on Pakistan and Pakistani Pakhtuns in a dream for ‘Pashtunistan’, Pakistani Balochis have always been dreaming of reuniting with their Iranian Balochi brothers, the Muhajirs & other immigrants always had a complex leaving their Indian homeland in 1947. Both Pakhtuns and Balochis are considered to be ‘puppets’ of the Punjabis, the people that ‘actually rule Pakistan’. Religion (and the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’) was a means of homogenization, the glue that stuck these different ethnicities together.


After 1971, with Pakistan losing its huge chunk of territory, I believe the Pakistani establishment started used Islam as a unification tool (& a means to get back at India), as a means to appease and unify the different ethnicities together, seeing that Balochistan and NWFP might follow East Pakistan to form independent nations from ‘Punjabized’ Pakistan. And despite a lot of problems Pakistan faces today, a recent Gallup poll in Pakistan conducted over various parts of Pakistan concluded that “The nation-state is of great significance to Pakistanis, and despite important ethnic and regional differences, national identity is strong throughout the country. Overall, 89% say they think of themselves first as Pakistani, rather than as a member of their ethnic group.” I believe that in India, most (or a lot) people consider their ethnic identity over their national identity.


India took a riskier and bolder approach of a secular democracy, which caused (and is still causing) it great distress in terms of unification and uneven ‘fortunes’ in its different states (for e.g, compare Gujarat with UP, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa etc), but it is also reaping its rewards. But despite its economic boom, it still has over 450 million people living below the Indian poverty line of $1.25. It still has over 130 separatist insurgency movements, while Pakistan has 4, coming from Balochistan. The separatist movements in the 7 sister states, the rise of Maoists from Orissa-West Bengal all the way to Maharashtra-Andhra Pradesh and even parts of Tamil Nadu shows the risks of the ‘lack of homogenization and unification’ India has implemented by following the secular democracy model. Pakistan has in the past even managed to cause havoc in Indian administered Kashmir by using Islam and Muslim identity. Bangladesh is said to be causing havoc in NE India with its 'Islamization' as well.


Pakistan has (rightly or wrongly) appeased to the wishes of the Pakhtuns, giving them the right to self governance in FATA (which is now a huge problem for Pakistan), and even renamed NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwan, which has hurt the sentiments of other minority groups in the province (such as Hazaras, Tajiks, Kalashas, Chitralis) to say the least. But as a result, there are no separatist movements in Khyber Pakhtunkhwan at the moment. But there is a problem of Islamic terrorism in the FATA region, as well as the risk of increasing extremism across the other parts of Pakistan; which is not really seen as much in India.


By adopting the secular democratic model, India is less prone to religious Islamic extremism, despite it having a whooping 130+ million Muslims in the country. It also results in a more diverse, free society accepting to minorities that focuses on development (a work in progress). But it also results in a more fragmented society in my opinion. India might have taken the riskier approach, but the greater risks one takes, the more rewards they get. Time will tell what the fate of Pakistan and India is.


Pakistani Public Opinion | Pew Global Attitudes Project
 

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